Montgomery County v. Lindsay

Liss, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In July of 1978, George E. Angerman, Jr., was employed by the State Department of Assessments and Taxation as a tax assessor. He was at that time and for some years prior thereto a member of the Montgomery County Employees Retirement System. On July 10, 1978, Angerman was the victim of a homicide which occurred in the garage of the building where he was employed in Rockville, Maryland.

The appellee herein, Margaret J. Lindsay, by a document entitled "Authorization to establish or change deductions,” dated January 25,1978, was designated by Angerman as the primary beneficiary of his retirement contributions. At the time of his death, Angerman was survived by Melanie Angerman, his daughter by a former marriage, one of the appellants herein. Following the death of Angerman, his former wife, Charlene S. Buckwalter, submitted a death ⁶⁷⁷ benefits application to the Acting Personnel Director for Montgomery County on behalf of appellant Melanie Angerman. The personnel director approved the payments of certain benefits to Angerman’s daughter under the provisions of Section 33-46 (b) (2) of the Montgomery County Employees Retirement System.

On January 12, 1979, the personnel director, Marjorie J. Collum, notified the appellee that the Montgomery County Employee’s Retirement Law required that a designated beneficiary was entitled to receive the member’s accumulated contribution plus credited interest, unless there was a specific provision for the payment of an annuity. She also advised the appellee that in the instance of a service connected death (as this one was), the statute provided for a spouse’s and child’s benefit, based upon the member’s final earnings. The personnel director determined that under the facts surrounding Angerman’s death the minor child was eligible to receive an annuity payment. The director then concluded that even though the appellee was the member’s beneficiary, she was not entitled to receive the return of the accumulated contributions plus credited interest.

Appellee sued Montgomery County, the other appellant herein, by way of a declaratory judgment action and sought a declaration of the rights, duties and obligations of the parties under the Employees’ Retirement System of Montgomery County. She also sought an order directing the appellant to pay appellee the accumulated contributions plus interest credited. The trial judge, after argument, concluded that the appellee, Margaret Lindsay, was entitled to receive the member’s contributions and interest under the provisions of Section 33-39 (c) (2) of the Montgomery County Employees Retirement Law and that the appellant, Melanie Angerman, was not entitled to benefits under Section 33-46 of the law. From an order implementing this conclusion the within appeal was filed.

The sole question raised by this appeal is: Whether the lower court’s decision that the provisions of Section 33-46 entitled "Death Benefits and Designation of Beneficiaries” do not prevail over the provisions of Section 33-39 entitled "Member Contributions and Credited Inter ⁶⁷⁸ est” of the Employees Retirement System of Montgomery County, was erroneous as a matter of law: 1. The issue here presented is a question of statutory interpretation. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151 , 416 A.2d 734 (1980); Department of State Planning v. Mayor and Council of City of Hagerstown, 288 Md. 9 , 415 A.2d 296, 299 (1980).

The Court of Appeals and this Court have enunciated several tests for determining legislative intent. The intention of the legislature must be sought in the first instance in the words of the statute. Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84 , 400 A.2d 1091 (1979); Board of Supervisors of Election of Baltimore City v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133 , 141 A.2d 734 (1958); Kimbrough v. Giant Food, Inc., 26 Md. App. 640 , 339 A.2d 688 (1975). Second, the court should consider the object or purpose to be obtained by the statutes in question, and the courts should construe the law so as to carry out, effectuate, or aid in its general purposes and policies.

State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416 , 348 A.2d 275 (1975), on remand, 30 Md. App. 1 , 351 A.2d 477 , cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 , 96 Sup.Ct. 1680 , 48 L.Ed.2d 185 (1976); State Department of Assessments and Taxation v. Ellicott-Brandt, Inc., 237 Md. 328 , 206 A.2d 131 (1965); Cooley v. White Cross Health and Beauty Aid Discount Centers, Inc., 229 Md. 343 , 183 A.2d 381 (1962); Prince George’s County v. Bahrami, 33 Md. App. 644 , 365 A.2d 343 (1976). Third, where a law such as the employees retirement system law has various parts, provision should be made, where possible, to give effect to all of its parts. Thomas v. State, 227 Md. 314 , 353 A.2d 256 (1976); Thomas v. Police Comm’r of Baltimore City, 211 Md. 357 , 127 A.2d 625 (1957); Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 615 , 65 A.2d 299 (1949). Fourth, it is well settled that specific terms covering a given subject matter prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove ⁶⁷⁹ controlling.

Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission of Maryland, 297 U.S. 209 (1936); United States v. Milk Distributors Association, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 792 (D.Md. 1961). Fifth, the court may not disregard the natural import of the statutory language unless some imperative reason is found in the statute for enlarging or restricting its meaning. Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County, 267 Md. 501 , 298 A.2d 427 (1973); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403 , 237 A.2d 35 (1968); Celanese Corporation of America v. Davis, 186 Md. 463 , 47 A.2d 379 (1946). Finally, where statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and sensible meaning, courts are not at liberty to insert or delete words with a view toward making the statute express an intention which is different from its plain meaning.

Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County, supra; Gatewood v. State, 244 Md. 609 , 224 A.2d 677 (1966); Fowel v. State, 206 Md. 101 , 110 A.2d 524 (1955); Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78 , 102 A.2d 821 (1954). The pertinent provisions of the Montgomery County Employees Retirement Law are as follows: Section 33-39 (c). Member Contributions and Credited Interest. Return of Member Contributions.

(1) Upon termination of County service, except by death or retirement, each member who has not elected to vest shall be paid the full amount of accumulated contributions with credited interest less any indebtedness to the County Government or the Montgomery County Employees Federal Credit Union. Section 33-46 (b). Spouse’s and Children’s Benefits of a Member Whose Death is Service Connected. If a member dies, while in the service of the County or participating agency on or after August 15, 1965, and satisfactory proof that death was the result of injuries sustained in the line of duty, or was directly attributable to the inherent hazards of ⁶⁸⁰ the duties performed by the member, is submitted, and the death was not due to willful negligence, payments effective March 1, 1974, will be made as follows: (1) A spouse’s benefit equal to twenty-five percent of the member’s final earnings, but not less than two hundred fifty dollars per month until death; plus (2) A child’s benefit equal to five percent of the member’s final earnings but not less than fifty dollars per month until the child reaches age twenty-one or for life if the child is disabled and