Montrose Christian School Corp. v. Walsh

ELDRIDGE, Judge. Chapter 27 of the Montgomery County Code contains a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at eliminating discrimination in the County in the areas of employment, housing, and public accommodation. Section 27-2 of the County Code creates the Montgomery County Human Relations Commission and. provides for its jurisdiction. The County’s general anti-discrimination policies, as well as the administration and duties of the Commission, are set out in §§ 27-1 through 27-7B.

The remainder of Chapter 27 is divided into four parts, namely, discrimination in places of public accommodation (§§ 27-8 through 27-10), discrimination in real estate (§§ 27-11 through 27-16C), discrimination in employment (§§ 27-17 through 27-26), and intimidation (§§ 27-26A through H). The two cases before this Court concern the third division, employment discrimination. Section 27-17 declares that it is Montgomery County’s public policy “to foster equal employment opportunity for all without regard to race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin, sex, marital status, age, handicap, or sexual orientation and strictly in accord with their individual merits as human beings.” Thus, § 27-19 provides in relevant part as follows (emphasis added): “Section 27-19. Unlawful Employment Practices.

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice to do any of the following acts because of the race, color, religious ⁵⁷¹ creed, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, marital status, handicap, or sexual orientation of any individual or because of any reason that would not have been asserted but for the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, marital status, handicap, or sexual'orientation of the individual: (1) For an employer: (a) To fail or refuse to hire or fail to accept the services of or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice: (2) For a religious corporation, association or society to hire and employ employees of a particular religion to perform purely religious functions.” (Emphasis added). The State Legislature, in Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 49B, § 42, has authorized a circuit court civil action for damages or other relief by “a person who is subjected to an act of discrimination prohibited by the [Montgomery] county code.... ” The present cases were brought pursuant to Art. 49B, § 42. 1 The plaintiffs in these cases were employees of ⁵⁷² Montrose Christian School, and they claimed that they were terminated by the school’s principal on the basis of their religious creed in violation of the County’s employment dis ⁵⁷³ crimination law.

The issues before us concern the monetary liability of the school and the principal under Art. 49B, § 42, and § 27-19 of the County Code. I. This opinion encompasses two cases; consequently, we shall set forth the facts and procedural history of each case separately. A. No. 147, Montrose Christian School, et al. v. Carver Montrose Christian School Corporation is a private, religious school affiliated with the Montrose Baptist Church in Montgomery County, Maryland. The school and the church operate on the same grounds for which only one sign, “Mont-rose Baptist Church,” is displayed.

The school provides education to children from kindergarten through twelfth grade. Enrollment is not limited to students whose families are members of the church or to students who are Baptist. The majority of students attending the school are not members of the church. Students belonging to a variety of religions and denominations attend the school.

According to the school’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, the Church Board of Deacons elects the School Board, all of whom are required to be members of the Church. The Pastor of the Church is an “ex officio” member of the School Board and is the supervisor of the school’s principal. The Bylaws provide that the “Principal shall carry out the administration of the school under the direction of the Pastor.” Pastor Ray Hope became the new Pastor of the Church in February 1996. In June 1996, the school promoted defendant Gregory Scheck, formerly vice principal, to principal of the school.

Changes in administrative policy at the school followed the change in pastors. All employees of the school who were not members of the Montrose Baptist Church, with the exception of two janitors, were discharged from employment. The plaintiff Barbara Anne Carver began working for the school as a teacher’s aide in 1990. At the time she was hired, ⁵⁷⁴ the school knew that she was not a member of the church and was not a Baptist.

Carver’s position required her to perform tasks such as copying, typing, grading papers, and generally assisting school staff and teachers in administrative ways. Carver is not a certified teacher, does not have a teaching degree, and has never been employed as a teacher. Carver was fired by the defendant Scheck in June 1996. Carver filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Montgomery County Human Relations Commission, and more than 45 days passed without resolution of the charge.

Carver then filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against the school and Scheck alleging employment discrimination and seeking both damages and injunctive relief. Specifically, Carver alleged that the defendants fired her for the sole reason that she was not a member of the church and that firing her for that reason violated § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code which prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their religious creed. In response, the defendants contended that their action fell within the exceptions to the employment discrimination law and, farther, that they were immune from liability under the doctrine of charitable immunity. 2 The defendants also assert ⁵⁷⁵ ed that the application of Montgomery County’s employment discrimination law to the school and Scheck violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the guarantee of freedom of association under the First Amendment, and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Moreover, the defendants argued that the County’s law was preempted because the local law impermissibly conflicts with state law prohibiting employment discrimination.

See Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Yol.), Art. 49B, § 18. Montgomery County intervened in the lawsuit for the purpose of defending the local law on constitutional and preemption grounds. The Circuit Court resolved the action for damages in Carver’s favor following a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment based on stipulated facts.

The court held that the defendants had engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code when they terminated Carver’s employment because of her religious creed. The court determined that none of the statutory exceptions in § 27-19 applied to the defendants’ conduct. The court further held that Montgomery County’s employment discrimination law does not impermissibly conflict with state law. The Circuit Court also held that the application of § 27-19 to the defendants did not violate the First Amendment or the Maryland Constitution.

Finally, the court ruled that the defendants were not entitled to the defense of charitable immunity. Judgment was entered awarding Carver $15,000.00 in damages and awarding $16,000.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs, for a total of $31,000.00. The court denied the request for injunctive relief. The defendants filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

Before argument in the intermediate appellate ⁵⁷⁶ court, this Court issued a writ of certiorari. Montrose Christian School v. Carver, 358 Md. 162 , 747 A.2d 644 (2000). B. No. 144, Montrose Christian School, et al. v. Walsh, et al. In 1979, the plaintiff Mary Lou Jones began working at the school as the bookkeeper and the principal’s secretary. The school hired the plaintiff Sharon M. Walsh in 1982 'for a secretarial position handling registration-type duties and general administrative tasks.

The plaintiff Helen E. Poole was hired as a cafeteria worker in 1989. Poole’s duties included planning menus, ordering food, preparing meals, and cleaning up. The three plaintiffs are not members of the church and are not Baptists. Scheck terminated the employment of each of the plaintiffs in June 1996.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Montgomery County Human Relations Commission charging the school and Scheck with employment discrimination based on religious creed in violation of § 27-19. More than 45 days passed without resolution of the administrative complaint, and the plaintiffs then filed an action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, seeking damages and injunctive relief against the school and Scheck. In response to the plaintiffs’ discrimination claims, the defendants asserted the same defenses described in the Carver case discussed above. Also, as in the Carver case, Montgomery County intervened in the Circuit Court for the purpose of defending the validity of the Montgomery County law.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the exceptions under the Montgomery County Code, the constitutional issues, the question of preemption by conflict, and charitable immunity. The Circuit Court denied the summary judgment motion. The court did grant a motion by the plaintiffs to exclude evidence relating to the “bona fide occupational qualification” and “undue hardship” exceptions in the local law, thus preventing the defendants from asserting those defenses at trial. See § 27-19(d)(l) and (3). ⁵⁷⁷ After the presentation of evidence relating to the reasons for terminating the plaintiffs’ employment, the jury found that each of the plaintiffs had been terminated by the school and by Scheck because of their religious creed.

Compensatory damages were awarded to each of the three plaintiffs. Subsequently, the Circuit Court filed an opinion holding that the local law did not conflict with state law and that the application of § 27-19 to the conduct of the defendants did not violate the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, or the guarantee of freedom of association under the First Amendment. The court further held that there was no violation of Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In rejecting the constitutional defenses, the court stated that it was persuaded by the evidence which indicated that “the duties of the plaintiffs were not the formulation or implementation of policy nor were they educational or instructive in nature, but rather administrative and ministerial.” The court did hold that the school was entitled to charitable immunity but that such immunity did not extend to Scheck.

In accordance with the jury’s verdicts, judgments for compensatory damages, in various amounts, were rendered for each of the three plaintiffs against Scheck. The court denied the request for injunctive relief. Both the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. 3 Prior to argument in the intermediate ⁵⁷⁸ appellate court, the plaintiffs filed in this Court a petition for a writ a certiorari and the defendants filed a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. We granted both the petition and the cross-petition.

