Mona Electrical Services, Inc. v. Shelton

KRAUSER, Judge. Section 9-736(b)(3) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”) provides that the Workers’ Compensation Commission “may not modify an award unless the modification is applied for within five years after the last compensation payment.” Md.Code Ann. (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 9-736 of the Lab. & Empl. Article 1 . The question presented by this appeal is whether the five-year limitations period of that provision bars a claim for permanent disability benefits made more than five years after the last payment of temporary total disability benefits, when no award has ever been made by the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“Commission”).

The Commission said it did and dismissed the claim of appellee, Wade O. Shelton, for permanent disability benefits because it was filed more than five years after appellants, Mona Electrical Service, Inc. and its insurance carrier, Assurance Company of America/Zurich American Insurance Company, had made the last payment of temporary disability benefits to appellee. The Circuit Court for Calvert County disagreed and held that, in the absence of an award, § 9-786(b) was simply not applicable and hence appellee’s claim was not barred. Appellants now request that we review that decision. Urging this Court to reverse the circuit court’s decision, they argue that not only was appellee’s request for permanent total disability benefits barred by the five-year limitations period imposed by § 9-736(b), but the Commission lacked the jurisdiction to even consider that request.

After reviewing this matter, we reject both contentions and shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ⁴ FACTS This case commenced when Mona Electric employee, Wade O. Shelton, filed a workers’ compensation claim for neck and back injuries he suffered in an automobile accident on August 30, 1991 while working for Mona Electric. In response, appellants filed “contesting issues” challenging appellee’s claim to workers’ compensation benefits. That placed appellee’s claim in dispute. Consequently, the Commission scheduled a hearing on appellee’s claim for September 17, 1992.

Before that date, however, appellants notified the Commission, by letter dated September 4, 1992, that they were withdrawing their challenge to appellee’s claim and had “elected to accept the subject claim as compensable.” The letter requested that the scheduled hearing be continued, but did not request the issuance of an award reflecting the benefits it had agreed to pay. The hearing was continued, as requested, to be “reset on request.” For the next three years, beginning on August 31, 1991 and ending on September 16,1994, appellants paid appellee temporary total disability benefits. During that time, no request was made by either party for the Commission to issue an award. With its last compensation payment, appellants notified appellee that they were discontinuing payments because he had attained maximum medical improvement.

Three years later, when appellee could not obtain appellants’ approval for surgical procedures recommended by his physicians, he filed “issues” requesting an emergency hearing. The parties were ultimately able to resolve their differences, and that hearing was also continued at their request. On November 1, 1999, more than five years after the last compensation payment, appellee filed issues with the Commission, requesting a determination of the “nature and extent of the permanent disability” to his “body as a whole (back).” In other words, he sought permanent total disability benefits. At the hearing that followed, the Commission found that the claim was “barred by limitations.” Challenging that decision, appellee filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court ⁵ for Calvert County.

The petition also named the Subsequent Injury Fund as a party because appellee had previously injured his back in 1983, while working as an electrician. Granting appellee’s motion, the circuit court reversed the Commission’s dismissal of his claim, remanding it to the Commission for further proceedings. That decision is now before us. Discussion I. Appellants contend that the circuit court erred in reversing the Commission’s determination that appellee’s claim for permanent total disability benefits was barred by § 9 — 736(b) (3) of the Act because the Commission had no jurisdiction to consider that claim and, if it did, the claim was barred by § 9-736(b)(3)’s five-year limitations period.

We begin our analysis by noting that a decision of the Commission is “presumed to be prima facie correct.” § 9-745(b)(1). In fact, we review a Commission decision only to determine whether the Commission “(1) justly considered all of the facts about the accidental personal injury ...; (2) exceeded the powers granted to it under this title; or (3) misconstrued law and facts applicable in the case decided.” § 9-745(c). Indeed, “only upon a finding that its action was based upon an erroneous construction of the law or facts” will we reverse a Commission ruling. Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655, 658 , 399 A.2d 250 (1979).

