Miller v. Duvall

Goldsborough, J., delivered the opinion of this Court. The bill of complaint in this case was filed by the appellant in - the Circuit Court for Baltimore city, in which he prayed for an injunction to restrain the appellee, Elizabeth, Duvall, from proceeding to enforce, by execution, a judgment she had obtained in the Court of Common Pleas of said city. The allegations in the bill are-these: The appellee was the tenant of one O'. B. Ferguson, of Washington city, of a house on the corner of Hanover and Conway streets, in Baltimore.

During the tenancy of the appellee, Ferguson assigned to the appellant the lease of the property. At the time of the assignment there were two months’ rent due Ferguson, amounting to $83.33, which he also assigned to the appellant. Having failed to collect the rent due, as he alleges, he gave notice to the appellee to quit the premises, which she refused to do. He then instituted proceedings before a Justice of the Peace, who gave judgment against the appellee, and by a warrant of restitution the appellant was put in possession, of the premises.

From ⁵¹ tliis judgment the appellee took an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, and upon the trial the judgment was reversed and a judgment rendered for the appellee for $90 damages and costs. The appellant further alleges, that at the time of the trial and when this judgment was rendered, the appellee was indebted to him for two months’ rent beside the rent due and assigned to him by Ferguson, amounting in the whole to $166.66, which he was prevented by the Court from proving by way. of set-off. He further charges, that the appellee is utterly insolvent, and he would suffer irreparable injury if she is allowed to enforce her judgment while he has a just claim against her for an amount greatly exceeding the amount of her judgment. The Circuit Court granted the injunction, but on the coming in of the answer and upon a review of the evidence, the Court dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill.

From this ruling this appeal was taken. It thus appears that the appellant mainly relies on two grounds to sustain the equity of this complaint: 1st. Because the Court of Common Pleas refused to allow him, at the trial, to prove the rent due him ; and secondly, the insolvency of the appellee. At the trial before the justice, which was had in pursuance of the