Montgomery Cnty. v. Cochran & Bowen

Montgomery County, Maryland v. Anthony G. Cochran and Andrew Bowen, No. 69, September Term, 2019 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT – OCCUPATIONAL DEAFNESS – MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. (1991, 2016 REPL. VOL.) § 9-650(b)(3) –– CALCULATION OF DEDUCTION FOR “EACH YEAR OF THE COVERED EMPLOYEE’S AGE OVER 50 AT THE TIME OF THE LAST EXPOSURE TO INDUSTRIAL NOISE” – COMPENSABLE DISABLEMENT – TINNITUS – Court of Appeals held that Workers’ Compensation Commission did not err in calculating deduction of decibels from firefighters’ total average hearing losses under Md. Code.

Ann., Lab. & Empl. (1991, 2016 Repl. Vol.) (“LE”) § 9-650(b)(3) by counting number of years between each firefighter’s 50th birthday and dates that they each retired from employment with Montgomery County, Maryland. Court of Appeals concluded that plain and ordinary meaning of term “industrial noise” as used in LE § 9-650(b)(3) is occupational noise or noise encountered in workplace in employment of employer.

Thus, phrase “time of [] last exposure to industrial noise” means date that employee is last exposed to occupational noise, i.e., date of employee’s retirement, and not date of hearing test measuring hearing loss. Court of Appeals also held that, under circumstances of one firefighter’s case, any issue as to whether firefighter sustained compensable disablement due to tinnitus, i.e., whether tinnitus is compensable as part of occupational deafness claim or as occupational disease upon establishment of disablement, was not before Court of Special Appeals. Court of Appeals thus concluded that Court of Special Appeals erred in considering matter and in reversing Workers’ Compensation Commission’s award of permanent partial disability benefits to firefighter for tinnitus on that ground. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case Nos. 423960-V and 442304-V Argued: September 14, 2020 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 69 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND v. ANTHONY G. COCHRAN AND ANDREW BOWEN ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Biran, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. McDonald and Getty, JJ., concur. ______________________________________ Filed: October 26, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2020-10-26 11:22-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Loss of hearing is inherent in many jobs.

As one example, firefighters are repeatedly exposed to loud noise in the form of sirens, air horns, engines, alarms, and the like while working, which may lead to hearing loss.1 The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. (1991, 2016 Repl. Vol.) (“LE”) §§ 9-101 to 9-1201, expressly recognizes that loss of hearing may occur on the job due to industrial noise and makes such hearing loss compensable under certain circumstances. The Workers’ Compensation Act states that an employer shall provide compensation to a covered employee for loss of hearing due to industrial noise in specified frequencies, also known as occupational deafness, or for a disability resulting from an occupational disease.

See LE §§ 9-505(a), 9-502(c)(1). Specifically, LE § 9-505(a) states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided, an employer shall provide compensation in accordance with this title to a covered employee for loss of hearing by the covered employee due to industrial noise in” four specified frequencies. LE § 9-650 sets forth the formula for calculating total average hearing loss and LE § 9-650(b)(3) provides for a deduction of the average decibel loss, stating: To allow for the average amount of hearing loss from nonoccupational causes found in the population at any given age, there shall be deducted from the total average decibel loss determined under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection one-half of a decibel for each year of the covered employee’s age over 50 at the time of the last exposure to industrial noise. Here, Anthony G. Cochran, Respondent, and Andrew Bowen, Respondent/Cross- Petitioner, were firefighters for Montgomery County, Maryland (“the County”), 1 See, e.g., Randy L. Tubbs, Noise and Hearing Loss in Firefighting, 8 No. 3 Occupational Med.

Dig. 9 (Mar. 1996). Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, for over thirty years. Both Cochran and Bowen developed hearing loss from exposure to loud noises they repeatedly encountered on the job as firefighters. Bowen also developed tinnitus, or ringing in the ears.

After retiring, Cochran and Bowen each underwent audiograms, which showed hearing loss in both ears, and each filed a claim under LE § 9-505 with the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the Commission”) seeking compensation for hearing loss and, in Bowen’s case, compensation for tinnitus, too. The Commission awarded compensation to both Cochran and Bowen and calculated the deduction under LE § 9-650(b)(3) by counting the number of years between each man’s 50th birthday and the date of his retirement. The Commission found that Cochran and Bowen had sustained hearing loss arising in and out of the course of their employment as firefighters, and that Bowen had also sustained tinnitus arising in and out of the course of his employment as a firefighter. As to Bowen, later, the Commission awarded Bowen compensation for a permanent partial disability for bilateral hearing loss and an additional permanent partial disability of 2% industrial loss of use of the body as a result of tinnitus.

The County filed separate petitions for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, which affirmed the Commission’s decisions. The County appealed each case to the Court of Special Appeals, which consolidated the cases. In a reported opinion, addressing how the deduction set forth in LE § 9-650(b)(3) should be calculated, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Commission correctly calculated “the deduction by counting the number of years between each firefighter’s 50th birthday and the dates they retired from service.” Montgomery Cty. v. Cochran, 243 Md. App. 102, 126 , 219 -2- A.3d 122, 136-37 (2019). The Court of Special Appeals held, though, that the Commission erred in awarding permanent partial disability benefits to Bowen for tinnitus.

See id. at 129 , 219 A.3d at 138. Although not a question raised by the County, the Court of Special Appeals determined that compensation for tinnitus must be determined under LE § 9-502 as an ordinary occupational disease, not under LE § 9-505 as part of occupational deafness. See id. at 129, 219 A.3d at 138-39. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that, because Bowen did not establish disablement under LE § 9-502, the Commission erred in awarding him benefits for tinnitus.

See id. at 129-30, 219 A.3d at 139. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in Cochran’s case and affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court’s judgment in Bowen’s case. See id. at 107, 133, 219 A.3d at 125, 141. We granted certiorari to consider the proper date for the calculation of the deduction under LE § 9-650(b)(3) and whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing the Commission’s award of permanent partial disability to Bowen for tinnitus.

