Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Usan

Motor Vehicle Administration v. Rahq Deika Montana Usan, No. 6, September Term, 2023. Opinion by Hotten, J. MARYLAND TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE – DRIVER’S LICENSES – TEST REFUSAL – The Supreme Court held that the Administrative Law Judge did not err in concluding that law enforcement had reasonable grounds to believe the detained individual was driving a vehicle while impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both. The record as a whole provided substantial evidence such that a reasoning mind could reasonably reach the same conclusion. The Court also held that the Administrative Law Judge did not err in concluding that law enforcement, having reasonable suspicion of a driver impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both, may request testing pursuant to Transportation Article § 16-205.1.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the driver violated Transportation Article § 16-205.1 by refusing to submit to the requested testing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court for Charles County. Circuit Court for Charles County Case No.: C-08-CV-22-000278 Argued: November 3, 2023 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 6 September Term, 2023 MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION v. RAHQ DEIKA MONTANA USAN Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. Opinion by Hotten, J. Biran, J., concurs.

Filed: January 25, 2024 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2024.10.30 '00'04- 13:30:20 Gregory Hilton, Clerk The Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) seeks review of a decision by the Circuit Court for Charles County, which overturned an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) suspension of Rahq Deika Montana Usan’s (“Mr. Usan”) driver’s license pursuant to Maryland’s implied consent statute, Maryland Code Ann., Transportation Article (“Transp.”) § 16-205.1. The MVA alleges the circuit court committed error in “[m]aking [i]ts [o]wn [f]actual and [l]egal [f]indings,” thereby “improperly substitut[ing] its judgment for the ALJ’s[.]” In response, Mr. Usan asserts that law enforcement had no grounds to request an alcohol breath test as a component of drug testing, because he was arrested under suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs, and there was no evidence that a Drug Recognition Expert (“DRE”) was available to administer said drug testing. We granted certiorari to answer the following question: Did the administrative law judge correctly find that reasonable grounds existed under Md. Code § 16-205.l of the Transportation Article for a law enforcement officer to request a motorist to take a test for alcohol concentration, despite there being no odor of alcoholic beverage on his breath and a preliminary breath test [with a] result [of] 0.00 alcohol content, but where the motorist was driving erratically[,] with indicia of intoxication to include horizontal gaze nystagmus and lack of coordination and balance? For the reasons discussed below, we answer the question in the affirmative and reverse the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Factual Background On December 17, 2021 at 12:06 a.m., State Trooper First Class Jonathan Greathouse (“Trooper Greathouse”) “observed a [r]ed Jeep . . . driving in an erratic manner[,] cross[ing] the solid white line” in Mechanicsville, St. Mary’s County, Maryland. Trooper Greathouse made a traffic stop and identified Respondent, Mr. Usan, based on securing his identification. At the time of the stop, Mr. Usan resided in Maryland and possessed a Maryland-issued driver’s license. Trooper Greathouse “observed [that Mr. Usan] was very disoriented[,] had glassy red eyes[, and] his movement was slow and sluggish.” Mr. Usan denied drinking any alcohol.

Trooper Greathouse requested that Mr. Usan submit to three Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (“SFSTs”), including horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”), walk and turn (“WAT”), and one leg stand (“OLS”).1 Mr. Usan did not successfully perform the field sobriety tests, as reflected in Trooper Greathouse’s report noting “6/6” indications of impairment on HGN, “7/8” on WAT, and “3/4” on OLS. Although “at no point did [Trooper Greathouse] detect the odor of an alcoholic beverage[,]” he suspected Mr. Usan may be under the influence of alcohol. Mr. Usan “was offered a preliminary breath test” (“PBT”) and blew “0.00” breath alcohol content (“BrAC”). “[Mr.] Usan was then arrested for driving under the influence of drugs and transported to the Maryland State Police Leonardtown Barrack for processing.” Before leaving the scene, Trooper Greathouse asked a law enforcement officer from a different police department: “do you think you guys will have a [DRE] available or no?” The other police officer appeared to say no. Trooper Greathouse was not a DRE. 1 HGN has subjects follow a ballpoint pen with their eyes to test eye movement and control.

