Motor Vehicle Administration v. Lipella

PER CURIAM. This case arises from an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) suspension on November 17, 2009 of Respondent’s, Ronald Lipella, driver’s license for ninety days, pursuant to Maryland Code (1977, 2009 Repl.Vol.), Transportation Article, § 16-205.1(b)(l)(i)(2)(A) (“Implied Consent Statute”). 1 The operative facts underlying the ALJ’s decision began on August 29, 2009 when Washington County Sheriffs Deputy Jared Lee Barnhart pulled Lipella over for swerving outside the proper travel lane on a highway in Washington County. Discovering after he approached Lipella that the driver smelled of alcohol and slurred his speech, Barnhart administered to Lipella the three standard field sobriety tests (“SFSTs”), all of which he failed. His blood alcohol content (“BAC”) registered O. 16, based on a preliminary breath test administered in the field.

Deputy Barnhart detained and transported Lipella to the Washington County Sheriffs Department where an official breathalyzer test was administered, which also registered a BAC of 0.16. His driver’s license was confiscated for driving while intoxicated. Upon judicial review of Lipella’s license suspension, the Circuit Court for Washington County concluded that Deputy Barnhart failed to indicate adequately on the Motor Vehicle ⁴⁵⁹ Administration (“MVA”) Form DR-15A 2 the reasonable grounds for the underlying traffic stop that led to the license suspension. Therefore, the Circuit Court held that the ALJ’s suspension of Lipella’s license was “unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence in light of the entire record submitted.” As we shall explain, the Implied Consent Statute does not require the officer to supply the grounds for the underlying traffic stop.

Rather, the officer is required to provide on the DR-15A form the reasonable grounds for the suspect’s intoxication. Thus, the ALJ concluded properly that the MVA mounted successfully a prima facie case, which was unrebutted, supporting the suspension of Lipella’s license. Accordingly, we shall reverse the Circuit Court’s judgment. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND On August 29, 2009, at approximately 12:49 a.m., Deputy Barnhart of the Washington County Sheriffs Department observed a person, later identified as Lipella, traveling eastbound in a motor vehicle on Maryland Route 64 in Washington County. 3 Deputy Barnhart observed Lipella’s car swerve twice onto the right shoulder and then move back onto the road, all the while traveling in excess of 65 mph.

The posted speed limit was 50 mph. The Deputy signaled for Lipella to pull over. Upon first contact with the driver, Deputy Barn-hart detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his person. He asked Lipella to step out of the vehicle and ⁴⁶⁰ administered the SFSTs. 4 Lipella exhibited signs of intoxication during the first test, the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and could not complete the other two tests, due apparently to his inebriation.

Deputy Barnhart requested of Lipella that he submit to a preliminary breathalyzer test (“PBT”). Lipella acquiesced. The test yielded a BAC reading of 0.16. Barnhart placed Lipella under arrest for driving while intoxicated and transported him to the Washington County Sheriff’s Office.

Before administering the second BAC test, the Deputy informed Lipella of his right to refuse the breathalyzer test and the consequences of: (1) a refusal to take the test; (2) a result of BAC over 0.08; and, (8) a result of BAC over 0.15. These rights and consequences are detailed also on the DR-15 Advice of Rights form, which is a replica of the language in § 16-205.1. Lipella agreed to submit to the second, certified breathalyzer test, which also resulted in 0.16 BAC reading. A DR-15A Order of Suspension was issued, Lipella’s license was confiscated, and he was issued a temporary driver’s license pending the results of an administrative hearing before an ALJ of the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings.

Deputy Barnhart forwarded a copy of the completed DR-15A, as required by the Implied Consent Statute, to the MVA. The form explained, in part: CERTIFICATION OF POLICE OFFICER I, the undersigned officer, had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver described and named above had been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a ⁴⁶¹ vehicle safely while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction of Section 16-813 of the Maryland Vehicle Law. REASONABLE GROUNDS: VEHICLE WAS] STOPPED ON REASONABLE GROUNDS. UPON CONTACT WITH DRIVER I DETECTED A STRONG ODOR OF AN ALC[OHOLIC] BEVIERAGE] AND HE HAD SLURRED SPEECH.

