Miller Metal Fabrication, Inc. v. Wall

BARBERA, J. This appeal arises out of a products liability action against Petitioner, Miller Metal Fabrication, Inc., and Country Fresh Mushroom Co. (“Country Fresh”) in which the Circuit Court for Caroline County granted summary judgment in Petitioner’s favor. 1 Because, however, the order granting summary ²¹⁴ judgment was not a final judgment as to all defendants and was not properly certified under Maryland Rule 2—602(b), we shall not reach the merits of the issues presented to this Court. I. Petitioner custom manufactures machinery, including food processing machinery. 2 The machine at issue here is a brine-filling machine (“the Machine”) commissioned by Country Fresh to be fabricated according to a design for a machine previously manufactured by a defunct company named A.K. Robins. Country Fresh commissioned the Machine for use in a mushroom processing plant assembly line at a Hanover Foods Corporation (“Hanover”) facility in Ridgely, Maryland. 3 The Machine was installed in Hanover’s mushroom processing assembly line to fill buckets of mushrooms with brine. During the time period relevant to this case, three employees filled buckets of various sizes with mushrooms and placed them on a conveyor belt.

The buckets then moved down the belt to the Machine, at which point the Machine’s sensors detected the buckets and engaged a carriage system, five nozzles attached to a beam located above the conveyor belt. Once the buckets stopped beneath the carriage system, it would descend until the nozzles were inside the buckets and fill them with brine. After filling the buckets, the carriage system would ascend to the default position above the convey- ²¹⁵ or belt, and the mushroom buckets continued down the assembly line. Ms. Wall, a quality control coordinator for Hanover, tested samples of mushroom brine by taking a full bucket off of the belt after the bucket moved out from under the Machine. 4 On May 1, 2003, Ms. Wall was resting her hand on a table behind the Machine, while waiting for it to fill some mushroom buckets so she could take a sample, when the carriage system descended unexpectedly.

Before Ms. Wall could remove her hand, the carriage system lowered onto her hand and pulled it inside the carriage system up to her mid forearm. Upon seeing the incident, other Hanover employees ran to Ms. Wall’s aid, but they could not lift the carriage system off of her arm. Despite unplugging and plugging back in the Machine, Ms. Wall’s armed was trapped for ten minutes before the carriage system ascended and released her arm. Ms. Wall suffered fractures to her hand and wrist, lacerations, and scarring.

The Lawsuit On April 13, 2006, Respondents filed suit against Petitioner and Country Fresh in the Circuit Court for Caroline County. The complaint was comprised of multiple counts, sounding in negligence and strict liability, for design defect, manufacturing defect, failure to warn, breach of an express warranty, breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and loss of consortium. On April 16, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment. In the memorandum supporting the motion, Petitioner argued that the defective design counts failed because the contractor’s defense insulated Petitioner from liability. 5 Peti ²¹⁶ tioner argued that the failure to warn counts failed because any risks associated with the Machine were “open and obvious” and because Petitioner supplied the Machine to a “sophisticated user,” 6 which shifted the duty to warn from Petitioner to Hanover.

Petitioner further argued that the breach of express warranty and manufacturing defect counts failed because Respondents had provided no evidence that the Machine deviated from the design plans provided and, likewise, provided no evidence of any express statements regarding the Machine’s fitness for the “use in the manner in which it was being used and operated.” Additionally, Petitioner argued that the count alleging breach of an implied warranty of merchantability must fail because Petitioner fabricated the Machine according to the designs provided by Hanover and thus could not have impliedly warranted for the safety or efficacy of the Machine. At most, Petitioner argued that it could have impliedly warranted “that the [M]achine would be constructed in a workmanlike manner in accordance with the specifications it was provided[.]” Petitioner argued that the count alleging breach of an implied warranty for a particular purpose failed because Respondents failed to establish any evidence that Hanover was relying on Petitioner’s expertise and Petitioner merely constructed the Machine according to the design provided by Hanover, an experienced and knowledgeable buyer. After a hearing on September 27, 2007, the ²¹⁷ Circuit Court issued an order granting Petitioner’s summary judgment motion. On October 19, 2007, Respondents filed with the Circuit Court a motion for entry of a final judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602(b). 7 The Rule permits a trial court to certify as final an order that resolves fewer than all of the pending claims or parties.

See Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Smith, 333 Md. 3, 6-7 , 633 A.2d 855, 857 (1993). Respondents argued in the motion that certification was proper because, if they proceeded to trial against Country Fresh and obtained a verdict in their favor, “inconsistent outcomes as to the two Defendants would occur.” Specifically, Respondents argued that if they obtained a verdict against Country Fresh and then successfully appealed the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment in Petitioner’s favor, the subsequent trial against Petitioner would involve the same issues already tried against Country Fresh and therefore be an inefficient use of judicial resources. Additionally, Respondents argued that, because Country Fresh would likely assert in a motion for summary judgment some of the same arguments as Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, timely appellate resolution of those matters would serve the “interests of justice and judicial economy.” ²¹⁸ On October 24, 2007, without the benefit of a hearing, the Circuit Court, “having determined that there is no just reason for delay,” granted Respondents’ motion. Consequently, the court entered a final judgment based on the order granting summary judgment in Petitioner’s favor.

The Circuit Court order consisted of a single page and provided no explanation for the court’s determination that “there was no just reason for delay.” On November 19, 2007, Respondents timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On appeal, Respondents argued that the Circuit Court had erred in granting summary judgment in Petitioner’s favor because a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to each count: defective design, manufacturing defect, failure to warn, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. On September 3, 2009, the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Circuit Court. The Court of Special Appeals at the outset noted that, even though Respondents’ claim was not settled as to all parties when the Circuit Court granted summary judgment, Respondents’ appeal was proper because, pursuant to Rule 2-602(b), the Circuit Court had entered a final judgment with respect to Petitioner.

The Court of Special Appeals did not address the propriety of the Circuit Court’s Rule 2-602(b) certification. Turning to the merits of Respondents’ appeal, the court held that, even assuming arguendo that the contractor’s defense would insulate from liability a custom manufacturer that built a product to customer specifications, a factual dispute existed as to whether Petitioner contributed to the Machine’s design and, therefore, the Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment on the design defect counts. Because, however, Respondents “failed to meet their burden of producing evidence of [Petitioner’s] specifications and the Machine’s non-conformance,” the Court of Special Appeals upheld the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment on the manufacturing defect counts. As to the counts alleging failure to warn, the ²¹⁹ court held that the sophisticated user defense shielded Petitioner from liability because Hanover was a “ ‘knowledgeable industrial user’ that had ‘reason to know of any dangerous condition which might be inherent in the product’ ” and, therefore, affirmed the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment on these counts.

(Citation omitted). The Court of Special Appeals then addressed each of the counts alleging breach of warranty. The court affirmed the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment on the breach of express warranty count, concluding that Respondents failed to present any evidence that Petitioner was aware that employees would obtain brine samples and therefore “could not have expressly warranted the Machine’s safety for this use.” The Court of Special Appeals reversed, however, the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to the count alleging breach of implied warranty of merchantability. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Respondents, the court concluded that Respondents had produced sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether the Machine would “ ‘[pjass without objection in the trade under the contract description[.]’ ” (Quoting Md. Code (1999 RepLVol., 2005 Supp.), § 2-314(l)(a) of the Commercial Law Article).

Finally, discerning no evidence in the record that Petitioner knew that Hanover employees would obtain brine samples near the Machine, the court affirmed the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment on the count alleging breach of implied warranty for a particular purpose. Consequently, on October 20, 2009, Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for writ of certiorari, and on November 4, 2009, Respondents filed a conditional cross-petition for writ of certiorari. We granted both petitions. Miller Metal Fabrication, Inc. v. Wall, 411 Md. 740 , 985 A.2d 538 (2009). 8 As ²²⁰ mentioned, however, we shall not reach the issues presented because, for the reasons we shall explain, the Circuit Court’s certification of the order granting summary judgment in Petitioner’s favor did not merit certification pursuant to Rule 2-602(b). 9 II.