See Montgomery Cty. v. Cochran, 467 Md. 263 , 224 A.3d 601 (2020). We must decide whether the Commission erred in calculating the deduction set forth in LE § 9-650(b)(3) by counting the number of years between each firefighter’s 50th birthday and the dates on which each firefighter retired. Specifically, we must decide whether the phrase “last exposure to industrial noise” as used in LE § 9-650(b)(3) means the date that an employee is last exposed to occupational noise at work, i.e., the date of retirement, or whether it means the date of a hearing test measuring hearing loss. We must also determine whether the issue of whether Bowen was required to bring a claim for tinnitus under LE § 9-502, as opposed to under LE § 9-505 as part of his occupational -3- deafness claim, was before the Court of Special Appeals, and whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing the Commission’s award of permanent partial disability benefits to Bowen for tinnitus.

We hold that the Commission did not err in calculating the deduction of decibels from Cochran’s and Bowen’s total average hearing losses under LE § 9-650(b)(3) by counting the number of years between each firefighter’s 50th birthday and the dates that they each retired from employment with the County. We conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “industrial noise” as used in LE § 9-650(b)(3) is occupational noise or noise encountered in the workplace in the employment of the employer. Thus, the phrase “time of the last exposure to industrial noise” means the date that an employee is last exposed to occupational noise, i.e., the date of the employee’s retirement, and not the date of a hearing test measuring hearing loss. We also hold that any issue as to whether Bowen sustained a compensable disablement due to tinnitus, i.e., whether tinnitus is compensable under LE § 9-502 as an occupational disease upon establishment of disablement and not under LE § 9-505 as part of an occupational deafness claim, was not before the Court of Special Appeals.

The Court of Special Appeals erred in considering the matter and in reversing the Commission’s award of permanent partial disability benefits to Bowen for tinnitus. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. BACKGROUND Anthony G. Cochran Cochran was employed as a firefighter by the County for approximately thirty-four -4- years. In November 2013, when he was approximately 57 years old, Cochran retired.

Nearly two years later, on September 23, 2015, when he was 58 years old, Cochran underwent an audiogram, which showed hearing loss in both ears. On March 21, 2016, Cochran filed a claim with the Commission seeking compensation for binaural hearing loss. In the claim, Cochran asserted that he developed hearing loss due to exposure to noise during the many years that he served as a firefighter. Cochran identified his “Date of accident/occupational disease disablement” as “09/23/2015[.]” Two months later, on May 23, 2016, Cochran underwent another audiogram, which also showed some hearing loss in each ear, although to a different and overall lesser degree than the September 23, 2015 audiogram.

On July 15, 2016, the Commission held an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Cochran testified that he had never worked in a factory and had not worked since his retirement as a firefighter in 2013. Cochran testified that his only employment was as a firefighter with the County and, prior to that, as a salesperson for Construction Anchors for one and a half years. At the hearing, Cochran’s counsel argued that the age that should be considered for purposes of the deduction set forth in LE § 9-650(b)(3)—the age at the time of the last exposure to industrial noise—should be the claimant’s age as of the last date of employment, i.e., the date of retirement.

The County’s counsel argued that Cochran’s 2016 audiogram did not show hearing loss meeting the threshold to be compensable, and, in the alternative, that the age that should be considered for purposes of the deduction should be the claimant’s age as of the date of a hearing test. At the conclusion of the hearing, with respect to the deduction set forth in LE § 9-650(b)(3) and the phrase “last exposure to -5- industrial noise,” the Commissioner stated: I’m satisfied that the age comes in for every year after the age of 50 from the last exposure, industrial exposure. I am of the belief, unless you have some statutory information to give us of what the intent was when the Act was passed, when they say industrial noise, I think they’re putting it into the context of work exposure. The only exposure this man has testified to for work, which would be the industrial, is as a fire fighter for Montgomery County.

On July 21, 2016, the Commission issued a compensation order finding that Cochran had sustained an occupational disease of hearing loss arising out of and in the course of employment as a firefighter with the County and that the first date of disablement was September 23, 2015. The Commission found, based on the first audiogram, that Cochran’s disability is the result of an occupational disease. The Commission thus ordered the County to pay Cochran’s “causally related medical bills[.]” The County filed in the circuit court a petition for judicial review and a memorandum in support of the petition, alleging among other things that LE § 9-650(b)(3) mandates that the Commission use the employee’s age at the time of a hearing test for the decibel deduction, rather than the employee’s age at the time of retirement. On April 27, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing.

After hearing argument from the parties, the circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision, stating in pertinent part: With respect to the industrial noise piece, I am persuaded that the Commissioner got it right. In other words, the Commissioner was legally correct. The phrase industrial noise means noise related to industry, and . . . it’s quite notable that our Workers’ Compensation Act and statutes derived from what happened in England in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and that’s when the concept of industry and factories was coming into the nomenclature when England turned from an agrarian society to an industrial society, and began to experience things like industrial accidents . . . . So by virtue of the plain meaning of the phrase industrial noise, it’s -6- the noise that comes from factories.

Now, understanding there’s all kinds of factories, and technology evolves, it still has to be a factory of some, quote unquote, factory of some kind, and not somebody’s stereo or they went to a Ravens game and people cheered loudly. I think the Commissioner got it right, and it’s not surprising to me that the legislature did not define industrial noise because it has a common and accepted meaning. They probably would have said to me, well, why would we have to define it? Everybody knows what it means[.] On May 2, 2018, the circuit court entered an order affirming the Commission’s decision.

The County appealed. Andrew Bowen Bowen was employed as a firefighter by the County for nearly thirty-five years. In September 2013, when he was 56 years old, Bowen retired. On August 17, 2016, Bowen filed a claim with the Commission seeking compensation for bilateral hearing loss.

In the claim, Bowen asserted that he developed hearing loss due to exposure to loud noise during many years of service as a firefighter. Bowen identified the “Date of accident/occupational disease disablement” as “01/24/2005[.]” On October 13, 2016, when he was 59 years old, Bowen underwent an audiogram, which showed hearing loss in both ears. Bowen also suffers from tinnitus.2 On December 30, 2016, the Commission held a hearing. At the hearing, Bowen 2 Stedman’s Medical Dictionary defines “tinnitus” as: Perception of a sound in the absence of an environmental acoustic stimulus.