WAT has subjects walk a straight line in a heel-to-toe fashion to test coordination. OLS has subjects stand on one leg to test balance. 2 With Mr. Usan sitting in the police car, Trooper Greathouse played an audio recording of the DR 15.2 The recording was very clear. Trooper Greathouse paused the recording to explain the DRE procedure that would take place if Mr. Usan consented to taking a test. However, Mr. Usan interrupted him and stated “yeah . . . we’re not taking any tests.” At this point, the recording resumed to play.

At the end of the recording, Trooper Greathouse clarified that Mr. Usan could go home regardless of whether he took the test, but that a test would “take a little longer”, and asked Mr. Usan if he would consent to a test. Mr. Usan replied, “not at this time.” Upon arrival at the barrack, Trooper Greathouse provided a DR 15 form to Mr. Usan. Mr. Usan signed the DR 15, refusing alcohol testing. Mr. Usan also verbally “refused to take the alcohol concentration test.” Thereafter, Trooper Greathouse suspended Mr. Usan’s license pursuant to Transp. § 16-205.1 for refusing to submit to the requested alcohol test.

Mr. Usan was also charged with violating Transp. § 21-902(a)(1)(i): driving while under the influence of alcohol; Transp. § 21-902(b)(1)(i): driving while impaired by alcohol; Transp. § 21-902(c)(1)(i): driving while impaired by drugs; Transp. § 21-901.1(b): negligent driving; Transp. § 21-901.1(a): reckless driving; and Transp. § 21-201(a)(1): failure to obey properly placed traffic control device instructions. The alcohol-related 2 A “DR 15” is a standardized audio recording or form which advises motorists of their rights regarding alcohol and drug testing pursuant to Transp. § 16-205.1. The recording and form also provide relevant administrative penalties for refusing testing. 3 charges were later dropped. However, Mr. Usan’s license suspension remained for refusing a requested alcohol test pursuant to Transp. § 16-205.1.

Procedural Background On April 8, 2022, Mr. Usan appeared before ALJ Joy Phillips to contest his license suspension. Mr. Usan testified that he drove for Uber for 12 hours on the day in question and that he was driving under the speed limit and crossed over the solid white lines because he was tired. Mr. Usan denied he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Mr. Usan further claimed nervousness affected him during his SFSTs due to the arrival of additional officers.

Mr. Usan argued that there was no reason to request a test for alcohol in the absence of evidence of alcohol impairment. The ALJ explained her understanding that per department procedure, law enforcement conducts certified alcohol testing before any drug testing to “rule . . . out” alcohol as the cause for impairment. Mr. Usan confirmed his understanding of law enforcement procedure. However, he argued that an officer who is not certified as a DRE does not have the statutory authority to request drug testing.

At no point did Mr. Usan argue before the ALJ that he was induced to refuse testing or that a DRE was completely unavailable. The ALJ found by a “preponderance of evidence” that: Trooper Greathouse had reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Usan was driving while impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both; there was evidence of the use of alcohol, drugs, or both due to Trooper Greathouse’s report of Mr. Usan’s sluggishness, glassy eyes, and the SFSTs results; that “Trooper [Greathouse] administered a PBT with results of 0.00 BrAC”; and that Trooper Greathouse 4 arrested Mr. Usan for “driving under the influence of drugs, not alcohol.” The ALJ also found that: “[Mr. Usan] said twice during the reading [of his rights] that he was not going to take any test[; and Trooper Greathouse] asked [Mr. Usan] if he would take a test and [Mr. Usan] responded, ‘[n]ot at this time.’” Further, “[a]t the station, [Mr. Usan] signed the DR 15 that he was refusing the alcohol test [and he] was never offered a drug test or an evaluation by a [DRE.]” Relying on Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 19 , 997 A.2d 768, 778 (2010), and Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Pollard, 466 Md. 531, 540 , 222 A.3d 177 , 182 (2019), the ALJ articulated that the reasonable suspicion of an officer is a “common-sense, nontechnical conception” based on the officer’s training and experience that is owed deference by the courts. Since Trooper Greathouse “supported his belief [that Mr. Usan] was under the influence of something with specific observations[,]” the ALJ concluded that Trooper Greathouse’s suspicions provided reasonable grounds to request certified testing at the barracks. The ALJ noted Mr. Usan’s “objections to being offered an alcohol test when he was arrested for suspicion of drugs, but [observed that] the Transportation Article includes both tests if an officer has an objectively reasonable belief the driver is under the influence or impaired by something, whether it be alcohol or drugs.” The ALJ determined that Mr. Usan’s test refusal violated Transp. § 16-205.1, resulting in the suspension of Mr. Usan’s driver’s license for nine months with an alternative of twelve months of Ignition Interlock restrictions. 5 Mr. Usan petitioned for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Charles County,3 where a hearing was held on November 29, 2022.

