Motor Vehicle Administration v. Salop

BARBERA, C.J. This case involves the interstate Driver License Compact (“Compact”), the articles of which are codified at Maryland Code (1977, 2012 Repl.Vol.), § 16-703 of the Transportation Article (hereinafter “TR”). Presuming that drivers who disregard traffic laws in other states will do so in the home state as well, thereby posing a danger to public safety, the Compact is a comprehensive interstate agreement “designed to promote compliance with motor vehicle laws in the party states and to ⁴¹³ make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility more just and equitable.” 1 Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 385 Md. 440, 457 , 869 A.2d 822 (2005) (quotation and citation omitted). To that end, the Compact requires party states to report all convictions of an out-of-state driver to the state that issued the driver a license to operate a motor vehicle. TR § 16-703, art.

III

For certain offenses, the home state then gives the same effect to the conduct underlying the conviction as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state. TR § 16-703, art. IV(a). In addition to enacting the articles of the Compact, 1987 Md. Laws ch. 320, Maryland has adopted other laws that relate to its enforcement.

TR §§ 16-701 — 16-708. Of particular relevance, one such provision, TR § 16-708, provides for judicial review of acts done under the Compact and sets forth the scope of that judicial review. In 2012, Respondent Joshua Salop, who held a provisional driver’s license, 2 paid a fine for speeding in Delaware, which is a party state to the Compact. Pursuant to the Compact, the Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), the licensing authority in that state, reported to the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”), the licensing authority in our state, that Respondent had been convicted of speeding.

The MVA recorded a speeding conviction on Respondent’s Maryland driving record and sent Respondent notice that it would be suspending his license for 30 days. ⁴¹⁴ Respondent contested the suspension at an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) of the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), arguing that his payment of the speeding ticket did not constitute a conviction under Delaware law. The ALJ, in rendering a decision on behalf of the MVA, refused to consider that argument. Upon judicial review, however, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled that the payment of a fine did not constitute a conviction under Delaware law, reversing the decision of the ALJ. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, with the direction to reinstate the decision of the ALJ.

I. Respondent received a ticket for speeding while driving in Delaware on March 3, 2012. He paid the fine associated with the ticket; the matter was not adjudicated in court. Based upon his payment of the fine, the Delaware DMV reported to the MVA that Respondent had been convicted of speeding, and the MVA recorded that conviction on Respondent’s Maryland driving record. Accordingly, the MVA sent to Respondent a notice that it would be suspending his provisional license for 30 days. 3 The notice advised that Respondent had the right to request a hearing to show cause why the suspen ⁴¹⁵ sion should not be imposed.

Respondent did so, and on June 7, 2012, an ALJ presided over the “show cause” hearing. 4 The MVA was not represented at the hearing but submitted into evidence Respondent’s Maryland driving record, which listed two moving violations: a 2011 conviction in Maryland for the offense of failure to obey a flashing traffic signal, and a conviction for speeding in Delaware with a conviction date of March 12, 2012, evidently the date the Delaware DMV processed Respondent’s payment of the fine. 5 The ALJ reviewed Respondent’s driving record and stated, “There appear to have been two violations.... So that’s why you’re here, with the [TR § 16 — 213(c)(2) ] violation.” The issue before the ALJ, it appears, was the penalty to be imposed. Respondent moved the ALJ to “dismiss” the notice of suspension, arguing that the payment of a fine is not a conviction under Delaware law and therefore does not trigger the Compact’s reporting requirement. 6 The ALJ denied the motion. The ALJ determined that, once advised of the conviction by Delaware, the MVA properly recorded it on Respondent’s Maryland driving record. 7 ⁴¹⁶ The ALJ found that Respondent had two moving violations on his record and, consequently, concluded that Respondent was in violation of TR § 16-213(c)(2).

