Montgomery County Career Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Montgomery County

WRIGHT, J. This appeal arises from appellee, Montgomery County Executive Isiah Leggett’s (“County Executive’s”), failure to include sufficient funds to implement a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Montgomery County and the ²⁰⁴ appellant, Montgomery County Career Fire Fighters Association (“Fire Fighters”), in the proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2012 (“FY12”). The Fire Fighters filed a prohibited practice charge against the County Executive accusing him of violating §§ 33-147, 33-153(k), 33-153(1), 33-154(a)(l), and 33-154(a)(8) of the Montgomery County Code (“MCC”). On May 17, 2011, the Montgomery County Labor Relations Administrator (“LRA”) found that while the County Executive had violated the MCC labor relations provisions, those actions did not constitute prohibited practices under Montgomery County Circuit Court precedent. The Fire Fighters filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County which dismissed the petition as moot.

This timely appeal followed. Questions Presented The Fire Fighters ask us to determine the following: 1. Did the Circuit Court err in dismissing the Appellant’s judicial review petition on grounds that it is moot? 2. Did the [LRA] err in ruling, based on an erroneous decision of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, that Appellees did not commit prohibited practices pursuant to Chapter 33, Article X of the Montgomery County Code when County Executive Isiah Leggett failed to include funding sufficient to implement the collective bargaining agreement between Appellant and Montgomery County, Maryland as required by the interest arbitration decision of Impasse Neutral M. David Vaughn, in his Fiscal Year 2012 Proposed Budget Submission to the Montgomery County Council?

Finding that the LRA’s decision was based on a correct interpretation of the law and the circuit court erred in dismissing the Union’s petition as moot, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment. Facts and Procedural History The facts in this case are undisputed. The Fire Fighters are the exclusive bargaining representative for Montgomery ²⁰⁵ County employees classified as Fire Fighter/Rescuer II, Fire Fighter/Rescuer III, Master Fire Fighter/Rescuer, Fire/Rescue Lieutenant, and Fire/Rescue Captain. This union and Montgomery County (the “County”) were parties to a CBA in effect from June 1, 2008, through June 30, 2008 (“2008 CBA”).

Pursuant to MCC §§ 33-147 to 33-157, the parties began negotiating a successor to the 2008 CBA in November 2010. Upon reaching an impasse, the parties submitted the dispute to an impasse neutral (the “Neutral”). The parties were required by the MCC to submit their last, best, final offers (“LBFO”) to the Neutral for the Neutral to review and decide which LBFO was the most reasonable. In making a conclusion, the Neutral was regulated by MCC § 33 — 153(i), which stated the following: (1) In determining which final offer is the more reasonable, the impasse neutral must first evaluate and give the highest priority to the ability of the County to pay for additional short-term and long-term expenditures by considering: (A) the limits on the County’s ability to raise taxes under State law and the County Charter; (B) the added burden on County taxpayers, if any, resulting from increases in revenues needed to fund a final offer; and (C) the County’s ability to continue to provide the current standard of all public services.

(2) After evaluating the ability of the County to pay under paragraph (1), the impasse neutral may only consider: (A) the interest and welfare of County taxpayers and service recipients; (B) past collective bargaining agreements between the parties, including the past bargaining history that led to each agreement; (C) wages, hours, benefits and conditions of employment of similar employees of other public employers in the Washington Metropolitan Area and in Maryland; (D) wages, hours, benefits, and conditions of employment of other Montgomery County employees; and ²⁰⁶ (E) wages, benefits, hours, and other working conditions of similar employees of private employers in Montgomery County. On March 1, 2011, the Neutral found that the Fire Fighter’s LBFO, which proposed no changes from the 2008 CBA, was the more reasonable offer. Under MCC § 33 — 153(k), the LBFO selected by the Neutral became the final agreement between the parties (“2011 Agreement”). MCC § 33-153(0 further states: In each proposed annual operating budget, the County Executive must describe any collective bargaining agreement or amendment to an agreement that is scheduled to take effect in the next fiscal year and estimate the cost of implementing that agreement.