It is a “long-standing bedrock rule of appellate jurisdiction, practice, and procedure that, unless otherwise provided by law, the right to seek appellate review in this Court or the Court of Special Appeals ordinarily must await the entry ²²¹ of a final judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties.” Silbersack v. AC & S, Inc., 402 Md. 673, 678 , 938 A.2d 855, 857 (2008); see generally Planning Board v. Mortimer, 310 Md. 639, 644-48 , 530 A.2d 1237, 1239-42 (1987) (outlining the pitfalls of permitting immediate appeals from every order issued in cases involving multiple claims or multiple parties). As stated above, Rule 2-602(b) provides an exception to this principle by permitting a trial court to certify as a final judgment an order adjudicating fewer than all of the claims against all of the parties in a given action. Schuele v. Case Handyman & Remodeling Servs., LLC, 412 Md. 555, 567 , 989 A.2d 210, 217 (2010). Specifically, Rule 2-602(b) provides, in relevant part, that, “[i]f the court expressly determines in a written order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the order the entry of a final judgment ... as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties.” Absent an “express determination that there is no just reason for delay,” an order directing the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602(b) is invalid.

See Rule 2-602(b); Blucher v. Ekstrom, 309 Md. 458, 462-63 , 524 A.2d 1235, 1237 (1987) (concluding that a trial court order certified as a final judgment under Rule 2-602(b) was invalid because the order did not contain an “express determination of no just reason for delay”). In the present case, the Circuit Court order granting Respondents’ motion for entry of a final judgment expressly stated that “there is no just reason for delay” and thus satisfied the express requirements of Rule 2-602(b). The discretionary authority vested in the trial courts by Rule 2-602 reflects their role as the “dispatcher” of final orders. Mortimer, 310 Md. at 647 , 530 A.2d at 1241 .

The Rule grants trial courts this discretionary authority because they sit at the best vantage point from which to determine whether a particular claim warrants an exception to the general rule requiring the entry of a final judgment disposing of all claims against all parties before an appeal may be taken. Silbersack, 402 Md. at 678-79 , 938 A.2d at 857-58 (acknowledging that the trial judge “normally has a much better grasp ²²² of the situation than an appellate court” and is therefore viewed as the “dispatcher” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Smith v. Lead, 386 Md. 12, 26 , 871 A.2d 545, 553 (2005) (“[The trial court] not only has greater knowledge than an appellate court regarding the overall effect of an immediate appeal but a greater interest in whether the case remaining before it should be ‘put on ice’ while an interlocutory appeal proceeds.”). Because the discretionary authority conferred by Rule 2-602 enables trial courts to grant exceptions to this “bedrock rule of appellate jurisdiction,” however, trial courts must reserve the exercise of this discretion for the “ ‘very infrequent harsh case.’ ” Silbersack, 402 Md. at 678-79 , 938 A.2d at 857 -58 (quoting Diener Enters. v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 556 , 295 A.2d 470, 473 (1972)); Diener, 266 Md. at 555-56 , 295 A.2d at 473 (“As a guide to trial judges, we suggest that when they contemplate utilizing the provisions of [the Rule] to enter an appealable judgment they exercise considered discretion.”). Thus, though we defer to a trial judge’s advantage as the “dispatcher” of final orders, appellate courts retain the authority to review a trial court’s exercise of its certification power “to determine if there is anything in the record which establishes the existence of any hardship or unfairness which would justify discretionary departure from the usual rule establishing the time for appeal.” Lead, 386 Md. at 24-25 , 871 A.2d at 552 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Mortimer, 310 Md. at 648 , 530 A.2d at 1242 (“The exercise of discretion is reviewable and should not be routinely exercised.”); Diener, 266 Md. at 555-556 , 295 A.2d at 473 .

To assist appellate review of trial court decisions directing the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602, the Court of Special Appeals has strongly encouraged trial courts to set forth, in addition to the magic words “no just reason for delay,” the reasons supporting such a determination. Murphy v. Steele Software Sys. Corp., 144 Md.App. 384, 394 , 798 A.2d 1149, 1154 (2002) (“The court should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying its decision to grant ... certification.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Canterbury Riding Condo. v. Chesapeake Investors, Inc., 66 ²²³ Md.App. 635, 651, 505 A.2d 858, 866 (1986) (“Although we stop short of adding any rigid requirement, ... when a trial judge certifies a case as final under Rule 2-602, we nonetheless find it more difficult to affirm the exercise of discretion where no reasons for that exercise are given.”). Likewise, this Court has established that the trial court’s failure to set forth those reasons leaves the certification determination less insulated from appellate scrutiny.

