Meola v. Bethlehem Steel Co.

Oppenheimer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ²²⁹ Angelo P. Meóla filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City against Bethlehem Steel Company (Bethlehem), the International Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America and its Local Number 24 (the two unions are hereafter referred to collectively as “the Unions” and separately as the International Union and Local 24). In his amended declaration, with which was filed an election of jury trial, Meóla asserted, as his cause of action against Bethlehem, that after he was furloughed from his employment as a second class ship-fitter on or about July 22, 1959, Bethlehem arbitrarily, capriciously and maliciously refused to call him back to work as was required under the collective bargaining “agreements” between Bethlehem and the International Union. Two causes of action are asserted against the Unions; first that they breached their duty of fair representation to Meóla by arbitrarily, capriciously and maliciously refusing to process his grievance against Bethlehem, and second, that the Unions breached their duty of fair representation to Meóla by arbitrarily, capriciously and maliciously depriving him of his right to have his grievance submitted to arbitration. The relief prayed was Meola’s reinstatement in his job classification with full seniority rights and back pay, and punitive and compensatory damages against Bethlehem and the Unions.

After answers denying liability, the defendant-appellees filed motions for summary judgments, on the ground that there was-no dispute as to a material fact and that they were respectively entitled to judgments as a matter of law. In support of its motion, Bethlehem filed an affidavit of J. S. Fleishell, Management’s Representative in the Industrial Relations Department of Bethlehem located on Key Highway, in Baltimore. The-Unions, in support of their motion, filed an affidavit of Edwin Vinson, who has been Shop Steward of the Shipfitting Department at Bethlehem’s Key Highway shipfitting yard since 1947, and president of Local 24 from July, 1957 to July, 1961. The Unions also filed as an appendix to Vinson’s affidavit a report of Dr. H. Alvan Jones, whose role in the controversy will be referred to hereafter.

In their affidavits, Fleishell and Vinson swore to the following facts: During the period covered by the Amended Decía ²³⁰ ration the International Union had successively entered into two Collective Bargaining Agreements with Bethlehem covering the shipbuilding employees in Baltimore, and between the periods covered by these two Agreements Bethlehem had introduced a “Company’s Proposal for a New Agreement.” The first Collective Bargaining Agreement was dated November 3, 1956, and was in effect until July 31, 1959. Between July 31, 1959 and June 23, 1960 there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement in force between the Unions and Bethlehem. However, on August 11, 1959, Bethlehem put into effect the terms of its Company’s Proposal. A new Collective Bargaining Agreement was entered into between Bethlehem and the International Union, effective June 23, 1960.

Both Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Company’s Proposal contain a binding three-step procedure for the adjustment of grievances of employees in Article XIX of each respective document. The provisions of each Article XIX are substantially the same, and Section 1 thereof provides for consultations and hearings in each of the said three steps and further provides that unless an appeal is taken to a subsequent step “* * * such grievance shall be deemed to be settled * * *” in accordance with the disposition at the previous step. Articles XIX, Sections 2 provide in substance that grievances not satisfactorily settled in the three-step procedure may be submitted to arbitration by either party. Meóla was first employed by Bethlehem at its Key Highway Yard on July 22, 1952, in the capacity of a shipfitter.

He voluntarily terminated this employment two weeks later on August 5, 1952. On February 24, 1955, Meóla was again employed by Bethlehem as a shipfitter, and from this date until laid off on July 30, 1959, due to lack of work (his last day of work being July 22, 1959), Meóla was employed as a shipfitter either at Bethlehem’s Key Highway Yard or Sparrows Point Yard with periodic layoffs and absences from work due to lack of work or physical injuries. Meóla had sustained industrial accidents to his back in 1950 and 1952, prior to his employment by Bethlehem. While employed by Bethlehem from February 24, 1955 to July 22, 1959, Meóla had a series of industrial accidents which caused him to be absent from work for extended periods of time. ²³¹ On the evening of September 12, 1959, Meóla informed Vinson that he had not been permitted to return to work, but had first to be examined by Dr. Bociek.

