Moore v. Schultz ex rel. Schultz

Alvey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The questions raised upon the exceptions in this case relate exclusively to the measure of damages that the appellee was entitled to recover of the appellants. ⁴²³ The declaration is for trespass de bonis asportatis, and alleges, as special damage to the appellee, consequent upon the taking and carrying away of the goods, that her business was broken up, and that she was reduced to poverty and deprived of the means of support. It appears that the appellants, as creditors of the appellee’s husband, had sued out an attachment and seized certain goods as belonging to their debtor, which were claimed at the time as belonging to the appellee, and the right to seize which, failing to be sustained, they were afterwards returned to the appellee in a greatly damaged condition. And the question is, upon all the facts and circumstances of the case, to what measure of damages was the appellee entitled.

Ordinarily, in actions of this character, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if there be no circumstances of aggravation, the value of the goods taken, if they be not returned, or if returned, the amount of the injury done to them, with interest from the time of the taking down to the trial. This is generally considered as the extent of the damages sustained, and is deemed legal compensation, which refers, however, only to the injury to the property, and not to any collateral or consequential damages resulting to the owner by the trespass. 6 Pet, 272. But if the trespass be committed in a wanton and aggravated manner, indicating malice, or a disregard of the rights of others, and the circumstances of the case afford no justification, in addition to the measure of compensation just stated, the jury will be allowed to make reparation, not only for the loss of property, but for outraged feeling and reputation; and this may be carried to the extent of setting a public example to deter others who may be alike evilly disposed. The exercise of this power of inflicting damages for aggravation is, however, always left to the discretion of the jury, as it is dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case, and for it no criterion can be ⁴²⁴ prescribed, except that the damages assessed in respect to aggravation, should not be disproportioned to the enormity of the case.

But it is contended that, in addition to the