Motor Vehicle Administration v. Gonce

WATTS, J. In this case, we interpret Md.Code Ann., Transp. (1977, 2012 Repl.Vol., 2015 Supp.) (“TR”) § 16-205.1, 1 commonly known as the “implied consent, administrative per se law,” which provides a basis for the automatic suspension of the licenses of drivers who refuse to submit to testing for alcohol and drugs. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Deering, 438 Md. 611, 615 , 92 A.3d 495, 498 (2014). In Deering, id. at 612-13, 92 A.3d at 496-97 , this Court explained the labels “implied consent” and “administrative per se” as follows: [TR § 16-205.1] incorporates “implied consent” in that [TR § 16-205.1] provides that any individual who drives a vehicle in Maryland is deemed to have consented to take a chemical test — usually, a breath test — to measure [ ] alcohol concentration, if stopped by a [law enforcement] officer with reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving under the influence of alcohol.

Despite [TR § 16-205.1]’s declaration of implied consent by all drivers, [TR § 16-205.1] recognizes that a driver detained by a[ law enforcement] officer may refuse to take the [ ] test. But the time for making that decision is limited — [ ] alcohol concentration is transient[,] and any test must be conducted within two hours of the stop. The phrase “administrative per se” refers to the administrative consequences of a refusal to take the [ ] test, or of ¹⁰³ test results that reveal that the driver has a[n] alcohol concentration above certain levels (regardless of whether the driver otherwise appears to be impaired). In both cases, [TR § 16-205.1] provides for an automatic suspension of the driver’s license for specified periods.

The license suspension is an administrative sanction that is distinct from any criminal prosecution of the driver that might also ensue. Under [TR § 16-205.1], a detained driver thus has a choice to make — a choice with legal consequences. On the one hand, refusing the test carries a sure suspension; on the other, taking the test may result in no sanction at all[,] or in a significant suspension plus an increased potential for criminal prosecution, depending on the test result. Here, we decide the following question: Under TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), is a driver subject to an automatic license suspension for a refusal to take a drug test where the driver has taken an alcohol concentration test and a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the driver was driving while impaired by drugs?

TR § 16-205.1’s plain language, purpose, and legislative history lead us to the inescapable conclusion that the answer to this question is “yes”; under TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), a law enforcement officer with reasonable grounds to suspect impairment may request that a driver take both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test, and the driver is subject to an automatic license suspension for a refusal to take the second test. BACKGROUND On June 29, 2014, Trooper G. Stambaugh (“Trooper Stambaugh”) 2 of the Maryland State Police issued to Jeffrey Thomas Gonce (“Gonce”), Respondent, an “Officer’s Certification and Order of Suspension” that contained the following facts, which we summarize. At 5:00 p.m. on June 29, 2014, Gonce was driving west on U.S. Route 50 near the intersection with Castle Marina Road in Queen Anne’s County. Trooper Stambaugh stopped Gonce for failure to securely fasten a ¹⁰⁴ registration plate.

Upon seeing Gonce, Trooper Stambaugh observed what he believed to be indications of impairment, and, thus, administered the three-part Standardized Field Sobriety Test. 3 The “horizontal gaze nystagmus” test indicated zero out of a possible six clues of impairment. The “walk and ¹⁰⁵ turn” test indicated seven out of a possible eight clues of impairment. The “one-leg stand” test indicated three out of a possible four clues of impairment. Trooper Stambaugh did not detect any odor of alcohol on Gonce’s breath.

Trooper Stambaugh asked to perform a preliminary breath test, to which Gonce consented. The preliminary breath test indicated a breath alcohol concentration of 0.003 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Trooper Stambaugh arrested Gonce and provided him with an Advice of Rights form, seeking permission pursuant to TR § 16-205.1 to perform an alcohol concentration test. 4 Gonce agreed to take an alcohol concentration test. Specifically, at 5:30 p.m., Gonce checked a box next to the words ‘Tes — Agree to submit to an alcohol concentration test” and signed the Advice of Rights form.

According to a “State of Maryland Notification to Defendant of Result of Test for Alcohol Concentration” (bolding and some capitalization omitted) and a printout from the equipment that tested breath alcohol concentration, between 6:07 p.m. and 6:13 p.m., Gonce took a breath alcohol concentration test, which indicated a breath alcohol concentration of 0.000 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. In other words, Gonce passed the alcohol concentration test. Knowing that Gonce had passed the breath alcohol concentration test, but having observed indications of Gonce’s impairment, Trooper Stambaugh referred Gonce to Trooper First Class M. Miller (“Trooper Miller”), 5 a drug recognition expert. Trooper Miller completed a “Drug Recognition Expert’s Certification Form.” At 7:05 p.m., Trooper Miller evaluated Gonce.

