Monroney v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co.

Rodowsky, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question presented in this will construction case is whether the appellant takes a remainder under his paternal great-aunt’s trust which is to be distributed to the "children” of his natural father. The appellant had been adopted by his stepfather prior to the death of the testatrix. After her death, but prior to the time of trust distribution, Maryland’s intestacy laws were changed to exclude inheritance by adopted persons from their natural relatives.

For reasons hereinafter set forth, we shall hold that the appellant takes the remainder. The testatrix is Edna Kenly James (Edna). Edna had one brother who died in infancy in 1883 and one sister, Eleanor Warfield Bacon, who died March 14,1927. Eleanor Warfield Bacon had only one child, John Kenly Bacon (John).

Edna married Joshua Marion James (Joshua). They had no children. The testatrix’s nephew, John, and his first wife, Mary Ellen, had one child, the appellant, who was born April 12, 1927 and named John Kenly Bacon, Jr. John and Mary Ellen were divorced June 23, 1930 by a Massachusetts decree which awarded custody of the appellant to his mother. Mary Ellen married Aimer Stillwell Monroney.

By an Oklahoma decree of November 22, 1938, appellant was adopted by Aimer Stillwell Monroney. That decree provided that thereafter appellant should be known as Michael Monroney (Michael). Michael’s natural father, John, remarried on August 1, 1930. No children were born as a result of John’s second marriage.

Edna executed her will on July 17, 1941. She died in Baltimore on December 19,1942. As of both dates her closest family consisted of her husband, Joshua, her nephew, John, and her nephew’s natural son, Michael. Item 12 of Edna’s will created a residuary trust and named as trustee Safe Deposit and Trust Company which, following a merger, is the appellee, Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Company. ⁵⁴⁹ In broad outline the trust provides that if Joshua survived Edna, the income was to Joshua for life and then outright to John.

If John predeceased Joshua, three-fourths of the corpus is paid equally to the children of John. John died June 13, 1952 and Joshua died December 26, 1976. Upon termination of the trust by Joshua’s death, the corporate trustee was uncertain whether Michael took as a child of John because of Md. Code (1974), § 1-207 (a) of the Estates and Trusts Article, which states that "[o]n adoption, a child no longer shall be considered a child of either natural parent....” The trustee brought the instant action in which it joined the other appellees who are heirs and next of kin of Edna, or their representatives. In relevant part, Item 12 of Edna’s will provides: Upon the death of my said husband or upon my death, if he predeceases me, I direct my Trustee to pay and deliver unto my said nephew, JOHN KENLY BACON, the principal or corpus of said trust fund, free and clear of any trust.

In the event that my said nephew be not then alive, I direct my said Trustee to pay and distribute three-fourths of the principal or corpus of the said trust fund, equally, free and clear of any trust among such of his children and the descendants of his deceased children as may be then alive, the descendants of his deceased children to take per stirpes and not per capita, and to pay and distribute the remaining one-fourth [equally to persons designated by name who may survive the survivor of Edna and Joshua]. . . . [I]n the event an intestacy should occur as to any devise or bequest made in this paragraph of my will through the death of all beneficiaries who would otherwise be entitled hereunder, I direct my said Trustee to distribute the property included in such devise or bequest to and among such person or persons as under the then existing laws of the State of Maryland would be my next of kin, had I then ⁵⁵⁰ died intestate, and in the proportions prescribed by said laws. At trial the above facts were presented by an agreed statement. Testimony was also taken, but in the view which we take of the case a review of that testimony is unnecessary. The chancellor filed a written opinion after trial and also upon rejecting a motion for rehearing.

He relied on § 1-207 (a) of the Estates Article which was said to apply "because the testatrix expressly directed that the determination of her nephew’s children occur upon her husband’s death.” Thereupon, a decree was entered adjudging that Michael did not take the gift to John’s children under Item 12. Michael appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari prior to consideration of the case by the intermediate appellate court. I "Primary and paramount is the intent of the testator, to be garnered from the meaning of the words he used throughout the will, as well as in the disputed clause, according to their plain import.” Cole v. Bailey, 218 Md. 177, 180 , 146 A.2d 14, 15 (1958).