The sound can be a pure tone or noise including (ringing, whistling, hissing, roaring, or booming) in the ears. Tinnitus is usually associated with a loss of hearing. The site of origin of the sound percept may be in the central auditory pathways even if the initial lesion is in the end organ of the auditory system. Tinnitus, Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (Westlaw database updated Nov. 2014). -7- testified that he worked as a paid/salaried firefighter for Montgomery County from 1979 until September 2013, and that he worked as a volunteer firefighter for Prince George’s County from 1973, as an active volunteer riding fire trucks, until 1998 or 1999, when he went inactive and transitioned to administrative work.

At the hearing, the County’s counsel raised issues as to apportioning liability between Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, and alleged that the date of disablement occurred in the early 1990s and that Bowen’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The County’s counsel conceded the limitations argument later during the hearing. On January 19, 2017, the Commission issued a compensation order finding that Bowen had “sustained an occupational disease of binaural hearing loss and tinnitus arising out of and in the course of employment” as a firefighter for the County and that the date of disablement was January 24, 2005. The Commission ordered the County to pay Bowen’s “causally related medical expenses” and authorized medical treatment in the form of hearing aids for Bowen.

In the compensation order, the Commission stated that Bowen’s case would be held for further consideration as to whether Bowen had sustained permanent partial disability and that the case would be reset on request. The County did not request a rehearing or seek judicial review of the Commission’s disability decision. Eight months later, on September 27, 2017, Bowen’s counsel filed issues with the Commission concerning the nature and extent of permanent partial disability due to hearing loss and tinnitus. On December 5, 2017, the Commission held a hearing on the nature and extent of Bowen’s hearing loss and tinnitus.

Bowen testified that the ringing in his ears is -8- constant and affects everything he does.3 The County’s counsel argued that “tinnitus is part of hearing loss, and it’s compensable under” LE § 9-650, and therefore Bowen’s testimony about his tinnitus was “not relevant . . . to rating the occupational deafness, which includes tinnitus and hearing loss, [be]cause tinnitus is a part of hearing loss.” The County’s counsel specifically acknowledged that a claim of tinnitus falls under LE § 9-505, stating: “[E]ven though tinnitus is . . . included and captured under the test under [LE §] 9-650; under [LE §] 9- 505, . . . it’s the occupational deafness statute; and under [LE §] 9-627[](d)[(2)](ii)[,] for bilateral hearing loss[,] it is to the ears, and not to the body as a whole.” Bowen’s counsel argued that tinnitus was not listed under one of the scheduled losses, and thus by statute “becomes other cases . . . and it is not subsumed under the hearing loss.”4 The County’s counsel reiterated “that tinnitus is part of hearing loss, and that it is to the ears and not to 3 The record contains two independent medical evaluations of Bowen. In one, from Jonathan Gitter, M.D., of Dr. Jeffrey D. Gaber & Associates, P.A., with a visit date of October 10, 2016, as to tinnitus, Dr. Gitter stated that Bowen “noted problems with his hearing about 15 years ago and most troubling he developed tinnitus about 10 years ago.” In Dr. Gitter’s assessment, Bowen suffered from a 16% whole person impairment due to hearing loss, with 10% of that total due to tinnitus. In another independent medical examination, conducted by Mark A. Dettelbach, M.D., of The Feldman E.N.T. Group, P.C., on September 20, 2016, Dr. Dettelbach stated that, with respect to tinnitus, Bowen “noted tinnitus for the first time around six or seven years ago when it became bothersome. His tinnitus ranges in severity from mild-to- moderate.” In an addendum dated December 4, 2017, Dr. Dettelbach opined “that the tinnitus is part of the hearing loss, and there would be a rating to the ears associated with it.” 4 In other words, Bowen’s counsel argued that tinnitus is not part of one of the scheduled losses for hearing loss under LE § 9-627(d)(2), but rather is an unscheduled or other cases loss under LE § 9-627(k), meaning that the duration of compensation for permanent partial disability would be determined from the percentage by which the industrial use of the body is impaired due to the injury. -9- the body as a whole[,]” and that since tinnitus is part of hearing loss, “under [LE §] 9-505, it can only be measured in accordance with [LE §] 9-650, and a doctor’s rating is not relevant.” As to the deduction issue, the County’s counsel argued that, under the statute and case law, “[y]ou . . . use the age at the time of the hearing test, as opposed to the age at the time that you retired from the job that you’re claiming nature and extent of hearing loss for.” According to the County’s counsel, industrial noise “is ubiquitous” and everyone is “exposed to industrial noise as soon as we run a dishwasher, a garbage disposal, a vacuum cleaner, we walk out on the street [and] hear traffic noise, all of which are industrial noise, none of which [are] in the statute.” Bowen’s counsel responded that Bowen had not been exposed to industrial noise since his retirement, i.e., that the deduction should use the age of retirement, not the age at the time of the hearing test.

On December 15, 2017, the Commission issued an award of compensation, giving Bowen compensation for permanent partial disability for “14.875% loss of use of [] both ears (bilateral hearing loss); and a further permanent partial disability under ‘Other Cases’ amounting to 2% industrial loss of use of the body as the result of an injury to the tinnitus[.]” The Commission awarded compensation in the amount of $257 per week, beginning January 25, 2005, for a period of 47.1875 weeks, and awarded payment of medical expenses in the form of hearing aids. On January 12, 2018, the County filed in the circuit court a petition for judicial review. The County disputed the Commission’s determination that Bowen sustained a 14.875% loss of use of both ears as well as the determination of permanent partial disability - 10 - under “Other Cases” amounting to 2% loss of use of the body due to tinnitus. In an answer to an interrogatory as to the facts relied on for the contention that the Commission’s decision was incorrect, the County stated in relevant part: “The injury was to the ear.

The hearing test was performed on October 13, 2016. The Claimant’s age at the time of the hearing test was 59. Tinnitus is a form of hearing loss. The AMA Guides rate tinnitus as an add-on to increase a hearing loss rating.” In an answer to another interrogatory, the County stated that the issue on appeal was “nature and extent of the occupational deafness claim and not compensability[.]” In the circuit court, the parties each filed a motion for summary judgment.

On October 12, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment. After hearing argument from the parties, the circuit court granted Bowen’s motion and denied the County’s motion, thereby affirming the Commission’s decision. As to the calculation of the deduction under LE § 9-650(b)(3), the circuit court stated: On the appropriate date to calculate the average hearing loss under Section 9-650, the Court finds that they need look no further than the plain language of the statute. . . . The Court finds that based on the statute, the Commission correctly deducted as of the last day that the employee worked for the County, not when he took the test as the County argues.