The annual operating budget must include sufficient funds to pay for the items in the parties’ final agreement. The employer must expressly identify to the Council by April 1, unless extenuating circumstances require a later date, all terms and conditions in the agreement that: (1) require an appropriation of funds, or (2) are inconsistent with any County law or regulation, or (3) require the enactment or adoption of any County law or regulation, or (4) which have or may have a present or future fiscal impact. If a later submission is necessary, the employer must specify the submission date and the reasons for delay to the Council President by April 1. The employer must make a good faith effort to have the council take action to implement all terms and conditions in the parties’ final agreement.

On March 15, 2011, the date required for budget submission by § 303 of the Montgomery County Charter (“Charter”), the County Executive submitted a proposed budget (“FY12 Budget”) to the Council that did not include sufficient funds to implement the 2011 Agreement. On March 23, 2011, the Fire Fighters filed a prohibited practice charge pursuant to MCC ²⁰⁷ § 33-154, with LRA Homer LaRue, based on the County Executive’s action. The Fire Fighters requested an expedited hearing and pre-hearing briefing because the Council was required by Charter § 305 to approve an annual operating budget by June 1, 2011. On March 30, 2011, the LRA established an expedited briefing schedule.

Oral argument was heard regarding the charge on May 4, 2011. Before the LRA issued a decision, the County provided the LRA with a copy of the circuit court decision in Mont. Cnty. Exec. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Mont.

Cnty., Case No. 346969 (“FOP Decision”). 1 In the FOP Decision, the trial judge reversed a finding by the Permanent Umpire that the County Executive had committed prohibited practices by refusing to include the CBA between the FOP and the County "with sufficient funding in the FY12 Budget. On May 17, 2011, the LRA issued a decision finding that the County Executive’s actions of informing the Council about the 2011 Agreement did not satisfy the requirements of MCC § 33-153(¿), and that the MCC provisions regulating the County Executive’s budget submissions could be harmonized with Charter §§ 303 and 510A. Nevertheless, the LRA concluded that he was bound by the FOP Decision and was, therefore, “required to order” that the County Executive did not violate MCC §§ 33-147, 33-157(k), 33-153(1), 33-154(a)(l), and 33-154(a)(8). The LRA disagreed with the circuit court’s conclusion in the FOP Decision that the separation of powers doctrine prohibited the Council from mandating that the County Executive include specific funding in the budget.

On May 18, 2011, the Fire Fighters filed a Petition for Judicial Review (“Petition”). On May 26, 2011, the Council approved the County’s final operating budget for fiscal year 2012, which did not include funding to implement the 2011 Agreement. On September 16, 2011, during oral argument on ²⁰⁸ the Petition, the County told the trial court that it would not move to dismiss the case on the ground of mootness because the case presented a matter capable of repetition, yet evading judicial review. On October 16, 2011, the parties filed a joint brief urging the trial court not to dismiss the Petition.

However, on October 17, 2011, the trial court entered an Order dismissing the Petition as moot and noting that resolution of the issues, specifically the interpretation of the MCC and Charter provisions, were “best left to the appellate courts.” The Fire Fighters filed the instant appeal on October 31, 2011. Additional facts will be discussed in the relevant sections below. Standard of Review The parties urge us to apply the usual standard of review of administrative agency decisions. Under this standard, the appellate court’s role is identical to that of the circuit court, and we review the agency, or in this case, the LRA’s decision.

Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Prigel Family Creamery, 206 Md.App. 264, 273-74 , 47 A.3d 1087 (2012). As such, our review is limited to determining if the agency’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and “no error of law exists.” Id. The agency’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Generally, we accord some deference to the agency when it is interpreting the statutes it administers.

Md. Aviation Admin, v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 572 , 873 A.2d 1145 (2005). However, here the issue lies not with the collective bargaining statutes themselves, but with an interpretation of the Charter and the Council’s ability to limit the County Executive’s budgetary discretion. Therefore, no deference is required. The Court of Appeals reminds us, in Balt.