Interpreting the words "dependent children” as they appear in Article III, § 38 of the Maryland Constitution, we said in Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 284-85 , 412 A.2d 396, 402 (1980): First, it has long been established that the "popular conception of the meaning of the words 'child or children’ [of specific individuals] is 'immediate offspring.’ ” Billingsley v. Bradley, 166 Md. 412, 419 , 171 A. 351, 354 (1934). See Ryan v. Herbert, 186 Md. 453, 561 , 47 A.2d 360, 364 (1946); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 388 (2d unabr. ed. 1961). Second, it has been stated that the word child "has two meanings in law: (1) In the law of... domestic relations, and as to descent and distribution, it is used strictly as the correlative of 'parent,’ and means a son or daughter ....” Black’s Law Dictionary 320 (3d ed. 1933). ⁵⁵¹ The term "children” is not specially defined in Edna’s will. Michael is the child of John and is literally within the class designated to take.

At the time Edna executed her will, and at the time of her death, an adopted person could inherit from his natural relatives under the Maryland laws of intestate distribution. This was made explicit in the statutes by Chapter 599 of the Acts of 1947, which implemented the Report of the Commission to Study Revision of Adoption Laws of the State of Maryland, chaired by Hon. Eugene O’Dunne. Code (1939, 1947 Cum.

Supp.), Art. 16, § 85K (b) was enacted which read: The natural parents of the person adopted, if living, shall after the interlocutory decree be relieved of all legal duties and obligations due from them to the person adopted, and shall be divested of all rights with respect to such person; provided, that nothing in this sub-title shall be construed to prevent the person adopted from inheriting from his natural parents and relatives under the laws of this or any other State. [Emphasis supplied.] This 1947 statute, however, made no change in the law as it had existed from the time of Maryland’s first adoption statute, Chapter 244 of the Acts of 1892. The report of the O’Dunne Commission, in its syllabus of the bill which became Chapter 599 of the Acts of 1947, states that "the child’s right to inherit from its natural parents is preserved.” In Bonnaville v. Shupp, 228 Md. 390, 392 , 179 A.2d 898, 899-900 (1962) we said that prior to Chapter 599 "the law was generally to the effect that the right of an adopted child to inherit from its natural parents and other relatives in the event of their death intestate was not affected or changed by the adoption.” Accord, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 270, 271 (1946); Strahorn, Adoption in Maryland, 7 Md. L. Rev. 275 , 316-17 (1943). (An adopted person "does inherit from his natural relatives despite being adopted.

The question has not yet been decided in Maryland but the answer would seem obvious.”). ⁵⁵² The right of an adopted person to take under the intestacy laws from natural relatives was abolished by Chapter 174 of the Acts of 1963. Code (1957,1962 Cum. Supp.), Art. 16, § 78 (b) was amended to delete the above-italicized proviso and the following language was substituted: Upon the entry of a Decree of Adoption the adopted child shall lose all rights of inheritance from its natural parents and from their natural collateral or lineal relatives. The rights of the natural parents or their collateral or lineal relatives to inherit from such child shall cease upon the said adoption.

Nothing contained in this section shall limit in any way the right of any person to provide for the distribution of his property by will. Article 16, § 78 was next amended by Chapter 3, sec. 4 (c) of the Acts of 1969. Chapter 3 was the comprehensive revision of statutes relating to decedents’ estates recommended by the Governor’s Commission to Review and Revise the Testamentary Law of Maryland, chaired by Hon. William L. Henderson.

The second sentence of § 78 (b) was amended to read: "Upon the entry of a decree of adoption, all rights of inheritance between the child and the natural relatives shall be governed by Article 93.” In 1974 (Ch. 686) the reference in § 78 (b) to Art. 93 was changed to the Estates Article. Chapter 3 of the Acts of 1969 also enacted Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol., 1969 Cum. Supp.), Art. 93, title, "Decedents’ Estates.” Relevant here are §§ 1-201 and 1-207 (a).