The term industrial noise is given its ordinary meaning and in the context of worker’s compensation, it doesn’t mean any noise that a person could be exposed to in his or her ordinary life. Instead, it means the noise that the person was exposed to on the job. Therefore, the appropriate date was when the claimant retired, not when he took the test years later. As to tinnitus, the circuit court ruled: [As to] whether the Commission erred in considering the tinnitus separately and in finding that [Bowen] had suffered further permanent partial disability under other cases, resulting in a two percent industrial loss of use - 11 - of the body as a result, as the exhibit submitted by [Bowen]’s attorney indicates, it was clear that . . .

Bowen was filing for both. The County disputes that because the County’s position is that tinnitus is a part of hearing loss. [LE §] 9-627(k)(1) provides that in all cases of permanent partial disability not listed in [subs]ections (a) through (j) of this section, the Commission shall determine a percentage by which the industrial use of the covered employee’s body was impaired as a result of the accidental personal injury or occupational disease. The parties dispute whether tinnitus comes under hearing loss and whether it can be rated separately. Tinnitus is not listed in . . . subsections (a) through (j) of the statute and the Commission has apparently never interpreted the statute as including it under hearing loss.

Tinnitus is a ringing in the ear which may or may not be associated with hearing loss. The mere fact that tinnitus relates to the ear and hearing loss relates to the ear does not mean that tinnitus is a part of hearing loss. The statute doesn’t refer to ear in general as it may refer to arm in general. The Commission’s interpretation therefore is not clearly erroneous, it does not conflict with the plain language of the statute and therefore, the Court does give it deference.

On October 17, 2018, the circuit court entered a written order consistent with its ruling, denying the County’s motion for summary judgment and granting Bowen’s cross- motion for summary judgment. The order affirmed the Commission’s decision. The County appealed. Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals The Court of Special Appeals consolidated the two appeals.

On November 1, 2019, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in Cochran’s case and affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court’s judgment in Bowen’s case. See Cochran, 243 Md. App. at 107, 133 , 219 A.3d at 125, 141. As to the issue common to both appeals—whether the Commission erred in determining “that the decibels deducted from the total average hearing loss under LE § 9-650(b)(3) should be calculated by counting the number of years between the date the firefighter turned fifty and the date the firefighter - 12 - retired (as opposed to the date the hearing test or audiogram was performed)”—the Court of Special Appeals held “that the Commission did not err in calculating the deduction by counting the number of years between each firefighter’s 50th birthday and the dates they retired from service.” Cochran, 243 Md. App. at 112, 126 , 219 A.3d at 128, 136-37. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the County that the phrase “last exposure to industrial noise” in LE § 9-650(b)(3) means the date of a hearing test.

See id. at 127, 219 A.3d at 137. The Court of Special Appeals pointed out that LE § 9-505 uses the terms “industrial noise” and “harmful noise,” and that the “section does not reference or hint at any form of noise other than noise to which the employee was exposed on the job.” Id. at 127-28, 219 A.3d at 137-38 (footnote omitted). The Court of Special Appeals held that the plain and unambiguous language of “LE § 9-650(b)(3) means what it says: the deduction reflects the number of years between the claimant’s 50th birthday and his [or her] last exposure to harmful noise at work, even if the audiogram is taken years after that last exposure.” Id. at 129, 219 A.3d at 138 (footnote omitted). As to whether the Commission erred in awarding permanent partial disability benefits to Bowen for tinnitus under LE § 9-627(k) as an unscheduled or other cases loss, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Commission erred, although for a reason different than that argued by the County.

See Cochran, 243 Md. App. at 112, 129 , 219 A.3d at 128, 138. Rather, the Court of Special Appeals held that compensation for tinnitus must be determined under LE § 9-502 because the plain language of LE §§ 9-505 and 9- 650 does not include tinnitus. See id. at 129, 219 A.3d at 139. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that, because “Bowen sought compensation for tinnitus as part of his - 13 - occupational deafness claim and did not attempt to establish disablement, the Commission erred in awarding him benefits for tinnitus.”5 Cochran, 243 Md. App. at 129-30 , 219 A.3d at 139 (cleaned up).

The Court of Special Appeals reasoned: [N]othing on the face of LE § 9-505 or [LE] § 9-650 suggests that the General Assembly intended workers’ compensation for occupational deafness to cover anything other than hearing loss measurable by loss of decibels in four specified frequencies, measured in hertz, that meets the threshold established by the mathematical formula in LE § 9-650. But we hold nevertheless that the Commission erred in awarding permanent partial disability benefits to [] Bowen for tinnitus under LE § 9-627(k) because [] Bowen made no showing, and the Commission accordingly made no finding, that he had a “disablement,” a prerequisite to workers’ compensation benefits for an occupational disease under LE § 9-502. Id. at 132-33, 219 A.3d at 140-41.6 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and Conditional Cross-Petition On November 27, 2019, the County petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following issue: Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err in holding that, when calculating a claimant’s hearing loss under LE § 9-650(b)(3), the decibels deducted from the total average hearing loss should be calculated by counting the number of years between the date the claimant turned 50 and the date the claimant 5 In its opinion, in a footnote, the Court of Special Appeals reasoned that it could reach the issue of whether a claim of disablement as to tinnitus must be brought under LE § 9-502 because, according to the Court, the County mentioned the argument as an “alternative” in a footnote in its brief. Cochran, 243 Md. App. at 130 n.15, 219 A.3d at 139 n.15. 6 The Court of Special Appeals also addressed an issue specific to Cochran’s case concerning whether the Commission erred “in calculating [] Cochran’s average hearing loss under LE § 9-650(b)(2) by using the results of his initial, earlier-in-time audiogram that showed more hearing loss than the later-in-time audiogram[.]” Cochran, 243 Md. App. at 112 , 219 A.3d at 128.

On that issue, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Commission did not err in relying on the September 2015 audiogram instead of the May 2016 audiogram in determining Cochran’s entitlement to compensation for occupational deafness. See id. at 121, 219 A.3d at 134. This issue is not before us. - 14 - retired? On December 10, 2019, Respondents filed an answer to the County’s petition and conditional cross-petition, raising the following issue: Whether the [Court of Special Appeals] erred by reversing a factual finding of the Commission as to whether [] Bowen suffered a “disablement” given that 1) the Commission’s factual finding is “presumed to be correct[]”[;] 2) the issue of whether [Bowen] suffered a disablement was not raised at the Commission hearing; and 3) there was no evidence put on by the County before the circuit court to disturb the Commission’s finding.

