Mercer v. Thomas B. Finan Center

Jason Mercer v. Thomas B. Finan Center, No. 1398, Sept. Term 2019. Opinion by Arthur, J. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION — RIGHT TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — FORCED MEDICATION OF CONFINED INDIVIDUALS Under Md. Code (1982, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 10-708(1) of the Health-General Article (“HG”), patients involuntarily confined to mental health facilities have the right to request legal or non-legal representation when appealing a clinical review panel’s approval of a decision to administer medication against the patient’s will. The patient must affirmatively invoke the right to request representation before the administrative hearing.

In this case, the administrative law judge had discretion to deny the patient’s request for representation for lack of good cause because the patient had affirmatively declined his right to request representation before the hearing. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS — FORCED MEDICATION OF CONFINED INDIVIDUALS HG § 10-708(1) provides patients with sufficient procedural due process before the State can administer psychotropic medications by ensuring patients are informed of the right to request representation at administrative hearings. In this case, the administrative law judge did not deprive the patient of procedural due process by declining to postpone the administrative hearing, because the patient had been informed of his right to request representation and because the State, too, had a significant constitutional interest in ensuring the safety of the patient and of all other patients confined to the mental health facility. Circuit Court for Allegany County Case No. C-01-CV-19-000381 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. {S82 Suzanne Johnson Oe: 2021-01-28 13:20-05:00 a Ase anes) IY Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1398 September Term, 2019 JASON MERCER V. THOMAS B. FINAN CENTER Berger, Arthur, Zarnoch, Robert A.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. Opinion by Arthur, J. Filed: January 28, 2021 Appellant Jason Mercer is a patient involuntarily confined to the Thomas B. Finan Center. A clinical review panel decided to administer anti-psychotic medications to him against his will. An administrative law judge (ALJ) approved the decision, and the Circuit Court for Allegany County affirmed the ALJ’s order.

In this appeal, Mercer claims that he had a statutory right to counsel at the administrative hearing and that the ALJ, in denying his request for counsel, deprived him of his procedural due process rights. We conclude that Mercer had the statutory right to request the assistance of counsel at the hearing, but that he had declined the assistance of counsel until the hearing began. In these circumstances, we shall hold that the ALJ did not err or abuse her discretion in treating Mercer’s belated request for the assistance of counsel as a request for a postponement, for which he lacked good cause. We shall also hold that the ALJ did not deprive Mercer of procedural due process in not conducting an on-the-record colloquy to confirm that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel.

Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Mercer is a patient at the Thomas B. Finan Center (“the Finan Center”), a psychiatric facility of the Maryland Department of Health. Mercer had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. He was involuntarily placed at the Finan Center after being found not criminally responsible for second-degree assault and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

A. Clinical Review Panel In July 2019, Mercer began refusing to take his prescribed psychotropic medications. On August 5, 2019, a clinical review panel was convened to determine whether to approve the administration of medication against Mercer’s will.! In determining whether to approve the recommended medication, the clinical review panel must determine that: (1) | The medication is prescribed by a psychiatrist for the purpose of treating the individual’s mental disorder; (2) The administration of medication represents a reasonable exercise of professional judgment; and (3) | Without the medication, the individual is at substantial risk of continued hospitalization because of: (1) Remaining seriously mentally ill with no significant relief of the mental illness symptoms that: 1. Cause the individual to be a danger to the individual or others while in the hospital; 2.

Resulted in the individual being committed to a hospital under this title or Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article; or 3. Would cause the individual to be a danger to the individual or others if released from the hospital; (11) | Remaining seriously mentally ill for a significantly longer period of time with the mental illness symptoms that: 1. Cause the individual to be a danger to the individual or to others while in the hospital; 2. Resulted in the individual being committed to a hospital under this title or Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article; or The panel found that Mercer had been suffering from increased paranoia because of his refusal to take the medications.

Mercer, since refusing medication, had begun to suffer from delusions that led him to refuse food and water. At the time the panel met, Mercer had lost approximately 25 pounds and was continuously dehydrated. He had become distrustful of his own physician and began refusing to engage in therapy sessions. He interfered with other patients’ treatment plans and triggered distressed behavior in the other patients by holding his own group therapy sessions and encouraging the other patients to refuse treatment.