In other words, “[njotwithstanding the deferential treatment of the Commission’s decision, a reviewing court has broad authority and may reverse the Commission’s decision when it is based on an erroneous conception of the law.” Board of County Comm’rs v. Vache, 349 Md. 526, 533 , 709 A.2d 155 (1998). Because the Commission’s decision in this case was “based on an erroneous conception” of § 9-736(b)(3), we hold that the circuit court properly reversed the Commission’s dismissal of appellee’s claim for permanent total disability benefits. ⁶ Before reaching that issue, however, we roust first address appellants’ claim that the Commission had no jurisdiction to consider appellee’s claim for permanent total disability benefits. Specifically, appellants contend that “because there was no Award of Compensation issued by the Commission after [they] withdrew their contesting issues, the Commission lacked jurisdiction” to consider appellee’s claim. In support of that proposition, appellants cite Judge v. R and T Construction Company, 68 Md.App. 57 , 509 A.2d 1236 (1986).

In that case, after filing a workers’ compensation claim with the Maryland Commission, the claimant, Thomas Judge, “requested that the claim be withdrawn because he intended to file a claim with the Virginia Industrial Accident Commission of which state he was a resident.” Id. at 59 , 509 A.2d 1236 . That request was granted, whereupon he filed a claim with the Virginia commission. That commission ultimately awarded Judge compensation and medical benefits. But, when it later denied his request for a “specially-equipped van” and for modifications to his residence, he requested that the Maryland Commission reopen his Maryland claim.

The Maryland commission denied that request, dismissing his claim “for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. That decision was affirmed by the circuit court. On appeal, we agreed with the Commission. We declared that the order of the Maryland commission, permitting Judge to withdraw his claim, was not an “award” within the meaning of Art. 101, § 40(b)(3), now § 9-736(b)(3).

We pointed out that in issuing that order the Commission made no findings and did not address the merits of the claim. Judge, 68 Md.App. at 61 , 509 A.2d 1236 . And because that order was not an award, the Commission, we reasoned, did not have jurisdiction under § 9 — 736(b)(3) to reopen it. Id.

The Maryland Commission, we observed, should have treated the refiling of the original claim “as the filing of a new claim, just as a court would treat the filing of a lawsuit after voluntary dismissal without prejudice.” Id. at 63-64, 509 A.2d 1236 . We then vacated the judgment below and remanded the case for consideration of Judge’s “new claim.” ⁷ Relying on that case, appellants contend that because no award was issued here, as in Judge , the Commission had no jurisdiction under § 9 — 736(b)(3) or under any other section of the Act to consider appellee’s permanency claim. Appellants are mistaken. In Judge , the Commission lost its jurisdiction because Judge had withdrawn his claim, something that never occurred here.

Indeed, unlike Judge, appellee never withdrew his claim, and therefore the Commission never lost its jurisdiction over it. See § 9 — 736(b)(1) (“The Commission has continuing powers and jurisdiction over each claim under this Title.”). In short, the Commission had jurisdiction to consider appellee’s permanency claim. But even if that is so, appellants counter, appellee’s claim for permanent disability benefits was barred by the five-year limitations period of § 9 — 736(b)(3).

Section 9-736(b)provides: (1) The Commission has continuing powers and jurisdiction over each claim under this title. (2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection, the Commission may modify any finding or order as the Commission considers justified. (3) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section [section (c) heading is estoppel and fraud], the Commission may not modify an award unless the modification is applied for within five years after the last compensation payment. 2 Citing that section, appellants maintain that appellee’s permanency claim constitutes a “petition to reopen” the initial claim he filed with the Commission more than five years ago and therefore it is barred by § 9 — 736(b)(3). In reply, appellee ⁸ contends that his claim was not a petition to reopen, given that the “Commission had not, prior to that time, made any findings pr entered any Order with respect to this claim.

As such, there was no ‘award’ to modify.” To resolve these two conflicting interpretations of § 9-736(b)(3) we begin with a review of the relevant canons of statutory construction: The “cardinal rule” of statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.” Mayor of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000); Prince George’s County, Maryland v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658 , 667 A.2d 898 (1995). “ ‘The primary source from which we glean this intention is the' language of the statute itself....’ ” Subsequent Injury Fund v. Ehrman, 89 Md.App. 741, 747 , 599 A.2d 875 (1992) (quoting Mazor v. Dep’t of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 360 , 369 A.2d 82 (1977)). “If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261 , 647 A.2d 1204 (1994). But even if the statute is clear and unambiguous, “we are not ‘precluded from consulting legislative history as part of the process of determining the legislative purpose or goal’ of the law.” Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 604 , 573 A.2d 1346 (1990)(quoting Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 92 , 548 A.2d 837 (1988)). Guided by these principles, we turn first to the “plain language of the enactment” itself. Waters v. Pleasant Manor Nursing