Montgomery County v. Voorhees

²⁹⁷ BISHOP, Judge. Cathy M. Voorhees (now Cathy Fowler) filed an action in negligence against Gary Kittay for personal injuries she sustained in an automobile collision at the intersection of Route 29 and Fairland Road in Montgomery County, Maryland on September 26, 1984. A Second Amended Complaint, filed on April 18, 1986, added Montgomery County (the County) as a defendant and alleged that the County failed to repair and maintain properly the traffic light governing the left turn signal at the intersection. The Second Amended Complaint also alleged that the County had actual notice that the light cycles at the intersection were operating defectively and that, as a direct and proximate consequence of the County’s negligence, Voorhees suffered injuries.

A trial was held on January 8, 1990, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Voorhees and Kittay and against the County in the amount of $100,000.00. At the close of Voorhees’ case, and at the close of all the evidence, the County made Motions for Judgment, both of which were denied. The County also filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, Alternatively, for a New Trial which the court denied. Montgomery County appeals from the judgment of the circuit court.

ISSUES We have consolidated the three issues presented by appellant into the following two issues: I. Whether appellee’s claim is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity; and, II. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. FACTS On September 26, 1984, Voorhees was operating her vehicle in a southerly direction on Route 29 approaching Fairland Road in Montgomery County, Maryland. As Voo ²⁹⁸ rhees made a left turn at that intersection, her vehicle collided with a vehicle being driven by Kittay, which was proceeding north on Route 29.

Voorhees testified that she had a green left turn arrow signal when she made her left turn onto Fairland Road. Kittay testified that he had been traveling northbound in the right lane of Route 29, and that he stopped at a red traffic light at the intersection of Route 29 and Fairland Road. Kittay did not recall seeing any vehicle turning left in front of him. He testified, however, that once the light turned green, he waited at least three seconds before he edged out, because there was a van or truck in the center lane of traffic which blocked his vision to his left.

Kittay’s witness, Francine Berk, who was a passenger in Kittay’s vehicle, testified that the light had turned green before Kittay began to move his vehicle forward into the intersection. Kittay’s testimony was corroborated by Thomas Blankenship, an eyewitness who was traveling northbound on Route 29 in the left lane. He testified that there was a truck or van in the center lane which may have blocked Kittay’s vision. He also testified that he observed Voorhees make her left turn well after Kittay’s light had turned green.

Bruce Mangum, traffic engineer for Montgomery County, testified that there had been no indication of malfunction of the lights at that intersection. He also testified as to the design, installation, timing, sequence and operation of traffic signals in Montgomery County. Ronald Wilke, Chief of the Division for Traffic and Engineering for the Montgomery County Department of Transportation, testified that it was his office’s responsibility to establish and monitor the timing of traffic lights in Montgomery County. He testified that the Department decided not to change the traffic controls at this intersection to an all red clearance interval 1 ²⁹⁹ because the Department’s policy was not to install all red clearance intervals for left turn signals.

Maryland State Trooper Glenn Reuschling, who responded to the scene of the accident, testified that after the accident Voorhees was confused about the color of the light at the time she entered the intersection. Both Trooper Reuschling and Detective Sergeant Linda Payne of the Maryland State Police had previously investigated the signals at the intersection, as well as signals with the same sequence at other intersections along Route 29. They found that it was not possible for a vehicle to turn left and pass completely through the intersection within the three seconds allotted for the yellow cycle. This means that a vehicle making a left turn just as the left turn signal changes from green to yellow would have only three seconds to clear the northbound traffic lanes before the northbound traffic had a green signal light.

As a result of her investigation, Sergeant Payne recommended to her superiors that the green signal be delayed in order to give vehicles making a left turn more time to clear the intersection. Discussion I. Appellant argues that “the State of Maryland should confer governmental immunity on its counties and municipalities for the planning, designing and timing of traffic lights” because such acts are discretionary and governmental functions. The conferring of immunity is a function of the legislative branch of government, not the judicial branch. We will address the issue of whether governmental immunity should have been applied in the case sub judice.

In Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 , 27 S.Ct. 526, 527 , 51 L.Ed. 834 (1907), the Supreme Court ³⁰⁰ stated the reason for sovereign immunity: 2 A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or absolute theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In Godwin v. County Comm’rs of St. Mary’s County, 256 Md. 326, 334 , 260 A.2d 295 (1970), the Court of Appeals stated that: As applied in Maryland, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not only applicable to the State, itself, as a governmental agency, but is also applicable to its agencies and instrumentalities, including its municipal political sub-divisions, if engaged in a governmental function as an agent of the State, unless the General Assembly either directly or by necessary implication has waived immunity. Accordingly, in tort actions, the counties in Maryland are immune with regard to those matters categorized as “governmental” but they are not immune from liability with regard to those matters categorized as “proprietary”. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Kranz, 308 Md. 618, 622 , 521 A.2d 729 (1987).

While there is no all-inclusive, bright-line test to determine whether a matter is governmental or proprietary in nature, the Court of Appeals, in Mayor and City of Council of Baltimore v. State ex. rel. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 276 , 195 A. 571 (1937), stated that: Where the act in question is sanctioned by legislative authority, is solely for the public benefit, with no profit or emolument inuring to the municipality, and tends to benefit the public health and promote the welfare of the whole public, and has in it no element of private interest, it is governmental in its nature. ³⁰¹ Based on this test alone, it is logical to conclude that the planning, designing and timing of traffic lights is a governmental act, since a county, in performing these acts as the State’s agent, appears to act for the public benefit and to promote the welfare of the whole public. In Maryland, however, “the liability of a county for its negligence arising out of its maintenance and control of the county roads is an exception to the general rule that counties share in the immunity of the sovereign.” Godwin, 256 Md. at 335 , 260 A.2d 295 (emphasis in original). See also, Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539, 548 , 479 A.2d 1321 (1984) (“The duty to maintain streets and highways in a reasonably safe condition is a major exception to the immunity from suit in Maryland of counties and municipalities.”); Cox v. Anne Arundel County, 181 Md. 428, 431 , 31 A.2d 179 (1943) (when maintaining public highways, a municipality is acting in its corporate capacity, and is liable for suit for its negligence).

In City of Baltimore v. Seidel, 44 Md.App. 465, 476 , 409 A.2d 747 , cert. denied, 287 Md. 750 (1980), we held that the placing of warning signs on public highways is a proprietary or corporate function and, consequently, the City was not immune from suit. Appellant argues that the rationale in Seidel was not explained and that the facts are not similar to the instant case. Appellant therefore, urges us not to apply the holding in Seidel to the facts in the case sub judice. Although the holding in Seidel was succinctly stated and the rationale for the holding was not explained, Judge Thompson, writing for this Court, correctly applied the well-established law in this State.

See, e.g., Godwin, 256 Md. at 335 , 260 A.2d 295 ; Cox, 181 Md. at 431 , 31 A.2d 179 ; Tadjer, 300 Md. at 548 , 479 A.2d 1321 ; Blueford, 173 Md. at 272-73 , 195 A. 571 . We do not have the power to alter this exception to the general rule that counties share in the immunity of the sovereign. As the Court of Appeals stated in