Mudrick v. Weakley

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case arises out of an accident which occurred October 9, 1968, between two eastbound vehicles on Randolph Road in Montgomery County, Maryland. Dorothy J. Mudrick and her husband brought suit against Jerry Lee Weakley and his employer, Alfred H. Smith, for physical injuries allegedly sustained by Mrs. Mudrick, for damage to Mr. Mudrick’s automobile, medical expenses and for injuries to their marriage relationship. The jury returned verdicts for the defendants.

From judgments on those verdicts the Mudricks have brought this appeal, alleging an error in the jury instructions. Mrs. Mudrick testified she was proceeding between 25 and 30 miles per hour along Randolph Road aware that the truck driven by Weakley “was about a car length and a half, maybe two car lengths behind me.” As she was driving through this residential section, she noticed a dog “up on the grass in front of one of the homes.” The portion of Randolph Road with which we are concerned has three eastbound lanes separated from the westbound lanes by a curbed grass median strip. Both vehicles involved in the collision were operating in the center eastbound lane. There were a few cars parked in the right lane and few cars passed Mrs. Mudrick and ¹⁷⁷ Weakley in the median-most lane.

Concerning the dog, Mrs. Mudrick’s attorney asked her: “Q. Now, how far away were you from the point where the animal was when you first saw him? A. About 300 feet. Q. And did you ever see the animal again ? A. Yes, little while later I saw him down the sidewalk.

Q. Did you ever see him after that? A. Then on the curb. Q. Did you ever see him after that? A. Yes, when he was about, seemed like 6 feet or so in front of me coming toward the right front of my car.

Q. Now, as he was heading toward the right front of your car, did you do anything? A. Yes, I stopped. Q. Well, when you say you stopped, did you hit the dog? A. I heard a yelp, but we couldn’t find the dog afterward.

Q. Now, when you came to a stop, did anything happen after you came to a stop? A. Yes. I was then struck in the rear by a truck.” She stated on cross-examination that “just before the collision occurred, a car [about three car lengths] in front of me swerved to the outside lane.” She was asked, “And was it to your judgment at that time that the reason for that swerving or veering was that the dog was indeed posing a problem?” She replied in the affirmative. She was then asked, “And isn’t it correct that the reason you were able to tell us the various positions of the dog as you were proceeding down the roadway is you were concerned about that dog?” She answered, “I was watching it; yes, sir.” * * * Q. “And you had been ¹⁷⁸ watching the dog for a distance of about 300 feet, isn’t that correct?

A. Yes, sir. Q. That is about the length of a football field; isn’t it? A. Yes, sir.” * * * “Q. Your best recollection is you were doing 25 to 30 miles, is that correct? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Am I further correct, Mrs. Mudrick, that prior to the time that you actually applied the brakes when the dog was six feet in front of you, you had not given any type signal to any of the trafile to your rear of any intent to come to a stop; is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. You had not given a hand signal, put your hand out or waved it or anything like that? A. No. Q. You had not tapped your brakes to flash your lights at all; had you ?

A. No. Q. So from the time you were proceeding along with the truck behind you for a distance of, some distance, the only time you applied your brakes was when the dog was out in the roadway; is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Appellee Weakley testified that he had been following Mrs. Mudrick in his employer’s truck for several blocks and that he stayed about forty feet behind her automobile, traveling at a constant speed of 30 miles per hour. He saw Mrs. Mudrick’s brake lights and the nose of her car “go down.” He saw nothing in the roadway that might have accounted for the sudden stop.

The appellants assign as error the trial court’s instructions to the jury which they allege were prejudicially incomplete. During his instructions to the jury as to the law in Maryland, the trial judge stated: “The driver of ¹⁷⁹ the front car must also exercise ordinary care not to stop