Montgomery v. Eastern Correctional Institution

HARRELL, Judge. On 9 September 1999, Petitioner, Sheila Montgomery, an administrative assistant in the Warden’s Office at the Eastern Correctional Institution (“the ECI”) in Westover, Maryland, filed a personnel grievance against her then supervisor, the Acting Warden, George Kaloroumakis. Approximately two months later, Montgomery was reassigned by the newly appointed Warden, Robert Kupec, to an administrative assistant position, at the same pay and classification, in the ECI’s ⁶¹⁸ Maintenance Department. Montgomery, a few months after that event, filed a “Whistleblower” complaint with the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Budget and Management (“the Department”) that Montgomery contends comes within the ambit of subtitle 3 of section 5 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article of the Maryland Code (1993, 1997 Repl.Vol.), entitled “Maryland Whistleblower Law in the Executive Branch of State Government” (“Whistleblower Law”).

In sum, Montgomery there complained that her reassignment was in retaliation for having filed the initial personnel grievance against Kaloroumakis. The Department found no merit in Montgomery’s ‘Whistleblower” complaint. Montgomery then appealed that action to the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) of the OAH, relying on federal precedent interpreting the federal Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”) upon which the Maryland statute was based, ruled that the information contained in Montgomery’s “Whistleblower” complaint “challenging the actions of a supervisor towards an employee is not a protected disclosure” within the meaning of the Maryland Whistleblower Law. 1 The ALJ ruled further that Montgomery’s complaint did not allege ⁶¹⁹ facts sufficient to show that she had made disclosures that were protected by Maryland’s Whistleblower Law.

Montgomery filed a petition for judicial review of the AL J’s decision in the Circuit Court for Somerset County. After a hearing, the judge concluded that Montgomery’s complaint about the behavior of her supervisor is not a protected disclosure under Maryland’s Whistleblower Law and affirmed the ALJ. Regarding Montgomery’s direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed. We granted Montgomery’s petition for writ of certiorari, Montgomery v. Eastern Correctional, 374 Md. 358 , 822 A.2d 1224 (2003), to consider the question: 1.

Has a State employee who has filed a grievance about the behavior of her supervisor, complaining that he has created a hostile work environment that is detrimental to her career, made a “protected disclosure” under Maryland-Code section 5-305 of the Maryland Whistle-blower Act, in the State Personnel & Pensions Article? I. Sheila Montgomery, prior to 8 November 1999, was for a number of years an administrative aide in the Warden’s Office at the ECI. She served as a personnel liaison between the Warden and staff members at the ECI and was responsible for maintaining the Warden’s calendar and drafting letters for his signature. In June 1999, Warden Ralph Logan left the ECI and was replaced, on a temporary basis, by Acting Warden George Kaloroumakis.

Between June and September 1999, Montgomery served as an administrative aide to Acting Warden Kaloroumakis. On 9 September 1999, Montgomery filed a grievance with the State Personnel Management System complaining about the Acting Warden’s behavior towards her. Under the section of the form asking Montgomery to state her grievance, she wrote: “Ongoing and continuing harassment by the Acting Warden (George Kaloroumakis) which constitutes a hostile ⁶²⁰ work environment or places me in a hostile work environment.” Under the heading “The issues of fact and law that support the employee’s appeal,” she stated: The derogatory demeanor and belittling comments of the Acting Warden ... in my opinion create a hostile work environment which is detrimental to my career with the State of Maryland and creates a hostile work place. I feel his behavior violates Executive Order 01.01.1995.19 Code of Fair Employment Practices.[ 2 ] The remedy sought in Montgomery’s grievance was that she wish[ed] to be able to be given the opportunity to perform [the] functions of [her] classification and that the State provide meaningful conflict resolution which would be agreeable to both parties of the grievance and that proper and adequate sensitivity training be provided. ⁶²¹ As previously related, the newly appointed Warden Rupee transferred Montgomery on 9 November 1999 from her administrative assistant’s position in the Warden’s Office to one in the ECI’s Maintenance Department.