Walsh v. Montrose Christian School, 357 Md. 481 , 745 A.2d 436 (2000). The parties in both cases present substantially the same issues for appellate review. We restate the three principal questions as follows: I. Whether § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code is in conflict with, and thus preempted by, Maryland Code (1957,1998 RepLVoL), Art. 49B, § 18; II. Whether the doctrine of charitable immunity precludes the award of damages against the school and Scheck; III.

Whether § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. If the defendants prevail under either the first or the second of the questions set forth above, it would not be necessary for us to reach the constitutional issues in the third question. Consistent with the “ ‘principle that a court will not decide a constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground,’ ” 4 we shall first consider the conflict and charitable immunity issues. ⁵⁷⁹ II. Montgomery County has charter home rule under the Home Rule Amendment, Article XI A of the Maryland Constitution.

See, e.g., Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 246-249 , 743 A.2d 748, 753-755 (2000); Haub v. Montgomery County, 353 Md. 448, 450 , 727 A.2d 369 -370 (1999); McCrory v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12, 16 , 570 A.2d 834, 835 (1990). The Home Rule Amendment enables those counties adopting a home rule charter to enjoy a significant amount of self-governance by transferring the General Assembly’s power to enact many types of public local laws to the home rule counties themselves. Nevertheless, under Article XI-A, § 1, “[a] local government ordinance which conflicts with a public general law enacted by the General Assembly is preempted and thus is invalid.” Coalition v. Annapolis Lodge, 333 Md. 359, 379 , 635 A.2d 412, 422 (1994). The defendants in the instant cases argue that § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code is preempted by Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, § 18, because the County’s employment discrimination law does not provide a broad exemption from coverage for religious organizations such as is afforded under state and federal anti-discrimination laws.

Specifically, the defendants assert that § 27-19 of the County Code, prohibiting religious organizations from discriminating in employment on the basis of religious creed, fatally conflicts with state law which contains no such prohibition. 5 The State’s employment discrimination law is codified at Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, §§ 14 through 18. In contrast to the Montgomery County Code, the ⁵⁸⁰ state law exempts religious organizations from the prohibition against religious creed discrimination. Art. 49B, § 18, states: “This subtitle shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside of the State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution or society of its activities.” The state statute was modeled after the federal anti-discrimination law, Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 632 , 672 A.2d 608, 614 (1996), providing the same broad exemption for religious organizations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Thus, the state law, like its federal counterpart, does not prohibit discrimination by religious organizations based on religious creed. According to the defendants, this exemption in the state statute means that the local law and state law are in conflict. 6 The controlling Maryland principle in determining preemption by conflict was set forth in Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481 , 487 n. 4, 620 A.2d 880 , 882 n. 4 (1993), as follows: “A local ordinance is pre-empted by conflict when it prohibits an activity which is intended to be permitted by state law, or permits an activity which is intended to be prohibited by state law.” See Soaring Vista Properties v. Queen Anne’s County, 356 Md. 660 , 741 A.2d 1110 (1999); Holiday v. Anne Arundel, 349 Md. 190, 210 , 707 A.2d 829, 839 (1998); Coalition v. Annapolis Lodge, supra, 333 Md. at 380 , 635 A.2d at 422 ; Allied Vending v. Bowie, 332 Md. 279 , 297 n. 12, 631 A.2d 77 , 86 n. 12 (1993). Although discrimination by religious organizations on the basis of religious creed is not covered by state law, this Court has held that noncoverage does not mean that such activity is ⁵⁸¹ authorized by the state statute. In Annapolis Lodge, 333 Md. at 380 , 635 A.2d at 422 , we said: “[O]ur cases have recognized a distinction between a state law which is intended to permit or authorize a particular matter and a state law which is simply intended to exempt the particular matter from its coverage.

When a state law simply excludes a particular activity from its coverage, our cases have not attributed to the General Assembly an intent to preempt local legislation regulating or prohibiting that activity. Instead, in such situations supplementary local legislation has not been deemed to be in conflict with and preempted by the state statute.” See Holiday v. Anne Arundel, supra, 349 Md. at 211 n. 6, 707 A.2d at 840 n. 6 (“When state law simply regulates a matter to a limited extent, our cases have not ordinarily attributed to the General Assembly an intent to preempt local law regulating the matter to a greater extent”); Molesworth v. Brandon, supra, 341 Md. at 636 , 672 A.2d at 615-616 ; National Asphalt v. Prince George’s County, 292 Md. 75, 80-81 , 437 A.2d 651, 654 (1981); City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 324 , 255 A.2d 376, 385-386 (1969). 7 The state employment discrimination law simply excludes religious organizations from coverage of the religious creed anti-discrimination provision in the state statute. Instead of constituting an affirmative authorization to discriminate, Article 49B, § 18, merely removes religious organizations from the scope of the state law with regard to religious creed discrimination. Under the above-cited cases, there is no conflict between Art. 49B, § 18, and § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code.

