Maryland case law › Miller v. Miller

Miller v. Miller

42 Md. 631 (1875) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: AffirmedRobinson, J.✓ Good law
SummaryJohn Miller and his wife Amanda conveyed real estate to William and George W. Miller in trust, to sell so much as necessary and apply the proceeds to pay the grantor's debts. Part of the land was sold; after debts were paid, a surplus of $3,426.78 remained in the trustees' hands. John Miller died before the trust was completed. The auditor, in stating the account, allowed Amanda, in lieu of dower, one-eighth of the surplus — the amount she would have received had the land been sold under a court decree free of dower. Amanda excepted, contending the surplus in the trustees' hands is personalty and that, her husband having died intestate, she is entitled to one-third under the statute of distribution. The Court (Robinson, J.) framed the question as depending on the construction of the deed's clause: 'And the balance of the estate hereby conveyed, or the proceeds thereof, to convey or pay o
Questions presented
  • Whether the surplus remaining in the hands of the trustees, after payment of the grantor's debts, is to be treated as personalty, entitling the appellant, her husband having died intestate, to one-third under the statute of distribution, or as real estate, limiting her to the one-eighth allowed in lieu of dower.
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Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. John Miller and Amanda, his wife, conveyed certain real estate to William and George W. Miller, in trust, to sell the same or so much thereof as might be necessary, and apply the proceeds arising from said sales to the payment of debts due by the grantor. Part of the real estate thus conveyed was sold by the trustees, and there remains in their hands, after the payment of the grantor’s debts, a surplus of $3,426 78. John Miller, the grantor, died before the completion of the trust, and the auditor, in stating the account, allowed the appellant, in lieu of her dower, the one-eighth of said surplus, being the amount to which she would have been entitled if the 633 land had been sold under a decree of the Court free of dower.

To this allowance the appellant excepted, and contends that the surplus remaining in the hands of the trustees is to he treated as personalty, and that her husband having died intestate, she is entitled, under the statute of distribution to the one-third. (Decided 11th June, 1875.) The determination of this question depends upon the construction of the following clause in the deed of trust: “And the balance of the estate hereby conveyed,'or the proceeds thereof, to convey or pay over to said John Miller, his heirs and assigns. The rights of Amanda J. Miller, his wife, to be the same in said balance as if this deed had not been made.” The rights of the appellant, both in the real estate unsold by the trustees, and in the surplus remaining in their hands after the payment of the grantor’s debts, are thus expressly defined by the deed. In and to each her rights remain the same as if the deed had not been made.

This, of cojxrse, could not he, unless the surplus be considered as real estate. If it be treated as personal estate, the rights of the appellant would not be the same as if the deed had not been executed. For these reasons the order below will be affirmed. Order affirmed, and cause remanded.