(Cleaned up). On February 11, 2020, this Court granted the petition and conditional cross- petition. See Cochran, 467 Md. 263 , 224 A.3d 601 . STANDARD OF REVIEW “In an action for judicial review, this Court reviews the administrative agency’s decision, not the decision of the circuit court or the Court of Special Appeals.” Elec.

Gen. Corp. v. LaBonte, 454 Md. 113, 131 , 164 A.3d 157, 168 (2017) (citation omitted). [A] court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Swedo, 439 Md. 441, 453 , 96 A.3d 210, 217 (2014) (cleaned up). As to workers’ compensation cases, “the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct[.]” LE § 9-745(b)(1).

That presumption, however, “does not extend to questions of law, which this Court reviews independently.” LaBonte, 454 Md. at 131 , 164 A.3d at 168 (cleaned up). Pursuant to LE § 9-745(c), a court must “determine whether the Commission: (1) justly considered all of the facts about the . . . occupational disease . . . ; - 15 - (2) exceeded the powers granted to it under this title; or (3) misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided.” (Paragraph breaks omitted). “This Court gives some deference to the Commission’s interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act unless its conclusions are based upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” LaBonte, 454 Md. at 131 , 164 A.3d at 168 (cleaned up); see also Montgomery Cty. v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 60 , 31 A.3d 191, 194 (2011) (This Court “afford[s] the Commission a degree of deference, as appropriate, in its formal interpretations of the Workers’ Compensation Act.” (Citation omitted)). Because this case involves statutory construction of the Workers’ Compensation Act, the principles of statutory construction discussed in LaBonte, 454 Md. at 131 , 164 A.3d at 168 , are relevant: The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the General Assembly’s intent. If the ordinary and natural meaning of a statute’s language makes the General Assembly’s intent clear, the Court applies the statute’s language.

Because the Workers’ Compensation Act is a remedial statute, if its language is ambiguous, the Court construes the Act as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Where the Workers’ Compensation Act’s language is unambiguous, however, the Court may not create an ambiguity to interpret the Act more favorably to injured employees. (Cleaned up); see also LE § 9-102(a) and (b) (“This title shall be construed to carry out its general purpose” and “[t]he rule that a statute in derogation of the common law is to be strictly construed does not apply to this title.”). - 16 - DISCUSSION I. The Parties’ Contentions The County contends that the Commission erred in calculating the deduction from Cochran’s and Bowen’s total average hearing loss under LE § 9-650(b)(3) by counting the number of years between the date the firefighter turned 50 years old and the date that each firefighter retired. The County argues that LE § 9-650(b)(3) requires the Commission to use a claimant’s age at the time of a hearing test, not the age at retirement, to calculate hearing loss for purposes of the deduction.

The County asserts that LE § 9-650(b)(3)’s plain language states that its purpose is to allow for the average amount of hearing loss from nonoccupational causes found in the population at any given age, which means measuring the age of the claimant at the time of a hearing test, “not dat[ing] it back to a remote occupational exposure date.” The County contends that the Court of Special Appeals misinterpreted the word “industrial” as used in LE § 9-650(b)(3) to conclude that industrial noise means occupational noise. The County argues that the term “industrial noise” includes noise to which all people are exposed in daily life, such as “riding the subway system, driving by a construction site, attending a concert, running a garbage disposal, vacuuming the floor, flying in a plane, or the like[.]” The County thus maintains that when hearing loss is measured, to take into account the nonoccupational causes found in the population at any given age, the deduction must be calculated using the date of the hearing test, which factors in the aging process that occurred after retirement. - 17 - Cochran and Bowen respond that the Commission correctly calculated the deduction in LE § 9-650(b)(3) by using their ages at the time of retirement. Cochran and Bowen contend that the phrase “last exposure to industrial noise” means the last time that a claimant encounters harmful noise at work, not the age of the claimant on the date of a hearing test. Cochran and Bowen argue that the plain and commonly understood meaning of “industrial noise” is noise related to a workplace.

Cochran and Bowen assert that, had the General Assembly intended to refer to noise unrelated to the workplace, it would have used the phrase “last exposure to any noise” or “last exposure to noise” in LE § 9-650(b)(3). (Emphasis omitted). Cochran and Bowen maintain that the language of LE § 9-505 confirms that the term “industrial noise” as used in LE § 9-650(b)(3) means noise in the workplace. Cochran and Bowen also contend that, contrary to the County’s contention, there is no conflict between the opening clause of LE § 9-650(b)(3) and the plain meaning of the phrase “last exposure to industrial noise.” According to Cochran and Bowen, by using the phrase “at the time of the last exposure to industrial noise[,]” the General Assembly simply “created a mechanism wherein the age, albeit at the time a claimant was ‘last exposed’ to the harmful noise of his/her occupation, is taken into consideration.” Cochran and Bowen contend that, even if LE § 9-650(b)(3) is ambiguous, the Workers’ Compensation Act is to be construed liberally in favor of injured workers and thus any ambiguity should be resolved in their favor.

In a reply brief, the County contends that interpreting LE § 9-650(b)(3) as Bowen and Cochran do would “result[] in an absurdity” because, according to the County, a - 18 - firefighter who retires at an older age may not have a compensable claim, whereas a firefighter who retires at a younger age with less exposure to noise may have a compensable claim. Statutory Framework and Provisions In Green v. Carr Lowery Glass Co., Inc., 398 Md. 512, 516-18 , 921 A.2d 235 , 237- 38 (2007), this Court discussed the history and statutory framework of the Workers’ Compensation Act related to hearing loss. In particular, we observed that “[w]orkers’ compensation encompasses two main categories of compensable events: accidental personal injury and occupational diseases.” Id. at 516-17 , 921 A.2d at 237 (citations omitted). “[A]n employee’s hearing loss may fall into either category, depending on whether the employee experienced a sudden traumatic event or was exposed repeatedly to loud noises.” Id. at 517 , 921 A.2d at 237 (citation omitted). As we explained in Green, id. at 517 , 921 A.2d at 237-38 , as originally enacted in 1914, the Workers’ Compensation Act provided compensation only for accidental personal injuries arising in and out of “the course of employment, and an employee was not required to show that his or her disability resulted in a loss of wages or earning capacity.” (Citation omitted).