III

As previously stated, the Circuit Court in No. 147 ruled that neither the school nor Scheck was entitled to the defense of ⁵⁸² charitable immunity with regard to their statutory liability for damages. In No. 144, however, the Circuit Court held that the defendant school was immune from liability because of charitable immunity. The court further held that the defendant Scheck could not avail himself of the defense of charitable immunity. In this Court, the defendants argue that both the school and Scheck are entitled to the defense of charitable immunity.

The plaintiffs urge that the common law doctrine of charitable immunity is not a defense to liability imposed by statute, and that the Circuit Court erred in No. 144 by holding that the defense of charitable immunity protected the school. We agree with the plaintiffs. The doctrine of charitable immunity was first recognized in Maryland in Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885), and has been reaffirmed by this Court in a line of decisions. See Abramson v. Reiss, 334 Md. 193, 197, 206-209 , 638 A.2d 743, 744-745, 749-751 (1994), and cases there cited.

This judge-made doctrine is intended to protect charitable organizations from tort liability. Under Maryland law, charitable immunity is premised on the trust fund theory, that is, because funds of the organization are impressed with a trust for charitable purposes, those funds should not be diverted to pay tort damage awards. See Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hospital, 130 Md. 265 , 100 A. 301 (1917). We assume, arguendo, that the school is a bona fide charitable organization for the purpose of the doctrine of charitable immunity.

See Abramson v. Reiss, supra, 334 Md. at 200-201 , 638 A.2d at 746-747 ; James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 336-337 , 418 A.2d 1173, 1185 (1980). Nevertheless, the defense is not available to shelter the school or Scheck from liability imposed by the Montgomery County employment discrimination law and Art. 49B, § 42. As pointed out above, the charitable immunity defense applies only to tort actions. Except for wrongful or abusive discharge actions pursuant to Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31 , 432 A.2d 464 (1981), actions for damages based on the termination of employment relation ⁵⁸³ ships, including those regulated by statutes, ordinarily sound in contract and not in tort.

See generally, Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438, 444-445 , 758 A.2d 995, 998-999 (2000); Suburban Hospital v. Dwiggins, 324 Md. 294, 303-308 , 596 A.2d 1069, 1073-1076 (1991); Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc., 322 Md. 197, 202-206 , 586 A.2d 1275, 1278-1280 (1991); Chappell v. Southern Maryland Hosp., 320 Md. 483, 493 , 578 A.2d 766, 772 (1990); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 625-626 , 561 A.2d 179, 190 (1989); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 49 , 537 A.2d 1173, 1174-1175 (1988). See also McMillan v. Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 307 (1st Cir.1998) (cause of action based on Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute is not based on tort); Blake v. Katter, 693 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir.1982) (civil rights claims are not properly characterized as common law torts). Since the doctrine of charitable immunity applies only in tort actions, and since the cases at bar sound in contract, the charitable immunity defense is inapplicable. Moreover, even if a statutory employment discrimination action were characterized as a tort suit, charitable immunity cannot be used to shield liability where the common law has been modified by legislation permitting actions against charitable organizations.

See, e.g., Abramson v. Reiss, supra, 334 Md. at 207-209 , 638 A.2d at 750-751 (extent of charitable immunity is a matter for the legislature); Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, 249 Md. 233, 236, 241 , 238 A.2d 863, 864, 867-868 (1968) (review of statutes limiting charitable immunity); Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 619-620 , 62 A.2d 574, 575 (1948). The Montgomery County Council, by enacting § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code, explicitly extended coverage of the statute to include the employment activities of charitable organizations such as the school. See § 27 — 19(d)(2) (referring to a religious corporation, association or society as an employer) and § 27 — 19(f)(2) (referring to positions of employment in a religious school). Section 27-19 of the Montgomery County ⁵⁸⁴ Code, together with Art. 49B, § 42, of the Maryland Code, clearly abrogate any charitable immunity that might otherwise have existed in cases like the present ones.