The panel determined that, without medication, Mercer was at a greater risk of causing harm to himself or others. Based on these concerns and the recommendations of his treating physician, the panel approved the administration of the recommended medication. B. Request for Administrative Hearing and Waiver of Counsel On August 5, 2019, the panel gave Mercer written notice of its decision. That same day, Mercer’s lay advisor, Lisa Olinger, reviewed both the panel’s written decision and the form that the Finan Center uses to inform patients of the right to request an appeal of the panel’s decision (the “appeals form”) with Mercer. 3.

Would cause the individual to be a danger to the individual or others if released from the hospital; or (111) Relapsing into a condition in which the individual is unable to provide for the individual’s essential human needs of health or safety. Md. Code (1982, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 10-708(g)(1)-(3) of the Health-General Article. The appeals form informs patients of their procedural nights under Md. Code (1982, 2019 Repl.

Vol.), § 10-708 of the Health-General Article (“HG”), when a clinical review panel has approved the administration of medication. The appeals form informs patients, first, of the right to appeal the panel’s decision; second, of the requirement that the appeal be filed within 48 hours of receiving the panel’s written notice; and, third, of the right to request legal representation. The appeals form also describes the types of legal representation available to patients, including: (1) the right to legal representation provided by the State at no cost to the patient; (2) the right to obtain and pay for the patient’s own legal representation; (3) the right to request representation by a non-legal advocate; and (4) the right to decline legal representation and to appear on one’s own behalf. Ms. Olinger discussed the categories of representation with Mercer and explained the process for requesting an appeal.

Mercer told Ms. Olinger that he did not want to appeal. Two days later, on August 7, 2019, Mercer met with Ms. Olinger again. This time he stated that he did want to appeal. Ms. Olinger again went over the appeals form with Mercer.

Mercer filled out the form to request an appeal of the panel’s decision, but checked the box declining legal representation and told Ms. Olinger that he did not want to be represented by counsel. Ms. Olinger signed and processed the appeals form.’ ? On August 13, 2019, while his appeal to the ALJ was pending, Mercer ripped up a floorboard and hid it in his room. C. Administrative Hearing before the ALJ Mercer’s administrative hearing occurred on August 16, 2019, before an ALJ with the Office of Administrative Hearings.

At the start of the administrative hearing, Mercer told the ALJ that he now “desire[d] an attorney.” The ALJ, relying on the appeals form, informed Mercer that he had been “offered the opportunity to make a choice” to request legal counsel, but had marked the box declining legal counsel. Mercer stated that he recognized his signature on the appeals form, but told the ALJ that he did not remember signing the form. He also claimed that if he had signed the form, he had not understood it because he did not have “legal counsel available when [he] was filling out” the form. To confirm whether Mercer had signed the appeals form, the ALJ asked whether Ms. Olinger, who was not present at the hearing, could appear.

When Ms. Olinger arrived, the ALJ asked her to confirm that Mercer had signed the appeals form. Ms. Olinger confirmed that Mercer had signed the form. She stated that she had explained to Mercer that if he marked the “no legal representation” box on the form, no attorney would be present at the hearing. Mercer again expressed his desire for an attorney, stating “I really would like to have .. . a lawyer.” The ALJ, based on the appeals form and Ms. Olinger’s description of the August 7, 2019, meeting, determined that Mercer “clearly indicated to Ms. Olinger that [he] declined legal representation.” The Finan Center agreed, stating that Mercer had declined legal representation.

It argued that postponing the administrative hearing to allow Mercer to obtain representation would place both Mercer and the other patients at a continued risk. Mercer again requested a lawyer, stating “I don’t understand how all of these procedures work and that’s why Id like to have a lawyer. ... I can’t represent myself because I’m not a lawyer.” The ALJ determined that while “certain procedural safeguards” had been “put into place for these hearings,” these safeguards did not require that legal counsel be present while Mercer was reviewing the appeals form. The ALJ also determined that Mercer had declined legal representation after he had been informed of his right to request representation.

The ALJ found that Mercer “had a whole lot of time between the time [he] filled out [the appeals form] until now to change [his] mind and ask for counsel.” Therefore, the ALJ concluded there was no good cause to postpone the administrative hearing until Mercer could obtain counsel. The ALJ proceeded to the hearing on the merits and approved the clinical review panel’s decision, finding that Mercer did present a danger to himself and others. D. Judicial Review of the ALJ’s Decision On August 26, 2019, Mercer petitioned for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision in the Circuit Court for Allegany County. The circuit court held the hearing on September 4, 2019.