As to the penalty, in an exercise of his discretion, the ALJ issued a reprimand, rather than the 30-day suspension permitted by statute. The ALJ explained why: “[UJnder these cases where a young person has only had two tickets, my policy has been and continues to be normally, unless there are exigent circumstances, that I simply issue a reprimand and take no action against him, and so that’s what I’m going to do.” 8 The ALJ advised Respondent that he had the right to appeal the decision of the MVA to the Circuit Court pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that a “party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision.... ” Maryland Code (1984, 2009 Repl Vol.), § 10-222(a) of the State Government Article (hereinafter “SG”). 9 Respondent filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. He asked the court to reverse the decision of the ALJ and order that the MVA remove the Delaware conviction from his Maryland driving record. ⁴¹⁷ Respondent again argued that the mere payment of a fine could not be considered a conviction for purposes of the Compact. For its part, the MVA argued that Respondent could not challenge the validity of the Delaware conviction upon judicial review of the proposed license suspension in Maryland, because TR § 16-708(b) limits judicial review of the “validity” of an out-of-state conviction reported under Article III of the Compact to “establishing the identity of the individual who was convicted in another state.” The MVA asserted that the proper place for Respondent to challenge the report of conviction — and, specifically, to litigate whether a fine constitutes a conviction under the law of the reporting state — is in the reporting state, not at a license suspension hearing in the recording state.

The MVA further maintained that, in any event, the payment of a fine is a conviction under Maryland and Delaware law and there was sufficient evidence before the ALJ for him to conclude that Respondent had two moving violations on his Maryland driving record. Respondent countered that, under Delaware law, the payment of a fine is an “admission of guilt,” not a conviction, and that, under Delaware law, a conviction occurs only after the “judicial determination of guilt after an assertion of innocence and not merely a judicial entry of an admission of guilt.... ” For support of that position, Respondent quoted Martin v. State, 116 A.2d 685, 687 (Del.Super.Ct.1955), a criminal case not involving the Compact. At the hearing on the petition on January 24, 2013, the Circuit Court reversed the decision of the ALJ. The court ruled that, under Delaware law, Respondent had not been convicted of speeding in Delaware and the ALJ, in finding to the contrary, committed an error of law.

Given that “a person can appeal an error of law,” the court found Respondent’s argument properly before it. In so ruling, the court rejected the MVA’s argument that, under TR § 16-708(b), Respondent was entitled only to challenge identity. 10 The court entered a ⁴¹⁸ written order the following day reversing the ALJ’s conclusion that Respondent was in violation of TR § 16-213(c)(2) and the ALJ’s decision to issue a reprimand. On April 8, 2013, Respondent attempted to convert his provisional license to a full driver’s license. He was told by a representative of the MVA that he would have to wait until 18 months from the date of the Delaware conviction to do so, under TR § 16 — 111(d)(1)(ii).

Consequently, Respondent filed in the Circuit Court a “Motion to Reopen Case for the Limited Purpose of Enforcing the Court’s January 24, 2013 Ruling.” In the motion, Respondent argued that “[t]he [c]ourt’s refusal to initially order the MVA to remove the conviction from [his] driving record is a mistake pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 2-535.” 11 Respondent contended that the court had committed a mistake in determining “that it did not have the jurisdictional authority to specifically order the MVA to remove the conviction” from Respondent’s driving record. In fact, Respondent asserted, the Circuit Court indeed had jurisdiction because a court reviewing the decision of an administrative agency “is under no constraints in reversing an administrative decision that is premise[d] solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” As the Circuit Court ruled that the ALJ committed an error of law in declaring that the payment of a fine is tantamount to a conviction, Respondent argued that the ⁴¹⁹ court was “entitled” to order the MVA to do “anything necessary to effectuate [the court’s] ruling.... ” In response, the MVA filed a “Motion to Dismiss [Respondent’s] Motion to Reopen Case or in the Alternative Motion to Revise a Mistake.” The MVA argued that the error Respondent alleged was not a “mistake” within the meaning of Maryland Rule 2-535(b), as the Circuit Court did not lack the “power” to enter the January 25, 2013 judgment. The MVA asserted that the true jurisdictional mistake occurred when the Circuit Court considered, and ruled on, Respondent’s argument that he had not received a conviction in Delaware, because the court was prohibited, under TR § 16-708(b), from doing so on the ground upon which it did. 12 The MVA suggested that, upon the MVA’s refusal to issue to him a full driver’s license, Respondent should have sought relief in the form of an administrative hearing, as opposed to attempting to reopen the Circuit Court case. Without holding a hearing, the Circuit Court issued an order on June 21, 2013, granting Respondent’s motion and ordering the MVA to remove the Delaware conviction from Respondent’s Maryland driving record.