Mr. Usan contended that the ALJ applied an incorrect standard because Trooper Greathouse needed “reasonable grounds that [Mr. Usan] was impaired by either alcohol and/or drugs . . . not just impaired by something.” Additionally, Mr. Usan argued that the record did not provide “competent, material, and substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that” Trooper Greathouse had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Usan was under the influence or impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both. Mr. Usan asserted that there was no direct evidence of the presence of alcohol, so there was “no alcohol.” Further, Mr. Usan argued that, while law enforcement can request both alcohol and drug testing depending on the context, “it was not proper to ask for or to request a [certified] breath test [for alcohol] based off of the evidence in the record.” Mr. Usan also contended that, despite a police manual requirement stating otherwise, an officer could not request alcohol testing without any evidence of alcohol. MVA argued that the standard of review was not de novo, but instead was whether there was “substantial evidence . . . to support the [ALJ’s] decision” and whether the decision was legally correct. MVA pointed to the failed SFSTs and erratic driving as substantial evidence of Mr. Usan’s impairment.

MVA contended that the evidence sufficed “to support the ALJ’s finding.” 3 Although the traffic stop at issue occurred in St. Mary’s County, Mr. Usan petitioned for judicial review in Charles County. Mr. Usan resided at the time in Waldorf, Charles County, Maryland. Maryland Code Ann., State Government Article § 10-222(c) provides that, “[u]nless otherwise required by statute, a petition for judicial review [of a final decision of an administrative agency] shall be filed with the circuit court for the county where any party resides or has a principal place of business.” So, venue was proper. 6 The circuit court acknowledged that it did not watch the dashcam videos of the incident. Instead, the court speculated on why Mr. Usan’s “eyes looked red[]” and “bloodshot,” noting that “there’s a lot of reasons why somebody may be tired that is causing them – maybe he’s falling asleep, I don’t know.” The circuit court then reiterated that if you’re pulling someone over and you’re suspecting that they’re under the influence of alcohol and they blow a [.]00 and you don’t have any other indication that he’s under the influence of alcohol such as a bottle, empty bottle of liquor, the smell of alcohol, any kind of admission that [Mr. Usan] drank at some point during the day, people do make admissions, if you go to the, the idea that maybe he’s on drugs, then, and there’s no expert that is able to even give any indication that they believed that he may be, then that’s just the officer guessing.

And then you have people who may just be tired and driving, which is dangerous, but without indication. And then that blow of [.]00. In short, the circuit court concluded that it did not “believe . . . that the decision was sustained by the evidence” and reversed Mr. Usan’s suspension. MVA timely appealed and we granted certiorari.

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Usan, 483 Md. 572 , 296 A.3d 415 (2023). STANDARD OF REVIEW A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court decides whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. A reviewing court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.

A reviewing court must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it; the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, and it is the 7 agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence and to draw inferences from that evidence. Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of our opinions, a court’s task on review is not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Carpenter, 424 Md. 401 , 412–13, 36 A.3d 439, 446 (2012) (cleaned up). “In applying this standard, we review the decision of the administrative agency, rather than the determination of the lower court, and will defer to the [ALJ]’s findings of fact and inferences drawn, insofar as supported by the record.” Id. at 413 , 36 A.3d at 446 (citation omitted). “We review an agency’s decision that is premised upon the application and analysis of caselaw without deference to the agency’s legal conclusions.” Pollard, 466 Md. at 537 , 222 A.3d at 180 (quotation omitted). DISCUSSION The purpose of Maryland’s implied consent statute, Transp. § 16-205.1, is “to reduce the incidence of [impaired] driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take [requested] tests[.]” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255 , 923 A.2d 100, 108 (2007) (citation omitted).