Cnty. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 4 v. Balt. Cnty., 429 Md. 533, 560 , 57 A.3d 425 (2012), that the standard of review in this Court “is determined by the circuit court’s disposition of the matter.” See also Mont. Cnty. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Mont.

Cnty. Lodge 35, Inc. (“FOP 35”), 427 Md. 561, 571 , 50 A.3d 579 (2012) (reviewing circuit court’s disposition for legal error ²⁰⁹ rather than reviewing arbitrator’s decision). Our review is thus constrained to the circuit court’s dismissal of the Petition. “We review de novo both the grant of a motion to dismiss ... and the interpretation of a statute.” Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142 , 46 A.3d 443 (2012) (citations omitted). Likewise, “where an order [of the trial court] involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory[,] or case law, our Court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 , 907 A.2d 175 (2006) (citations omitted).

Discussion I. Mootness The parties agree, as do we, that the circuit court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of mootness. It is well established that the role of the Court is not to decide moot or abstract questions or to render advisory opinions. Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 471-72 , 71 A.2d 474 (1950). “If no existing controversy is present, the case is moot and an appellate court ordinarily will not consider the case on its merits.” Office of the Pub. Defender v. State, 413 Md. 411, 422 , 993 A.2d 55 (2010) (citations omitted).

The circuit court acknowledged that the case presented an exception to the mootness doctrine but, nevertheless, passed on reviewing the merits of the case. As the trial court noted, “even where a case may be moot technically, there exists a number of exceptions to the general rule that the [case] must be dismissed. For example, where a case, while technically moot, presents a recurring matter of public concern which, unless decided, will continue to evade review, [the Court] nonetheless ha[s] considered the case on its merits.” Id. at 423 , 993 A.2d 55 (citing In re Julianna B., 407 Md. 657, 665-66 , 967 A.2d 776 (2009)); see also Motor Vehicle Admin, v. Jaigobin, 413 Md. 191, 196 , 991 A.2d 1251 (2010). The Court of Appeals stated: ²¹⁰ [I]n exceptional situations, we have addressed issues in cases that are technically moot, when “[t]he urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest,” or where “the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between government and its citizens, and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to prevent a decision.” Arrington v. Dep’t of Human Res., 402 Md. 79, 91 , 935 A.2d 432 (2007) (quoting Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43 , 111 A.2d 379 (1954)).

The Fire Fighters argue, and the County does not contest, that this Court is empowered to review the substance of the LRA’s decision. The Fire Fighters cite Albert S. v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 166 Md.App. 726 , 891 A.2d 402 (2006), where this Court reviewed an administrative decision after an appeal of that decision had been dismissed as moot by the circuit court. The Albert S. Court concluded that, while technically moot, the substantive issue fell into the exception articulated by the Court of Appeals in Lloyd, supra, 206 Md. 36 , 111 A.2d 379 . Albert S., 166 Md.App. at 746-48 , 891 A.2d 402 .

The issue in the case sub judice is one of public concern; it implicates the discretion of the County Executive in proposing a budget that affects both taxpayers and the employment conditions of many of the county’s public safety employees. The CBA must be renegotiated every two years, and the budget must be proposed every fiscal year. The issue is clearly one that is capable of repetition. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal and proceed to evaluate the merits of the case.

II

Collective Bargaining Law and Montgomery County Charter The Fire Fighters argue that the LRA properly concluded that the County Executive violated the MCC sections pertaining to collective bargaining with the Fire Fighters by ²¹¹ failing to include sufficient funding in the FY12 Budget to implement the 2011 Agreement. The Fire Fighters contend that the LRA erred in finding the County Executive’s actions did not constitute a prohibited practice because of the circuit court’s decision in the FOP case. The Fire Fighters also aver that the County Executive’s actions are not immune from judicial review under the doctrine of legislative immunity. In response, the County argues that the County Executive has a discretionary legislative function in proposing a budget delegated to him by Charter § 303 that cannot be divested by any collective bargaining laws enacted by the County Council.

