Monroe v. State
Gilbert, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Marlene Monroe, the appellant, was convicted at a non-jury trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore (Dorf, J.), of theft and of trespass on posted property (Md. Ann. Code 662 art. 27, § 576). She was committed to the custody of the Division of Correction for eighteen months for the theft, together with a consecutive three-month commitment for trespassing. On appeal she contends: 1.
Her actions did not fall within the conduct prohibited by section 576. 2. The evidence was insufficient to sustain her convictions. The record reveals that at about 2 p.m. on Monday, October 27, 1980, Michael Carmichael changed from his street clothing to his work clothes. He put the street clothing in his locker in the men’s locker room on the eighth floor of the University Hospital where he was employed.
He left two twenty dollar bills in a pocket of the trousers that he placed in the locker. There was a jar of grease sitting on a shelf in the locker. A short time later, one of his fellow workers, Morris Phillips, who was in the locker room, heard a noise. Phillips testified that he saw the appellant in the vicinity of Carmichael’s locker.
The appellant brushed by him stating she had had to use the bathroom. Phillips then notified Carmichael of the occurrence. Carmichael returned to the locker room where he found his locker broken open, the forty dollars missing, and the jar of grease spilled. After looking for appellant on the eighth floor of the hospital, Carmichael and Phillips took the elevator to the ground floor corridor where they espied her.
At their request, the appellant was arrested by security guard Donald Boyd. Boyd related to Judge Dorf that the appellant, when arrested, had two twenty dollar bills in her possession, and she was wiping grease off her hands. Boyd also told the court that the locker room was a restricted area with signs posted that read that the entry by unauthorized personnel was prohibited. Appellant admitted being on the eighth floor where, she said, she was visiting a sick friend.
She denied, however, taking the forty dollars, being in the locker room, or even 663 seeing Phillips prior to the arrest. She also denied that Boyd found the money in her possession or that she was wiping grease off her hands at the time of her arrest. I. Forbidden Course of Conduct In In re Appeal No. 631, Term 1977, 282 Md. 223, 226-27 , 383 A.2d 684, 685-86 (1978), the Court of Appeals said: "A mere trespass to real property is not a crime at common law unless it amounts to a breach of the peace. Thus, criminal trespass is for the most part a statutory creation.
The Maryland statutory scheme concerning criminal trespass, involves both public and private property and deals with various situations. Article 27, § 576, provides that anyone who 'enters or trespasses’ on property conspicuously posted against trespassers is guilty of a misdemeanor. Article 27, § 577, makes criminal either entering or remaining on privately owned property after being notified by the owner not to do so. Article 27, § 577A, on the other hand, which is concerned generally with public lands and buildings, is more narrow in its scope than the provisions relating to posted property and private property.
Although the statute makes 'refusing or failing to leave a public building or grounds . .. upon being requested to do so by .. . [an] authorized employee’ a criminal offense, there is no provision whereby mere entrance into a public building, following a prior notification, amounts to a criminal trespass under § 577A.” (Citations omitted.) Specifically, Article 27, § 576, states, inter alia: 1 "Any person who enters or trespasses on any prop 664 erty which is posted against trespassers in a conspicuous manner is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $500, or imprisonment not exceeding three months, or both.” (Emphasis supplied.) The question here is whether the locker room area was "posted against trespassers in a conspicuous manner.” We note that at the trial, Carmichael testified: "Q. There is a sign in the corridor? A. Right. Q. It says a restricted area? A. Yes.
I Q. Does it say anything else to your knowledge? A. No. You can not — Restricted area. You can’t come past without a pass of some kind, authorization or badge or something.” The questions put to and answered by Boyd show: "Q. What, if any, signs are on the door leading to the locker or bathroom? A. There are quite a few signs.
One states that it is
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