In the Drug Recognition Expert’s Certification Form, Trooper Miller stated: I had reasonable grounds, which I have set forth below on this form, to believe that [Gonce] was driving ... a motor ¹⁰⁶ vehicle while so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs[,] or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, that [Gonce] could not drive a vehicle safely, or while under the influence of a Controlled Dangerous Substance. REASONABLE GROUNDS: [Horizontal gaze nystagmus], [Lack of convergence 6 ], Droopy eyelids on the nod, Low raspy slow speech, Facial itching, Little reaction to light[, P]sychophysical impairment,[ 7 ] 0.00[0 Breath alcohol concentration], Slurred speech[,] Dry mouth, [C]onfused[.] Trooper Miller asked Gonce to take a blood test for drugs or controlled dangerous substances, and Gonce refused to take the drug test. Specifically, at 8:15 p.m., Gonce signed a second Advice of Rights form, on which he checked a box next to the words “No-Drug or [Controlled Dangerous Substances] test refused ([Drug Recognition Expert] must complete & submit [Drug Recognition Expert] Certification Form)[.]” Afterward, Trooper Stambaugh confiscated Gonce’s driver’s license, served an order of suspension on Gonce, and issued him a temporary driver’s license. Gonce requested an administrative hearing to show cause why the Motor Vehicle Administration (“the MVA”), Petitioner, should not suspend his driver’s license.

On September 23, 2014, an administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) of the Office of Administrative Hearings conducted an administrative hearing. The ALJ admitted into evidence the Officer’s Certification and ¹⁰⁷ Order of Suspension, the State of Maryland Notification to Defendant of Result of Test for Alcohol Concentration, the Drug Recognition Expert’s Certification Form, the printout from the equipment that tested breath alcohol concentration, and both Advice of Rights forms. At the administrative hearing, Gonce did not dispute the accuracy of any facts in any document, including Trooper Stambaugh’s observations, Trooper Miller’s observations, or the results of the three-part Standardized Field Sobriety Test. 8 Nor did Gonce dispute that Trooper Stambaugh had reasonable grounds to believe that he had been driving while under the influence of a drug or controlled dangerous substance. Instead, at the administrative hearing, Gonce asserted that, under TR § 16-205.1, he was not subject to an automatic license suspension for his refusal to take a drug test because he had taken and passed the alcohol concentration test.

More broadly, Gonce argued that, under TR § 16-205.1, a driver is subject to an automatic license suspension for a refusal to take either an alcohol concentration test or a drug test, but not for a refusal to take a second test after the driver took one test. The ALJ rejected Gonce’s contention, concluding that: The way [that TR § 16-205.1] is written, it’s a test for alcohol concentration and/or a test for drug detection^ or] for [controlled dangerous substances]. Here, [Trooper Stambaugh] would not have had reasonable grounds to request [Gonce] to take a [controlled dangerous substances] test until after he was seen by [Trooper Miller].[ 9 ] (Emphasis added). The ALJ determined that Trooper Stambaugh had reasonable grounds to believe that Gonce had been driving while under the influence of a controlled dangerous ¹⁰⁸ substance; concluded that Gonce violated TR § 16-205.1 by refusing to take the drug test; and ordered that Gonce’s driver’s license be suspended for one hundred and twenty days.

Gonce petitioned for judicial review. On March 17, 2015, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County 10 (“the circuit court”) conducted a hearing. In an oral ruling, the circuit court reversed the ALJ’s decision and concluded that, after Gonce passed the alcohol concentration test, Gonce “was not required ... to submit to a blood test in order to avoid suspension.” In an order dated April 14, 2015, the circuit court reversed the ALJ’s decision. On April 24, 2015, the MVA filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the following issue: Was a drunken or drugged driving suspect, who agreed to take an alcohol concentration test, which produced a test result of 0.00[0], subject to suspension under [TR] § 16-205.1, when he thereafter refused to submit to a [law enforcement] officer’s request, based on reasonable grounds, to submit to a blood test for drugs or controlled dangerous substances?

On June 17, 2015, this Court granted the petition. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gonce, 443 Md. 234 , 116 A.3d 474 (2015). DISCUSSION The MVA’s position is straightforward; it contends that TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3) authorize law enforcement ¹⁰⁹ officers with reasonable suspicion of impaired driving to request both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test. The MVA argues that, as used in TR § 16 — 205.1(b)(2) and (3), the word “test” means both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test.

