Morgan State University v. Walker

GREENE, Judge. This case arises from a slip and fall incident. Pamela Walker (“Respondent”) went to visit her daughter at Morgan State University (“MSU”) after a heavy snowstorm, and, after driving onto a snow and ice covered parking lot, walked across the ice, fell and fractured her leg. Respondent instituted a personal injury action against MSU, arguing that it was negligent in failing to remove the snow from the parking lot.

The Circuit Court determined that despite MSU’s negligence, as a matter of law, Respondent assumed the risk of her injuries and granted summary judgment in favor of MSU. The ⁵¹¹ Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the voluntariness of Respondent’s actions was a jury question. We conclude that, when Respondent walked across the parking lot with knowledge that the lot was covered with ice and snow, she assumed the risk of her injuries, as a matter of law, under the circumstances. The voluntariness of the plaintiffs conduct in an assumption of the risk analysis is measured by an objective standard.

Because the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that Respondent knowingly and voluntarily walked across the icy parking lot, the Circuit Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of MSU. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The pertinent facts of this case are not in dispute. It snowed approximately 22 inches in Baltimore, Maryland between February 16-18, 2003. MSU was closed through February 19, 2003 because of the snowfall.

At that time, Respondent’s daughter was a residential student at MSU. Carnegie Express, a company that MSU had hired to remove the snow, performed snow removal services on February 16 and 17. On February 18, MSU informed Carnegie Express that MSU would complete the snow removal process and that Carnegie Express did not have to do so. At or around 8:00 a.m. on February 24, 2003, Respondent drove approximately one hour from her home in Upper Marlboro to visit her daughter at MSU.

Respondent stated that she needed to bring her daughter money because her daughter did not have an ATM card and needed money for gas and other things. Respondent arrived at MSU’s campus with the intention of parking in parking lot T, the lot in front of her daughter’s dormitory. The parking lot is an elevated lot. Respondent explained that she, therefore, did not notice the ice and snow until she was already on top of it.

She testified that once she pulled into the parking lot she noticed that she was driving “on crunchy ice and snow.” Respondent found a parking spot near the entrance to the dormitory and parked without looking for a spot in another portion of the lot. She ⁵¹² explained that the only spots closer to the entrance were handicapped spaces. Respondent testified that she “didn’t think of danger,” she just thought “doggone, they didn’t clean this parking lot.” She also testified that she “had no other choice,” aside from that parking lot, as to where to park her car. Respondent parked and exited her car.

She noticed snow and ice on the ground between her car and the entrance to the dormitory. She therefore held onto the cars next to her as she walked to reach her daughter’s building. Respondent’s daughter testified that, like the parking lot, the driveway and steps in front of her dormitory had not been cleared. Respondent testified that she held onto the railing when walking on the steps and walked very slowly.

She also noted that she had on Timberland boots and stated “I mean I don’t have any problems with walking or anything like that. Actually I’m a dare devil to be honest with you.” She reached her daughter’s dormitory without incident. Respondent visited with her daughter for approximately one hour. On her way back to her car, she walked slowly and tapped each car, while looking down at the ground “to make sure that [she] didn’t slip and fall.” She saw snow and ice on the ground as she was walking and testified that she was “trying to be safe.” When Respondent reached her vehicle, she lost her footing, fell to the ground and fractured her leg, an injury that she claims has cost her approximately $50,000 in medical bills and lost earnings.

Respondent instituted a personal injury action against MSU in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging negligent failure to clear the parking lot of snow and ice, and negligent hiring, training and supervision, on the basis that MSU’s employees failed to clear adequately the snow and ice in the parking lot. 1 The Circuit Court granted summary judgment ⁵¹³ for MSU based on the theory that, as a matter of law, Respondent voluntarily assumed the risk of her injuries by walking on the snow and ice. Respondent appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court reversed the Circuit Court, holding that, under the circumstances, the jury should decide whether Respondent’s decision to park in the lot and walk on the snow and ice was voluntary. MSU filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court, which we granted. 2 Morgan State v. Walker, 395 Md. 420 , 910 A.2d 1061 (2006).

DISCUSSION MSU contends that the Circuit Court correctly applied an objective standard when it determined that Respondent acted voluntarily when she chose to park in parking lot T and enter her daughter’s dormitory, despite the ice and snow on the ground. MSU states that “the evidence established unequivocally that [Respondent] was fully informed of the existence of ice and snow on the parking lot and fully understood the risk of slipping and falling and, therefore, voluntarily assumed the risk.” MSU argues further that the intermediate appellate court erred in concluding that the issue of voluntariness was a jury question because that court “erroneously substituted a subjective test for the proper objective standard regarding the voluntariness of [Respondent’s option to turn around and go home without visiting her daughter.” MSU lastly avers that the Court of Special Appeals erred in considering MSU’s negligence because any duty owed by MSU was superseded by Respondent’s voluntary assumption of the risk. ⁵¹⁴ Respondent counters that the determination of her voluntariness “does not involve an exploration of her subjective state of mind but a weighing of objective, factual evidence to be presented at trial.” She contends that this evidence includes whether: the parking lot was fully covered with snow eight days after the snow storm, the lot was open for students and their guests, MSU posted warnings, Respondent saw the dangerous condition before entering the lot, there existed a less dangerous, accessible route to the building, and turning around and going back home would have presented less risk than parking close to the door and walking to the dormitory. Respondent argues that a jury should decide whether she voluntarily assumed the risk of her injury, based on the answers to those questions. Respondent also contends that her daughter was a business invitee of MSU and MSU therefore had a legal duty to provide a safe premises, and that, as her daughter’s visitor, Respondent was owed the same legal duty from MSU as her daughter.

