Moore v. Clarke

Offutt, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Bernard A. Hanford, a professional jockey, was accidentally killed while riding a horse called “Apprehensive,” entered by Mrs. F. Ambrose Clarke in a horse race held at the Pimlico Race Track in Baltimore City on May 4th, 1933. On February 24th, 1934, Mrs. Barbara Hanford Moore, his mother, filed with the State Industrial Accident Commission of Maryland, on behalf of his infant brothers and sisters, a claim for compensation against Mr. and Mrs. F. Ambrose Clarke, “and or Captain P. M. Walker,” as agent for them, the Maryland Casualty Company, insurer, and Preston M. Burch, on the theory that Hanford’s death resulted from an accident that arose out of and in the course of an employment by the Clarkes, Walker, and Burch, or some one or more of them. The Clarkes were insured in compliance with the Workmen’s Compensation Law of this state (Code, art. 101, sec. 1 et seq., as amended) by the Maryland Casualty Company, Walker was their agent, and Burch was a horse trainer to whom Hanford had formerly been apprenticed, and who had, after the termination of the apprenticeship, engaged his services as a jockey to ride his, Burch’s, horses.

To that claim the persons named as employers and the insurer presented two defenses: (1) That at the time ⁴³ of the accident Hanford was not an employee within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, but an independent contractor; and (2) that if he was an employee he was a casual employee, and therefore expressly excepted by its terms from the application of the statute. Issues submitting those defenses were considered by the Commission, and it found (1) that Hanford’s death did not “arise out of and in the course of employment” by Walker, Burch, or the Clarkes; (2) that when it occurred, Hanford was an independent contractor and not a casual employee; and as a result of those findings it disallowed the claim. From that, decision the claimant appealed to the Superior Court of Baltimore City, where the case was tried before a jury on these three issues: “1. Was Bernard A. Hanford acting as an independent contractor at the time of his injury? “2.

Was Bernard A. Hanford an employee of Mrs. F. Ambrose Clarke at the time of his injury? “3. Was Bernard A. Hanford a casual employee of Mrs. F. Ambrose Clarke at the time of his injury?” At the conclusion of the claimant’s case the court instructed the jury to answer the first issue “Yes,” the second issue, “No,” and the third issue “No.” From the judgment on the verdict, returned in accordance with those instructions, the claimant took this appeal. At some stage in the proceedings the claim against Burch was abandoned, so that the appeal concerns only the Clarkes, as principals, Walker as their agent, and the insurer. It submits three questions: (1) Was Hanford at the time of his death an independent contractor, or was he an employee of the Clarkes or either of them, or of Walker?

(2) If he was an employee, was he a casual employee within the meaning of article 101, section 65, subsection 3, Code (1935 Supplement) ? and (3) May that question be considered on this appeal? For convenience the third question will be first considered. The appellant’s contention is that, if the trial court erred in ruling that Hanford was an independent con ⁴⁴ tractor, the judgment must be reversed, because, she says, since the Commission found that he was not a casual employee, the statutory presumption precluded the trial court from ruling as a matter of law that he was a casual employee, and that therefore this court, even though the undisputed facts permit no inference other than that he was a casual employee, must nevertheless remand the case for a new trial on that issue. That contention, however, is not only contrary to the recorded decisions of this court, but is inconsistent with the expressed and explicit purpose and intention of the statute itself.

The statute, Code (1935 Supp.) art. 101, sec. 56, provides that “Any employer, employee, beneficiary or person feeling aggrieved by any decision of the Commission affecting his interests under this Article, may have the same reviewed by a proceeding in the nature of an appeal.” It then provides that, in dealing with such an appeal, the court to which the appeal is taken “shall determine whether the Commission has justly considered all the facts concerning the injury, whether it has exceeded the powers granted it by the Article, and whether it has misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided. If the Court shall determine that the Commission has acted within its powers and has correctly construed the law and facts, the decision of the Commission shall be confirmed; otherwise it shall be reversed or modified,” and in the same section further provides that “In all Court proceedings under or pursuant to this Article, the decision of the Commission shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same.” It also allows an appeal to this court from the judgment of the “Circuit Court of the County or the Common Law Courts of Baltimore City” entered on any such appeal, “as in other civil cases.” The purpose of those provisions was to protect the parties to proceedings under the authority of the statute from error by the Commission in deciding controverted ⁴⁵ issues of fact, by granting to the party aggrieved the right of having the decision of the Commission on issues of fact reviewed by the court, or by a court and jury, in a circuit court in a county, or by a common law court in the City of Baltimore, and to protect them against errors of law by the Commission or by such circuit or common law court, by granting to the party aggrieved, first, the right to have the decisions of the Commission on matters of law reviewed by such circuit or common law court, and, second, to have the decision of such court on any matter of law reviewed by this court. It nowhere appears in the statute that the Legislature intended that any party to a proceeding before the Commission could secure a right through the Commission’s error, but, on the contrary, the clear intention of the statute is that no rights shall accrue under it except upon facts proved or otherwise established sufficient to support the right asserted. The provision that the decision of the Commission shall be “prima facie correct” and that the burden of proof is upon the party attacking the same does not mean, therefore, that if no facts are established before the Commission sufficient to support its decision, that there is any burden of factual proof on the person attacking it, for the decision of the Commission cannot itself be accepted as the equivalent of facts which do not exist, and, in all cases, whether there is evidence legally sufficient to support the decision of the Commission is necessarily a matter of law to be decided by the court as any other question of law would be.

