Montgomery County Education Ass'n v. Board of Education

ELDRIDGE, Judge. Maryland Code (1978, 1985 Repl.Vol.), § 6-408(b)(l) of Education Article, empowers a public school employer and its employees’ designated representatives to “meet and negotiate” a collective bargaining agreement relating to “salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions.” Section 6-408(a)(2) of the Education Article permits the parties to “provide for binding arbitration of grievances arising under the [collective bargaining] agreement that the parties have agreed to be subject to arbitration.” This case requires us to decide whether the employees’ designated representatives may require a public school employer to negotiate, and thus possibly to arbitrate, the issues of the school calendar and job reclassification. 1 I. The Montgomery County Education Association, Inc. (“MCEA”) is the designated representative for teachers and certain other professional personnel employed by the Mont ³⁰⁶ gomery County Board of Education (“the County Board”). In 1970, MCEA claimed that the County Board had violated the collective bárgaining agreement then in force by unilaterally adopting a school calendar and reclassifying staff positions. The State Board of Education, however, ruled that the County Board was not obliged to negotiate either of these issues.

MCEA v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery Co., No. 70-1, 1 Opinions of the Md. State Bd. of Educ. 35 (1970) (“Opinion 70-1”). According to the State Board, establishing a school calendar was a local board’s “prerogative.” Moreover, in the State Board’s view, reclassification decisions rested in a local board’s “complete control” and were therefore “non-negotiable.” Over the next thirteen years, the parties negotiated several collective bargaining agreements, and MCEA did not challenge Opinion 70-1. While the parties were negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement in 1983, however, MCEA submitted an initial proposal that included the subjects of the school calendar and job reclassification. Relying on Opinion 70-1, the County Board declined to negotiate with regard to these subjects.

MCEA then brought its case before the State Board, asking it to overrule Opinion 70-1 and to order the County Board to negotiate these issues. 2 The State Board referred the matter to a Hearing Examiner. Before the Hearing Examiner, MCEA advanced a broad, literal interpretation of § 6-408(b)(l). Under this interpretation, any matter that relates, apparently even tangentially, to “salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions,” could be subject to collective bargaining. MCEA contended that the calendar related to working conditions and that job reclassification related to salary; therefore, MCEA concluded, both issues were negotiable.

The County Board, on the other hand, urged a narrower ³⁰⁷ interpretation, which would ensure that the Board, and not an arbitrator, would carry out the Board’s statutory duties to determine and implement educational policy. On the calendar issue, the Hearing Examiner concluded that Opinion 70-1’s original rationale was still valid; therefore, she recommended that the State Board reaffirm this aspect of its prior opinion. As to the reclassification issue, the Hearing Examiner concluded that subjecting such decisions to collective bargaining would lead to continual negotiations between the County Board and its three unions. This in turn, she believed, would create chaos in the management function and erode the statutory provisions that empower local boards to manage public school systems.

Nevertheless, she recommended that the State Board modify Opinion 70-1 to require the County Board to negotiate with respect to an “across-the-board” provision that would protect employees whose salaries had been reduced by reclassification. The State Board adopted the Hearing Examiner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, except for the final recommendation that Opinion 70-1 be modified in part. According to the State Board, a requirement that the County Board negotiate concerning a provision to protect employees adversely affected by reclassification would lead to the same difficulties that would arise from a requirement that the County Board negotiate reclassification issues in general. Adopting MCEA’s terminology, the State Board concluded that such a provision was not a “mandatory” subject of collective bargaining.

MCEA v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery Co., No. 84-31, 3 Opinions of the Md. State Bd. of Educ. 602 (1984). MCEA filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County an action for judicial review of the State Board’s decision. The circuit court agreed with the State Board’s conclusion that the school calendar was nonnegotiable. The court held, however, that the salary impact of reclassification decisions was a “mandatory” subject of collective bargain ³⁰⁸ ing, and the court reversed this aspect of the State Board’s decision.