DRIVER FAILED SFST. PBT — .16 [.] Lipella requested timely an administrative hearing regarding the ninety-day suspension of his license. At the hearing, 5 Lipella argued that, because Deputy Barnhart wrote on the DR-15A only that the “vehficle wasj stopped on reasonable grounds!,]” the MVA’s paperwork did not meet its prima facie burden to show that the officer had reasonable grounds to stop initially Lipella’s vehicle. Lipella maintained that the officer was required to list on the DR-15A the specific reasons for making the underlying traffic stop.

Without such information regarding the initial stop, Lipella complained he was precluded from presenting a bad faith challenge to the grounds for the stop, as permitted by Code of Maryland Regulations 11.11.02.10(H) (2012). 6 The MVA retorted that, based on this Court’s interpretation of the Implied Consent Statute in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Illiano, 390 Md. 265, 281 , 888 A.2d 329, 340 (2005), the Deputy’s duty to document and prove the driver’s intoxication began after making the initial traffic stop and, thus, the motive for the initial traffic stop should not be considered. As this argument went, the basis for the traffic stop and the ⁴⁶² evidence for suspecting intoxication are separate from one another, based on Illiano, 390 Md. at 281 , 888 A.2d at 340 (holding that the Legislature’s use of the phrase “stop or detain” in § 16-205.1(b)(2) serves to sever the stop from the detention, and permits reasonable grounds to believe intoxication of the driver may arise post-stop to justify the detention and request for administration of a breath test). The MVA sought to bolster its argument by contending that the Legislature intended to make it easier to remove intoxicated drivers from Maryland’s roads by not requiring suspicion of intoxication necessarily to be developed prior to approaching the driver. To this end, the Implied Consent Statute was enacted to prevent endless litigation and achieve swiftness in removing intoxicated drivers from endangering the public; therefore, the underlying traffic stop’s constitutionality is not a permitted issue to be raised at a license suspension hearing. 7 As the MVA’s argument continued, the ALJ should conclude that the MVA is required only to show, in making a prima facie case, that the officer had reasonable grounds to request the driver to take the official breathalyzer test.

To this effect, the MVA relied upon Motor Vehicle Administration v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 18 , 997 A.2d 768, 778 (2010), where we held that the ALJ’s duty is to determine whether the officer had reasonable grounds to request the accused to take a test to determine the BAC. The ALJ suspended Lipella’s license for ninety days because the DR-15A describing Deputy Barnhart’s basis for ⁴⁶³ suspecting intoxicated driving, and the official BAC test result administered at the Washington County Sheriffs Office, were sufficient to constitute a prima facie case. Although he admitted the Alcohol Influence Report into evidence, the ALJ felt he did not need to rely on the report as corroborating evidence because the MVA presented a prima facie case otherwise, using the DR-15A and the BAC results. Additionally, although Lipella suggested tangentially a possible defense of bad faith on the part of the police officer, he adduced no evidence to call the police officer’s statements into question.

This scenario is illustrated by the following exchange between the ALJ and Lipella’s attorney: ALJ: In the absence of bad faith, we don’t even get into the stop. So I get Counsel’s position, but I still think at this point, it’s still a prima facie case, but it could be refuted by evidence, (emphasis added) ATTORNEY: Well, that’s what the problem is. We don’t know what to refute, because he didn’t tell us. ALJ: Well, I can look at the corroboration to find out.[ 8 ] ATTORNEY: Well— ALJ: But it’s still a prima facie case and in the absence of bad faith — and I can’t make a presumption of bad faith — I have to make a presumption of good faith because the officer said ⁴⁶⁴ he had reasonable grounds.

So, I’ll just go ahead and admit them.[ 9 ] ATTORNEY: Ok. In addition to not subpoenaing the Deputy to testify, Lipella did not testify on his own behalf at the hearing. Based on the admitted evidence, the ALJ held that the officer’s stop was made in good faith and Lipella’s license should be suspended for ninety days. Lipella filed a petition for judicial review with the Circuit Court for Washington County, pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), State Government Article, § 10-222.