Lastly, Respondent avers that “[ajccepting [MSUJ’s position would subvert good public policy with bad tort law.” Respondent’s Assumption of the Risk We agree with MSU and the Circuit Court that the question of voluntariness, in the context of an assumption of the risk analysis, is measured by an objective standard. Therefore, when the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that Respondent knowingly and voluntarily walked across a snow and ice covered parking lot and injured herself, she assumed the risk of her injuries as a matter of law. The Circuit Court was therefore correct to grant MSU’s motion for summary judgment and not send the question to the jury. Assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense in a negligence action.

Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421 , 226 A.2d 273, 275 (1967). The two leading cases on this issue are ADM P’ship v. Martin, 348 Md. 84 , 702 A.2d 730 (1997), and Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275 , 592 A.2d 1119 (1991). In ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 90-92 , 702 A.2d at 734-35 , we set forth the principles of an assumption of the risk analysis: ⁵¹⁵ In Maryland, it is well settled that in order to establish the defense of assumption of risk, the defendant must show that the plaintiff: (1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk of danger. ‘The doctrine of assumption of risk rests upon an intentional and voluntary exposure to a known danger and, therefore, consent on the part of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward [her] and to take [her] chances from harm from a particular risk.’ Assumption of risk means ‘voluntary incurring that of an accident which may not occur, and which the person assuming the risk may be careful to avoid after starting.’ Thus, if established, it functions as a complete bar to recovery because ‘it is a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accident occurs.’ * * * ‘In determining whether a plaintiff had knowledge and appreciation of the risk, an objective standard must be applied and a plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been obvious to him.’ Thus, ‘when it is clear that a person of normal intelligence in the position of the plaintiff must have understood the danger, the issue is for the court.’ * * * * Moreover, ‘there are certain risks which anyone of adult age must be taken to appreciate: the danger of slipping on ice, of falling through unguarded openings, of lifting heavy objects ... and doubtless many others.’ Concerning whether a plaintiff has voluntarily exposed him or herself to the risk of a known danger, ‘there must be some manifestation of consent to relieve the defendant of the obligation of reasonable conduct.’ ‘The risk will not be taken to be assumed if it appears from [the plaintiffs] words, or from the facts of the situation, that ⁵¹⁶ he does not in fact consent to relieve the defendant of the obligation to protect him. Nevertheless, if the plaintiff proceeds to enter voluntarily into a situation which exposes him to the risk, notwithstanding any protests, his conduct will normally indicate that he does not stand on his objection, and has consented, however reluctantly, to accept the risk and look out for himself.’ (citations omitted).

In ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 88 , 702 A.2d at 733 , Keen Martin was employed as a delivery person. On the morning after a snowstorm, she was assigned by her employer to deliver blueprints to a business. She arrived at the business and noticed snow and ice in the parking lot surrounding the building. Martin testified that she feared losing her job if she did not complete the task for her employer.

ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 89 , 702 A.2d at 733 . To deliver the blueprints, Martin exited her vehicle and walked to the building; she slipped, but caught herself and avoided falling. She made it to the building and delivered the blueprints. She then left the building and walked back to her vehicle along the same path that she had entered; however, Martin slipped and fell, injuring her back.

Martin filed a personal injury action against the owners of the building, ADM Partnership. The partnership argued that it was not liable because Martin assumed the risk of her injuries when she walked across the icy parking lot. Martin argued that she did not assume the risk because she did not walk onto the ice voluntarily; she had to walk on the ice or she would lose her job. The trial court applied an objective standard, stating that “ ‘[everybody knows that walking on ice is slippery ... the assumption of the risk is [when,] with that knowledge[,]’ ” an individual assumes that she can walk on that ice and does so.

ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 90 , 702 A.2d at 733 (citations omitted). The trial court found that Martin assumed the risk as a matter of law. ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 90 , 702 A.2d at 734 . The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that there existed questions of fact for the jury to decide; specifically whether Martin’s beliefs that she would lose her job if she did not walk on the ice and complete the ⁵¹⁷ delivery rendered her actions involuntary.

This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, rejecting that court’s conclusion that Martin’s actions were rendered involuntary because she was acting at the instruction of her employer. ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 94-95 , 702 A.2d at 736 . We determined that despite her employer’s instructions, Martin still retained a choice of whether to walk across the ice, after she realized that it would be dangerous. ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 102-03 , 702 A.2d at 740 .

We held that when Martin chose to walk across the ice, she did so knowingly and voluntarily and therefore assumed the risk as a matter of law. Similarly, in Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278 , 592 A.2d at 1120 , Frances McNeal arrived at a hotel shortly after four inches of snow had fallen. She noticed that the area in front of the main entrance to the hotel had been cleared of ice and snow, but observed that the rest of the parking lot had not. Nonetheless, she requested a hotel room closest to an exit because she had a lot of paperwork to carry from her car to her room.

Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278 , 592 A.2d at 1120-21 . The room that McNeal was given was accessible from the main lobby, but she chose to drive her car away from the main entrance to a different entrance that was closer to her room so that she could move her paperwork with greater ease. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278 , 592 A.2d at 1121 . McNeal parked on packed ice and snow and noticed that the area was slippery.

Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278-79 , 592 A.2d at 1121 . She removed her cat and some belongings from her car and entered the hotel without incident. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278 , 592 A.2d at 1121 . On the way back to her car, however, she slipped and fell, breaking her ankle.

McNeal sued, alleging poor maintenance of the parking lot and negligent failure to warn her of the condition. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 276 , 592 A.2d at 1120 . A jury returned a