The County also argues that, under MCC § 33-155(a)(l), a prohibited practice charge cannot arise out of the County Executive’s “expression of his views,” and the County Executive “cannot be called to account before an arbitrator for an exercise of his legislative discretion.” At bottom, the dispute involves the interpretation of the Charter and any effect the collective bargaining laws enacted by the Council have on the County Executive’s responsibilities under Charter § 303. The Court of Appeals, after noting that “[t]he tension between public employee unions and local governments, particularly those bound by an executive budget system, has surfaced in Maryland appellate cases since at least [1945],” provided an extensive review of the cases arising since then in Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 428 Md. 723, 728 , 53 A.3d 1184 (2012). Succinctly, the Court concluded that collective bargaining is appropriate charter material and, therefore, there is no need to reiterate their analysis here. Id. at 745 , 53 A.3d 1184 .

A. The State Executive Budget System The Montgomery County budget system is modeled in many respects on the State budget system. The State has an “executive” budget system, where the budget originates with the Governor. So too, does Montgomery County — as the County points out, “[u]nder the Charter, only the County Executive can initiate the County’s budgetary process.” How ²¹² ever, where the State system limits the ability of the General Assembly to alter the budget submitted to it, 2 the Montgomery County system gives the Council unfettered authority to alter, reduce, or increase the appropriations submitted by the Executive. 3 The similarities of the two systems, in regard to the limitations placed on the executive branch’s discretion as to what must be included in the budget is instructive. The State budget process is set forth in Art. III, § 52 of the Maryland Constitution.

Section 52 was adopted, in large measure, to correct the haphazard system of appropriation that existed prior to 1915, which could easily lead to a deficit. 4 ²¹³ See McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 96 , 98 A.2d 561 (1953) (“Appropriations for various purposes were made piece-meal by the General Assembly, each project receiving independent consideration without relation to other claims upon the public purse.”). Section 52 apportioned responsibility according to the established branches of government by vesting “sole responsibility, within the limits of the Constitution and the provisions of existing law, of presenting to the Legislature a complete and comprehensive statement of the needs and resources of the State” to the Governor. Md. Action for Foster Children, Inc. v. State, 279 Md. 133, 146 , 367 A.2d 491 (1977) (quoting Journal of Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland at 133-34). The General Assembly was given authority to initiate appropriations, but was subject to the balanced budget requirement of Art. III, § 52.

The underlying purpose of establishing an orderly budget system with clearly delineated responsibility was the rationale behind the Court’s holding in Foster Children, where it stated: The provisions of the Budget Amendment to the Maryland Constitution, Art. III, § 52, and the purposes underlying those provisions set forth in the Goodnow Commission’s report, compel the conclusion that he funding of Art. 88A, ²¹⁴ § 60B(b) of the Code in future annual budgets is a matter constitutionally committed to the Governor’s discretion. For a court to require that the Governor fund the foster care program administered by the Juvenile Services Administration at a particular level in future Budgets prepared and submitted by the Governor would be inconsistent with several provisions of the Budget Amendment to the Constitution. Id. at 148, 367 A.2d 491 . The Court further explained: “The Legislature, by enacting statutes specifying minimum spending limits, cannot deprive the Governor of the discretion which the Constitution explicitly vests in him.” Id. at 151 , 367 A.2d 491 .

The Court stated that if the General Assembly could specify what was to be included in the budget and the amounts, then the executive budget system would be destroyed. Id. at 152 , 367 A.2d 491 . Dissenting, Chief Judge Murphy stated: To impose such a mandatory duty on the Governor is not to cause the destruction of the executive budget system, as the majority suggests. Indeed, not to impose such a duty upon the Governor has far more deadly consequences; most certainly it would herald the demise of the delicate and time-honored balance existing between the power and responsibility of the legislature to make the laws and the Governor’s duty to see that they are faithfully executed---Under the majority’s interpretation, the Governor enjoys unbridled authority to ignore the legislative will, or even worse, to decide, in his sole discretion, which enactments will be funded and which will not.