He renewed his assertion that the DR-15A, as completed by Deputy Barnhart, was overly vague and insufficient to constitute a prima facie case by the MVA. Additionally, due to the MVA’s lack of evidence as to the grounds for the traffic stop, he asserted that he was deprived of the opportunity to raise and prove the defense that the stop was made in bad faith. Lipella also argued that the Alcohol Influence Report should not have been admitted into evidence in the administrative hearing because it was not a sworn statement and, if excluded, the MVA had no evidence to corroborate or supplement the insufficient DR-15A. The MVA riposted that, under the Maryland Code (1984, 2009 RepLVol.), State Government Article, § 10-213(b), the ALJ may consider any probative evidence, as long it would be accepted commonly by reasonable and prudent individuals in the conduct of their affairs.

See Md.Code Regs. 11.11.02.10(A) (2012). Furthermore, the MVA argued that § 16-205.1 enumerates the only permissible issues that may be raised at ⁴⁶⁵ license suspension administrative hearings, and Lipella’s “insufficient grounds for a stop” argument was not one of them. Specifically, the MVA maintained that this Court held in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 , 368 n. 7, 739 A.2d 58 , 65 n. 7 (1999), that the constitutionality of the underlying traffic stop was prohibited from being an issue at the administrative hearing, absent proof tendered by the driver that the officer acted in bad faith in making this stop. The MVA pointed out also that the DR-15A refers only to the reasonable grounds the officer had to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive under the influence, requiring no particular details be supplied in the first instance regarding the underlying traffic stop.

The Circuit Court concluded that, in order to enable Lipella to elect whether to raise a bad faith defense, the officer must list on the DR-15A specifically what he contended were the reasonable grounds for the underlying traffic stop. The judge held that, without adducing the specific reasons for the stop, the MVA did not make a prima facie case on this record. The Circuit Court explained why it was reversing the ALJ’s decision and remanding the matter: [TJhere should be the reasonable grounds for the stop were that x, y and z and Mr. Lipella would then have the opportunity to say, ‘No, that wasn’t true.’ And therefore I do find that the findings of the Administrative Law Judge is unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence in light of the entire record submitted. And also that it was arbitrary and capricious for this sanction to be imposed based on the reasonable ground being reasonable grounds.[ 10 ] The MVA filed timely a petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court, under Maryland Code (1973, 2006 RepLVol.), ⁴⁶⁶ Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 12-305, which allows for a direct appeal from the Circuit Court judgment regarding administrative hearings held under Title 16 of the Transportation Article.

We granted the petition, Motor Vehicle Administration v. Lipella, 415 Md. 607 , 4 A.3d 512 (2010), to consider the following question: In determining the sufficiency of an officer’s sworn certification of grounds to request an alcohol concentration test under § 16.205.1, as recorded on the DR-15A, did the ALJ err in determining that the specific reasons for the underlying traffic stop need not be recorded under the section labeled “REASONABLE GROUNDS?” We shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand with directions to affirm the decision of the ALJ. STANDARD OF REVIEW In judicial review of a state administrative agency (such as the ALJ decision here, where he acted on behalf of the MVA by express delegation), we review the action of the agency directly, rather than the judgment of the intervening reviewing court. See Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 160 , 874 A.2d 919, 939 (2005).

Under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, a reviewing court may: (1) remand the case for further proceedings; (2) affirm the final decision; or (3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or ⁴⁶⁷ (vi) is arbitrary and capricious. Md.Code (1957, 2009, RepLVol), State Gov’t Art., § 10-222. In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569, 577 , 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994), we held that a court’s role in reviewing an agency’s adjudicatory decision is narrow and “limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” The substantial evidence test evaluates “whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.” Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512 , 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978). Furthermore, significant weight is given to any reasonable factual inferences that the ALJ draws in license suspension proceedings specifically, Shea, 415 Md. at 18 , 997 A.2d at 778 (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243, 256-57 , 941 A.2d 1067, 1076 (2008)), as well as the statutory interpretations of an administrative agency in the field of its delegated authority from the Legislature.