The MVA notes that TR § 16 — 205.1(a)(l)(iii)(3) defines the word “test” as “[b]oth: A. A test of a person’s breath or a test of [one] specimen of a person’s blood, to determine alcohol concentration; and B. A test or tests of [one] specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood.” (Paragraph breaks omitted). The MVA maintains that TR § 16-205.1’s legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly did not intend to limit the meaning of the word “test” to only one test. Gonce responds that the ALJ erred in concluding that he was subject to an automatic license suspension for refusing to take the drug test. Gonce contends that, as used in TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), the word “test” means a single test.

Under Gonce’s interpretation of TR § 16 — 205.1(b)(2) and (3), a driver is subject to an automatic license suspension for a refusal to take either an alcohol concentration test or a drug test, but not for a refusal to take a second test after the driver has already taken one test. In support of this interpretation, Gonce relies on the circumstance that, in TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), the word “test” is singular, not plural. A court defers to an administrative law judge’s finding of fact where the record supports that finding of fact. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 14 , 997 A.2d 768, 775-76 (2010) (“A reviewing court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.” (Citation omitted)).

A court reviews with some deference an administrative law judge’s interpretation of a statute that the relevant administrative agency administers. See Deering, 438 Md. at 622 , 92 A.3d at 502 (“A reviewing court ‘... determined if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.’ While ¹¹⁰ this standard accords less deference to an agency’s legal conclusions than to its fact findings, a reviewing court should give weight to the administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute that the agency administers.” (Quoting Shea, 415 Md. at 14-15 , 997 A.2d at 775-76 )). In interpreting a statute, a court first considers the statute’s language, which the court applies where the statute’s language “is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose[.]” Lark v. Montgomery Hospice, Inc., 414 Md. 215, 227 , 994 A.2d 968, 975 (2010) (citation omitted). We begin by examining the relevant provisions of TR § 16-205.1, “[t]he implied consent, administrative per se law[.]” Deering, 438 Md. at 615 , 92 A.3d at 498 .

TR § 16-205.1(a)(2) provides for “implied consent” as follows: Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of [Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl.Vol.) (“CJP”)] §§ 10-302 through 10-309,[ 11 ] to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of [TR] § 16-813 [ (Driving Commercial Motor Vehicle with Alcohol Concentration in Blood or Breath Prohibited) ]. (Emphasis added).

TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) directs law enforcement officers as follows: ¹¹¹ Except as provided in [TR § 16-205.1(c) ], if a [law enforcement] officer stops or detains any person who the [law enforcement] officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of [TR] § 16-813 [ (Driving Commercial Motor Vehicle with Alcohol Concentration in Blood or Breath Prohibited) ], and who is not unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing to take a test, the [law enforcement] officer shall[, among other things]: (i) Detain the person; [and] (ii) Request that the person permit a test to be taken[. 12 ] (Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted). “If the person refuses to take the test ..., the [law enforcement] officer shall[, among other things]: (i) Confiscate the person’s driver’s license issued by this State; (ii) Acting on behalf of the [MVA], personally serve an order of suspension on the person; [and] (iii) Issue a temporary license to drivef.]” TR § 16-205.1(b)(3) (emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted). 13 TR § 16-205.1(c)(l) directs law enforcement officers as follows: If a person is involved in a motor vehicle accident that results in the death of, or a life[-]threatening injury to, ¹¹² another person[,] and the person is detained by a [law enforcement] officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, or in violation of [TR] § 16-813 [ (Driving Commercial Motor Vehicle with Alcohol Concentration in Blood or Breath Prohibited) ], the person shall be required to submit, as directed by the [law enforcement] officer, to a test of: (i) The person’s breath to determine alcohol concentration; (ii) One specimen of the person’s blood, to determine alcohol concentration or to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood; or (iii) Both the person’s breath under item (i) of this paragraph and one specimen of the person’s blood under item (ii) of this paragraph. (Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted). TR § 16-205.1(a)(l)(iii), part of the statute’s definition subsection, defines the word “test” as follows: “Test” means, unless the context requires otherwise: 1. A test of a person’s breath or of [one] specimen of a person’s blood to determine alcohol concentration; 2.

A test or tests of [one] specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood; or 3. Both: A. A test of a person’s breath or a test of [one] specimen of a person’s blood, to determine alcohol concentration; and B. A test or tests of [one] specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood. (Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted). The facts of this matter are undisputed.