Both the County Board and MCEA appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. In a reported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, stating that “the ‘true intent and meaning’ of § 6-408(b) is laced with educational policy considerations” and that “the State Board’s decision should therefore have been regarded as final.” Bd. of Educ. v. Montgomery Co. Educ. Ass’n, 66 Md.App. 729 , 743-744, 505 A.2d 905 (1986). 3 MCEA filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. Because of the importance of the issues presented, we granted the petition.

II

Initially, MCEA asserts that the Court of Special Appeals gave “the State Board absolute, total, final, and unreviewable authority over any matter involving educational policy,” and that “this is a completely inaccurate ³⁰⁹ reading of prior Maryland cases dealing with the scope of judicial review of State Board decisions.” (MCEA’s brief, p. 10). MCEA goes on to argue that the disputes in this case involve statutory interpretation, namely an interpretation of § 6-408(b)(l) of the Education Article which delineates the scope of collective bargaining negotiations. According to MCEA, this question of statutory interpretation is principally for the reviewing court to resolve, as “courts have far greater expertise in this area of statutory construction than the legally unskilled members of the State Board of Education.” (Id. at 16). MCEA concludes that the State Board’s interpretation of § 6-408(b)(l) is erroneous.

It is true that, under our cases, a reviewing court should not always defer entirely to the State Board’s interpretation of a statute. If the State Board’s interpretation or application of § 6-408(b)(l), in a particular situation, would clearly be contrary to the statute’s plain meaning, a reviewing court must reject that interpretation. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Garrett Co. v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55 , 453 A.2d 1185 (1982). We disagree, however, with MCEA’s position that reviewing courts should consider virtually de novo the State Board’s resolution of issues arising under § 6-408(b)(l).

For a number of reasons, the State Board’s interpretation and application of § 6-408(b)(l) is entitled to a great deal of deference from reviewing courts. An agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers is generally entitled to weight. Bd. of Ed. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 790-791 , 506 A.2d 625, 633 (1986); Comm’n on Hum. Rel. v. Mass Transit, 294 Md. 225, 233 , 449 A.2d 385, 389 (1982), and cases there cited.

This principle is particularly important in the case of the State Board of Education. As pointed out in Bd. of Ed. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, supra, 305 Md. at 791 , 506 A.2d at 633 , “the paramount role of the State Board of Education in interpreting the public education law sets it apart from most administrative agencies.” Section 2-205(e)(l) of the Education Article of the Code provides that the State Board “shall explain the true intent and meaning” of the Education Article and the ³¹⁰ bylaws, rules, and regulations promulgated thereunder. In addition, § 2-205(e)(3) provides that, in controversies and disputes under the above provisions, the State Board’s decision is “final.” These broad powers necessarily circumscribe the scope of judicial'review of State Board decisions. Moreover, unlike some other issues, the interpretation of § 6-408(b)(l) is fraught with questions of educational policy.

The General Assembly has charged the State Board, not the courts, with the duty of determining the elementary and secondary educational policies of the State. § 2-205(b)(l). This duty must further circumscribe the scope of judicial review under § 6-408(b)(l). There are two additional reasons for deference in this case. First, MCEA has drawn into question the State Board’s longstanding interpretation of § 6-408(b)(l), an interpretation that was adopted almost contemporaneously with the enactment of that statute and that the General Assembly has left unchanged.

Courts generally should defer to such interpretations. Board of Educ., Garrett Co. v. Lendo, supra, 295 Md. at 63 , 453 A.2d at 1189 . Second, the resolution of the issues involved in this case could have a substantial impact on the State Board’s authority. As we observed in Hubbard, supra, where we discussed, but declined to decide, these issues ( 305 Md. at 791-792 , 506 A.2d at 633-634 ): “The ... [employees] have ... argued for an extremely broad interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘all matters that relate to salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions.’ Literally, almost any educational matter may relate to an employee’s ‘working conditions’ in the broadest sense of the term.