Miller & Smith v. Casey PMN, LLC, 412 Md. 230, 245 , 987 A.2d 1, 9 (2010)(“[W]e will not hesitate to ... dismiss an appeal upon a finding that the trial court did not articulate a sufficient reason why there was no just reason for delay of an appeal.”); Silbersack, 402 Md. at 680 , 938 A.2d at 858 (stating that, upon determining that certification was not sufficiently justified, ‘Tthis Court and the Court of Special Appeals] have ‘not hesitated to countermand the entry of a judgment under Rule 2-602(b)[.]’ ” (quoting Lead, 386 Md. at 25 , 871 A.2d at 552 )). Even though Rule 2-602 does not expressly require trial courts to set forth an explanation of the basis for the determination that “there is no just reason for delay,” such express findings ensure “meaningful appellate review.” Canterbury, 66 Md.App. at 650-51 , 505 A.2d at 865-866 (noting that, because “the interests of judicial economy and the policy against piecemeal appeals are readily apparent considerations militating against certification,” the absence of an explanation of a trial court’s reasoning supporting certification leaves the court to “speculate as to what the countervailing considerations might be”). In Canterbury, the Court of Special Appeals correctly noted that the current iteration of Rule 2-602(b) is derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and, accordingly, that court relied on federal cases touting the utility of including in certification orders an explanation of the trial court’s reasoning for determining that “there is no just reason for delay.” 10 66 Md.App. at 648-50 , 505 A.2d at 865 - ²²⁴ 66 (“[W]e note that neither Md. Rule 2-602 nor Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) requires that the trial court include a statement explaining the reasons for its action.... Numerous federal appellate courts, however, have recognized the usefulness of such an explanation, especially where the reasons for the certification ... are unclear[.]”).

Federal interpretations of Rule 54(b) “are especially persuasive in interpreting our own Rule.” Mortimer, 310 Md. at 644 , 530 A.2d at 1240 . A majority of the federal Courts of Appeals have recognized that appellate review of a trial court’s determination of “no just reason for delay” is hobbled when the trial court has not provided an explanation of the factors it considered to reach that determination. See Bldg. Indus.

Ass’n v. Babbitt, 161 F.3d 740, 744-45 (D.C.Cir.1998); Ebrahimi v. Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162 , 166-67 (11th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen a sound basis for the certification is not obvious and the [trial court] merely repeats the language of the Rule or frames its certification in conclusory terms, we have little choice but to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.”); Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co., 59 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir.1995) (“The court making a Rule 54(b) determination ‘should not direct entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) unless it has made specific findings setting forth the reasons for its order.’” (citation omitted)); Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir.1993) (“Where the [trial court] is persuaded that Rule 54(b) certification is appropriate, the [trial court] should state those findings on the record or in its order.”); Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1003 (3d Cir.1992) (“A proper exercise of discretion under Rule 54(b) requires the [trial court] to do more than just recite the 54(b) formula of ‘no just reason for delay.’ ”); Willhauck v. Halpin, 953 F.2d 689 , 702 n. 11 (1st Cir.1991) (“This circuit has not imposed a ‘rigid requirement on [a] [trial court] to prepare a written statement in every case to justify its Rule 54(b) actions.’ Rather, in order to promote meaningful appel ²²⁵ late review of the [trial court’s] exercise of its discretion under Rule 54(b), we have suggested that ‘it should ordinarily make specific findings setting forth the reasons for its order.’ ”) (citations omitted); Harriscom, Svenska AB v. Harris Corp., 947 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir.1991) (“[I]n making the express determination required under Rule 54(b), [trial courts] should not merely repeat the formulaic language of the rule, but rather should offer a brief, reasoned explanation.” (internal quotation marks and