Monumental Printing Co. v. Edell

Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The facts in this case, as shown by the record, are: .The State Industrial Accident Commission, on August 14th, ⁵⁵³ 1930, passed an order disallowing compensation to the claimant. . The commencement of the action in the Baltimore City Court seems to have been by filing’ in that court notice of appeal given to the commission, and admission of service of such notice by one of the commissioners, in the following language: “To the honorable, the members of said Commission: Kindly enter an appeal on behalf of the claimant, August Edell, from the order of the: Commission passed on the 14th day of August, 1930, and have all papers certified and all proceedings sent to the Baltimore City Court. Erank Klitzner, attorney for claimant.” “Notice of appeal in the above entitled cause is hereby accepted oil behalf of the State Industrial Accident Commission and service of copy of said appeal is hereby admitted this 33th day of September, 1930.

Omar D. Crothers, Commissioner”; and by filing two proposed issues, together with an election that these issues be tried before a jury. On October 21st the employer and insurer filed a motion ne recifiatur as to the transcript of record, upon the ground that the action in the Baltimore City Court had not been begun within the time prescribed by section 56 of article 101 of the Maryland Code, Supp'. 1929. This motion was overruled, and that action constitutes the first exception contained in the record. The question thus presented may be succinctly stated: Under the provisions contained in section 56 of article 101 of the Maryland Code, has the court jurisdiction to review the finding or order of the Industrial Accident Commission in eases where nothing has been filed in the nature of an appeal in the court where the appeal is to be reviewed, within thirty days from the date of the order of the commission, even though it appear that notice of or request for an appeal to that court had been served personally upon one of the commissioners, and that service admitted?

The trial court answered this question in the affirmative. The contention of the appellants is that a proper construction of section 56 of article 101 requires the person feeling aggrieved at the action of the commission to take two steps: (1) To commence the proceeding by filing some paper in the court in which it is ⁵⁵⁴ sought to have the commission’s decision reviewed; and (2) that notice of such action be served personally upon a member of the commission within thirty days from the rendition of its order or finding. Thei’e can be no question or dispute that section 56, in unambiguous terms, provides that no such appeal shall be entertained unless notice of appeal shall have been served personally upon some member of the commission within thirty days following the rendition of the decision appealed from; and unless it be shown that such notice was served within the time prescribed, the court to which the appeal is taken is without jurisdiction to hear and determine the questions sought to be reviewed. Holland Mfg.

Co. v. Thomas, 136 Md. 11, 110 A. 209 . The appellants argue that the. notice required to be given to the commission is the second step in the proceedings on appeal, and therefore cannot be taken until after the first step. With the premise admitted that it is a second step, logically the conclusion must follow that if there is a time limit of thirty days within which to take the second step, the first step, must, of necessity, be required to be taken within the same time limit. .The appellee does not dispute the logic of the result, if the premise is admitted, but denies the soundness of such assumption. The question therefore is: Does the language of section 56 require one, feeling aggrieved by the action of the commission, to docket a suit, or file some paper equivalent thereto, in the trial court before giving the prescribed notice to the commission ?

Those portions of section 56 pertinent to this inquiry are: “Any * * * person feeling aggrieved by any decision of the Commission affecting his. interests, under this Article, may have the same reviewed by a proceeding in the 'nature of an appeal and initiated in the Circuit Court of the county or in the Common Law Courts of Baltimore City having jurisdiction over; the place where the accident occurred or over the person appealing from such decision. * * * No such appeal shall be entertained unless notice of appeal shall have been served personally upon some member of the Commission within thirty days following the rendition of the decision appealed ⁵⁵⁵ from. An appeal shall not be a stay. * * * In all Court proceedings under or pursuant to this Article, the decision of the Commission shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same.” In construing these provisions, the purpose of the whole act must be borne in mind, and such construction be given as will effectuate the intent and spirit of the act, unless that construction is plainly denied by the language used. This is indicated by positive provisions of the statute, where in section 10 it is provided that the commission shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of procedure other than those provided in the act ; and section 63 provides that the rule which requires statutes in derogation of the common law to be strictly construed shall have no application, but that the act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose. Clough & Molloy v. Shilling, 149 Md. 189 , at page 193, 131 A. 343 ; Core Contracting Co. v. Schaeffer, 151 Md. 494 , at page 502, 135 A. 318 .

Courts will adapt themselves to the increased latitude allowed the commission as to procedure. Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 252 , 127 A. 850 . Section 1 of article 5 of the Code provides: “An appeal may be taken from a court of law or equity by' application to the clerk; from the orphans’ court by application to the register; from the commissioner of the land office by application to the commissioner; from the county commissioners by application to their clerk, and from a justice of the peace by application to the justice; or by filing a, petition with the clerk of the court to which the appeal is made; and upon such application, if made within the time prescribed by law for taking such appeal, the clerk, register, commissioner or justice to whom the same is made¡ shall enter a prayer of appeal upon his docket or minutes of proceedings, and transmit the papers or a transcript of the record, as hereinafter required.” This section covers appeals from courts of law and equity, and other courts or bodies, specifically designated therein, empowered to originally determine the ques ⁵⁵⁶ tions involved. It provides two methods of taking' an appeal, one by application to the court ox body from -which the appeal is taken, and the1 other by filing' a petition with the clerk of the court to which the appeal is taken.

