Moore v. State

Digges, J"., delivered the opinion of the Court. On February 25th, 1925, the appellant was tried by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City upon an indictment containing three counts; the first charging the obtention of goods by false pretenses, the second larceny, and the third receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen. The verdict of the jury found her guilty on the first count, but not guilty on the second and third counts. A motion for new trial having been overruled, the judgment and sentence of the court was that she he confined in jail for the period of six months.

From that judgment this appeal was taken. The record contains five exceptions, all being to the rulings of the court on the evidence. The record also contains the following stipulation : “It is stipulated between the State’s Attorney of the City of Baltimore and the counsel for the defendant in the above entitled case that the folio-wing is a correct statement of the proceedings immediately following the close of the testimony in the case: “The attorneys for the State and the traverser then argued the case to the jury. “Thereupon the court instructed the jury in substance as follows: “Gentlemen of the Jury: The indictment in this case contains three counts, the first count charges the traverser with false pretenses in the manner therein set forth; the second charges the traverser with larceny in the manner therein set forth; the third count charges the traverser with receiving stolen goods. There is no ³⁰⁰ evidence in the case to sustain a conviction under the third count of the indictment in this case, charging receiving stolen goods, and therefore the verdict of the jury should be not guilty on the third count.

Your verdict may be guilty on the first count, not guilty on the second count; or not guilty on the first count, guilty on the second count; or your verdict may be not guilty.” The entire argument in the brief, with the exception of one paragraph of six lines, as well as the oral argument, is a contention on behalf of the appellant that there was error in the instruction of the trial court as set out in the above stipulation. This contention raises a question which is not before us, for the reason that the record fails to* disclose any objection by the appellant at the time the instruction was given to the jury, or the reservation of an exception thereto. Mr. Poe in his work on “Practice” sec. 212, in discussing bills of exception, states: “But for any error not apparent upon the. record, such as refusal to instruct a1 jury as requested, or for erroneous instruction, or for an erroneous ruling in admitting or excluding evidence, the only mode by which the question can be brought into the record, so as to be open for examination in the appellate court, is by bill of exceptions duly reduced to writing and signed.” The frequency with which this Oourt has announced and applied the rule as stated by the learned author, makes it unnecessary for us at this time to enter into any discussion in respect thereto, it being only necessary to refer to section 10 of article 5 of Bagby’s Code of 1924, 'being Rule 4 of this Court, and the numerous eases cited in the annotations to that section. As stated, the appellant has made practically no contention for a reversal of the judgment on the ground of error by the lower court in its rulings upon the evidence.

It is, however, stated in her brief: “The court below erred in overruling objections to the questions embraced in the first, second, third and fourth bills of exception.” ÜSTo mention of the fifth exception being there made, and it not having been ³⁰¹ argued in this Court, we will treat it as abandoned, but at the same time expressing the opinion that after an examination we are unable to see upon what theory the question embraced in that exception could have been excluded. The questions considered in the first three bills of exception relate to objections by tbe appellant to rulings of the court in allowing certain questions to be asked Mrs. Mar-chant, a State witness, as to a conversation between Mks. Marchant and tbe appellant on tbe morning of December 2nd, shortly after tbe bracelets were obtained from Bucher & Co. This witness bad testified that she was employed by Goldsmith-Stern & Co., whose store on Lexington Street was frequently visited by tbe appellant, and that on tbe morning of December 2nd the appellant came to tbe store. She, was then asked: “Mow, then, suppose you tell tbe court and jury under what circumstances you saw, her, and what if any conversation you bad with her relative to a bracelet she displayed?” This question was objected to, which objection being overruled, tbe witness answered: “Well, she came there to pay me for a dress that she bad purchased a few days