Vinson immediately spoke to Ellerman, foreman of the shipfitting department. Ellerman informed Vinson that the matter should be taken up with the Bethlehem Industrial Relations Department. Shortly thereafter, Joseph Munley, the Executive Secretary of Local 24, and Vinson met with Eleishell concerning certain matters, among which was the question of Meola’s not being returned to work on September 11, 1959. Eleishell informed them that Meóla had been injured in early 1959, that in the opinion of the Company he was physically unable to work and that the Company would not permit him to work without a doctor’s certificate stating that he could perform his normal duties.

Munley and Vinson arranged with Fleishell for Meóla to be examined by Dr. Bociek or to be allowed to go to a doctor of his own choosing and so advised Meóla. They asked Meóla to obtain a doctor’s certificate that he could perform his normal duties. Meóla did not return to the Bethlehem Yard on the date of September 15, 1959, for examination by Dr. Bociek, nor was Bethlehem advised that Meóla had been examined by any private doctor at or about that time. Despite the fact that the 1956 Agreement had expired, Vinson filed a grievance on behalf of Meóla on October 2, 1959.

The grievance read : “The Union charges the Company with violating the applicable provisions of the Agreement by refusing to put 34-621, Angelo Meóla, to work on Monday, September 14, 1959. “The Union requests the Company to pay Mr. Meóla for all hours lost to him by the unjust action on the part of the Company effective 30 days prior to the filing date of this grievance.” On October 9, 1959, the Bethlehem foreman to whom the matter had been referred denied the grievance on the ground that the Agreement of November 3, 1956, was no longer applicable and that the grievance was not presented in accordance with Article XIX of the Company’s Proposal and thus the grievance ²³² was improperly in the grievance procedure. On October 13, 1959, the grievance was appealed to Step No. 2 of the grievance procedure. On October 29, 1959, in a letter from Bethlehem’s management representative in the Baltimore Yard to Joseph Munley, Chairman of the Grievance Committee of Local 24, the Union was informed that Meola’s grievance was deemed settled inasmuch as the Grievance Committee of the Unions had not pressed the appeal by appearing at the Step No. 2 meeting of Wednesday, October 21, 1959, and inasmuch as the Unions had not submitted their position in writing with respect to the grievance within five days after the hearing meeting. On Saturday, November 11, 1959, Meóla was given permission to bring his case before the Executive Board of Local 24.

He was given full opportunity to present his work record and to argue for the processing of his grievance at that time. Meóla was again advised to obtain a doctor’s certificate certifying his ability to perform his normal shipfitter’s work. The record in the case reflects that Meóla did not obtain any such physical examination at that time. No appeal was taken to Step No. 3 of the grievance procedure by the Unions or by Meóla.

On January 29, 1960, the employees of Bethlehem went on strike, and the strike was not settled until June 23, 1960, at which time a new Collective Bargaining Agreement was signed between the International Union and Bethlehem, and employees were called back to work in order of their seniorit}''. This recall lasted until the end of 1960. During this period Meóla had other employment, and, while employed by the Hake Rigging Company, Meóla again injured his back in an industrial accident on October 2, 1960, and filed a claim for further disability with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. The claim was compromised on January 13, 1961, for the amount of $1,750.

In March of 1961 Meóla again went to Local 24 and demanded that his prior grievance be processed. He was again informed by Vinson and Munley that he should go to a doctor. Both men were aware of his recent injury while employed by the Hake Rigging Company. Meóla advised them that he could not afford to go to a doctor at that time, and the Union officials agreed that Local 24 would pay for an examination. ²³³ On May 3, 1961, pursuant to an appointment made by the Unions’ office, Meóla was examined by Dr. Jones and written reports submitted to Local 24.

