Miller, Mayhew & Co. v. Cumberland Cotton Factory

Bowie, C. J., delivered the opinion of this Court. This appeal presents the question, whether the appellants are entitled to a lien, and the remedies for its satisfaction, prescribed by the Act of 1847, ch. 228, and its supplements. The appellants, merchants of the city of Baltimore, furnished cotton in hales to the appellees, “The Cumberland Cotton Factory," in the year 1856, amounting to §1,269.34, which being unpaid, they filed their petition in the Court "below claiming a lien, and praying . the appointment of a receiver. They charge that at the time they furnished the eitton, the company was the owner of, and in possession of ⁴⁹¹ '«certain personal property, which is, and always was liable, since said raw cotton was furnished, to be sold for tbe benefit of the appellants, but that two executions were issued on November 5th, 1856, by certain stockholders therein named, ■•against the Cumberland Cotton.

Factory, on two judgments, and that at sheriff’s gale under those executions, the property was purchased by tbe 00-defendants of the company, and is now in their possession. They pray the proceeds of the property may be applied to the payment of their claim-. On the 28th of December, 1857, an order was passed requiring the defendants to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed and summons issued. The individual respondents, neither admitting nor denying the indebtedness .of the Company to the petitioners, in their answers insist that the sale to them by the sheriff, under the executions mentioned in the petition, was legal and valid, and aver, that if the petitioners have been injured by the negligence or action of the sheriff, their remedy is against him.

They •aver that the third section of the Act of 1847, ch. 228, made it the duty of the sheriff to ascertain all outstanding liens, and exempt from levy a sufficiency of property to cover such indebtedness. But they deny that the petitioners have any right to tbe benefit of said Act, which was •passed for the protection of miners, mechanics, laborers and •others, employed in mines and manufactories in tbe county •of Allegany, and the petitioners, being merchants in the •city of Baltimore, are not within the purview of the Act, &c. The Court below, waiving other objections, relied upon •in argument, held that the Act of 1847, ch. 228, and its supplements, conferred upon it a special limited jurisdiction, which must be strictly pursued, and the time prescribed by the law for the trial of the issues and appointment of a receiver having expired, the jurisdiction of the Court had ceased, wherefore the petition was dismissed. Whence this appeal. ⁴⁹² The appellants insist that the proceeding is one in equity, the appointment of a receiver being the peculiar province of that Court, and that the restrictions as to the time of trying the issues and appointment of a receiver, were for the benefit of the creditors and directors, to promote dispatch, not to be literally enforced, as such a construction would enable defendants to defeat the purposes of the law or deprive parties of the means of proof.

It was further insisted, that although the law created a lien and pointed out a mode in which it might be enforced, yet it was a general lien and might be executed through the usual forms of a Court of Equity, in which liens were properly cognizable. All these questions, although highly important and in-teresting, are posterior in order to the inquiry whether the petitioners are within the provisions of the law which creates a lien in hehalf of certain classes of creditors. The, intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from a consideration of every part of the Act. 2 Granch, 386. For the purpose of ascertaining this intent, “the cause or necessity of making the Act or foreign circumstances may be considered.” Frazier vs. Warfield, 13 Md. Rep., 301 . 4 G. & J., 152 .

The object of the Act of 1847, ch. 228, is indicated by its title, viz. “An Act for the protection of miners, mechanics, laborers and others, employed in mines and manufactories in the county of Allegany, and for other purposes.” The first section enacts, that if any individual, association or body corporate, engaged in mining or manufacturing within the county of Allegany, shall, for the space of ninety days, refuse to pay the daily, weekly or monthly wages, as the same may be due, of the persons in his or