The statute provides that [a]ny person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway . . . in this State is deemed to have consented . . . to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving . . . while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, [or] while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance[.] Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(2) (emphasis added). 8 “Test” means, unless the context requires otherwise: 1. A test of a person’s breath or of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to determine alcohol concentration; 2. A test or tests of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood; or 3. Both: A. A test of a person’s breath or a test of 1 specimen of a person’s blood, to determine alcohol concentration; and B. A test or tests of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood.

Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii). The statute, in relevant part, directs that a police officer that has “reasonable grounds to believe” a person is driving a motor vehicle while under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or any combination of both, is to detain the person, request that the person permit a test to be taken, and advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed if testing is refused. Transp. § 16-205.1(b)(2)(i)–(iii). If the motorist refuses requested testing, the statute directs the police officer to, among other things, confiscate and suspend the person’s driver’s license, inform the person that they have a right to timely request administrative review, and advise the person of the administrative sanctions that will be imposed upon an adverse finding upon review.

Transp. § 16-205.1(b)(3)(i)–(vi). At an administrative hearing in a test refusal case, the statute directs the ALJ to assess whether: the law enforcement officer had “reasonable grounds to believe” the motorist was driving under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 9 of the two; there was evidence the motorist used alcohol, drugs, or a combination of the two; the officer advised the motorist of their rights under the statute and possible administrative sanctions before requesting testing; and the motorist refused to take the requested test. Transp. § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(1)–(4). If each element is satisfied, the statute requires that the MVA “suspend or revoke the person’s license[.]” Transp. § 16- 205.1(f)(8)(i).

In test refusal cases, for first-time offenders, the statute directs a 270-day suspension. Transp. § 16-205.1(f)(8)(v)(5)(A). Transp. § 16-205.1(j) features specific provisions focused on drugs and controlled dangerous substances (“CDS”). It provides that a “test for drug or [CDS] content” may only be requested by a police officer if the “law enforcement agency of which the officer is a member has the capacity to have such tests conducted[.]” Transp. § 16-205.1(j)(1).

Capacity to conduct these drug tests is limited to those types of officers designated within the statute as DREs. See Transp. § 16-205.1(j)(2)–(3). Transp. § 16-205.1(j) makes no provisions for alcohol testing. I. The Record Contains Substantial Evidence to Support the Administrative Law Judge’s Findings of Fact, and the ALJ’s Legal Conclusions Bore no Error of Law.

A. The ALJ had Substantial Evidence for finding Trooper Greathouse had Reasonable Grounds to Believe Mr. Usan was Driving under the Influence. At issue is whether the ALJ’s conclusion that Trooper Greathouse had reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Usan was driving under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or both, was supported by substantial evidence. In Shepard, we held that, as used 10 in the implied consent statute, the phrase “reasonable grounds” means “reasonable articulable suspicion[.]”4 399 Md at 254, 923 A.2d at 107 . Here, the ALJ relied on Shea, 415 Md. at 19 , 997 A.2d at 778 , for the articulation of an officer’s reasonable suspicion as a “common sense, nontechnical conception that considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent people act.” The ALJ also followed our instruction in Pollard, 466 Md. at 540 , 222 A.3d at 182, to “consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detaining officer had ‘reasonable suspicion,’ and [] give deference to the detaining officer’s experience and training and his or her ability to infer from his or her observations.” The ALJ’s articulation of reasonable suspicion presents no error of law.

Next, the evidence before the ALJ sufficiently supported the ALJ’s finding that Trooper Greathouse had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Usan was driving under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or both. The ALJ’s determination was based on an examination of the totality of the record, including Trooper Greathouse’s report, reflecting his credible, unopposed observations that Mr. Usan: was driving erratically, crossing solid white lines, and driving under the speed limit; had red and glassy eyes; exhibited slow and sluggish movement; and failed three SFSTs. Trooper Greathouse’s report was further supported by dashcam footage documenting Mr. Usan’s failed SFSTs. 4 We have explained that “reasonable suspicion requires less in the way of quantity and quality of evidence than is required for probable cause and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Shea, 415 Md. at 19 , 997 A.2d at 778 (cleaned up); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Medvedeff, 466 Md. 455, 468 , 221 A.3d 955 , 963 (2019). 11 We “defer to the [ALJ’s] fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.” Carpenter, 424 Md. at 412–13, 36 A.3d at 446 . Although Trooper Greathouse did not detect an odor of alcohol and Mr. Usan’s preliminary breath test result reflected an alcohol content of 0.00 on a PBT, such a result may be negative indicia of alcohol but is not determinative of actual influence or impairment and does not absolve drivers of complying with later-requested alcohol testing.