The MVA filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, seeking our review of the following questions: 1. Did the Circuit Court exceed the scope of its authority by ordering the MVA to remove a reported Delaware speeding conviction from [Respondent’s] driving record, where Maryland’s adoption of the Driver License Compact mandates that the MVA maintain a record of each out-of-state conviction reported by states that are parties to the Compact and Maryland law provides no right to judicial review of the MVA’s maintenance of [Respondent’s] driving record? ⁴²⁰ 2. Did the Circuit Court err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion when it used its revisory power under [Maryland] Rule 2 — 535(b) to correct a nonjurisdictional “mistake,” given this Court’s long-standing precedent confining a Circuit Court’s authority under this Rule to correcting only jurisdictional errors? 3. Did the Circuit Court exceed the permissible scope of review by reviewing the underlying validity of Delaware’s reported conviction, in light of the plain language in [TR] § 16-708 strictly limiting judicial review of reported out-of-state convictions?

We granted the petition. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Salop, 435 Md. 266 , 77 A.3d 1084 (2013). As we shall see, in accordance with the well-established principles of appellate review of administrative agency decisions, we resolve the case on the basis of the ALJ’s decision, not the rulings of the Circuit Court.

II

This case comes to us on judicial review of the decision of the MVA, an administrative agency, via the ALJ. The rules by which we undertake such review are well-known. We examine the decision of the agency, not that of the preceding reviewing court. Employees’ Ret.

Sys. of Balt. v. Dorsey, 430 Md. 100, 110 , 59 A.3d 990 (2013). Our role is narrow, as “it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571 , 873 A.2d 1145 (2005) (quoting Bd. of Physician Quality Assur. v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-68 , 729 A.2d 376 (1999)) (quotations and citations omitted). In applying the test for substantial evidence, we “decide[] whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.” Noland, 386 Md. at 571 , 873 A.2d 1145 (quoting Banks, 354 Md. at 68 , ⁴²¹ 729 A.2d 376 ) (quotations and citations omitted). We defer to the agency’s factual findings, if supported by the record.

Id. Moreover, we “review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it; ... the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, and ... it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence and to draw inferences from that evidence.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted). With respect to the agency’s conclusions of law, “a certain amount of deference may be afforded when the agency is interpreting or applying the statute the agency itself administers.” Dorsey, 430 Md. at 111 , 59 A.3d 990 . “We are under no constraint, however, to affirm an agency decision premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Thomas v. State Ret. & Pension Sys., 420 Md. 45, 54-55 , 21 A.3d 1042 (2011) (quotations and citations omitted).

In his decision, the ALJ concluded that Respondent had violated TR § 16-213(c)(2). That legal conclusion was based on the factual finding that Respondent had two moving violations on his Maryland driving record, the second of which occurred in Delaware. It is the second of those moving violations that is the subject of the parties’ dispute. Respondent maintains that, under the Compact, his payment of a fine in Delaware for a speeding ticket should not have been reported as a conviction to the MVA.

The MYA responds that Maryland recorded the conviction for speeding in compliance with the Compact, because it had no discretion to decide whether the recorded conviction, in fact, was a conviction under Delaware law. At issue, then, is the interpretation of the Compact. Specifically, Respondent argues that his payment of the fine for a speeding ticket is not a conviction under the Compact, for the reason that it is not a conviction under Delaware law. His payment of a fine was not a conviction under Delaware law, he argues, given a decision of the Superior Court of Delaware in Martin, 116 A.2d at 687 , instructing that a conviction occurs only after an assertion of innocence followed ⁴²² by a judicial determination of guilt.

He interprets Article II 13 to mean that his payment of the fíne, if not a conviction under Delaware law, may not be considered a conviction under the Compact. He asserts that the MVA erred in recording a conviction where there was not one. The MVA argues that it recorded a conviction on Respondent’s driving record in response to Delaware’s report of a conviction, as the Compact requires. The MVA suggests that the Compact envisions a simple sequence of events: the reporting state makes a report under Article III, and the recording state records under Article IV.

Recording is, for practical purposes, automatic; the licensing authority in the recording state enjoys no discretion to determine whether a conviction was, in fact, a conviction under the reporting state’s law. We conclude by examination of the Compact that the MVA has the better part of the argument.