Mohler v. State

ALPERT, Judge. This case presents the question of whether a defendant who has entered a guilty plea effectively waives an alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers when the State failed to try him within the 120 day statutory time limit. We respond in the affirmative and explain. FACTS On February 5, 1989, the State’s Attorney’s Office filed an indictment in the Prince George’s County Circuit Court charging Jeffrey Edward Mohler (appellant) with the following crimes: assault with intent to murder, malicious stabbing with intent to maim, malicious stabbing with intent to disable, assault and battery, and carrying a dangerous weapon openly with the intent to injure.

The State filed a second indictment in the same court on March 13, 1989, charging Mohler with three counts of storehousebreaking, theft over $300.00, and theft under $300.00. Even before the State filed its second indictment, Mohler already had failed to appear for arraignment on March 3, 1989; the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. On March 16, 1989, the State filed a request under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), Md.Ann.Code art. 27, §§ 616A-616R (Supp.1989), for temporary custody of Mohler to try him on the two indictments. Mohler, who had been incarcerated in Lorton, Virginia, arrived in Prince George’s County on May 4, 1989.

The facts relevant to a determination of the issue in this case follow chronologically: May 5, 1989 Mohler was arraigned and his case continued until May 19, 1989 to allow him to retain counsel; trial was scheduled for May 31, 1989. May 12, 1989 ⁴³⁴ The case again was continued to give Mohler sufficient time to retain counsel; trial was rescheduled for July 25, 1989. July 25, 1989 The case was continued because defense counsel was “in carryover trial;” the new trial date was set for September 5, 1989. September 1, 1989 The court held a hearing on Mohler's motion to suppress and denied the motion.

September 5, 1989 The court held a hearing on Mohler’s motion to dismiss the charges against him because of the State’s violation of the 120 day limit imposed by the IAD; the court denied the motion. The court granted a continuance to permit defense counsel to locate an essential witness. September 28, 1989 At trial, Mohler pleaded guilty to malicious stabbing with intent to disable and to storehousebreaking. The court imposed identical sentences of ten years for both charges, all but seven years suspended, with five years supervised probation upon release.

October 6, 1989 Mohler filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. October 27, 1989 Mohler filed an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On January 30,1989, we granted leave to appeal. Appellant presents but one question for our decision: Should the guilty findings rendered against the appellant be dismissed because of the State’s failure to bring the defendant to trial within 120 days of his arrival in Maryland? 1.

Interstate Agreement on Detainers “The Interstate Agreement on Detainers [(IAD)] is a compact among 48 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto ⁴³⁵ Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the United States.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 , 105 S.Ct. 3401, 3403 , 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). Maryland adopted the agreement in 1965. Act of May 4, 1965, ch. 627, 1965 Md.Laws 862, codified at Md.Ann.Code art. 27, §§ 616A-616R (1987 & Supp.1989). As stated in Article I, Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 616B (1987), the participating states intend the IAD to prevent the disruption of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation programs that occurs from the uncertainties accompanying “charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions____” Article I indicates that the IAD’s purpose is to encourage participating states to dispose expeditiously of charges outstanding against such individuals and determine the proper status of detainers “based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints.” The IAD provides cooperative procedures to further that end.

Id. Under Article IV, id. § 616E(a), an “appropriate officer” of a participating state may obtain temporary custody of an individual incarcerated in another participating state to try that individual once the officer has filed a detainer. Article IV(c), id. § 616E(c), directs that “[the] trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” Article V(c), id. § 616F(c), provides that [i]f the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdic ⁴³⁶ tion where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect. Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the charges against him because the State failed to try him within the 120 day period required by Article IV of the IAD.

He contends that the time period impermissibly was extended to 124 days without a good cause hearing held before trial on September 5, 1989. He argues that the trial court did not have the authority to exercise jurisdiction and accept the guilty plea tendered on September 5, 1989 because appellant previously had moved for a dismissal of the charges on the grounds of the State’s IAD violation. Appellant submits that a judgment rendered by the trial court is voidable if a prisoner has filed a request for disposition of intra state detainers and the State subsequently fails to try the prisoner within the 120 day statutory period of the Intra state Detainer Act. See Md.Ann. Code art. 27, § 616S(b)(3) (1987 & Supp.1989) (emphasis added).

We so held in Parks v. State, No. 75, slip op. at 5 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. Oct. 21, 1977), in which we reversed the lower court’s judgment because the State failed to obtain a continuance or to try the defendant within the statutory period of the Intrastate Detainer Act and, thus, the trial court “lost jurisdiction of the case and was powerless thereafter to entertain the matter.” See also Parks v. State, 41 Md.App. 381, 382 , 397 A.2d 212, 213 (1979), aff'd, 287 Md. 11 , 410 A.2d 597 (1980). The General Assembly enacted the Intrastate Detainer Act in Maryland in 1965, in the same session in which it enacted the IAD. Parks v. State, 41 Md.App. 381, 383 , 397 A.2d 212, 213 (1979). This court has noted previously that “the purpose and rationale of the two enactments are identical.” Id.

See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 20 Md.App. 262 , 315 A.2d 117 , aff'd, 273 Md. 195 , 328 A.2d 737 (1974). ⁴³⁷ Although there are similarities between the two, there are differences as well. Most notably, the language of the Intrastate Detainer Act specifically provides that “[i]f the untried indictment, information, warrant, or complaint, for which request for disposition is made, is not brought to trial within the time limitation set forth in subsection (b) of this section \i.e., 120 days], the court no longer has jurisdiction, and the untried indictment, information, warrant, or complaint has no further force or effect. In that case, the court upon request of the prisoner or his counsel shall enter an order dismissing the untried indictment without