Merit Music Service, Inc. v. Sonneborn

Finan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ²¹⁵ Appellant, Merit Music Service, Inc., is a Maryland corporation engaged in the business of leasing coin-operated vending and amusement machines in various locations in and around Baltimore City. Appellees, Sidney Sonneborn and Jennie Sonneborn, his wife, own and operate a tavern located on South Monroe Street in Baltimore and trade as Jen’s Park Inn, hereinafter referred to as Jen’s, at that location. Prior to August, 1962, appellees operated a similar business on Ridgely Street in Baltimore, which was closed during the latter part of July, 1962, due to urban renewal. For approximately five months appellees tried to find another location for their business and in November, 1962, the appellees were informed by a real estate agency that Jen’s was for sale.

In order to consummate the purchase of the new tavern, appellees approached the appellant for a loan of $1,500. Appellant had supplied amusement machines to appellees for a number of years at their former place of business and appellees owed appellant over $5,000 from their previous dealings. Settlement for the purchase of the tavern took place on the evening of November 16, 1962, at Jen’s. Present when settlement talks began were the seller, the appellees, Julius W. Lichter, appellees’ attorney, and Lee Fine, a real estate agent for the seller.

Shortly after settlement began Mr. Morris Silver-berg, president of appellant, arrived. After discussions, which lasted almost half an hour, Silverberg agreed to loan appellees $1,500 provided that security was given for the loan; this much is not disputed. However the testimony is contradictory as regards the security discussed by the parties at the settlement. Mr. Lichter, appellees’ attorney, testified that Silverberg requested that the appellees’ prior indebtedness as well as the $1,500 loan be secured by the liquor license formerly located at appellees’ previous place of business and that this was the only security agreement discussed or executed by the parties in his presence.

Mr. Fine, the real estate agent and who is also an attorney, testified that in addition to the assignment of the liquor license Silverberg wanted additional security by way of a minimum guarantee from machines he was going to install in Jen’s and that he believed appellees’ attorney was present during this discussion. He further testified that he was not present when ²¹⁶ the contract embodying the minimum guarantee provision was signed. Mr. Silverberg, who is also a member of the Bar of Maryland but not a practicing attorney, corroborated the testimony of Fine and further testified that after he had given the Sonneborns his check for $1,500, he telephoned his son, David Silverberg, and told him to bring to Jen’s a form contract relating to the leasing of amusement and vending machines from Merit to appellees. After his son arrived with the form agreement, Morris Silverberg testified that he inserted the minimum guarantee clauses 1 in the blank spaces, after explaining them to the appellees, after which the contract was executed by the Sonneborns.

It was also Silverberg’s testimony that the terms of this agreement were discussed with Mr. Lichter prior to its formal execution; however, from the preponderance of the evidence, it would appear that Mr. Eichter was not present when the contract was executed. According to the testimony of appellee Jennie Sonneborn, Mr. Silverberg left after he had given the appellees his check for $1,500 and received the assignment of the liquor license; that was the only security arrangement discussed before his departure. She further testified that Silver-berg returned alone to Jen’s about midnight and “asked us [Sidney Sonneborn et ux.] to sign a paper he had in his handwriting in reference to the $1500. He said, ‘Just sign this.’ We ²¹⁷ thought it was a note that he had loaned us the $1500.” The appellees signed the contract without reading it and alleged that no copy of the agreement was left by Silverberg with them.

Immediately thereafter appellant installed one pinball machine and shortly thereafter a music box pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Within two weeks of the conception of the contract appellant learned that competitive equipment was installed in the appellees’ premises in violation of the agreement. This violation was called to the Sonneborns’ attention by letters dated December 8 an December 21, 1962. In March or April of 1963, the competitive bowling machine was removed and appellant installed its own, which according to Jennie Scnneborn was continually out of order.

Collections from the machines were started by the appellant on a weekly basis and for the first few weeks the proceeds were divided on a 50-50 basis — apparently to give the appellees an incentive. Thereafter the minimum guarantee clause was invoked and this is when controversy developed. According to the testimony of Jennie Sonneborn the appellees were first told in the early part of 1963 that they were going to be held to a minimum guarantee and they objected. It was not until after they refused to sign collection slips, reflecting a division of the proceeds according to the minimum guarantee clause, that they allegedly became aware of the leasing contract.