Dr. Jones’ report states in part: “There is no doubt as to why this man, by way of history, over the past ten or eleven years, has had repeated occurrences of temporary disablement because of his back, and both current physical examination and x-ray examination of his lumbar spine have revealed functional impairment due to a so-called degenerative disc arthrosis of the lower lumbar spine * * * In fact, with the type of back that this man has, I do not believe that he is physically able to continuously carry on with any so-called strenuous, or laboring type of occupation. “Because of all that has been discussed above, as to rating of this man’s back disability, in my opinion it lies within the category of 35-40%, and will be permanent.” The Unions took no further steps with regard to processing Meola’s claim for grievance. By letter to Bethlehem dated August 3, 1961, Meóla, through his attorney, demanded that he be returned to work. Bethlehem gave careful consideration to whether the Appellant was able to perform his work as a shipfitter and determined that based on the medical evidence, the findings of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and his work history, Meóla could not perform the duties of a shipfitter. Bethlehem informed Meóla that he could not be returned to work because of his disabilities.

Because of the posture in which this case comes before us, we set forth in full Meola’s affidavit filed in support of his opposition to the granting of the defendant-appellees’ motions for summary judgment. Meóla made oath as follows: “That the Plaintiff was and is an employee of the Bethlehem Steel Company and that on or about July 22, 1959 he was laid off due to lack of work; subsequently the Defendant, Bethlehem Steel Company, rehired other employees with less seniority rights than ²³⁴ the Plaintiff which was contrary to the agreement between the Defendant, Bethlehem Steel Company and the Defendant Unions, specifically as set forth in Article 13, Section 1, Sub-section 2 of said agreement; that the Plaintiff continuously requested the Defendant Unions to proceed in his behalf to have him rehired by the Bethlehem Steel Company in accordance with the agreement between the Defendant Unions and Bethlehem Steel Company, and in accordance with the Plaintiff’s rights of membership in said Unions. That even though the said Defendant Unions continuously agreed and promised that they would proceed with the necessary procedures to enable the Plaintiff to be rehired, the said Defendant Unions failed and refused to proceed fully with the procedures for the protection of the Plaintiff’s rights which it was the duty of the Defendant Unions to do. That the Plaintiff filed his grievance as provided for in Article 19 of the aforesaid agreement between the Bethlehem Steel Company and the Unions and even though the Unions were duty bound to protect the rights of the Plaintiff, the said Unions have arbitrarily failed to protect his rights in violation of said agreement, and in violation of the Plaintiff’s rights as a member in good standing in the said Unions.

That the arbitrary refusal of the Defendant Unions was a breach of their contractual duty to the Plaintiff. At the time that the Plaintiff requested the Defendant Unions to proceed with the necessary procedure to have him rehired he was physically able to perform his work. As a result of the above stated facts the Plaintiff was caused to sustain damages.” The court below held that, in view of the affidavits, there were no facts from which a court or jury could infer liability on the part of any of the defendant-appellees and granted their motions for summary judgments. The legal principles in Maryland pertaining to an action of this kind are established.

Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A. 2d 88 (1958) ; Fiorita v. McCorkle, ²³⁵ 222 Md. 524 , 161 A. 2d 456 (1960) ; Henthorn v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 226 Md. 499 , 174 A. 2d 175 (1961). See Bernstein, Suits by Employees against their Employers under a Labor Agreement, 65 Transactions Md. State Bar Ass’n 201 (1960).

Generally, under the usual grievance procedure of a collective bargaining agreement, the employer is entitled to immunity from suit by individual employees if the grievance procedure is properly followed, but the employee is not barred from redress through litigation for allegedly wrongful discharge or failure to rehire if the union’s refusal to carry the employee’s case through the various steps of the grievance procedure is unfair, arbitrary or discriminatory. A union has wide discretion, if fairly exercised, in determining whether to go forward through the various steps of the grievance procedure in regard to a member’s employment status. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967), the Supreme Court held, as a matter of federal law, that, even though the employee’s grievance may be meritorious, the union’s duty of fair representation of a member is breached only when the union’s conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Jenkins (which was referred to the Supreme Court in Vaca) was decided on demurrer to the employee’s declaration against her employer.

After a thorough discussion of the considerations involved and the law applicable thereto by Chief Judge Bruñe, for the Court, the judgment of the lower court sustaining the