Id. at 153 , 367 A.2d 491 . The dissent pointed to the language of Art. III, § 52(4) requiring the Governor to include appropriations “for such other purposes as are set forth in the ... laws of the State” and argues that this provision removes the Governor’s discretion to simply exclude items from the budget. Id. at 157, 367 A.2d 491 . The dissent explains that it is not “new or novel” for the General Assembly “by enacting a general law [to] compel the Governor to include an appropria ²¹⁵ tion in his Budget Bill[.]” Id. at 158 , 367 A.2d 491 (citations omitted); see also id. at 160-61 , 367 A.2d 491 (citing the Goodnow Commission which drafted the Budget Amendment and Md.Code (1957, 1967 Repl.Vol.) Art. 15A, § 21A).

Citing to amicus curiae briefs, the dissent clarified the position of the General Assembly: Maryland’s adoption of an executive budget system has resulted in no transfer from the General Assembly of its fundamental power to declare what the law shall be, in fiscal as in other matters. At most, the adoption of such a system shifted to the Governor a role of initiation or proposal; it did not give to the executive branch any power to overrule legislative policy determinations. The Governor still has the power, within the guidelines established by the General Assembly by law, to allocate the general revenues of the state among the various programs provided by law and to determine the extent to which these programs shall be funded. If in his opinion the general revenues of the state will not be sufficient, then it is incumbent upon him to make this fact known to the Legislature so that it may levy such taxes as it deems best to provide the necessary revenue.

Id. at 158-160, 367 A.2d 491 . The majority’s holding was superceded in part by a 1978 constitutional amendment, which required the Governor to include in the annual budget bill any minimum level of funding for a program specified by statute. It is our view that, as a result, the dissent’s argument has been vindicated and, as the County Executive analogizes his role to that of the Governor, this discussion is pertinent to the case sub judice. Further, because the question of whether the Council can permissibly constrain the County Executive’s discretion in his budget submission is one of first impression, we will be guided by the State’s example. ²¹⁶ B. History of the Montgomery County Charter Montgomery county evolved differently than the State, with the position of the County Executive established via an amendment to the County’s original Charter.

Montgomery County is a “home rule” county, authorized by Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution to adopt a county charter. The county charter functions as a “constitution” for the county. Mont. Cnty. v. Anchor Inn Seafood Rest., 374 Md. 327, 331 , 822 A.2d 429 (2003) (citing Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 248 , 743 A.2d 748 (2000)).

Article XI-A, § 3, entitled requires “that a county adopting a home rule charter must select one of two types of government: (1) an elective legislative body known as the County Council without an elected County County Executive or (2) an elective County Council plus an elective County Executive.” Id. at 331, 822 A.2d 429 (footnote omitted); see Md. Const. Art. XI-A, § 3. In 1948, Montgomery County adopted a charter. In the original charter, Montgomery County had no county executive, making the elected County Council the entire governing body with both legislative and executive powers.

Id. at 332, 822 A.2d 429 . Twenty years later, in 1968, Montgomery County adopted a new charter, effective in 1970, which, pursuant to Article XI-A, imposed separation of powers with the Council as the legislative branch and a county executive as the executive branch of the government. Id.; see also Eggert v. Mont. Cnty.

Council, 263 Md. 243, 256-60 , 282 A.2d 474 (1971) (discussing the new charter and how the Council’s efforts to exercise powers now reserved to the executive branch were invalid). The original Charter expressly prohibited the Council, when sitting in executive session, from exercising legislative powers. Scull v. Mont. Citizens League, 249 Md. 271, 280 , 239 A.2d 92 (1968).

In construing the Council’s powers in its respective roles, the Court in Scull stated that “unambiguously ... the Council in executive session has and may exercise the administrative and executive powers ... and may implement and facilitate and insure the proper execution of laws and ordinances passed by the Council in legislative session[.]” Id. at ²¹⁷ 281-82 , 239 A.2d 92 . This same delineation of power is reflected in the new (and current) Charter. Article 1 of the Charter describes the legislative branch of the county, with § 101 stating, in pertinent part: All legislative powers which may be exercised by Montgomery County under the Constitution and laws of Maryland, including all law making powers heretofore exercised by the General Assembly of Maryland but transferred to the people of the County by virtue of the adoption of this Charter, and the legislative powers vested in the County Commissioners as a District Council for the Montgomery County Suburban District, shall be vested in the County Council. The legislative power shall also include, but not be limited to, the power to enact public local laws for the County and repeal or amend local laws for the County heretofore enacted by the General Assembly upon the matters covered by Article 25A, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957, as now in force or hereafter amended, and the power to legislate for the peace, good government, health, safety or welfare of the County.