Periodic collections continued on a regular basis until June of 1963, after which only intermittent collections were made because, according to Mr. Silverberg, of appellees’ interference. On August 21, 1964, by letter of their counsel, the appellees ordered the appellant to remove its equipment from their premises. Two subsequent letters dated February 16, and March 30, 1965, ordered removal of the machines and as a result of this correspondence, counsel for the parties reached an agreement for the removal of appellant’s equipment and disposition of the proceeds from a final collection to be made without prejudicing the rights of either party. On July 6, 1965, Merit filed a bill of camplaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging breach of paragraph g ²¹⁸ of the agreement of November 16, 1962, which reads as follows : “During the term of this lease, or of any renewal thereof, no other electrical, manual, or mechanical coin operated equipment, machines or phonographs of any kind, nature or description shall be permitted on the premise, and in accordance with such provision the Proprietor agrees to permit no other party, parties, firm, corporation or even the Proprietor himself to install and operate any such machine or machines on the said premises during the term of this lease, or any renewal thereof.

The Proprietor agrees for himself, his personal representatives, his heirs, successors and assigns, by reason of the aforementioned consideration passing to him, that a decree may be passed by any Court of Equity in which suit is brought for such purpose, enjoining him, his personal representatives, heirfs], successors and assigns from violating this covenant.” The relief prayed was an injunction restraining appellees “from permitting any electrical, * * * coin-operated equipment, machines, or phonographs of any nature or description of any operator or operators than” appellant on appellees’ premises ; an accounting and a monetary decree for damages. Appellees’ answer denied the existence of a valid, legal and enforceable contract between the parties and in the alternative pleaded that, assuming a valid contract, the appellant breached the agreement by its failure to properly service the equipment and account for the proceeds derived therefrom as provided for in the contract. The Chancellor dismissed the bill of complaint finding that the appellees never agreed to a minimum guarantee; that the alleged contract was without consideration; that the agreement would be unconscionable if the minimum guarantee were to be enforced and the minimum guarantee clause constituted a material addition to the agreement by the appellant. From the Chancellor’s order dismissing the bill of complaint, appellant has taken this appeal.

The Chancellor, sitting as a judge of the law as well as of ²¹⁹ the facts, found that the contract between the appellant and the appellees on its face was valid despite the apparent harshness of its terms, citing Stamatiades v. Merit Music, 210 Md. 597 , 124 A. 2d 829 (1956), a case in which the present appellant was involved in litigation regarding a contract similar to that in the case at bar. The question now before us is whether or not the Chancellor was clearly in error (Rule 886 a) in his finding that the contract was materially altered by the appellant after its execution by the appellees. The Chancellor in his oral opinion stated: “I find as a fact that this contract was not the contract that the Sonneborns [appellees] agreed to; that the clause in dispute, namely the minimum guarantee clause, was not part of it [contract] at the time they signed it; that there has been a material addition made by the operator, [appellant] * * *." This Court is of the opinion that the evidence in this case does not support the finding of the lower court. There w*as no question in the Chancellor’s mind that the appellees executed a contract, the court stating: “I have no doubt they both signed it.

Mrs. Sonneborn identifies her signature and admits it to be her signature. Mr. Sonneborn is not so sure, but I believe this is his signature. I have no difficulty over that.” The persons who should have been in the best position to give testimony as to whether or not the contract had been altered after its execution were the appellees, but they foreclosed themselves from giving trustworthy testimony on this all important issue because, by their own admission, neither of them read the contract prior to signing it nor, according to their testimony, did they retain a copy in their possession. Mrs. Sonneborn, when asked by counsel what she thought she was signing, testified: “I imagined it was a note.” Both appellees readily admitted that they did not read the written document prepared for their signature.

The date of execution of the contract was November 16, 1962. It was not until March of 1963, that their attorney obtained a photostatic copy of it. After he explained the contract to them, both appellees stated they would never have signed ²²⁰ a contract with such harsh terms. Mrs. Sonneborn perhaps best summed it up when replying to a question from appellant’s trial attorney regarding her reactions when the contract was explained to them, stating: “When he said it was a seven year contract I said I would never sign a seven year contract under those terms, I would be foolish to sign a contract for $30 a week on a pinball machine and $12 on a music box.

I didn’t know what those machines would take in a week.” Again, later in her testimony, she said: “I never signed a seven year contract calling for a minimum.” But the fact remains she did sign a contract and furthermore, she left herself in such a position that she cannot actually say what was, or was not, in the contract for the simple reason that she did not read it, and the same applies to Mr. Sonneborn. In the case of Rossi v. Douglas, 203 Md. 190 , 100 A. 2d 3 (1953) wherein this Court reversed a decree of the