Transp. § 16-205.2 (c) (“The results of the [PBT] shall be used as a guide for the police officer in deciding whether an arrest should be made[.]”), (d) (“[T]he taking of a [PBT] shall not relieve the individual of the obligation to take the test required under [Transp.] § 16-205.1[.]”); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Dove, 413 Md. 70, 94 , 991 A.2d 65, 79 (2010) (“The fact that the [PBT] . . . showed a reading of 0.00 is irrelevant to the analysis of whether Dove refused the required blood test.”). Presuming the ALJ’s determination that Trooper Greathouse had reasonable suspicion of Mr. Usan’s impairment by alcohol, drugs, or both as prima facie correct, a reasoning mind could reasonably conclude as the ALJ did. In other words, given Trooper Greathouse’s reported observations of Mr. Usan’s condition and the dashcam footage of Mr. Usan’s failed SFSTs, the record contained substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Trooper Greathouse had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Usan was driving under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or both. B. The ALJ Correctly Interpreted Transp. § 16-205.1 as Permitting Law Enforcement to Request Alcohol Testing, Drug Testing, or Both if an Officer has a Reasonable Suspicion that a Driver is Under the Influence or Impaired by Alcohol, Drugs, or Both. 12 The ALJ also correctly interpreted Transp. § 16-205.1 in determining that a law enforcement officer has the ability to request alcohol testing, drug testing, or both if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a driver was under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or both. “In interpreting a statute, a court first considers the statute’s language, which the court applies where the statute’s language is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gonce, 446 Md. 100, 110 , 130 A.3d 436, 442 (2016) (cleaned up).

The Transportation Article provides, in relevant part: Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented . . . to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title. Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(2) (emphasis added). The Transportation Article defines “test” as: 1. A test of a person’s breath or of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to determine alcohol concentration; 2.

A test or tests of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood; or 3. Both: A. A test of a person’s breath or a test of 1 specimen of a person’s blood, to determine alcohol concentration; and B. A test or tests of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood. 13 Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii). The ALJ concluded that law enforcement officers had access to both testing procedures available in Transp. § 16-205.1, despite a lack of clarity as to whether Mr. Usan was under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or both. Based on the plain language of Transp. § 16-205.1, we agree with the ALJ.

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Deering, 438 Md. 611, 622 , 92 A.3d 495, 502 (2014). Under the plain language of Transp. § 16-205.1(a), a law enforcement officer with reasonable suspicion that a driver was under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or both may request alcohol testing, drug testing, or both. Nowhere does Transp. § 16- 205.1(a) expressly or impliedly limit reasonable suspicion to either alcohol or drugs, or limit testing to only alcohol or only drugs, respectively. Instead, Transp. § 16-205.1(a) provides that drivers have consented to a test if suspected of driving under any of the varied options of influence or impairment, and then defines “test” as alcohol testing, drug testing, or both.

In short, a person reasonably suspected of driving under only the influence or impairment of drugs or CDS has impliedly consented to alcohol testing, drug testing, or both. In reaching this conclusion, Gonce is helpful. In Gonce, the driver had submitted to alcohol testing pursuant to Transp. § 16- 205.1(a)(1)(iii) but refused to take subsequently requested drug testing, whereupon his license was suspended. 446 Md. at 109 , 130 A.3d at 442 . Gonce argued that the word “test” in Transp. § 16-205.1 indicated a singular testing requirement, which he had satisfied by submitting to the alcohol test, and refusal to submit to further drug testing did not 14 warrant his license suspension.

Id. at 109, 130 A.3d at 442 . We disagreed and explained that, [b]y its plain language, [Transp.] § 16-205.1 gives law enforcement officers the authority to request that a person submit to a blood test for drugs or [CDS] and an alcohol concentration test, whether through breath or blood. [Transp.] § 16-205.1’s plain language does not expressly limit law enforcement officers to only one test; i.e., [Transp.] § 16-205.1 does not state that law enforcement officers must elect which test to request or that only one test is to be permitted. Stated otherwise, [Transp.] § 16-205.1 authorizes law enforcement officers to request an alcohol concentration test and a drug test,