Moxley v. Acker

Couch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In August, 1981, the appellant,'Lefferage B. Moxley, filed a Complaint Against Forcible Detainer in the District Court for Harford County against Theodore and Cynthia Acker. That court ruled in favor of Moxley. The appellees appealed to the Circuit Court for Harford County on the ground that force, or the threat of force, was a necessary element of the cause of action and no such force had been used.

The circuit court reversed the judgment of the district court on that basis. The appellant petitioned for certiorari to this Court, and we granted it to consider the important issue of public interest involved. This dispute arose after the appellant sold the appellees a tract of land improved by a mobile home under a land installment contract in August, 1979. The appellees paid the appellant a down payment and began making monthly payments of principal and interest.

On May 4, 1981, the appellees’ counsel notified the appellant that it was his opinion that the installment contract violated Maryland Code (1974,1981 Repl. Vol.), Real Property Article, § 10-102 (f), 1 and that the appellees "elect to avoid the contract under the forementioned statute . . . and by this act of canceling the Land Installment Contract demand an immediate refund of all payments and deposits made since date of contract foresaid.” On May 7, the appellant, through counsel, agreed that the contract violated the statute and that "your clients would be entitled to repudiate this Contract.” He also requested appellees’ counsel to advise him of the amount of the claim and when the appellees "will be prepared to vacate the premises, as the last payment they made was more than thirty days ago.” Appellees’ counsel replied on May 8 that he would cooperate in the expeditious handling of the case, especially ⁴⁹ in determining the amount of the appellees’ claim, but that, "Needless to say a couple with three children all in school will need a reasonable amount of time to relocate.” A month later, on June 9, appellant’s counsel wrote appellees’ counsel that if he (Mr. Acker, one of the appellees) wished to repudiate the contract, "he must do so and vacate the premises”, that the matter must be settled promptly or the appellees must move out of the premises and the amount of the claim negotiated. The appellees failed to vacate the property or to pay rent, although it is conceded that at no time did they use force or the threat of force to detain the property. The appellant then filed a Complaint Against Forcible Detainer in the District Court in August, 1981.

That court, as noted above, held for the appellant. On appeal, following reversal by the circuit court, the appellant presents two issues: (1) whether force is a necessary element in the action of forcible detainer, and (2) even if it is, whether this Court should abolish that requirement. The causes of action of forcible entry and forcible detainer were incorporated into Maryland law by Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights. It states: "That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity. .. .” Md. Const., Dec. of Rights, art. 5.

Kilty’s Report of English Statutes reflects that the English statutes that created these causes of action were found to be applicable to the circumstances of the people and thus proper to be introduced and incorporated into Maryland law. W. ⁵⁰ Kilty, Report of English Statutes 223, 227 (1811); 2 Alexander’s British Statutes 262-64, 299-306 (2d ed., vol. 1, 1912). The English statutes involved here are primarily 15 Richard II, chapter 2 (1391) and 8 Henry VI, chapter 9 (1429); see id.; they have not been repealed by the Maryland legislature. See Code (1974, 1981 Repl.

Vol.), Real Property Article, § 14-115. The origin of these statutes is recounted in G. Liebmann, Maryland Practice 82-83 (vol. 2, 1976): "At common law and prior to the enactment of the statute of 5 Richard 2d, Chapter 8 (1381) in the 14th century, whenever a right of entry existed the party entitled to the right could lawfully enter and regain his possession by force. This right of self-help was curbed by 5 Richard 2d Chapter 8 which limited entries under claim of right to entries 'not with strong hand, nor with a multitude of people, but only in a peaceable and easy manner.’ This statute was enacted to meet problems existing in the period following the Black Death, in which public policy demanded that real estate vacated by death be put to early use, thus making desirable limitation of the former eviction rights of property owners, which were restricted to instances of forcible conduct by squatters. The limitations on eviction imposed by the statute remain in effect in England where, in consequence, large scale 'squatting’ remains a contemporary problem in virtue of the lack of other statutory remedies for trespass, and a strict definition of what constitutes force.

This limitation was supplemented by the Statute of 15 Richard II, Chapter 2 (1391) to provide that persons making unlawful forcible entries be imprisoned by justices ⁵¹ of the peace who on complaint were required to 'go to the place where such force is made.’ The statute of 8 Henry VI, Chapter 9 (1429) provides