On September 5, 2019, the court issued its decision affirming the ALJ’s decision. On October 1, 2019, Mercer filed this appeal. QUESTIONS PRESENTED Mercer presents two questions for appellate review, which we have rephrased for clarity: I. Whether the ALJ erred or abused her discretion in treating Mercer’s request for the assistance of counsel as a request for a postponement and denying the request for want of good cause. Il.

Whether the ALJ deprived Mercer of procedural due process by not conducting an on-the-record waiver colloquy to determine whether he had waived his right to request representation. * For the reasons stated below, we conclude that because HG § 10-708 provides patients with a right to request representation that they must affirmatively invoke, and because Mercer affirmatively declined the assistance of counsel until just before the hearing began, the ALJ did not err or abuse her discretion in deciding not to postpone the hearing until counsel could be obtained. We also conclude that due process did not require the ALJ to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to confirm that Mercer had knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the decision of the ALJ, not the circuit court. Allmond v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 448 Md. 592, 608 (2016); Beeman v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 107 Md. App. 122, 135 (1995).

Our review of the ALJ’s decision is 3 Mercer presented the following questions for review in his brief: 1. Did the ALJ commit an error of law by failing to safeguard Appellant’s right to counsel? 2. Did the ALJ commit an error of law by failing to ensure due process? The Department formulated the question as follows: Did the administrative law judge correctly exercise her discretion when she denied a request to postpone an involuntary medication hearing in order for Mr. Mercer to obtain counsel because Mr. Mercer had declined representation in writing prior to the hearing, he had previously been advised of the availability of pro bono legal assistance, and a postponement would have been dangerous to Mr. Mercer and others in the hospital? “quite narrow.” Cecil County Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. v. Russell, 159 Md. App. 594, 604 (2004). We are limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings and conclusions and whether the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore Cnty., 336 Md. 569, 577 (1994). The findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence if a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusions that the ALJ reached, “giving deference to the ALJ’s prerogative to find the facts and draw reasonable inferences from them.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 18 (2010).

We must affirm the decision if there is sufficient evidence such that a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion that the ALJ reached. See Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 160 (2005). “A different, more expansive standard applies to purely legal conclusions[. |” Beeman y. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 107 Md. App. at 137 .

Where the decision “‘is predicated solely upon an error of law, no deference is appropriate and the reviewing court may substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ].’” /d. (quoting Kohii v. LOOC, Inc., 103 Md. App. 694, 711 (1995)). DISCUSSION The dispute in this case centers on § 10-708(1)(4)(i1) of the Health-General Article, which provides a patient with the “right to request representation or assistance of a lawyer or other advocate of the individual’s choice” when seeking administrative review of a clinical review panel’s decision before the ALJ. In seeking reversal of the ALJ’s decision, Mercer first contends that HG § 10-708 creates a statutory right to counsel and that the ALJ was required to conduct an on-the- record colloquy to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

Although Mercer had declined the assistance of counsel before the hearing began, he argues that the ALJ erred in considering his request for counsel at the hearing itself as a request to postpone the hearing. Mercer also argues that the ALJ deprived him of due process of law by requiring him to proceed without counsel after he attempted to rescind his earlier decision not to request the assistance of counsel. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Mercer’s claims lack merit. A. Statutory Framework Mentally ill patients committed to psychiatric facilities in Maryland have the right to receive “appropriate humane treatment and services in a manner that restricts the individual’s personal liberty only to the extent necessary[.]” HG § 10-701(c)(1).

This includes the right to refuse the administration of medication. Jd. § 10-708(b). A person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in “‘avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.’” Allmond v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 448 Md. at 610 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990)); accord Beeman vy. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 107 Md. App. at 142 .

To protect the “significant constitutional liberty interest in being free from the arbitrary and capricious administration of such medicines” (Beeman vy. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 107 Md. App. at 142 ), HG § 10-708 creates procedural safeguards that the State must follow when seeking to administer medications against a patient’s will. HG § 10-708, as first enacted in 1984, provided only “general guidance” for involuntarily medicating patients in non-emergency situations. A//mond y.

Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 448 Md. at 613 . In 1990, the Court of Appeals held that HG § 10-708, as it was then structured, failed to afford procedural due process to patients who were being involuntarily medicated. Willliams v. Wilzack, 319 Md. 485 (1990). Williams was decided only months after the Supreme Court had held that “[a] State’s attempt to set a high standard for determining when involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs is permitted cannot withstand challenge if there are no procedural safeguards to ensure the prisoner’s interests are taken into account.” Washington v. Harper, 494 US. at 233.

In light of Washington v. Harper, the Williams Court held that, for HG § 10-708 to afford procedural due process, the statute needed to provide patients with: (1) advance notice of the proceedings before the clinical review panel; (2) the right to be present, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses before the clinical review panel; (3) the right to have assistance from a lay advisor; and (4) the right to obtain judicial review of an adverse panel decision. Williams v. Wilzack, 319 Md. at 509 - 10. After Williams v. Wilzack, the General Assembly, based on the recommendations of a “Mental Hygiene Administration Task Force,” proposed amendments to HG § 10- 708. The amendments included “enlarged procedural safeguards purportedly . . . to 10 comport with the due process requirements” that were held lacking in Williams v. Wilzack.

Beeman v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 107 Md. App. at 138 . As amended, HG § 10-708 establishes that before a patient may be involuntarily medicated, a clinical review panel must be convened to approve the administration of the medication. HG § 10-708 (f). The patient must be notified that the panel is being convened and informed of the right to attend the meeting of the panel.

HG § 10- 708(e)(1). Among other things, the patient may “attend the meeting of the panel, 99, 66 excluding the discussion conducted to arrive at a decision”; “present information, including witnesses”; “ask questions of any person presenting information to the panel”; and “request assistance from a lay advisor.” HG § 10-708(e)(2).4 The clinical review panel must base its determination on a “clinical assessment of the information contained in the individual’s record and the information presented to the panel.” HG § 10- 708(h)(1). If the panel approves the plan to administer medication against the patient’s will, the panel must inform both the patient and the patient’s lay advisor of its decision, in writing. HG § 10-708(1)(2).

The panel’s written notice must contain: (i) Notice of the right to request a hearing [before an ALJ]; (ii) The right to request representation or assistance of a lawyer or other advocate of the individual’s choice; and (111) |The name, address, and telephone number of the designated State protection and advocacy agency and the Lawyer Referral Service. +“T ay advisor” is defined as an “individual at a facility, who is knowledgeable about mental health practice and who assists individuals with rights complaints.” HG § 10-708(a)(2). 11 HG § 10-708(i)(4)(i)-(iii). In addition to the notice that the patient must receive when a panel approves the administration of medication, HG § 10-708 requires the patient’s lay advisor to provide certain information. Specifically, the lay advisor must: (1) (2) (3) (4) Inform the individual of the individual’s right to appeal [to the ALJ] Ensure that the individual has access to a telephone... ; If the individual requests a hearing, notify the chief executive officer of the facility or the chief executive officer’s designee .. . and give the individual written notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing; and Advise the individual of the provision for renewal of an approval under [§ 10-708(n), which generally provides that a panel cannot approve treatment for more than 90 days]. HG § 10-708(k)(1)-(4).

If the patient decides to appeal, the request for an administrative hearing must be filed within 48 hours of the panel’s decision. HG § 10-708(/)(1). During this 48-hour period, the approval of forced medication is stayed. HG § 10-708(/)(3).

If the patient requests an administrative hearing, the stay remains “in effect until the issuance of the administrative decision.” HG § 10-708(/)(3). Because the administration of medication is stayed pending administrative review, the appeal process is expedited. The ALJ is required to issue a decision within seven days after the clinical review panel’s decision. HG § 10-708(/)(4).

The stay ends when the ALJ issues a decision. HG § 10-708(/)(3). 12 If the patient or the facility decides to appeal the ALJ’s decision, the appeal must be filed within 14 days of the ALJ’s decision. HG § 10-708(m)(1). The circuit court must hear the appeal and issue a decision within seven days from the date when the appeal was filed.

HG § 10-708(m)(4). B. The ALJ had discretion to deny Mercer’s request to postpone the hearing until he obtained counsel and was not required to conduct a waiver colloquy, because HG § 10-708 does not create a statutory right to counsel. Mercer first argues that, based on the “plain meaning” of HG § 10-708, he had a statutory right to counsel, and not merely a right to request counsel. Under his interpretation of the statute, the “right to request representation” could be waived only through an on-the-record colloquy in which the ALJ determined whether Mercer understood the rights being waived.

