Maryland case law › Montgomery Ward v. Wilson

Montgomery Ward v. Wilson

339 Md. 701 (1995) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: Reversed✓ Good law
SummaryThis case involves a punitive damages award against Montgomery Ward and one of its employees, Bresnahan, arising from the plaintiff's arrest and prosecution for credit card fraud. The Court of Appeals held that implied malice in the sense of gross negligence can no longer support a punitive damages award in Maryland, regardless of the underlying tort. The majority reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court's instruction that implied malice could support punitive damages. Judge Raker concurred, agreeing that gross negligence alone is insufficient but arguing that gross negligence plus outrageous conduct equivalent to depraved heart malice should suffice. Judge Bell dissented, agreeing with the Court of Special Appeals that implied malice could support punitive damages and that the evidence showed Bresnahan acted maliciously. The dissent also
Questions presented
  • Whether implied malice in the sense of gross negligence can form the basis of a punitive damages award in Maryland.
  • Whether the evidence at trial suggested that Bresnahan acted maliciously.
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RAKER, Judge, concurring: I join in the judgment of the Court and join in Parts I, II, and III of the opinion. The Court states in footnote 5 that “ ‘implied malice’ in the sense of gross negligence can no longer form the basis of any punitive damages award in Maryland, regardless of the nature of the underlying tort.” I write separately because, although I agree that gross negligence is insufficient to support a punitive damages award, gross negligence plus should be considered the legal equivalent of actual malice. I agree with the concurring opinion of Judge McAuliffe in Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720 , 629 A.2d 721 (1993), wherein he stated that “outrageous conduct sufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder under the ‘depraved heart’ theory should be treated as the legal equivalent of actual malice, and should be sufficient to permit consideration of an award of punitive damages.” Id. at 731 , 629 A.2d at 726 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). I would adopt the test formulated by Judge McAuliffe: “A person who is actually aware that his [or her] action involves a clear and serious danger of substantial harm to the plaintiff or anyone in the plaintiffs class, and who unreasonably takes such action with flagrant indifference as to whether anyone will be harmed or not, should be liable for punitive damages if his [or her] conduct causes the foreseeable harm.

This type of outrageous conduct, being just short of intentional harm, warrants such a sanction. 738 Although the requisite conduct and state of mind will often include gross negligence, the test would not be met by a showing of gross negligence alone.” Id. at 732 , 629 A.2d at 727 (McAuliffe, J., concurring) (quoting Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 477-78 , 601 A.2d 633, 661 (McAuliffe, J., concurring)). Because the conduct of the defendants in this case does not meet that test, I agree that the judgment should be reversed. BELL, Judge, dissenting. I dissent.

I agree with the Court of Special Appeals when it concluded that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County “correctly instructed the jury that a finding of implied malice could support an award of punitive damages in this case.” Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 101 Md.App. 535, 548-49 , 647 A.2d 1218, 1225 (1994). See also my dissenting opinions in Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 478 , 601 A.2d 633, 661 (1992) and Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 740 , 629 A.2d 721, 731 (1993). Nor do I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “[t]he evidence at trial did not suggest that Bresnahan acted maliciously.” 339 Md. 701, 736 , 664 A.2d 916, 933 (1995). The majority opines that the plaintiff’s testimony denying making credit card purchases at Montgomery Ward, did not conflict with the testimony by two of her accusers that they informed Bresnahan that the plaintiff had made the unauthorized credit transactions.

That testimony, the majority asserts, was uncontradicted. I do not agree. Although indirect, the contradiction is implicit and sharp. The jury was not required to, and did not, believe the defense testimony.

Indeed, given the sharpness of the contradiction and the fact that the plaintiffs version of the facts could not be reconciled with that of the defense the jury very likely determined that the defense evidence, concerning the source of Bresnahan’s knowledge of the plaintiffs wrongdoing was fabricated. That certainly would establish the malice necessary to support the award of punitive damages.