These sections are today the comparably numbered sections of the Estates Article. Section 1-201 provides: "In the absence of express language to the contrary, the rules of construction contained in this subtitle shall be applied in construing all provisions of the estates of decedents law and the terms of a will.” Section 1-207 (a) provides: General Rule. — An adopted child shall be treated as a natural child of his adopting parent or parents. On adoption, a child shall no longer be deemed a ⁵⁵³ child of either natural parent, except that upon adoption by the spouse of a natural parent, the child shall still be considered the child of such natural parent. These provisions, which were in effect when the testatrix’s husband died, were applied by the chancellor who reasoned thusly: In this case, the testatrix clearly directed that distribution and determination of remainder interests occur upon the death of her husband (Item 12).

The testatrix also directed that in the event of the death of her nephew (the beneficiary of the trust), three-quarters of the trust or corpus should be distributed "among such of his children and the descendants of his deceased children as may be then alive.” [Emphasis in original.] It is the opinion of this court that the testatrix intended determination of her deceased nephew’s children be made at the time of her husband’s death, December 26, 1976. This finding dictates the inescapable conclusion that the applicable law of adoption is that which existed on December 26, 1976. We do not accept this analysis. The reference in the will to the children and the descendants of deceased children of John as may be "then” alive merely fixes the time of survivorship.

Under the contingency which occurred, whereby Edna predeceased Joshua, and Joshua survived John, the testatrix is merely making clear that the children and descendants of deceased children of John must survive Joshua. Survivorship of the children will be determined at Joshua’s death. However, this is not the same as a gift to the then children of John, then surviving. The testatrix does not direct that those who are children of John be determined in accordance with the law as of the time of the death of Joshua, in addition to determining whether children of John have survived Joshua.

This reading of Edna’s will is made clear by two aspects of the further provision of Item 12 dealing with the end limi ⁵⁵⁴ tation at the death of Joshua. That contingent gift is to "such person or persons as under the then existing laws of the State of Maryland would be my next of kin, had I then died intestate____” By specifying laws existing at the time the end limitation operates, Edna expressly recognized the possibility of a change in the laws of intestate distribution occurring between the date of her death and time for distribution of the corpus and she specified the latter "then existing laws” to govern that particular limitation. However, the preceding gift to the children of John is not similarly modified. The possibility of a change in some other context of the meaning of the term "children,” e.g., under the intestacy laws, was not expressly addressed in the gift to children of John.

This contrast is made even more clear in that part of the end limitation of Item 12 which reads: "[I]n the event an intestacy should occur... through the death of all beneficiaries ....” The end limitation, in the words used, anticipates an absence of children of John only through death and does not contemplate an absence of children of John due to a possible later and different meaning of "children.” Thus the chancellor erred in reading Item 12 as expressing an actual intent on the part of Edna to have those who were the children of John, surviving Joshua, determined by reference to the laws of adoption, or intestate distribution, as they might exist at the death of Joshua. II When inquiry is expanded beyond the four corners of the will to include the only nonultimate fact found by the chancellor concerning the circumstances surrounding execution of the will, a significant factor is added. The chancellor found that "the testatrix was aware of [Michael’s] status. . . .” This finding was made in connection with an analysis in which the trial court was "impressed by the fact that [Michael] was not mentioned in the will by name, although all other beneficiaries, including John Kenly, Sr., were specifically named.” It was said this "would indicate an intent not to include [Michael] as beneficiary,” and that ⁵⁵⁵ Edna could have included Michael "in the will if she had desired to do so.” We cannot accept this analysis. It is subject to reductio ad absurdum.

It would mean that dispositions by class description would be ineffective where the testator knew of existing members of the class and did not designate them by name. The fact that Edna knew that Michael had been adopted by his stepfather and nevertheless made a gift to the