As such, “an employee who suffered the total loss of hearing in both ears due to a one-time accident that created a loud blast, for example, would have received compensation.” Id. at 517 , 921 A.2d at 238 (citation omitted).7 In 1951, the Workers’ In 1939, the Workers’ Compensation Act “was amended to provide compensation 7 for injuries arising from occupational disease. . . . [T]he 1939 law did not permit compensation for occupational disease unless and until the employee was no longer able - 19 - Compensation Act was expanded to provide compensation for hearing loss as an occupational disease where the employee showed that he or she was no longer able to work in the occupation that produced the disability. See Green, 398 Md. at 517 , 921 A.2d at 238 (citation omitted); see also Yox v. Tru-Rol Co., Inc., 380 Md. 326, 332 , 844 A.2d 1151, 1155 (2004). In 1967, the General Assembly amended the Workers’ Compensation Act to create a separate provision specifically addressing occupational disease hearing loss, which “provided that ‘occupational deafness shall be compensated according to the terms and conditions of this section’ and set forth a testing methodology for determining eligibility for compensation.” Green, 398 Md. at 517 , 921 A.2d at 238 (citations omitted). In enacting the new provision, the General Assembly’s intent “was not only to provide technical criteria for measuring occupational loss of hearing but also to make such loss compensable without regard to inability to work or loss of wages.” Id. at 518 , 921 A.2d at 238 (cleaned up).

The new provision thus “provided that an employee may be eligible for occupational disease compensation due to work-related hearing loss without a showing of disablement, i.e., loss of wages or inability to perform regular work.” Id. at 518 , 921 A.2d at 238 (citations omitted). Decades later, in 1991, as part of the Code revision process, the Workers’ Compensation Act was repealed and recodified as Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. See id. at 518 , 921 A.2d at 238 . At that time, to work in the last occupation in which he/she was exposed to the hazards of the disease.” Yox v. Tru-Rol Co., Inc., 380 Md. 326, 331 , 844 A.2d 1151, 1154 (2004) (citation omitted). - 20 - the provisions concerning occupational hearing loss were divided between Subtitle 5, concerning entitlement to and liability for compensation, and Subtitle 6, concerning benefits.

See id. at 518, 921 A.2d at 238 . In this case, both Cochran and Bowen alleged hearing loss (and, in Bowen’s case, tinnitus) based on repeated exposure to loud noise in the course of their employment as firefighters for the County, i.e., an occupational disease, rather than on a sudden traumatic event. LE 9-101(g) defines “occupational disease” as “a disease contracted by a covered employee: (1) as a result of and in the course of employment; and (2) that causes the covered employee to become temporarily or permanently, partially or totally incapacitated.” (Paragraph breaks omitted). LE § 9-505 specifically governs a claimant’s right to compensation for occupational deafness.

LE § 9-505(a) states: “Except as otherwise provided, an employer shall provide compensation in accordance with this title to a covered employee for loss of hearing by the covered employee due to industrial noise in the frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 hertz.”8 LE § 9-505(b) provides the caveat, though, that “[a]n employer is not liable for compensation for occupational deafness under subsection (a) of this section unless the covered employee claiming benefits worked for the employer in the employment that 8 In Yox, 380 Md. at 337 , 844 A.2d at 1157-58 , we explained “disablement” in occupational hearing loss cases as follows: “In place of wage loss or impairment—the objective standard applicable to other occupational diseases—[the Workers’ Compensation Act] substitute[s] the specific objective criteria for measuring compensable hearing loss. If a covered employee suffers that degree of hearing loss, he/she is, for purposes of compensation, disabled.” - 21 - exposed the covered employee to harmful noise for at least 90 days.”9 Once a claimant establishes the right to compensation for an occupational disease, the claimant is eligible to receive benefits. Subtitle 6 of Title 9 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, entitled “Benefits,” governs benefits and consists of several Parts. The various Parts concern, among other things, general provisions, temporary partial disability, temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, permanent total disability, and occupational deafness.

Here, the Commission found that Cochran sustained an occupational disease of hearing loss and ordered the County to pay causally related medical expenses. Similarly, the Commission found that Bowen sustained an occupational disease of hearing loss and tinnitus and ordered the County to pay causally related medical expenses. Additionally, the Commission ordered the County to pay permanent partial disability benefits to Bowen for his hearing loss and tinnitus. As to permanent partial disability benefits, Part IV of Subtitle 6, LE §§ 9-625 to 9- 633, governs.

LE § 9-627 sets forth the duration of compensation for a permanent partial 9 Generally, LE § 9-502 governs a claimant’s right to compensation for a disability caused by occupational disease. LE § 9-502(a) defines “disablement” as “the event of a covered employee becoming partially or totally incapacitated: (1) because of an occupational disease; and (2) from performing the work of the covered employee in the last occupation in which the covered employee was injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease.” (Paragraph breaks omitted). See also Miller v. W. Elec. Co., 310 Md. 173, 187 , 528 A.2d 486, 493 (1987) (“Actual incapacity from employment (whether total or partial) is the test in occupational disease cases[.]” (Citation omitted)).

LE § 9-502(c)(1) and (d) provide that an employer and insurer are liable to a covered employee “for disability of the covered employee resulting from an occupational disease” where, among other things, the occupational disease that caused the disability “is due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist” and, “on the weight of the evidence, it reasonably may be concluded that the occupational disease was incurred as a result of the employment of the covered employee.” - 22 - disability by “prescrib[ing] a schedule of benefits and the ‘weeks’ of compensation for specific injuries resulting in permanent partial disability” and provides “that all other cases of permanent partial disability are to be determined from the percentage by which the industrial use of the body is impaired as a result of the injury.” Montgomery Cty. v. Robinson, 435 Md. 62, 65 , 76 A.3d 1159, 1161 (2013) (footnote omitted). To determine the duration of permanent partial disability payments for specific injuries, the Commission must determine the extent of the body part’s disability and then calculate the number of weeks for which compensation is to be paid. For example, LE § 9-627(d) addresses the specific injuries of loss of toes other than the great toe, a hand, an arm, a foot, a leg, an eye, hearing, and a perforated nasal septum. LE § 9-627(d)(2) states: “Compensation shall be paid for the period listed for: (i) the total loss of hearing of 1 ear, 125 weeks; and (ii) the total loss of hearing of both ears, 250 weeks.” (Paragraph breaks omitted).