In addition to the physical surroundings of her new workplace not being as nice as in the Warden’s Office, Montgomery observed that her secretarial duties became less challenging and fulfilling and generally that the prestige of her new position was less. Nevertheless, she suffered no decrease in classification or pay. 3 Consequently, about six months after filing the personnel grievance and four months’ service in her new position, Montgomery wrote a letter (the “Whistleblower” complaint), dated 20 March 2000, to Frederick W. Puddester, the Secretary of the State Department of Budget and Management. In the “Whistleblower” complaint, she alleged that the November 1999 transfer was a reprisal for filing her grievance against Acting Warden Kaloroumakis. In her “Whistleblower” complaint, Montgomery explained that Kaloroumakis referred to office workers as “peons” and “made disparaging remarks about our income and social standing.” When she and a co-employee attempted to bring to his attention their objections regarding his behavior, Kalo-roumakis reportedly acknowledged making “the discourteous remarks attributed to him” and also admitted that he “ex ⁶²² press[ed] himself in a manner ‘locals’ might consider sarcastic or even abrasive.” Kaloroumakis summarily rejected their complaints by saying that “such behavior was the norm in his native New York.” Montgomery’s “Whistleblower” complaint letter was referred by Secretary Puddester to the Office of the Statewide Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Coordinator. 4 On 2 June 2000, the Acting Statewide EEO Coordinator wrote a letter to Montgomery advising her that the evidence of record did not support her allegations that she had made a protected disclosure under the Whistleblower Law and that, accordingly, no violation of that Act was found.

Montgomery noted an appeal to the OAH, pursuant to Md.Code (1993, 1997 Repl.Vol.), § 5-310 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article. 5 The ECI responded by filing a “Motion for Summary Decision.” 6 In that motion, the ECI contended that the information contained in Montgomery’s grievance did not constitute a “protected disclosure” under the Whistleblower Law. The ALJ treated the ECI’s “motion for summary decision” as a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause' of action upon which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the ALJ treated all allega ⁶²³ tions in Montgomery’s complaint as true. Relying on federal precedent interpreting and applying the WPA, upon which the Maryland statute was based, the ALJ ruled that “challenging the actions of a supervisor towards an employee is not a protected disclosure” under the Maryland Whistleblower Law.

Alternatively, the ALJ ruled that the type of information disclosed by Montgomery in her complaint was not protected by the Act because (1) the disclosure was “not a matter of interest to the greater public” and (2) the “disclosure in the grievance in no way addressed the fiscal, health, or safety concerns of the public at large, which is an essential element of a” claim under the State Whistleblower Law. On those grounds, the ALJ ruled that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to show that Montgomery had made disclosures that were protected by the Whistleblower Law. On 30 November 2000, Montgomery filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Somerset County. Following a hearing on 24 July 2001, the judge opined in open court: “[T]his court agrees [with the ALJ] ... that under the federal Whistleblower Act, which is ... similar to Maryland’s Act, [an] employee[’]s complain[t] about the behavior of a supervisor is not a protected disclosure.

The court is not persuaded that a hostile work environment is a protected disclosure under the Whistleblower Act. And it appears to this court that the Whistleblower statute does not cover the type of conduct that Ms. Montgomery was alleging. The court finds no error as a matter of law. “An administrative agency’s decision must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the agency since decisions of administrative agencies are prima facie correct and carry with them the presumption of validity. Therefore the court will affirm the decision of the administrative law judge.” After the hearing, by written order, dated 27 July 2001, the Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the ALJ. ⁶²⁴ In the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioner argued that an allegation of a “hostile work environment” affecting co-workers as well as herself is not the type of personal grievance that is prohibited under federal law from being pursued as a whistleblower complaint.

Petitioner also maintained that the Maryland state employee personnel law affords employees who are retaliated against for filing a grievance the option of filing a whistleblower complaint. In addition, Petitioner argued that the ALJ may not dismiss summarily a whistleblower complaint — on the grounds that a “hostile work environment” complaint does not allege an “abuse of authority” as a matter of law — without making factual determinations. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion filed on 23 August 2002, affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgment. The intermediate appellate court noted that the purpose of Maryland’s Whistleblower Law is the same as the federal WPA from which it derives, that is, to protect government employees who disclose serious government illegality, waste, and corruption.

On the issue of whether the subject matter of a personal grievance also can be the subject of a whistleblower complaint, the court found that “[federal cases appear to uniformly hold that only disclosures made outside the grievance procedures are protected disclosures under the federal WPA, and our research has uncovered no authority to the contrary.” As such, the court concluded that reprisals based upon a right to complain are not entitled to whistleblower protection. Regarding Petitioner’s claim of a right to an election of remedies to file under the Whistleblower Law or the employee grievance procedure, the court held that “a state employee has no such election when, as here, the employee failed to allege facts showing that he or she made a disclosure that was protected under the Whistleblower Act.” Finally, the court found Petitioner’s contention that further factual determinations by the ALJ were needed, to be unwarranted. The court concluded that there was no dispute as to what Montgomery had disclosed in writing and, therefore, there was no need for a hearing to “develop facts.” ⁶²⁵ II. Maryland’s Whistleblower Law, Maryland Code §§ 5-301 thru 5-313 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article, prohibits a reprisal against a State employee who makes a protected disclosure of “information that the employee reasonably believes evidences: (i) an abuse of authority, gross mismanagement, or gross waste of money; (ii) a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; or (iii) a violation of law....” Md.Code (1993, 1997 Repl.Vol.), § 5-305(1) of the State Pers. & Pens.