We must resolve a legal question of first impression — namely, whether, under TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), a driver is subject to an automatic ¹¹³ license suspension for a refusal to take a drug test where the driver has taken (and passed) an alcohol concentration test and a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the driver was driving while impaired by drugs. Based on TR § 16-205.1’s plain language, we conclude that a driver may be asked to submit to both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test, and the driver cannot have an automatic license suspension overturned on the basis that TR § 16-205.1 permits a law enforcement officer to request only one test. By its plain language, TR § 16-205.1 gives law enforcement officers the authority to request that a person submit to a blood test for drugs or controlled dangerous substances and an alcohol concentration test, whether through breath or blood. TR § 16-205.1’s plain language does not expressly limit law enforcement officers to only one test; ie., TR § 16-205.1 does not state that law enforcement officers must elect which test to request or that only one test is to be permitted.

Stated otherwise, TR § 16-205.1 authorizes law enforcement officers to request an alcohol concentration test and a drug test, without any explicit language indicating that the tests are mutually exclusive. To the contrary, as used in TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), the word “test” includes the plural of the word — ie. “tests” — and means both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test. TR § 16-205.1(a)(l)(iii)(3) specifically defines the word “test” as “[b]oth: A. A test of a person’s breath or a test of [one] specimen of a person’s blood, to determine alcohol concentration; and B. A test or tests of [one] specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood.” (Emphasis added). TR § 16 — 205.1(a)(l)(iii)(3) unambiguously establishes that, as used in TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), the word “test” does not mean only one test.

Thus, under TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), a law enforcement officer with reasonable grounds to suspect impairment may request that a driver take both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test — ie., the law enforcement officer is not limited to requesting either an alcohol concentra ¹¹⁴ tion test or a drug test — and the driver is subject to an automatic license suspension for a refusal to take both tests. Our conclusion is based not only on TR § 16-205.1(a)(l)(iii)(3)’s plain language, but also on Md.Code Ann., Gen. Prov. (2014) (“GP”) § 1-202, which is part of the subtitle “Interpretation of Code Provisions.” GP § 1-202 states in its entirety: “The singular includes the plural and the plural includes the singular.” This Court has previously used GP § 1-202’s predecessors for the purpose of statutory interpretation.

In Gatewood v. State, 244 Md. 609, 618 , 224 A.2d 677, 683 (1966), in determining whether the singular version of a word also included its plural, this Court relied on GP § 1-202’s immediate predecessor, Md.Code Ann., Art. I (“Art. I”), § 8, which stated: “The singular always includes the plural, and vice versa, except where such construction would be unreasonable.” In Gate-wood, id. at 616, 224 A.2d at 682 , a defendant was convicted of a lottery-related crime for the third time; one statute provided that the maximum sentence for a person’s first conviction for a lottery-related crime was one year, and another statute stated: “If any person shall be a second time convicted of [a lottery-related crime], he [or she] shall on conviction be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years[.]” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A trial court sentenced the defendant to four years of imprisonment. See id. at 616-17 , 224 A.2d at 682 . On appeal, the defendant contended that he could not be sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment because the statute that included the phrase “a second time convicted” did not apply to a person’s third conviction.

See id. at 617 , 224 A.2d at 682 . This Court rejected the defendant’s contention, stating: “Under [Art. I, § 8], the word ‘time’ may properly be taken as meaning ‘time or times.’ ” Id. at 618, 224 A.2d at 683 . Similarly, in Wheeler v. Rhoten, 144 Md. 10, 12 , 123 A. 572, 573 (1923), this Court relied on Art. I, § 8’s identical predecessor, Art. I, § 7. In Wheeler, id. at 11, 123 A. at 573 , an employee was injured and awarded worker’s compensation, ¹¹⁵ which the employer was obligated to pay.

The relevant worker’s compensation statute defined the word “employer” as “a person ... employing workmen in extrahazardous employments.” Id. at 12 , 123 A. at 573 (emphasis omitted). The employer, who had only the one employee, contended that the worker’s compensation statute did not apply because the phrase “a person ... employing workmen” did not include a person who employed only one workman. See id. at 12 , 123 A. at 573 . This Court rejected the employer’s contention, stating: “This question ... is ... fully answered by” Art. I, § 7.

Id. at 12, 123 A. at 573 . Although Gatewood and Wheeler involved GP § 1-202’s predecessors — which were not completely identical to GP § 1-202 — Gatewood and Wheeler are controlling with respect to GP § 1-202’s application, as GP § 1-202 is substantively identical to its predecessors. Both of GP § 1-202’s predecessors, Art. I, §§ 7 and 8, stated: “The singular always includes the plural, and vice versa, except where such construction would be unreasonable.” In 2014, the General Assembly recodified Art. I, § 8 as GP § 1-202, which states: “The singular includes the plural and the plural includes the singular.” See 2014 Md. Laws 407 , 423-24 (Vol. I, Ch. 94, H.B. 270).

