Miner v. Novotny

MURPHY, Chief Judge. We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a law enforcement officer against whom a brutality complaint has been filed may maintain a defamation action against the complainant based upon the contents of the complaint. I. On July 14, 1982, Joseph A. Novotny was arrested by John J. Miner, a deputy sheriff for Harford County, and charged with driving while intoxicated in violation of Maryland Code (1977, 1982 Cum.Supp.), § 21-902 of the Transportation Article. The arrest was apparently not a peaceful one.

Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that Novotny was also charged with assaulting Miner. Two days after his arrest, Novotny filed a “Complaint of Brutality” with the Harford County Sheriffs Office, alleging that he had been kicked, choked, and otherwise abusively treated by Miner during and after the arrest. Upon receiving Novotny’s complaint, the sheriff’s office conducted an internal investigation and concluded that Miner was not guilty of any misconduct. Miner then brought suit against Novotny in the Circuit Court for Harford County, asserting three bases for recovery: (1) defamation, based on the contents of the brutality complaint; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (8) malicious ¹⁶⁷ abuse of civil administrative proceedings.

Novotny’s demurrer was sustained without leave to amend as to each of the three counts. On appeal, Miner sought review only of the defamation count. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the brutality complaint constituted a petition for redress of grievances and that Novotny was therefore insulated from defamation liability by an absolute immunity provided by the Petition Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1 Miner v. Novotny, 60 Md.App. 124 , 481 A.2d 508 (1984).

II

For reasons of public policy, the law of defamation recognizes certain communications as privileged, and thereby affords those who publish such communications immunity from liability. The privilege, and the resultant immunity enjoyed by the publisher, may be either absolute or qualified. As we explained in DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 238 Md. 512 , 197 A.2d 245 (1964), “[a]n absolute privilege is distinguished from a qualified privilege in that the former provides immunity regardless of the purpose or motive of the defendant, or the reasonableness of his conduct, while the latter is conditioned upon the absence of malice and is forfeited if it is abused.” 233 Md. at 522 , 197 A.2d 245 . See also Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1, 3 , 415 A.2d 292 (1980) (“absolute privilege protects the person publishing the defamatory statement from liability even if his purpose or motive was malicious, he knew that the statement was false, or his conduct was otherwise unreasonable”); Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md. 285, 292 , 277 A.2d 573 (1971) (qualified privilege “must be exercised in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose” or the speaker “will forfeit his ¹⁶⁸ immunity”); Note, Developments in the Law — Def amation, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 875, 917 (1956).

The case before us raises questions regarding the nature and scope of two distinct privileges: 2 the constitutionally-based privilege attaching to petitions to the government for redress of grievances, and the common law privilege attaching to testimony in administrative proceedings. We will address each of these privileges separately. A. Constitutionally-Based Privilege for Petitions to the Government for Redress of Grievances As indicated earlier, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Novotny’s brutality complaint was protected by an absolute privilege provided by the Petition Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In so doing, the court followed the interpretation of the Petition Clause developed in its recent decisions in Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md.App. 553 , 456 A.2d 59 , aff'd per curiam, 296 Md. 189 , 460 A.2d 601 (1983), and Bass v. Rohr, 57 Md.App. 609 , 471 A.2d 752 , cert. dismissed, 301 Md. 641 , 484 A.2d 275 (1984).

The central issue addressed in Sherrard was whether allegedly defamatory remarks made during an open meeting of a board of county commissioners were absolutely privileged under the Petition Clause. In an opinion which we later adopted, the Court of Special Appeals carefully surveyed the relevant case law and concluded that the question of whether the petitioning privilege should be absolute or qualified had resulted in a split of authority. ¹⁶⁹ Following what it viewed as “[t]he modern, better reasoned cases,” 53 Md.App. at 572 , 456 A.2d 59 , the court held that “remarks made by an individual in the course of petitioning for a redress of grievances before a legislative body are absolutely privileged under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. So long as the individual’s comments are not part of a sham and are relevant to his petition and thus are uttered as a part of or in conjunction with it, he may not be held liable in damages for defamation.” Id. at 555 , 456 A.2d 59 . This absolute privilege was held in Bass to extend as well to the contents of a consumer’s complaint filed with the Maryland Home Improvement Commission, the administrative agency charged with the licensing of home improvement contractors. 57 Md.App. at 619-21 , 471 A.2d 752 .

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in McDonald v. Smith, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2787 , 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985), necessitates our reappraisal of the interpretation of the Petition Clause set forth in Sherrard and Bass. McDonald was a libel action brought by an unsuccessful candidate for the position of United States Attorney. The defendant allegedly had written several letters containing defamatory statements disparaging the candidate’s performance of his duties as a Superior Court judge. Copies of the letters had been mailed to the President and other federal government officials.