Article. The Department, the OAH, the Circuit Court, and the Court of Special Appeals all applied the same legal principles in the present case to conclude that Montgomery’s grievance complaining of Acting Warden Kaloroumakis’ “derogatory” and “belittling” behavior did not amount to a “protected disclosure” under the Whistleblower Law. As this conclusion is supported by the language of the relevant Maryland statutes and regulations, persuasive federal precedents, and the assertions of Montgomery’s grievance itself, we shall affirm. A. It is well settled that our role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow, United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 576 , 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994); it “is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” United Parcel, 336 Md. at 577 , 650 A.2d at 230 .

See also Md.Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(h) of the State Gov’t Article. “Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency.” Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69 , 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999). We, therefore, ordinarily give considerable weight to the administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute that the agency administers. Lussier v. Md. Racing Comm’n, 343 Md. ⁶²⁶ 681, 696-97, 684 A.2d 804, 811-12 (1996), and cases there cited; McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 612 , 552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989) (“The interpretation of a statute by those officials charged with administering the statute is ... entitled to weight.”). Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own field of endeavor is entitled to judicial respect.

Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, 337 Md. 441, 455 , 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995); Christ v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 335 Md. 427, 445 , 644 A.2d 34, 42 (1994) (legislative delegations of authority to administrative agencies will often include the authority to make “significant discretionary policy determinations”); Bd. of Ed. For Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 792 , 506 A.2d 625, 634 (1986) (“application of the State Board of Education’s expertise would clearly be desirable before a court attempts to resolve the” legal issues). B. The Maryland Whistleblower Act initially was proposed in 1980 as House Bill (H.B.) 616. The preamble to H.B. 616 stated, in pertinent part: “The General Assembly finds that the interests of the citizens of Maryland demand a government which operates in accordance with the law and in avoidance of mismanagement, monetary waste, abuse of authority, and danger to public health and safety. In furtherance of these goals, it is essential that classified State employees be free to disclose impropriety in exercise of their constitutional right of free speech. “The purpose of this subtitle is to prohibit any State appointing authority from using a personnel action as a retaliatory measure against an employee or applicant for State employment who has made a disclosure of illegality or impropriety.”[ 7 ] ⁶²⁷ The parties to this appeal agree that Maryland’s Whistle-blower Law is patterned after the whistleblower provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”).

Federal protection of government employees who made certain types of disclosures, most of which were embarrassing to the government, was first provided in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 8 The CSRA, in addition “to setting up an exclusive framework of merit principles and personnel procedures,” also “detailed a host of ‘prohibited practices,’ actions which are prohibited to be taken against employees.” Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 978 F.2d 679, 682 (Fed.Cir.1992). In 1989 Congress passed the WPA, Pub.L. Nos. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989), under which federal employees gained additional protection from retaliatory action due to whistleblowing. 9 Whistleblowers are now protected by provisions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(8) (2003). The WPA was enacted “for the purpose of protecting federal employees who disclose government illegality, waste, and corruption.” Ellison v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 7 F.3d 1031, 1035 (Fed.Cir.1993) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1201 note (Supp. III 1991)). ⁶²⁸ The WPA substantially changed the role of the OSC [Office of Special Counsel][ 10 ] revised the substantive provisions of the whistleblower defense, and created a new route in whistleblowing cases for employees to take in appealing agency discipline — the Individual Right of Action (IRA). Through the IRA, employees previously excluded from MSPB [Merit Systems Protection Board] review gained access both to the MSPB and the augmented enforcement powers provided through the IRA.

Spruill, 978 F.2d at 682 (footnotes omitted). Section 2302(b)(8) provides, in pertinent part: (b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority— ❖ * * (8) take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of— (A) any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reásonably believes evidences— (i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs; or (B) any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, ⁶²⁹ of information which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences— (i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.... In 1996, a Maryland gubernatorial task force appointed to study reform of the Maryland State Personnel Management System, filed its report. The report recommended, among other things, numerous changes to the Maryland Whistleblower Law, but § 5-305 remained essentially the same.