Article 2 of the Charter sets forth the executive branch powers, stating in § 201: The executive power vested in Montgomery County by the Constitution and laws of Maryland and by this Charter shall be vested in a County Executive who shall be the chief executive officer of Montgomery County and who shall faithfully execute the laws. In such capacity, the County Executive shall be the elected executive officer mentioned in Article XI-A, Section 3 of the Constitution of Maryland. The County Executive shall have no legislative power except the power to make rules and regulations expressly delegated by a law enacted by the Council or by this Charter. The Charter’s delegation of power is critical to an analysis of the meaning of Charter § 303.

Section 303 states: The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than January 15 and March 15, respectively of each year, proposed capital and operating budgets including recommended expenditures and revenue .sources for the ensu ²¹⁸ ing fiscal year and any other information in such form and detail as the County Executive shall determine and as may be prescribed by law. These budgets shall be consistent with six-year programs. A summary shall be submitted with the budgets containing an analysis of the fiscal implications for the County of all available budgets of any agencies for which the Council sets tax rates, makes levies, approves programs or budgets. As discussed, Charter § 305 gives the Council the authority to “add to, delete from, increase or decrease any appropriation item in the operating or capital budget.” The Council clearly did not divest itself of authority to overhaul the budget submitted by the Executive in the way that the General Assembly is precluded from altering that submitted by the Governor.

Section 510A states: “The Montgomery County Council shall provide by law for collective bargaining with binding arbitration with an authorized representative of the Montgomery County career fire fighters. Any law so enacted shall prohibit strikes or work stoppages by career fire fighters. (Election of 11-8-94.)” The Council enacted the collective bargaining laws at issue pursuant to Charter § 510A and imposed binding arbitration on the Executive, but not on itself. See footnote 8 and accompanying text, infra.

It is evident that the Council retained nearly all the discretion in enacting a budget, subject only to the Executive’s line-item veto power. C. Statutory Interpretation Recently, in FOP 35, 427 Md. 561 , 50 A.3d 579 (2012), another case involving Montgomery County and a union, the Court of Appeals was called upon to determine whether the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights, Md.Code (2003, 2011 Repl.Vol.), §§ 3-101 to 3-113 of the Public Safety Article (“LEOBR”) preempted arbitration. In doing so, the Court stated that the issue was one of statutory interpretation and reiterated the following from Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hayward, 426 Md. 638, 649-50 , 45 A.3d 224 (2012): ²¹⁹ It is a well-settled principle that the primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. The first step in this inquiry is to examine the plain language of the statute, and if the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.

Thus, where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts do not normally look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent. Furthermore, words may not be added to, or removed from, an unambiguous statute in order to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature chose to use[.] Id. at 572-73, 50 A.3d 579 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Charters are subject to the same canons of statutory construction that apply to the interpretation of statutes.” Just as the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, so it is “the cardinal rule of charter interpretation.” Mayor & City Council v. Bunting, 168 Md.App. 134, 141 , 895 A.2d 1068 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). However, the Court of Appeals has said: where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. In such circumstances, the court, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.

Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986) (internal citations omitted). Even under the plain meaning rule, however, we do not ignore the Legislature’s purpose if it is readily known ... ²²⁰ [and] may ... consider the particular problem or problems the Legislature was addressing, and the objectives it sought to attain. Maryland — Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Anderson, 164 Md.App. 540, 569-70 , 884 A.2d 157 (2005) (internal citations omitted). “[W]e are obligated to construe the statute as a whole, so that all provisions are considered together and, to the extent possible, reconciled and harmonized.” Id. at 570 , 884 A.2d 157 (citations omitted).