Although acknowledging the vital role of the right to petition in our system of self-government, the Court concluded that the framers of the Petition Clause never intended it to provide absolute immunity from defamation liability: “To accept petitioner’s claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petition Clause to special First Amendment status. The Petition Clause, however, was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble..... These First Amendment rights are inseparable, ... and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protec ¹⁷⁰ tion to statements made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions.” — U.S. at-, 105 S.Ct. at 2791 (citations omitted). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Supreme Court first recognized a constitutionally-mandated qualified privilege in the field of defamation law.

The qualified privilege identified in New York Times, which was applied in that case to protect defamatory statements concerning the official conduct of a public official, was held to arise from the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. 376 U.S. at 264 , 84 S.Ct. at 717 . The contours of this privilege have been expanded and refined in a line of subsequent Supreme Court decisions, which we have reviewed at length on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 537-40 , 445 A.2d 1038 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 , 103 S.Ct. 344 , 74 L.Ed.2d 384 (1982); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 314-22 , 413 A.2d 170 (1980); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 584-94 , 350 A.2d 688 (1976); A.S. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 58-70 , 265 A.2d 207 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 921 , 91 S.Ct. 2224 , 29 L.Ed.2d 700 (1971). In light of McDonald , the qualified privilege recognized in New York Times and its progeny constitutes the extent of the constitutionally-mandated protection of the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances.

To the extent that they are inconsistent with McDonald and this opinion, Sherrard and Bass are no longer authoritative rulings. B. Common Law Privilege for Testimony in Administrative Proceedings In Maryland, a witness who testifies in the course of judicial proceedings is protected by an absolute privilege against liability for defamatory statements made during the testimony. Adams, supra, 288 Md. at 3 , 415 A.2d 292 ; Korb v. Kowaleviocz, 285 Md. 699, 701-04 , 402 A.2d 897 ¹⁷¹ (1979). In Korb , we reaffirmed our adherence to the so-called English Rule, followed in a minority of American jurisdictions, under which the protection of this immunity is not dependent upon the relevance of the testimony to the subject matter of the judicial proceeding. 285 Md. at 701-04 , 402 A.2d 897 .

The absolute privilege for judicial testimony is based upon sound considerations of public policy. As our predecessors observed in Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 187 , 14 A. 500 (1888), “it is of the greatest importance to the administration of justice that witnesses should go upon the stand with their minds absolutely free from apprehension that they may subject themselves to an action of slander for what they may say while giving their testimony.” See also Adams, supra, 288 Md. at 5 , 415 A.2d 292 . The absolute nature of this privilege is intended “not merely to protect the witness from ultimate liability, but to protect him from the annoyance of suit itself.” Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 192 , 434 A.2d 547 (1981). The absolute privilege extends not only to oral testimony given in open court, but also to statements contained in documents which have been filed in a judicial proceeding.

DiBlasio, supra, 233 Md. at 522 , 197 A.2d 245 ; Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 227 , 14 A. 518 (1889). Statements contained in documents prepared for possible use in a pending judicial proceeding, but never actually filed in the proceeding, are similarly shielded by absolute immunity. Adams, supra, 288 Md. at 8-9 , 415 A.2d 292 . See generally Annotation: Libel and Slander: Application of Privilege Attending Statements Made in Course of Judicial Proceedings to Pretrial Deposition and Discovery Procedures, 23 A.L.R.3d 1172 (1969).

Professors Prosser and Keeton have suggested that “an informal complaint to a prosecuting attorney or a magistrate is to be regarded as an initial step in a judicial proceeding, and so entitled to an absolute, rather than a qualified immunity.” W. Prosser & ¹⁷² W. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 114, at 819-20 (5th ed. 1984) (citations omitted). In Gersh, supra, we addressed for the first time the question of whether the absolute privilege afforded judicial testimony should extend as well to defamatory statements made in the course of administrative proceedings. The allegedly defamatory statements in that case were published by a witness testifying at a public hearing before the Baltimore City Community Relations Commission. In the ensuing defamation action, the defendant maintained that his testimony before the Commission was protected by an absolute privilege.

After reviewing the relevant case law from other jurisdictions, we concluded that “[t]he nature and scope of such proceedings are too varied to be circumscribed by specific criteria. Rather, [the question of] whether absolute witness immunity will be extended to any administrative proceeding will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis and will in large part turn on two factors: (1) the nature of the public function of the proceeding and (2) the adequacy of procedural safeguards which will minimize the occurrence of defamatory statements.” 291 Md. at 197 , 434 A.2d 547 . Applying these principles to the facts of that’ case, we observed that the