The General Assembly adopted the task force’s suggestions without substantial change. The language used in § 5-305 of the current Maryland Whistleblower Law is similar to that found in 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(8). In language nearly identical to that of the Maryland statute, the federal WPA defines a protected disclosure as “any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences — (i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(8) (2003); see also Ford v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr.

Servs., 149 Md.App. 488, 501 , 817 A.2d 264, 272 (2003) (“Maryland’s Whistleblower Statute was patterned after the federal Whistleblower Protection Act”). In such circumstances, it seems appropriate to apply the well settled principle that “where the purpose and language of a federal statute are substantially the same as that of a later state statute, interpretations of the federal statute are ordinarily persuasive.” Fioretti v. Maryland State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 351 Md. 66, 75-76 , 716 A.2d 258, 262 (1998). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 11 and the federal Merit Systems Protection Board repeatedly and con ⁶³⁰ sistently have recognized that the federal WPA normally does not encompass complaints by federal government employees that a supervisor’s behavior violated the employee’s individual employment rights because such complaints do not constitute “protected disclosures” and “whistleblowing.” Serrao v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 95 F.3d 1569 (Fed.Cir.1996) (filing grievance against supervisor is not “whistleblowing”); Ellison v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 7 F.3d 1031 (Fed.Cir.1993) (grievance complaining of adverse personnel action (failure to promote) does not constitute “whistleblowing”); Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 978 F.2d 679 (Fed.Cir.1992) (allegations of reprisals for filing EEOC complaints do not invoke whistleblower protections); Horton v. Dep’t of Navy, 60 M.S.P.R. 397 (1994) (complaints concerning offensive and inappropriate conduct in the workplace did not reveal or uncover government wrongdoing, and hence were not “whist-leblowing”); Nogales v. Dep’t of the Treasury. 63 M.S.P.R. 460 (1994) (filing grievance alleging discrimination does not constitute “whistleblowing”); Williams v. Dep’t of Defense, 46 M.S.P.R. 549 (1991) (filing of EEO complaint does not constitute “whistleblowing”); Fisher v. Dep’t of Defense, 47 M.S.P.R. 585 (1991) (filing of EEO complaint and other .internal agency grievances do not constitute “whistleblowing”); Williams v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 47 M.S.P.R. 578 (1991) (filing of several complaints of discrimination and Title VII lawsuit do not constitute “whistleblowing”); Peterson v. Dep’t of Transportation, 54 M.S.P.R. 178 (1992) (submitting statement in support of another employee’s sexual harassment and sex discrimination complaint does not constitute “whistleblow-ing”). The results in these cases are all grounded on the principle that Congress, in passing the Civil Service Reform Act, chose to “differentiate between reprisals based on disclosures of information and reprisals based upon a right to complain.” Spruill, 978 F.2d at 690 . “Only the former— described in [5 U.S.C.] § 2302(b)(8)” — are entitled to “whistle blower protection.” 978 F.2d at 690-93 .

Reprisals based upon the assertion of the employee’s right to complain are covered only under 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(9)(A) (2003) and are not ⁶³¹ entitled to WPA protection. Id. Section 2302(b)(9)(A) of 5 U.S.C. reads in part as follows: (b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority— (9) take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, any personnel action against any employee or applicant for employment because of— (A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation.... In the Spruill case, Roland Spruill, an employee of the Department of Veteran Affairs (“DVA”), brought an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaint against his employer, in which he alleged that his supervisor changed his work hours and in doing so discriminated against him because he was handicapped and black. 978 F.2d at 681 .

Almost a year after the EEOC complaint was filed, the DVA suspended the employee for abuse of sick leave. Spruill complained to the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”), contending that the sick leave abuse suspension was made in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC complaint. The OSC declined to investigate on the grounds that complaints alleging discrimination and reprisal for filing an EEOC Complaint— like that filed by Spruill — were “more appropriately resolved through the EEOC process.” Id. at 682 . Spruill then appealed to the federal Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) for review of his three-day suspension, alleging that filing the EEOC complaint was “protected whistleblowing activity” under 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8).

Id. Spruill’s appeal was dismissed by an ALJ who found that the MSPB was without jurisdiction. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, one of the issues presented was whether the filing of an EEOC complaint (the act that triggered the alleged reprisal) was a prohibited act described in 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). The Spruill Court held that it was not.