For other cases of permanent partial disability where the injury does not fall under LE § 9-627(d) or another subsection for a specific injury, LE § 9-627(k) sets forth the process by which the Commission is to calculate the duration of compensation, which involves the Commission determining the percentage by which the industrial use of the body was impaired, taking into consideration the nature of the physical disability, as well as the age, experience, occupation, and training of the claimant at the time that the occupational disease or accidental injury occurred. See LE § 9-627(k)(1), (2). The Commission then determines the number of weeks of compensation to be awarded by apportioning the loss, using 500 weeks as the base point. See LE § 9-627(k)(3).

As to compensation for occupational deafness, Part VII of Subtitle 6 of the Workers’ - 23 - Compensation Act—LE §§ 9-649 to 9-652—governs how “[a] covered employee who suffers from occupational deafness shall be paid compensation[.]” LE § 9-649. LE § 9- 650 “sets forth the criteria for calculating the percentage of hearing loss[.]” Green, 398 Md. at 518 , 921 A.2d at 238 . LE § 9-650(a)(1) requires that hearing loss “be measured by audiometric instrumentation” meeting certain specified technical criteria. LE § 9-650(b) sets forth the mathematical formula used to calculate a claimant’s average thresholds of hearing in four specific frequencies: (1) The percentage of hearing loss for purposes of compensation for occupational deafness shall be determined by calculating the average, in decibels, of the thresholds of hearing for the frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 hertz in accordance with paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(2) The average of the thresholds in hearing shall be calculated by: (i) adding together the lowest measured losses in each of the 4 frequencies; and (ii) dividing the total by 4. (3) To allow for the average amount of hearing loss from nonoccupational causes found in the population at any given age, there shall be deducted from the total average decibel loss determined under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection one-half of a decibel for each year of the covered employee’s age over 50 at the time of the last exposure to industrial noise. Thus, to calculate the total average decibel loss in an ear, the Commission would look at the decibel losses in the specified frequencies and divide the total by four. For example: Frequency (Hertz) 500 1,000 2,000 3,000 Decibel Loss 25 30 35 30 The total decibel loss is 120 (25 + 30 + 35 + 30).

Dividing that total of 120 by 4 gives an average decibel loss of 30 for that ear. Then, taking into account the deduction of LE § 9- - 24 - 650(b)(3), the Commission would subtract one-half of a decibel from the average decibel loss (30 in this example) for each year of the covered employee’s age over 50 at the time of the last exposure to industrial noise. So, if the covered employee is 57 years old at the time of the last exposure to industrial noise, the Commission would deduct 3.5 decibels (7 years over age 50 x 0.5) from 30, leading to an adjusted average decibel loss of 26.5 for the ear in question. LE § 9-650(c) establishes the minimum level of hearing loss for a compensable occupational deafness claim and the method to calculate the percentage of compensable hearing loss, stating: (1) If the average hearing loss in the 4 frequencies determined under subsection (b) of this section is 25 decibels or less, the covered employee does not have a compensable hearing loss.

(2) If the average hearing loss in the 4 frequencies determined under subsection (b) of this section is 91.7 decibels or more, the covered employee has a 100% compensable hearing loss. (3) For every decibel that the average hearing loss exceeds 25 decibels, the covered employee shall be allowed 1.5% of the compensable hearing loss, up to a maximum of 100% compensable hearing loss at 91.7 decibels. LE § 9-650(d) sets forth the formula for calculating the “binaural percentage of hearing loss[,]” i.e., the percentage of hearing loss relating to both ears, providing: The binaural percentage of hearing loss shall be determined by: (1) multiplying the percentage of hearing loss in the better ear by 5; (2) adding that product to the percentage of hearing loss in the poorer ear; and (3) dividing that sum by 6. - 25 - LE § 9-650(e)(1) precludes the consideration of whether an amplification device, e.g., a hearing aid, can improve the employee’s hearing in determining the percentage of hearing loss and contains additional requirements.10 LE § 9-651 describes the extent of liability for occupational deafness. LE § 9-651(a) states that, generally, an employer is liable for the full extent of the occupational deafness of a covered employee if: (1) the employment of the covered employee by the employer has contributed to any extent to the occupational deafness of the covered employee; and (2) the employer otherwise is liable under this section and [LE] § 9-505[.] LE § 9-651(b) sets forth a limitation on liability, providing: An employer is liable only for the part of the deafness attributable to the employment by the employer if the employer establishes by competent evidence, including the results of a professionally controlled hearing test, the extent of the deafness of the covered employee that existed before exposure to harmful noise in the employment of the employer.

Green v. Carr Lowery Glass Co., Inc. In Green, 398 Md. at 514 , 921 A.2d at 236 , this Court held that a claimant was not 10 LE § 9-650(e) provides: (1) In determining the percentage of hearing loss under this section, consideration may not be given to whether the use of an amplification device improves the ability of a covered employee to understand speech or enhance behavioral hearing thresholds. (2) (i) In determining a workers’ compensation claim for noise-related hearing loss, audiologic data shall use both bone conduction and air conduction results. (ii) If a conductive loss is present, the bone conduction thresholds for each ear, rather than the air conduction levels, shall be used to calculate a claimant’s average hearing loss. - 26 - eligible for medical benefits in the form of hearing aids under LE § 9-660 unless he was eligible for compensation under LE §§ 9-505 and 9-650. We briefly reviewed the history and statutory framework of the Workers’ Compensation Act as it relates to hearing loss, including setting forth the provisions of LE §§ 9-505, 9-650, and 9-660 (concerning the provision of medical services and treatment).

See id. at 516-22, 921 A.2d at 237-40 . We concluded that the plain language of LE § 9-505 “establishes minimal requirements for an occupational deafness claim[,]” “establishes certain frequencies where a loss of hearing may, in accordance with Title 9, constitute occupational deafness[,]” and “acknowledges that occupational deafness is an occupational disease, regardless of a person’s inability to work or loss of wages.” Id. at 524, 921 A.2d at 242 (citation omitted). We observed that LE § 9-505 “sets forth only general requirements for making an occupational deafness claim[,]” and “does not provide specific criteria for determining the extent of [] hearing loss” or how to calculate entitlement to compensation for occupational deafness. Id. at 524, 921 A.2d at 242 .

