Morris v. State

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Appellant was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses from the Baltimore City Welfare Department on the basis of testimony which established that while he was receiving Welfare payments under the name of George Chesnut, he failed to notify the Department that he was at the same time receiving income from gainful employment under the name George Morris. As a part of its proof that the Appellant on occasion had used the name George Morris, the State offered in evidence several statements which were produced by an attorney who had formerly represented the Appellant in a civil matter, which statements bore the signature, George Morris. Also, the attorney’s receptionist was pemitted to testify, over objection, that the Appellant was known to her both as George Morris and as George Chesnut and that the office files indicated that he used both names.

The Appellant asserted that his real name was George Chesnut and he denied ever having used the name George Morris. He admitted, however, that the attorney who produced the statements had previously represented him in a civil matter. ²⁵⁴ In this appeal, it is contended that the introduction of statements bearing the signature George Morris and the testimony of the receptionist identifying the Appellant as George Morris- and George Chesnut were in violation of the confidential relationship between attorney and client. The statements were offered not for their substance but solely for the purpose of identifying the Appellant as a client who had represented his name to be George Morris. Thus, the question for determination is-whether the identity of a client is protected by the privilege which ordinarily attaches to communications arising out of the attorney-client relationship.

While the issue appears to be one of first impression in this State, it has been the subject of decision in a number of jurisdictions throughout the Country. The principle of the attorney-client privilege is grounded in the common law, and, according to Professor Wigmore, its history goes back at least to the reign of Elizabeth I. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2290 (McNaughton, rev. 1961). In some States the privilege has been recognized and regulated by statute ; but by and large, the common law principle has remained unchanged even in those states which have enacted specific statutes since they have been interpreted as simply reflecting the common law doctrine. Professor Wigmore phrases the principle as follows (supra, Sec. 2292) : “(1) Where legal advice of kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.” It is apparent from the foregoing statement that what is sought primarily to be protected are the communications between the client and the attorney, the modern theory being that an individual in a free society should be encouraged to consult with his attorney