Id. at 690 . The court said that, in enacting sections 2302(b)(8) and (9)(A), Congress chose ⁶³² to differentiate between reprisal based on disclosure of information and reprisal based upon exercising a right to complain. Only the former — described in § 2302(b)(8) — was termed “whistleblowing” in the debates, although that term was neither employed nor defined in the original statute itself. This understanding of the term was subsequently formalized in the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.

Congress in the Findings and Purpose section of the Act noted that one of the functions of the CSRA and the OSC was “to protect whistleblowers (those individuals who make disclosures described in such section 2302(b)(8)) from reprisal.” 103 Stat. 16 , § 2(a)(3) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1201 , note (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added)). See also 135 Cong. Rec. H750 (daily ed.

March 21, 1989) (joint explanatory statement of S. 508, reintroduced in support of S. 20). Id. The Spruill Court continued: Congress’ pervasive references to whistleblowers whose disclosures saved Government funds or short-circuited potential health and safety hazards bolster the conclusion that reprisal for filing EEOC complaints falls exclusively within § 2302(b)(9)(A). See, e.g, 135 Cong.

Rec. E98 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1989); 135 Cong. Rec.

S2805 (daily ed. March 16, 1989). Such references were even more pointed and pervasive in the legislative history of the 1989 amendment which added the WPA.[ 12 ] And that Act itself stated: “Federal employees who make disclosures described in section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, serve the public interest by assisting in the elimination of fraud, waste, ⁶³³ abuse, and unnecessary Government expenditures.” 103 Stat. 16 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1201 note (Supp. II 1990)). This is a description of the results of the type of public disclosure generally evoked by the term “whistleblowing,” not a description of the results of an individual’s complaint about the discriminatory behavior of a particular supervisor.

Id. at 692 (emphasis added). Federal cases hold that making a disclosure protected by the WPA fundamentally is different from a government employee complaining about, or grieving, how he or she is treated by his or her supervisor. See, e.g., Serrao v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 95 F.3d 1569, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1996). The Court of Special Appeals followed this federal precept, in Ford v. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety and Corr. Servs., 149 Md.App. 488, 501 , 817 A.2d 264, 272 (2003), in finding that an employee’s complaint in an administrative equal employment opportunity proceeding about alleged sexual harassment towards her by her supervisor did not constitute “protected disclosures” under the Maryland Whistleblower Law. In the Ford , case, the complaining employee, Barbara Ford, was employed as a correctional officer by the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. Ford claimed she was terminated from employment at the ECI, in violation of Maryland’s Whistleblower Law, in retaliation for filing charges against her supervisor. 149 Md.App. at 501 , 817 A.2d at 272 .

Ford argued that federal authorities have been loath to permit federal employees who were retaliated against for filing grievances to proceed with a federal WPA complaint because, unlike Maryland, there is a separate statutory remedy under federal law addressing such retaliation. 149 Md. App. at 502 , 817 A.2d at 272-73 . The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court and ALJ, finding that Ford’s argument ignored the fact that Maryland law also provides remedies specifically for addressing employee complaints alleging violations of employment rights and reprisals for making such complaints. Id. See, e.g., Md.Code (1993, 1997 Repl.Vol.), § 12-103 of the State Pers. & Pens.

Article (providing exclusive remedy by which employee may pursue ⁶³⁴ claim of reprisal); Md.Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, § 16(f) (prohibiting discrimination against employee for making charge of discrimination to Maryland Human Relations Commission or testifying, assisting, or participating in a proceeding of the commission). In the present case, Petitioner adopts the argument that was rejected by the Court of Special Appeals in Ford and contends there are [significant differences between the two statutory schemes — state and federal — which militate against imposing a federally derived exception upon the Maryland Whistleblower Law. The WPA, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(8), is merely a part of a broad-based statute ( 5 U.S.C. § 2302 ) prohibiting various discriminatory or unfair management practices. Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(8), Title VII — style discrimination ( 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(1)) and grievance-generated reprisals ( 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(9)), are identified separately, proscribed separately and addressed separately.

By contrast, the Maryland Whistleblower Law is a “stand-alone” statute and does not draw any of the distinctions made in 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b). Thus, while it arguably makes sense to require [flederal employees who have been retaliated against for filing grievances to pursue claims under 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(9), and not under the Whistleblower provision, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(8), there is no logical or pragmatic basis for imposing such an exception upon the Maryland Whistle-blower Law. It is true, as Petitioner argues, that the federal statutes separately address and