In fact, at oral argument before us, one of the counsel for the [employees] was unable to produce an example, other than a tenure decision, of an educational matter which would not fall within the scope of collective bargaining under the [employees’] reading of the statutory language. If such interpretation is correct, arbitrators could in the future be making many of the educational policy decisions which have heretofore been ³¹¹ made by the local boards of education and the State Board of Education. “On the other hand, the General Assembly may have contemplated that a somewhat narrower scope be given to the concept of ‘matters’ relating ‘to salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions,’ perhaps intending (as was argued before us) to draw a line between educational policy matters and wages, hours, salaries and other working conditions. If so, such a line will be somewhat elusive in many contexts, and application of the State Board of Education’s expertise would clearly be desirable before a court attempts to resolve the matter.” Consequently, we reject MCEA’s contention that a reviewing court should accord little or no deference to the State Board’s construction and application of § 6-408(b)(l).

III

In the course of its argument concerning the proper construction of § 6—408(b)(1), MCEA contends that the statute merely authorizes but does not require local boards to engage in collective bargaining on many matters that might fall within the section’s ambiguous terms. To this end, MCEA distinguishes “mandatory” subjects of collective bargaining, which a local board must agree to negotiate, from “permissive” subjects, which a local board may but need not agree to negotiate, and “illegal” subjects, which a local board may never agree to negotiate. MCEA claims that these three categories are accepted in public sector labor law. In our view, however, the three categories are neither uniformly accepted elsewhere nor consistent with Maryland law.

These categories evolved in private sector labor law under the definition of collective bargaining in § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1982). See Fibreboard Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 223 , 85 S.Ct. 398, 409 , 13 L.Ed.2d 233, 246 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); N.L.R.B. v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern., etc., 575 F.2d 394, 397 (2d Cir.1978). As one state court ob ³¹² served, however, “it does not necessarily follow that federal precedent relating to private employment is particularly helpful in resolving the difficulties arising in the public sector.” Pennsylvania L. R. Bd. v. State Col. A.S.D., 461 Pa. 494, 499 , 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975).

It is true that a number of state courts utilize these three categories in public employee collective bargaining decisions; however, this is often because the pertinent public sector collective bargaining statute creates or has been construed to create a “permissive” category, City of Fort Dodge v. Iowa P.E.R.B., 275 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 1979) (construing Iowa Code Ann. § 20.9 (1978)); Pennsylvania L. R. Bd., supra, 461 Pa. at 501 , 337 A.2d at 265 (Pa.Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 702 (Purdon Supp.1987); Beloit Educ. Ass’n v. WERC, 73 Wis.2d 43 , 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976) (construing Wis.Stat.Ann. § 110.70(l)(d) (West 1974); or because the pertinent collective bargaining statute is deemed in pari materia with § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 578 , 295 A.2d 526, 533 (1972) (Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-153(d) (1987)); Incorporated Village of Lynbrook v. New York State Pub. Emp. Relations Bd., 48 N.Y.2d 398 , 402-403 n. 1, 423 N.Y.S.2d 466 , 467 n. 1, 399 N.E.2d 55 , 57 n. 1 (1979) (N.Y.Civ.Serv.Law § 204, subd. 3 (Lawyer’s Coop. 1982)); Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or. 217, 235-236 , 621 P.2d 547, 559 (1980) (Or.Rev.Stat. § 243.650(4) (1985)).

See also Minn. Arrowhead Dist., etc. v. St. Louis Cty., 290 N.W.2d 608 , 611 (Minn.1980). On the other hand, several courts simply recognize a dichotomy between negotiable and nonnegotiable subjects, with no intermediate category. See, e.g., Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Kenai Peninsula Ed., 572 P.2d 416, 423 (Alaska 1977); Metro.

Tech. Com. Col. Ed. Assn. v. Metro.

Tech. Com. Col. Area, 203 Neb. 832, 837-838 , 281 N.W.2d 201, 204 (1979).