In other words, in 2014, the General Assembly made only three changes: deleting the word “always,” replacing the phrase “vice versa” with the phrase “the plural includes the singular,” and deleting the phrase “except where such construction would be unreasonable.” None of these three changes was substantive, however. The Revisor’s Note to GP § 1-202 states in its entirety: [GP § 1-202] is new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 1, § 8. The phrase “the plural includes the singular” is substituted for the former phrase “vice versa” for clarity. The former phrase “except where such construction would be unreasonable” is deleted as a standard rule of statutory construction.

See General Re-visor’s Note to title. ¹¹⁶ (Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted). See also 2014 Md. Laws 424 (Vol. I, Ch. 94, H.B. 270). In turn, the General Revisor’s Note to Title 1 (Rules of Interpretation) of the General Provisions Article states, in pertinent part: Throughout this subtitle,[ 14 ] former language indicating that a definition applies unless such a construction would be “unreasonable” is deleted.

The General Provisions Article Review Committee believes such a caveat is unnecessary because Maryland case law already factors the unreasonableness of a particular construction into a determination of legislative intent. See Board of Trustees v. Hughes, 340 Md. 1, 7 [, 664 A.2d 1250, 1253 ] (1995) (“[W]e seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” [ (Citation omitted) ]); Wagner v. Board of County Commissioners, 263 Md. 560, 568 [, 284 A.2d 5, 9 ] (1971) (“[W]e should prefer a construction which leads to a reasonable, rather than an unreasonable and absurd[,] result.”); [] Doswell v. State, 53 Md.App. 647, 653 [, 455 A.2d 995, 999 ] (1983) (“[T]he statute should be read in a commonsense manner to avoid an unreasonable or absurd result.” [ (Citation omitted) ]). No substantive change is intended. (Emphasis added) (some alterations in original).

See also 2014 Md. Laws 436 (Vol. I, Ch. 94, H.B. 270). In short, the General Assembly’s express purpose in deleting the phrase “except where such construction would be unreasonable” was simply to ensure that GP § 1-202 did not ¹¹⁷ include any “unnecessary” language. Likewise, the General Assembly did not substantively change GP § 1-202’s predecessors by deleting the word “always” when enacting GP § 1-202.

There is no difference between “The singular always includes the plural” and “The singular includes the plural.” Finally, the General Assembly did not substantively change GP § 1-202’s predecessors by replacing the phrase “vice versa” with “the plural includes the singular” when enacting GP § 1-202. According to the Revisor’s Note to GP § 1-202, the change was simply “for clarity.” As demonstrated above, GP § 1-202 is substantively identical to its predecessors, and Gatewood and Wheeler endure as good law with respect to GP § 1-202’s application. The lesson of GP § 1-202, Gatewood , and Wheeler is that a singular word in a statute is not necessarily limited to only one subject, and a plural word in a statute is not necessarily limited to multiple subjects. Just as the word “time” meant “time or times” in the statute that was at issue in Gatewood, 244 Md. at 618 , 224 A.2d at 683 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), the word “test” means “test or tests” in TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3).

The “question ... is ... fully answered by” GP § 1-202, Wheeler, 144 Md. at 12 , 123 A. at 573 ; applying GP § 1-202 conclusively demonstrates that, as used in TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), the word “test” includes both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test. Because TR § 16-205.1(a)(l)(iii)(3)’s plain language and GP § 1-202’s application alone establish that, as used in TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), the word “test” may properly be taken as meaning “tests” — i.e., both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test — we could end our inquiry into TR § 16-205.1’s interpretation without further discussion. Nonetheless, “even when we believe that the language of [a] statute renders [the General Assembly’s] intent clear, [we may] examine the legislative history as a confirmatory process.” Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 160 , 46 A.3d 443, 462 (2012) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we examine TR § 16-205.1’s legislative history.

In doing so, we find even greater support for our conclusion. ¹¹⁸ The predecessor of TR § 16-205.1 that was effective in 1988, Md.Code Ann., Transp. (1987 Repl.Vol., 1988 Supp.) § 16-205.1, did not define the word “test,” as TR § 16-205.1(a)(l)(iii) does. Notably, TR § 16-205.1’s predecessor did not provide for drug testing, as TR § 16-205.1 does, and did not direct law enforcement officers to confiscate a