The provisions of this section have no application to appeals from the State Industrial Accident Commission, and are cited only for the purpose of showing the two methods of appeal applicable to a very large proportion of all appeals, only excluding those that are governed by special provisions. Of these two methods, that one which is most commonly, and we might say almost universally, employed, is by making application to the tribunal from which the appeal is taken and a review of whose decision is desired. Whereupon it becomes the duty of the original trial body to make a minute or memorandum of the appeal, and transmit a transcript of the record to the appellate body. This is required to be done, and is done, by the State Industrial Accident Commission in cases of appeal from its findings.

If the construction of section 56 of article 101 contended for by the appellants be sustained, it will limit appeals in workmen’s compensation cases to the one method least frequently employed (although permitted) in the great majority of cases, namely, by a petition to or docketing a suit in the court to which the appeal is taken; and this even though it is unequivocally required by the provisions of that section that in order to get any benefit from the appeal the appellant must serve personally upon a member of the commission notice of appeal within thirty days from the rendition of the decision appealed from. Upon the prescribed notice to the commission, the procedure followed and necessary to bring the case to trial in the appellate court is precisely the same in cases where there has not been previously docketed a suit in that court as in those cases where that has been done. But, say the appellants, unless the thirty days’ limitation for notice to the commission is also a limitation as to time for docketing the suit in the appellate court, there, is no limitation as to the time within which the suit must be therein docketed. Since the taking effect of chapter 406 of ⁵⁵⁷ the Acts of 1931, eases on appeal from the State Industrial Accident Commission must bo heard and determined on the record made before the commission, and no additional evidence is permitted to be received in the court.

Thomas v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 162 Md. 509 , 160 A. 793 , decided May 11th, 1932. Therefore the question of how soon the case on appeal is heard depends solely upon the time at which the transcript of record made before the commission is received in the court. The duty of the commission is to transmit the record promptly, or as soon as can be; and the fact that the appeal may or may not have been docketed in the court in no way affects the celerity with which the commission acts in transmitting the record. The party aggrieved is that one against whom the commission has decided; he is the appellant, and it is to his interest to prosecute the appeal as speedily as possible.

This is true whether the appellant be the employee or the employer-insurer. In eases where the employee is the appellant the commission has determined adversely to his claim, and his every interest would urge a prompt hearing on appeal. On the other hand, if the appellant be the employer-insurer, it would be equally in his interest to have a speedy trial in the court, because his appeal does not, under the specific provisions of article 101, stay the award of the commission, but payments must be made in accordance with that award during the pendency of the appeal and until the commission’s findings are reversed. If if be contended, as has been suggested, that delay might result in the death or disappearance of material witnesses for either party, the answer is that such consideration is of no consequence, because since the¡ act of 1931 the record before the commission contains all of the evidence permitted at the trial on appeal.

Again, it is urged by the appellants that the language of the statute, “any * * * person feeling aggrieved by any decision of the Commission affecting his interests under this Article, may have the same reviewed by a proceeding in the nature of an appeal and initiated in the Circuit Court,” etc., can only mean that the first step must be by taking ⁵⁵⁸ some action in the appellate court, because “initiate” means “to begin,” “to commence,” “to introduce by first act,” “to set afoot,” “to originate”; and any other action must be a subsequent step and, to be effective under the statute, must be taken after and not before the initiation of the appeal in court. Yet it is admitted that the prevailing practice in Baltimore City is to serve notice on the commission first, and file its admission of service in court at the time of docketing the suit, both steps being taken within thirty days. But it is said that although this practice shows that what is claimed to be1 the second step was taken before the first one, it would be highly technical to hold that the court was without jurisdiction under such practice. With this contention we agree, Even though the question presented is one of jurisdiction, in our opinion it would also' be a technical construction, and subversive of the intent and purpose of the Legislature as disclosed by the entire Workmen’s Compensation Law (Code, art. 101, sec. 1 et seq., as amended), to hold that the appellate court’s jurisdiction depended upon the filing of some paper or the docketing of a suit in the appellate tribunal within thirty days from the rendition of the decision of the commission.

As has been shown, that act could not possibly have any effect upon the promptness with which the controversy would ■or could be determined. This is a jurisdictional question, and the jurisdiction of the appellate court depends upon the construction of language employed in the statute, the meaning of which is doubtful and ambiguous. The practice throughout the state, under its provisions, has ajot been uniform. There have been a great many departures from the construction urged by the appellants, some of which they contend are slight and should be disregarded as technical; others they think are of greater moment, as illustrated by the case now under consideration, and should be so construed as to deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Logically, their contention would deny the court’s jurisdiction in one case as certainly as in the other; and in our opinion there is no' justification for making such a distinction, especially in view of the fact that there could ⁵⁵⁹ be no difference in respect to the rights and interests of the parties litigant by giving jurisdictional effect in one