IV

In light of our holdings that § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code does not conflict with Art. 49B, § 18, of the Maryland Code, and that the defense of charitable immunity is not applicable in these cases, it becomes necessary to consider the constitutionality of § 27-19(d)(2). As earlier discussed, § 27-19(a) of the Montgomery County Code makes it unlawful, inter alia, for an employer “to discharge any individual” “because of ... religious creed____” Section 27-19(d)(2), however, contains an exception to this prohibition which allows “religious” organizations to employ persons “of a particular religion.” Nevertheless, the last five words of § 27-19(d)(2) limit the exception to employees hired “to perform purely religious functions.” Consequently, because of this limitation, churches, religious schools, and other religious organizations in Montgomery County are expressly prohibited from making employment decisions based on “religious creed” except for employees hired to perform purely religious functions. We shall hold that the limitation in § 27 — 19(d)(2), “to perform purely religious functions,” on its face violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. We shall further hold that the limitation is severable from the remaining language of § 27-19(d)(2).

As a result, the viable portion of § 27-19(d)(2) will provide that “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice * * * [f]or a religious corporation, association, or society to hire and employ employees of a particular religion.” Because the defendants’ conduct was permitted by the valid portion of the § 27 — 19(d)(2) exception, we shall reverse the judgments below. ⁵⁸⁵ A. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof____” The religion clauses of the First Amendment are, of course, applicable to the states and their political subdivisions by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-877 , 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1599 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876, 884 (1990); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 903 , 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1217-1218 (1940); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 396-397 , 190 A.2d 621, 625 (1963); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 599 , 155 A.2d 684, 690 (1959); Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 496 , 69 A.2d 456, 459 (1949). The free exercise guarantee of the Maryland Constitution is in Article 36 of the Declaration of Rights, which provides that “... all persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion, or profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any ministry....” 8 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights ordinarily do not grant to an individual or a religious organization “a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability” even when such laws have an incidental effect of burdening a particular religious activity.

City of Boerne v. ⁵⁸⁶ Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 , 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2161 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624, 634 (1997). The Supreme Court explained in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 , 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2226 , 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 489 (1993): “In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” See, e.g., Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 , 64 S.Ct. 438 , 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); Levitsky v. Levitsky, supra, 231 Md. at 396-397 , 190 A.2d at 625 ; Craig v. State, supra, 220 Md. at 599 , 155 A.2d at 689 . Although religious activities may ordinarily be subject to neutral laws of general applicability, “the First Amendment obviously excludes all ‘governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.’ ” Employment Div., Ore.

Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. at 877 , 110 S.Ct. at 1599 , 108 L.Ed.2d at 884 , quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 , 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 969 (1963). Furthermore, under the Free Exercise Clause, laws targeting particular religious practices, or selectively imposing burdens on conduct motivated by religious belief, are subject to strict scrutiny, and “must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, supra, 508 U.S. at 531-532 , 113 S.Ct. at 2226 , 124 L.Ed.2d at 489 . Moreover, even laws which are neutral and generally applicable have “failed to pass constitutional muster” under the Free Exercise Clause when “other constitutional protections were at stake.” City of Boerne v. Flores, supra, 521 U.S. at 513-514 , 117 S.Ct. at 2161 , 138 L.Ed.2d at 634 . In addition, and particularly applicable to the cases at bar, is the principle set forth in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral ⁵⁸⁷ of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 , 73 S.Ct. 143, 154-155 , 97 L.Ed. 120, 136-137 (1952), that the Free Exercise Clause reflects “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation — in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.

Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.” In N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 , 99 S.Ct. 1313, 1320 , 59 L.Ed.2d 533, 543 (1979), the Supreme Court, holding that the National Labor Relations Act did not apply to teachers in church-operated schools, and that the National Labor Relations Board had no jurisdiction over such teachers, explained: “The church-teacher relationship in a church-operated school differs from the employment relationship in a public or other nonreligious school. We see no escape from conflicts flowing from the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools and the consequent serious First Amendment questions that would follow.” See, e.g., Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 111 Md.App. 616, 622 , 683 A.2d