Nor does LE § 9-505 expressly state that an employer must “provide medical benefits to covered employees with hearing loss in the named frequencies.” Id. at 524, 921 A.2d at 242 . In short, the plain language of LE § 9-505 does not “independently establish employer liability for compensation or medical benefits if a covered employee suffers hearing loss in the identified frequencies[,]” and thus we concluded that “[a]n employee must also qualify for compensation and benefits under [LE] § 9-650 and [LE] § 9-660.” Id. at 525, 921 A.2d at 242 (emphasis omitted). As to LE § 9-650, we explained that the statute “provides precise testing procedures for determining the extent of a worker’s hearing loss.” Id. at 525, 921 A.2d at 242 . We - 27 - observed that, under LE § 9-650(b)(3), “[t]he threshold of hearing loss that must be met in [LE] § 9-650 is calibrated such that any hearing loss experienced due to aging is deducted from the overall calculation of loss.” Id. at 525, 921 A.2d at 242 .

Pursuant to LE § 9- 650(c)(1), “a covered employee does not have a compensable hearing loss if the average hearing loss in the four frequency ranges is 25 decibels or less.” Id. at 525, 921 A.2d at 242 . We explained that LE § 9-650’s criteria “presumably establish a threshold that is lower than whatever level of hearing loss constitutes ‘disablement,’ because occupational hearing loss was meant to be compensable without regard to ‘disablement.’” Id. at 525, 921 A.2d at 243 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, in providing that a claimant must have an average loss of more than 25 decibels in the specified frequencies, the General Assembly set a minimum/base threshold for compensation, i.e., the General Assembly “did not set a threshold such that any hearing loss attributed to work is compensated[.]” Id. at 525-26 , 921 A.2d at 243 (emphasis in original). We concluded that LE §§ 9-505 and 9-650 are complementary sections and that a claimant must comply with both to be eligible for benefits.

See id. at 526, 921 A.2d at 243 . This is so because LE § 9-650 “provides the technical criteria for measuring occupation hearing loss,” whereas LE § 9-505 does not contain criteria for calculating hearing loss or accounting for age-related hearing loss because LE § 9-505 “references what is already established in [LE] § 9-650.” Id. at 526, 921 A.2d at 243 . We determined that, because the claimant had conceded that he was not eligible for compensation under LE § 9-650 and therefore not suffering occupational deafness, the claimant was not eligible for medical benefits under LE § 9-660. See id. at 527, 921 A.2d at 243-44 . - 28 - Analysis Here, we hold that the Commission did not err in calculating the deduction of decibels from Cochran’s and Bowen’s total average hearing losses under LE § 9-650(b)(3) by counting the number of years between each firefighter’s 50th birthday and the dates that they each retired from employment with the County.

We conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “industrial noise” as used in LE § 9-650(b)(3) is occupational noise or noise encountered in the workplace in the employment of the employer. Thus, the phrase “time of the last exposure to industrial noise” means the date that an employee is last exposed to occupational noise, i.e., the date of the employee’s retirement, and not the date of a hearing test measuring hearing loss. We begin by examining the plain language of LE § 9-650(b)(3). As explained above, to determine whether a claimant has compensable hearing loss, the Commission must “add[] together the lowest measured losses in each of the 4 frequencies[,]” LE § 9- 650(b)(2)(i)—“500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 hertz[,]” LE § 9-650(b)(1)—and “divid[e] the total by 4[,]” LE § 9-650(b)(2)(ii).

Then, the Commission deducts from that number “one- half of a decibel for each year of the covered employee’s age over 50 at the time of the last exposure to industrial noise.” LE § 9-650(b)(3). Under the plain language of LE § 9- 650(b)(3), the deduction appears fairly straightforward and is calculated by deducting half of a decibel for each year over the age of 50 “at the time of the last exposure to industrial noise.” The parties dispute, however, the meaning of the phrase “time of the last exposure to industrial noise.” We must construe the plain meaning of the phrase “last exposure to industrial - 29 - noise,” and, in particular, what “industrial noise” means. Although neither LE § 9-650 nor any other statute in the Workers’ Compensation Act defines “last exposure to industrial noise” or “industrial noise,” from our perspective, it is clear that the plain meaning of the term “industrial noise” is occupational noise or noise encountered on the job. Indisputably, what can be gleaned from the plain language of LE § 9-650(b)(3) is that the General Assembly intended the deduction to be calculated by using the date of the “last exposure to industrial noise.” The plain meaning of that phrase is that the last exposure to industrial noise is the last date that an employee encounters occupational noise on the job, i.e., the employee’s retirement date.

On its face, the plain language of the statute suggests nothing else. A reading of the phrase “last exposure to industrial noise” in no way denotes that the language means the date of a hearing test, i.e., the words “exposure to industrial noise” clearly do not mean or even suggest a reference to the date a person takes a diagnostic hearing test. It would strain logic to conclude that “last exposure to industrial noise” somehow means the date of a hearing test when LE § 9-650(b)(3) does not reference or mention the date that a hearing test is performed or otherwise give any indication that the date of the hearing test is relevant to the calculation of the deduction. Nor does the plain language of the statute lead to the conclusion that “industrial noise” means loud noises generally encountered in everyday life, such as vacuuming or driving by a construction site.

One of the first tenets of statutory construction is to accord language its ordinary meaning. See LaBonte, 454 Md. at 131 , 164 A.3d at 168 . Here, the plain language of the statute gives no indication of a meaning other than the plain words—last exposure to industrial noise. Had the General Assembly intended otherwise, it would have used a term - 30 - other than “industrial noise.” Under the circumstances, though, we think it helpful to briefly examine the “natural and ordinary meaning” of the term “industrial noise.” Bottini v. Dep’t of Fin., 450 Md. 177, 195 , 147 A.3d 371, 382 (2016) (cleaned up). “To ascertain the natural and ordinary meaning of the term . . . , we look to dictionary definitions as a starting point[,]” as “it is proper to consult a dictionary or dictionaries for a term’s