The goal in interpreting a statute is said to be to “ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the General Assembly.” Johnson v. Maryland Dep't of Health, 470 Md. 648, 674 (2020); Hill v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 415 Md. 231, 247 (2010). When the 4 language of a statute is “‘clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there.’” Hill vy. Motor Vehicle Admin., 415 Md. at 247 (quoting Smith v. State, 399 Md. 565 (2007)). In full, HG § 10-708(1)(4)(i1) states that patients have “[t]he right to request representation or assistance of a lawyer or other advocate of the individual’s choice[.]” The “right to request representation or assistance” unambiguously means that patients 13 may request legal representation; it does not mean that the patient has the right to counsel absent a timely request.

Unlike HG § 10-708, other Maryland statutes use unambiguous language to create an unconditional right to counsel. For example, in Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) proceedings, “[a] child who is the subject of a CINA petition shall be represented by counsel[,]” at the State’s expense. Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 3-813(d) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.

Had the General Assembly intended to establish an automatic right to counsel in an administrative appeal of a clinical review panel’s decision, it would have said that the patient “shall be represented by counsel,” as it did in the CINA statute. The General Assembly would not have placed the burden on the patient to request the assistance of counsel. Nor would it have permitted the patient to select non-lawyers to provide assistance. Therefore, the plain language of HG § 10-708 refutes Mercer’s contention that patients have a statutory right to counsel that automatically attaches without any action on their part.

The lay advisor’s statutory duties support the conclusion that, under § 10-708, the right to counsel is conditioned upon a request made by the patient. If a panel approves the administration of medication against the patient’s will, HG § 10-708(k) requires the lay advisor to inform the patient of the right to appeal and to ensure that the patient has access to the telephone. Because the patient must also be informed of “the night to request representation or assistance of a lawyer or other advocate of the [patient’s] choice” and “[t]he name, address, and telephone number of the designated State 14 protection and advocacy agency and the Lawyer Referral Service” (HG § 10- 708(1)(4)(i1)-(ii1)), it is obvious that the lay advisor’s role, in ensuring access to a telephone, is to facilitate the patient’s ability to request assistance. In summary, under HG § 10-708, a patient has the right to request the assistance of counsel (and to request the assistance of a lay advisor, and also to decline the assistance of counsel or a lay advisor).

If a patient makes a timely request for the assistance of counsel (or for a lay advisor), the State has agreed to supply counsel (or a lay advisor), at no expense to the patient. Nonetheless, under the plain language of HG § 10-708, patients have the right to the assistance of counsel only if they first request the assistance of counsel. Here, Mercer was informed of his right to appeal the clinical review panel’s decision and of his right to request the assistance of counsel or another advocate at the administrative hearing. Mercer invoked his right to appeal, but he affirmatively declined the assistance of counsel, until he appeared at the hearing.

When Mercer belatedly attempted to rescind his decision to decline the assistance of counsel, it was reasonable for the ALJ to interpret his request for counsel as a request for a postponement. In these circumstances, the ALJ did not err in not conducting an on-the-record colloquy to determine whether Mercer had knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel.° > In arguing that the ALJ’s efforts were insufficient, Mercer appears to rely on Jn re Alijah Q., 195 Md. App. 491 (2010), a case involving an indigent parent’s waiver of the statutory right to counsel in a CINA proceeding. Alijah QO. does not support Mercer’s position. In Alijah Q. this Court held that the trial court was not required to determine whether a parent had knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel when the parent’s attorney informed the court that her client had discharged her.

See id. at 519 ; see 15 Mercer argues that the legislative history of HG § 10-708, as amended in 1990, shows a legislative intent to create a statutory right to counsel that attaches without any action on his part. Although we conclude that HG § 10-708 is not subject to multiple interpretations (and thus that it is unnecessary to resort to legislative history to ascertain its meaning), we may still review the legislative history to corroborate our interpretation. See Johnson vy. Maryland Dep’t of Health, 470 Md. at 674 (“[w]hether the statutory language is clear or ambiguous, it is useful to review the legislative history of the statute to confirm that interpretation and to eliminate another version of the legislative intent alleged to be latent in the language”); Martinez v. Ross, 245 Md. App. 581, 591 (2020) (“[e]ven in instances when the language is unambiguous, it is useful to review legislative history of the statute to confirm that interpretation”) (quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 469 Md. 656 (2020).