A statutory provision should be interpreted in the context of the entire statutory scheme. See Gordon Family P’ship v. Gar On Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138 , 702 A.2d 753 (1997). Reading the various provisions together and giving effect to each can aid in determining the intent of the legislature. Office of the Pub.

Defender, 413 Md. at 464, 993 A.2d 55 . Thus, viewing § 303 in context of the entire Charter, and reviewing the history of Charter § 510A is instructive. Section 302 of the Charter, entitled “Six Year Programs for Public Services, Capital Improvements, and Fiscal Policy,” states: The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than January 15 of each even-numbered year, a comprehensive six-year program for capital improvements. The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than March 15 of each year, comprehensive six-year programs for public services and fiscal policy.

The six-year programs shall require a vote of at least five Council members for approval or modification. Final Council approval of the six-year programs shall occur at or about the date of budget approval. The public services program shall include a statement of program objectives and recommend levels of public service by the County government, and shall provide an estimate of costs, a statement of revenue sources, and an estimate of the impact of the program on County revenues and the capital budget. The capital improvements program shall include a statement of the objectives of capital programs and the rela ²²¹ tionship of capital programs to the County’s long-range development plans; shall recommend capital projects and a construction schedule; and shall provide an estimate of costs, a statement of anticipated revenue sources, and an estimate of the impact of the program on County revenues and the operating budget.

The capital improvements program shall, to the extent authorized by law, include all capital projects and programs of all agencies for which the County sets tax rates or approves budgets or programs. The Council may amend an approved capital improvements program at any time by an affirmative vote of six Council-members. The fiscal program shall show projections of revenues and expenditures for all functions, recommend revenue and expenditure policies for the program period and analyze the impact of tax and expenditure patterns on public programs and the economy of the County. The County Executive shall provide such other information relating to these programs as may be prescribed by law.

All capital improvement projects which are estimated to cost in excess of an amount to be established by law or which the County Council determines to possess unusual characteristics or to be of sufficient public importance shall be individually authorized by law; provided however, that any project declared by the County Council to be of an emergency nature necessary for the protection of the public health or safety shall not be subject to this requirement if the project is approved by the affirmative vote of six Councilmembers. Any project mandated by law, statutory or otherwise, interstate compact, or any project required by law to serve two or more jurisdictions shall, likewise, not be subject to this requirement. The County Council shall prescribe by law the methods and procedures for implementation of this provision. (Emphasis added).

Just as in Charter § 303, in the above-cited section of the Charter, the County Executive is required to include in the ²²² six-year plan any “other information ... as may be prescribed by law.” The Council may amend an approved capital improvement program at any time by an affirmative vote of six Councilmembers. Here, the Charter again reserves to the Council the authority to amend the County Executive’s submissions. Section 303 requires the County Executive to make the budget consistent with these six-year programs, a clear and uncontested limit on the County Executive’s discretion. The Council retains the authority to limit the County Executive’s power through legislation in other Charter provisions as well.

Section 217, entitled “Reorganization of the Executive Branch” states that “[t]he Council may prescribe by law the organization of the Executive Branch of County Government.” (Emphasis added). Section 309, entitled “Transfer of Funds” permits the County Executive to “transfer an unencumbered appropriation balance within a division or between divisions of the same department” but allows the Council to limit that authority in stating that “[tjransfers between departments, boards or commissions, or to any new account, shall be made only by the County Council upon the recommendation of the County Executive.” Section 501, entitled “Disaster-Continuity of Government During Emergencies” states: In order to ensure continuity of government during an emergency caused by a disaster or enemy attack, the Council shall prescribe by law for the temporary suspension of specific provisions of this Charter and for temporary succession to the powers and duties of public offices whether filled by election or appointment. (Emphasis added). The Charter affords the Council the authority to control the County Executive’s action or limit the County Executive’s discretion by enacting laws specific to more general Charter provisions.

Moving on, the Charter provision in question, § 303, is not ambiguous. It requires, as the Permanent Umpire in the FOP Decision found, the