Morris v. State

Per Curiam. On June 22, 1967, the appellant, Joseph Eeon Morris, was tried in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Judge Charles D. Harris presiding without a jury, and convicted of assault upon William Marshall and of manslaughter for the killing of James William Johnson. On July 17, 1967, after denying a Motion for a New Trial, the appellant was sentenced to eight years imprisonment for the manslaughter conviction and four years imprisonment for the assault conviction, sentences to run concurrently. Appellant’s sole contention raised on this appeal is that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the convictions.

From the evidence adduced below, the trial court could properly find that on September 10, 1966, at approximately 2:15 o’clock a.m., the appellant was involved with William Marshall in an altercation in the middle of the street, near Riggs and Calhoun Streets, in Baltimore, which, after some arguing and scuffling, culminated in the appellant striking Mr. Marshall on the side of his head with a gun which discharged killing a bystander, James William Johnson. Two Baltimore City policemen, cruising in the area, heard the report of the gun and immediately responded to the scene. They observed the appellant, while walking from where the deceased lay, take a handkerchief from his pocket placing a black ³³¹ object therein, and deposit same in the gutter. The officers immediately retrieved the object and found it to be a .38 colt revolver.

Appellant testified that he struck Marshall in self-defense, was not aware that the gun was loaded, and that the gun was in a paper bag when he struck Marshall, he having never withdrawn the gun. Marshall and witness Leroy Wilson testified that they did not observe a paper bag but saw the naked gun in the appellant’s hand. The applicable test in reaching a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence in a non-jury case is whether the evidence, if believed, either shows directly or supports a rational inference of the facts to be proved, from which the court could fairly be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt of the offense charged. Speaks v. State, 3 Md. App. 371, 379 , 239 A. 2d 600, 605 (1968); Anderson and Washington, Jr. v. State, 3 Md. App. 362, 369 , 239 A. 2d 579, 583 (1968); Montague v. State, 3 Md. App. 66, 72 , 237 A. 2d 816, 820 (1968).

In non-jury trials the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses rests within the determination of the trial judge. McRae v. State, 3 Md. App. 388, 393 , 239 A. 2d 607, 610 (1968). Anderson and Washington, Jr. v. State, supra, 369; Lucas v. State, 2 Md. App. 590, 593, 235 A. 2d 780, 782 (1968). Furthermore, in non-jury trials, the trial court in performing its duty of judging the credibility of witnesses may disbelieve the exculpatory statements made by the defendant.

Anderson and Washington, Jr. v. State, supra, 369. The thrust of the appellant’s argument is that since he was acting in self-defense with respect to Marshall, he could not, therefore, be held culpable for the killing of Johnson, since if Marshall had been killed instead, the resultant homicide would have been justified by application of the doctrine of self-defense. However, it is clear that the burden of proving self-defense rested upon the appellant. Davis v. State, 237 Md. 97, 103 , 205 A. 2d 254 (1964).

An assault predicated upon the doctrine of self-defense is justified only where the accused had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, that he was in apparent imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm from his actual or ³³² potential assailant. It is the task of the trier of facts to determine whether the accused was justified in meeting force with force. Upon finding such justification, the force used against the assailant must not have been unreasonable or excessive, that is, the defender must not have used more force than the exigency reasonably demanded. Tipton v. State, 1 Md. App. 556, 560 , 232 A. 2d 289 (1967).

While under a particular set of facts and