Moats v. State

Brune, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Moats, was committed to Rosewood State Training School (Rosewood), an agency of the State, on June 4, 1954, “as a minor without proper care and guardianship, for an indefinite period of time.” Moats was then about sixteen and one-half years old. Several weeks later, while he was operating a wringer in the laundry of the institution, he was badly injured through his right arm becoming caught in the machine. A claim was filed on his behalf under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

The State Industrial Accident Commission (the “Commission”) held hearings on two different dates and determined (a) that the claimant was an employee of Rosewood within the meaning of the Workmen’s ⁵¹ Compensation Law, (b) that he sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, (c) that as a result of his injury he incurred a partial, permanent disability resulting in 85% loss of use of his right arm, (d) that he was not illegally employed and (e) that his average weekly wage was $13.62. Rosewood and the State Accident Fund, its insurer, appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which reversed the decision of the Commission on the ground that the claimant, Moats, was not within the coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Law; and Moats appeals from the judgment of that Court. In this case there is no dispute as to the facts or as to the inferences to be drawn therefrom; and consequently the Court may decide the issue as one of law. Krell v. Maryland Drydock Co., 184 Md. 428, 435 , 41 A. 2d 502 .

Rosewood is a State institution for the care, treatment and possible rehabilitation of the mentally defective or retarded. It is now “under the supervision, direction and control of the Department of Mental Hygiene.” Code (1951), Article 59, Section 18. Whatever may have been the conduct of Moats which led to his commitment to that institution, he was not committed as a criminal. Though the record is not clear, it would appear from his commitment as “a minor without proper care and guardianship” that he was committed, not as a criminal, but as either a “neglected child” or a “dependent child”, as defined in paragraphs f and g, respectively, of Chapter 526, Section 560 of the Acts of 1941, amending Article 22, Section 559, paragraphs b and c of the Public Local Laws of Maryland (1930).

In any event, Rosewood is not a penal institution, and those committed to it are described as patients, not as prisoners. Unquestionably, the claimant-appellant is not, under the exact terms of Section 34 of Article 101 of the Code (1951), entitled to the benefits thereof which provides in part that: “Whenever any prisoner in the Maryland Penitentiary or the Maryland House of Correction shall be engaged in any extra-hazardous employment within the meaning of this Article for which wages or a stipulated sum are paid either to the institution or to the prisoner, this Article shall be applicable ⁵² thereto.” Likewise, because Rosewood is not a penal institution, he does not receive the benefits of the administrative practice under which claims are paid to inmates of penal institutions other than those specifically mentioned in Section 34. The appellant relies principally upon Section 32 of Article 101 of the Code (1951), which provides in part as follows: “Whenever the State, county, city or any municipality shall engage in any extra-hazardous work, within the meaning of this Article, whether for pecuniary gain or otherwise, in which workmen are employed for wages, this Article shall be applicable thereto.” The - appellant was assigned to work in the laundry. The appellees assert that this was to aid in his rehabilitation; the appellant stresses that it was to help in doing work which was necessary for the operation of the institution.

It seems clear that in any event the appellant was not paid any sum for his services and that apart from whatever treatment may have been given him, which is not shown, he received simply a place to stay