On the other hand, where the decision of the Commission involves the consideration of conflicting evidence as to essential facts, or the deduction of permissible but diverse inferences therefrom, its solution of such conflict is presumed to be correct, and the burden of proof is upon the party attacking it to show that it was erroneous. But even there the burden may be one of persuasion rather than proof, for the appellant to overcome it need not produce additional evidence, but may rely upon the identical evidence before the Commission; it is enough if he can ⁴⁶ convince the court or jury that the Commission erred in interpreting the facts or the inferences deducible therefrom, or in construing the law applicable thereto. Where the facts are undisputed, and permit no inferences consistent with the existence of a supposed or asserted right, the existence of such right, wherever it arises, whether before the Commission, the trial court, or this court, is an unmixed question of law. If it were otherwise, the rights of parties to proceedings under the statute would depend not upon the law but upon the unguided and unrestrained discretion of men.

That was the construction placed upon the statute in Harrison v. Central Construction Co., 135 Md. 170 , 108 A. 874, 878 , where the court, speaking through Judge Burke, said: “The question as to whether an injury arose out of or in the course of the employment is ordinarily, like negligence or want of probable cause, a mixed question of law and fact, but when the facts have been ascertained and agreed upon by the parties, or are undisputed, and there is no dispute as to the inferences to be drawn from the facts, the question becomes one of law and may be decided by the court.” In Todd vs. Easton Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 Md. 352 , 128 A. 42, 43 , while the facts were undisputed, they “admitted of an inference of fact” opposed to that embodied in an instruction which directed a verdict in favor of the employer on its appeal from a decision of the Commission in favor of the employee. There, in holding that under such circumstances the statute, Code, art. 101, sec. 56, precluded the court from directing a verdict against the employee, it was said: “In view of the code provisions to that effect, it has been uniformly held, except under such conditions as existed in the case of Harrison v. Central Construction Company, supra, that the trial court is not authorized to withdraw a case from the jury at the instance of a party appealing from the Commission’s determination. Jewel Tea Co. v. Weber, 132 Md. 183 , 103 A. 476 ; Coastwise Shipbuilding Co. v. Tolson, 132 Md. 203 , 103 A. 478 ; Beasman & Co. v. Butler, 133 Md. 382 , 105 A. 409 ; Thistle Mills v. Sparks, ⁴⁷ 137 Md. 117 , 111 A. 769 ; Bell v. Steen, 137 Md. 388 , 112 A. 584 ; Taylor v. Robert Ramsay Co., 139 Md. 113 , 114 A. 830 ; and Baltimore Dry Docks Co. v. Hoffman, 142 Md. 73 , 120 A. 227 .

In the cases last cited, the issues, as presented upon the proof, could not properly be determined against the claimants as questions of law. Those cases therefore were not within the principle stated in Harrison v. Central Construction Co., supra. The rule as to the burden of proof in such cases is not incompatible with the recognized rule that the issue may be decided as one of law where the facts are agreed upon, or proved without contradiction, and there is no ground of dispute as to any material inference of fact. In our opinion, no occasion for the application of the latter rule exists in the present case.” The construction placed upon the statute in those cases was approved in Southern Can Co. v. Sachs, 149 Md. 562 , 131 A. 760 , and Coca-Cola: Bottling Works v. Lilly, 154 Md. 239, 244 , 140 A. 215, 217 , and the principle was restated in the latter case in this form: “Where the question involved in such decision, like the one in this case, is a mixed question of law and fact, it only becomes a question of law for the court to decide, when the facts upon which the decision of the court is rendered have been ascertained and agreed upon by the parties, or when such facts are undisputed and there is no dispute as to the inferences to be drawn from them.” In States Engineering Co. v. Harris, 157 Md. 487, 491 , 146 A. 392 , 394, the court undertook to remove any confusion that may have inhered in the earlier cases upon the application of the “burden of proof” rule, saying: “We said in Harrison v. Central Construction Co., 135 Md. 170 , 108 A. 874 , that in cases where the facts are conceded or undisputed, and there is no dispute as to the inferences to be drawn therefrom, their legal significance is a matter of law to be determined by the court, and that the expression in Jewel Tea Co. v. Weber, 132 Md. 182 , 103 A. 476 , and other cases, that the court was not authorized to say that the appellant had met the burden of proof imposed upon ⁴⁸ it by section 56 of article 101 of the Code, was not intended to apply to such a case.

And what was said in the Harrison case was approved in Todd v. Easton Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 Md. 352 , 128 A. 42 , and in Bogatsky v. Swerdlin, 152 Md. 18 , 135 A. 416 . And the reason it becomes a matter of law for the court to decide, as was pointed out * * * in the opinion of the court in the last mentioned case, is that, if the facts are conceded, and there is no dispute as to the inference to be drawn therefrom, there is no issue of fact to be submitted to the jury.” Beyer v. Decker, 159 Md. 289, 291 , 150 A. 804, 805 , flatly decided that where “the facts are undisputed” the court might direct a verdict contrary to the decision of the Commission, because that was what was done in that case, which turned on the construction of the statute, so no question of opposed inferences was involved. In Barnes v. Myers, 163 Md. 209 , 161 A. 279, 280 , it was held: “There can be no such thing as a burden of proving legal principles.

Beyer v. Decker, 159 Md. 289, 291 , 150 A. 804 ; Gunter v. Sharp & Dohme, 159 Md. 438, 445 , 151 A. 134 .” While in Schemmel v. T. B. Gatch & Sons Contracting & Building Co., 164 Md. 671, 672 , 166 A. 39 , the court was dealing in part with the effect of chapter 406 of the Acts of 1931 (repealed and re-enacted with amendments, chapter 508, Acts 1933, chapter 545, Acts 1935) as construed in Thomas v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 162 Md. 509 , 160 A. 793 , it approved the principle that, as the statute stood originally, as it was amended, and as it now stands, the burden of proof rule embodied in it has no application to a case where the facts are undisputed or conceded, and susceptible of no inference supporting appellant’s