And at least one court has expressly held that, under its state law, no permissive category exists. Ridgefield Park Ed. Ass’n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Ed., 78 N.J. 144, 162 , 393 A.2d 278, 287 (1978). ³¹³ As the existence of a “permissive” category depends on the applicable collective bargaining statute, we turn to an examination of Maryland law. In construing § 6-408(b)(l), we must keep in mind the well-established principle that, absent express legislative authority, a government agency may not enter into binding arbitration agreements under which an arbitrator establishes the wages, hours, etc., for public employees. Office & Prof Employees Int’l v. MTA, 295 Md. 88, 97 , 453 A.2d 1191, 1195 (1982); Maryland Cl.

Emp. Ass’n v. Anderson, 281 Md. 496, 508-513 , 380 A.2d 1032, 1038-1041 (1977); Mugford v. City of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 270-271 , 44 A.2d 745, 747 (1945). The purpose of this rule is to insure that a governmental agency does not, without authority, abdicate or bargain away its statutory discretion. See Maryland Cl.

Emp., supra, 281 Md. at 508 , 380 A.2d at 1038 ; Mugford, supra, 185 Md. at 270 , 44 A.2d at 747 . Section 6-408(b)(l) constitutes the sole authorization for local boards of education to engage in collective bargaining. In this section, the General Assembly employed mandatory language: “[A] public school employer ... shall meet and negotiate ... on all matters that relate to salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions.” (Emphasis added). Any particular subject either will or will not fall within the scope of this provision.

If a subject falls within the provision, the language of the statute makes it a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. If it does not come within this provision, there is no other legislation authorizing collective bargaining and arbitration with regard to the subject, and, under our cases, a local board would be without authority to negotiate a binding arbitration agreement covering the matter. Therefore, under § 6-408(b)(l) and this Court’s decisions, a local board is either required to agree to negotiate a particular subject, or it is not permitted to agree to negotiate that subject. Maryland law leaves no room for subjects that a local board may, but need not, agree to negotiate. ³¹⁴ This conclusion, to some extent, undermines MCEA’s construction of § 6-408(b)(l).

Counsel for MCEA acknowledged at oral argument in this case that, under MCEA’s construction, “just about everything” would fall within the scope of § 6-408(b)(l). He justified this construction by contending that, in many instances, local boards would be permitted, but not required, to agree to engage in collective bargaining. But because Maryland law contains no such “permissive” category, under MCEA’s construction, local boards would be required, rather than merely permitted, to negotiate “just about everything.” Thus, MCEA would read § 6-408(b)(l) more broadly than even § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, which does not mandate collective bargaining on subjects that lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Fibreboard Corp. v. N.L.R.B., supra.

IV

As noted above, under MCEA’s interpretation of § 6-408(b)(l), a local board would be required to negotiate any matter, except perhaps a tenure provision, 4 that in any way “relates to salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions.” It is readily apparent that many such matters also involve questions of educational policy, which local boards and the State Board of Education are charged by statute to determine and implement. In order to exempt educational policy determinations from the collective bargaining process, the State Board rejected MCEA’s interpretation. We believe that the State Board’s position is reasonable. Under MCEA’s interpretation, a local board and the employees’ representative could together completely remove the State Board’s authority in a county.

The local board ³¹⁵ and the representative might preempt particular State Board directives by entering into binding arbitration agreements on innumerable matters of educational policy. In requiring collective bargaining with public school employees, we do not believe that the General Assembly intended to authorize local boards thus to evade their statutory duty to carry out the State Board’s policies. See §§ 4-107(1), 4-204. Moreover, MCEA’s interpretation might be plausible only if one reads § 6-408(b)(l) in isolation and not in the context of the entire subtitle of which it is a part.

Section 6-411(a) of the Education Article provides: “This subtitle does not supercede any other provision of the Code____” But numerous Code provisions charge local boards with substantial responsibility in matters of educational policy. For example, § 4-101(a) vests in a local board control over educational matters that affect the county. Section 4-107(1) states that a local board shall to the best of its ability carry out the applicable provisions of the Education Article and the State Board’s bylaws, rules, and regulations. Section 4-107(2) requires a local board to maintain a reasonably uniform system of public schools.

Section 4-107(3) states that, subject to the provisions of the Education Article and to the State Board’s bylaws, rules, and regulations, a local board shall determine the educational policies