See e.g., Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571-72 , 873 A.2d 1145, 1154-55 (2005); Fogle v. H & G Rest., Inc., 337 Md. 441, 445 , 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995) (holding that an agency’s expertise in its own field should be respected). See also Md.Code (1984, 2009 RepLVol., 2011 Cum.Supp.), State Gov’t Art., § 10-222(1), (h) (stating that “[¡Judicial review of disputed issues of fact shall be confined to the record for judicial review,” and “[i]n a proceeding under this section, the court may remand, reverse, or modify the decision of the administrative agency” if, inter alia, the decision “is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted”). DISCUSSION In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, we consider only the evidence that was before the ALJ at the hearing. We will review first the evidentiary standards for administrative hear ⁴⁶⁸ ings; evaluate the plain language requirements of § 16-205.1 and how they relate to the DR-15A; and, finally review the sufficiency of the evidence with regards to the ALJ’s ruling on Lipella’s contemplated bad faith defense and the suspension of his license.

As detailed in Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) § 11.11.02.10 (2012), 11 any proffered evidence that the ALJ determines to be probative and accepted commonly by reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs, may be considered. In the present case, the ALJ admitted the Alcohol Influence Report. He mentioned that, although the Alcohol Influence Report would not be considered by him in determining whether the MVA had advanced a prima facie case, it could, if needed, be looked to for corroboration. An ALJ, presiding over an administrative hearing of a driver’s license suspension matter, may consider also evidence that might not be admissible in a court proceeding.

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 133-34 , 887 A.2d 1042, 1053 (2005). In Weller , we approved the admission in evidence of a PBT in a license suspension hearing. 390 Md. at 138, 887 A.2d. at 1056 . Weller argued that § 16-205.1 prohibits specifically the PBT from being used in any “court action.” Weller, 390 Md. at 135 , 887 A.2d. at 1054 . We held that, because the administrative hearing is not a “court action,” the formal rules of evidence were not operative strictly and, thus, the PBT was permissible.

Weller, 390 Md. at 135 , 887 A.2d at 1053-54 . In Motor Vehicle Administration v. McDorman, 364 Md. 253, 262 , 772 A.2d 309, 314 (2001), we reiterated that hearsay ⁴⁶⁹ evidence may be admitted in administrative hearings and, if credible, may be the sole basis of a successful prima facie case. (Citing Eger v. Stone, 253 Md. 533, 542 , 253 A.2d 372, 377 (1969)). Furthermore, we approved the use of an Alcohol Influence Report as evidence of a defendant’s refusal of a breathalyzer test, which was the basis for the subsequent suspension of his driver’s license.

Thomas v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 418 Md. 280, 298-300 , 13 A.3d 1256, 1267 (2011). 12 In the present case, the sworn DR-15A and the formal toxicology report of a BAC reading of 0.16 from the official breathalyzer test are prima facie case evidence, in and of themselves, proving a violation of § 16-205.1. Accord Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 51-52 , 821 A.2d 62, 70 (2003) (holding that the Legislature intended for the completed DR-15A to be prima facie evidence of a violation of § 16-205.1). The Alcohol Influence Report, as corroborative evidence, may be admitted in an administrative hearing under COMAR 11.11.02.10(A) because it is a probative document that a reasonable police officer uses in the conduct of his duties. Just as the PBT in Weller was probative because it made the fact that Weller was driving while intoxicated more likely so than not, the Alcohol Influence Report in the present case makes it more likely so than not that Deputy Barnhart had a reasonable belief that Lipella was driving while intoxicated.

Therefore, the ALJ admitted properly here the Alcohol Influence Report as corroborating evidence. ⁴⁷⁰ We examined, in detail, the plain meaning of § 16-205.1 in Illiano, 390 Md. at 278-79 , 888 A.2d at 337-38 , in order to determine if the Legislature intended to separate proeedurally the events leading to the traffic stop from the detention events that lead to the request to take a breathalyzer test. See also Richards, 356 Md. at 368 n. 7, 739 A.2d at 65 n. 7. The DR-15A was created, using the requirements set out in § 16-205.1 13 as a precise model, to record the information that led the police officer to suspect intoxication. Neither the form, nor the statute, require the officer to document the events leading to the underlying traffic stop, unless those events formed a part of the officer’s suspicion of intoxication.

The ⁴⁷¹ only requirement is that the officer provide the “reasonable