In our view, the legislative history refutes, rather than supports, Mercer’s contention. When HG § 10-708 was amended in response to Williams v. Wilzack in 1990, the General Assembly focused on ensuring that the statute created two procedural safeguards: (1) “advance notice to the individual that a clinical review panel will be convened, including the right to attend, present evidence, ask questions, and be assisted by a lay advisor”; and (2) the right to “appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings if also id. at 520 (“a full blown waiver of counsel colloquy is not required with respect to a contested CINA adjudicatory hearing”). Instead, the court was only required to make some attempt to verify that the parent wanted to discharge her counsel. /d. at 522. In this case, the ALJ had an ample basis to conclude that Mercer did not even want to be represented by counsel, at least until he announced that he had changed his mind just before the hearing began. 16 the panel approves the administration of medication.” H.B. 588, 1991 Gen.

Assembly (Md. 1991). In amending HG § 10-708, the General Assembly formed a “Mental Hygiene Administrative Task Force” to ensure that the amended bill balanced the “competing interests of mental health consumers, advocates, attorneys, doctors, hospitals, and state officials.” Statement of the Maryland Disability Law Center Regarding House Bill 588, Entitled Refusal of Psychiatric Medication — Administrative Appeal, 1991 Gen. Assembly (Md. 1991) (statement of Andrew Penn, Attorney, Maryland Disability Law Center).° The task force, which included the Maryland Legal Aid Bureau and the Maryland Disability Law Center, agreed that HG § 10-708, as amended, “add[ed] the procedural protections” held lacking in Williams and that it alleviated the Williams Court’s concerns by creating a “streamlined administrative mechanism with built-in timelines for both challenging and maintaining the forced medication order.” Jd. Neither organization raised any concern that the amended statute did not afford an automatic right to counsel at administrative hearings.

Instead, the Maryland Legal Aid Bureau recommended that HG § 10-708(1)(4)(11) of the amended bill include a right to elect to be represented by an attorney or by an “advocate of the individual’s choice.” Letter from Mary W. Coffay, Managing Attorney, Maryland Legal Aid Bureau to ° Mr. Penn participated in the work of the Mental Hygiene Administrative Task Force. Previously, he had represented the patient who successfully challenged the former version of HG § 10-708 in Williams v. Wilzack. 17 Delegate John S. Arnick, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee (March 7, 1991).’ Thus, the legislative history confirms that HG § 10-708 was intended to give patients the right to request legal or non-legal assistance at an administrative hearing, not to confer a right to counsel that automatically attaches without a request by the patient. As evidence that the General Assembly intended patients to have a statutory right to counsel in forced medication proceedings, Mercer relies on the creation of the legal assistance program, as part of the consent decree in Coe v. Hughes, No. K-83-4248 (D. Md. 1985).® The Coe consent decree established funding for legal assistance providers “to serve residents who have civil rights or entitlements claims.” Coe Consent Decree, Civil Action No. K-83-4248 (D. Md. 1984). Mercer claims that the establishment of the legal assistance program led to a statutory right to counsel codified in HG § 10-708.

Mercer’s reliance on the legal assistance program is misplaced. The legal assistance program created a procedure for patients confined to mental health institutions to seek legal assistance in any civil proceeding, including proceedings regarding “Social Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income, Veterans Administration benefits, Special Education, Vocational Rehabilitation Services, and General Public Assistance.” Coe Consent Decree at 7. Although the legal assistance program grants patients the right 7 The Legal Aid Bureau represented patients in the guardianship proceedings that the State employed, in the immediate aftermath of Williams v. Wilzack, to obtain permission to administer medications against a patient’s will. It currently represents patients in hearings before ALJs under HG § 10-708, when the patients request representation. 8 A copy of the Coe consent decree is attached to this opinion. 18 to seek legal services for civil “entitlement and rights claims,” the program did not establish a statutory right to legal assistance unless representation is first requested.

In this case, Mercer had the statutory right to request representation through the Finan Center’s legal assistance provider, Maryland Legal Aid. Mercer’s lay advisor, Ms. Olinger, informed him of this right, as did the appeals form. Mercer elected to appeal, but declined the assistance of counsel. Because HG § 10-708 creates a right to request representation, not a statutory right to counsel that attaches without a request, the ALJ’s role in the administrative hearing was to determine whether Mercer had previously declined