Motor Vehicle Administration v. Jaigobin

MURPHY, Judge. In this appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, 1 we are presented with an issue of statutory interpretation: Does a “probation before judgment” (PBJ) imposed ¹⁹⁴ pursuant to § 6-220 of the Criminal Procedure Article (CP § 6-220) constitute a “conviction” as that term is defined in the Maryland Commercial Driver’s License Act (§ 16-803(d) of the Transportation Article; TA § 16-803(d))? If the answer to this question is “no,” the Motor Vehicle Administration, Appellant (the Administration), 2 was incorrect in imposing a “disqualification” on the commercial driver’s license (CDL) held by Leonard Jaigobin, Appellee. 3 For the reasons that follow, however, we hold that the answer to this question is “yes.” Background On December 27, 2007, Appellee was charged with driving while under the influence “per se,” in violation of § 21-902(a)(2) of the Transportation Article. On September 16, 2008, the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County, found him guilty of that offense.

After Appellee was found guilty, he accepted “probation before judgment,” a disposition authorized by CP § 6-220. A defendant who accepts PBJ is required to sign his or her name at the bottom of a Probation Order, immediately underneath the “CONSENT” portion of the order that concludes with the following acknowledgment: If I fail to abide by the above conditions, the Court could enter judgment against me and proceed with a disposition as if I had not been placed under probation. I have been ¹⁹⁵ notified and I understand that by consenting to and receiving a stay of judgment under Criminal Procedure Article, § 6-220, I waive my right to appeal from a judgment of guilty by the Court in this case. The record includes Appellee’s written acknowledgment of- and consent to-the terms of the Probation Order entered by the District Court.

On October 14, 2008, the Administration mailed to Appellee a “NOTICE OF COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE DISQUALIFICATION” that included the following information: Your commercial driver’s license/privilege will be disqualified in Maryland for 1 years [sic] on 10-29-2008. This disqualification is mandatory pursuant to Maryland Transportation Article T6-812’ and Federal Regulation 49 CFR 383.51 as a result of: DATE STATE VIOLATION 12/27/07 MD Drive/attempt to drive while under the influence of alcohol Per Se (mv) You may request a hearing to show cause why your commercial driver’s license/privilege should not be disqualified by completing page two (2) of this notice. Appellee requested a hearing, which was conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Office of Administrative Hearings, who rejected Appellee’s argument that a PBJ disposition is not a “conviction” under the applicable state and federal laws. Appellee then filed a petition for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision upholding the Administration’s action.

At the conclusion of a judicial review hearing, the Circuit Court “ORDERED, that the action of the Motor Vehicle Administration be REVERSED,” on the ground that TA § 16-803 is (in the words of the Circuit Court) “inconsistent within itself, because ... a probation before judgment is a vacated adjudication of guilt, not a final unvacated adjudication of guilt.” Thereafter, the Administration filed a petition for unit of certiorari with this Court, and we granted that petition. 410 Md. 559 , 979 A.2d 707 (2009). ¹⁹⁶ Discussion I. Appellee argues that the case at bar became moot on October 29, 2009. The record shows, however, that the one year period of disqualification was suspended by the Circuit Court on June 11, 2009. Because we are affirming the ALJ’s decision upholding Appellee’s disqualification, (1) Appellee’s one year period of disqualification does not include the period of time between June 11, 2009 and the date of this Court’s judgment, and (2) there are “collateral consequences” of a CDL disqualification. For these reasons, this appeal is not moot.

Moreover, when a moot case presents a question that involves a matter of public concern, and that will continue to arise until resolved by an appellate court, this Court has declined to dismiss on the ground of mootness. See e.g., In re Julianna B., 407 Md. 657, 665-66 , 967 A.2d 776, 780-81 (2009); Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 220 , 935 A.2d 731, 736 (2007); Arrington v. Dep’t of Human Res., 402 Md. 79, 91-92 , 935 A.2d 432, 439-40 (2007); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 , 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996); Attorney Gen. of Maryland v. Anne Arundel County Sch. Bus Contractors Ass’n, 286 Md. 324, 328 , 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979); Lloyd v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43 , 111 A.2d 379, 381-82 (1954). We shall therefore address the merits of the Administration’s petition.

II

As there are no disputes of fact in the case at bar, our review is “limited to determining ... if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569, 577 , 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994). Although it has been stated that “an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts,” Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 172 , 783 A.2d 169 , ¹⁹⁷ 177 (2001), the correct interpretation of the applicable statutes presents a question of law that this Court must decide by applying the following principles of statutory construction: In seeking to ascertain legislative intent, we first look to the words of the statute, see Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 126 , 756 A.2d 987, 990 (2000); Harris v. State, 353 Md. 596, 606 , 728 A.2d 180, 184 (1999); Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998); Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45 , 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380 , 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344 , 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995), viewing them “in ordinary terms, in their natural meaning, in the manner in which they are most commonly understood.” Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335 , 748 A.2d 478, 484 (2000); see also Sacchet v. Blan, 353 Md. 87, 92 , 724 A.2d 667, 669 (1999); Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672 , 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995). “Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts do not normally look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent.” Degren, 352 Md. at 417, 722 A.2d at 895 (citing Marriott Employees, 346 Md. at 444-45 , 697 A.2d at 458 ); Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414 , 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968)). Nor may a court under those circumstances add or delete language so as to “reflect an intent not evidenced in that language,” Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491 , 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1993), or construe the statute with “ ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.” Id. (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 73 , 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)).

We have acknowledged that in determining a statute’s meaning, courts may consider the context in which a statute appears, including related statutes and, even when a ¹⁹⁸ statute is clear, its legislative history. See Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 604 , 573 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1990); see also Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,