Muhammad v. State

CHARLES E. MOYLAN, Jr., Judge, retired, specially assigned. For 22 days in October of 2002, Montgomery County, Maryland, was gripped by a paroxysm of fear, a fear as paralyzing as that which froze the London district of White-chapel in 1888. In Whitechapel, however, the terror came only at night. In Montgomery County, it struck at any hour of the night or day.

In Whitechapel, all of the victims were prostitutes. In Montgomery County, every man, woman, and child was a likely target. The body count in Whitechapel was five; in Montgomery County the death toll reached six. The name of the Whitechapel terrorist has never been discovered.

In Montgomery County, their names are John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo. After a month-long trial in May of 2006, a Montgomery County jury, presided over by Judge James L. Ryan, convicted the appellant, John Allen Muhammad, of 1) the October 2, 2002, first-degree murder of James Martin; 2) the October 3 first-degree murder of James Buchanan; 3) the October 3 ¹⁹⁹ first-degree murder of Premkumar Walekar; 4) the October 3 first-degree murder of Maria Sarah Ramos; 5) the October 3 first-degree murder of Lori Lewis Rivera; and 6) the October 22 first-degree murder of Conrad Johnson. Judge Ryan sentenced John Muhammad to six terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, to be served consecutively with each other and to be served consecutively with any previously imposed sentences in other jurisdictions (including a death sentence in Virginia) for crimes committed in the course of the same murder spree. Ironically, it is John Muhammad who is aggrieved at the way he was treated by Montgomery County, as he now complains 1. that Judge Ryan erroneously failed to comply with Maryland Rule 4-215, when he permitted the appellant to discharge counsel and to proceed pro se; 2. that Judge Ryan erroneously conducted a competency hearing and erroneously found the appellant to be competent to stand trial; 3. that Judge Ryan erroneously denied him a fair trial by refusing to permit him to call a number of witnesses in his defense; 4. that Judge Ryan erroneously permitted the State to present the prior recorded testimony of Dr. Emily Ward; 5. that Judge Ryan erroneously refused to remove the trial from Montgomery County; 6. that Judge Ryan erroneously refused to question the jury venire about a possibly disqualifying conversation reportedly overheard by one prospective juror; 7. that Judge Ryan erroneously allowed the State to cross-examine an officer about compliance with the discovery requirements and erroneously instructed the jury with respect to such compliance; 8. that Judge Ryan erroneously refused to allow the appellant to recross-examine a State’s witness; and 9. that the cumulative effect of all of the above denied the appellant a fair trial. ²⁰⁰ The Epicenter of Montgomery County Although the reign of terror perpetrated by Muhammad and Malvo ultimately spread over seven separate jurisdictions and involved 10 murders and 3 attempted murders, the epicenter was unquestionably Montgomery County.

Six of the ten murders were committed in Montgomery County. The terror began in Montgomery County on Wednesday evening, October 2, 2002. The terror ended in Montgomery County on Tuesday evening, October 22, 2002. Seized with epidemic apprehension of random and sudden violence, people were afraid to stop for gasoline, because a number of the shootings had occurred at gas stations.

Schools were placed on lock-down status. On one occasion, Interstate 95 was closed in an effort to apprehend the sniper. A multi-jurisdictional state and federal task force was formed to cope with the crisis. “Hot lines” to receive tips were created by both the Montgomery County Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Over 60,000 tips were ultimately received.

The sense of dread that hovered over the entire community was immeasurable. The six lives that were taken were but a part of an incalculable toll. 1. James Martin James Martin was a systems analyst for the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration. At just after 6 P.M. on October 2, 2002, he was standing in the parking lot of a Shoppers Food Warehouse in Wheaton.

Three witnesses heard a “loud bang” as Martin clutched his chest, gave a cry for help, and collapsed to the ground. He died almost immediately from a bullet fired into his back. It was determined that the shot had been fired from the rear of the parking lot. There was later recovered from Muhammad and Malvo, on October 24, a Bushmaster XM-15 semiautomatic .223-caliber rifle with a muzzle velocity of approximately 3,000 feet per second.

The autopsy of Martin showed that his injuries were consistent with those inflicted by a .223-caliber bullet fired from a Bushmaster rifle. The ²⁰¹ medical examiner testified that a .223-caliber bullet fired by a high velocity weapon leaves a distinctive and extremely devastating injury, as it did to Martin, because the bullet fragments when it hits the body, causing “a tremendous amount of damage.” When Muhammad and Malvo were apprehended on October 24, they were in a dark colored 1990 Chevrolet Caprice with New Jersey license tag number NDA 21Z. At about 10:50 A.M. on the day that Martin was killed, an officer on patrol near Aspen Hill took note of the Caprice and its New Jersey tags stopped in a traffic lane. It was occupied by two black males.

A records check showed that it was registered to John Allen Muhammad. Because there were no outstanding warrants, the officer did nothing further. At about 10 P.M. that night, four hours after Martin’s killing at the Wheaton Shoppers Food Warehouse, a police detective, checking the White Flint Mall parking lot because of a rash of car thefts that had occurred there, noted the presence of Muhammad’s car with the New Jersey tags on the lot. The security guard spoke with John Muhammad on the parking lot.

He was not wearing any shoes and the guard suspected that he was homeless. Muhammad stated that he was traveling with his son and he pointed to an old, dark blue car with New Jersey license tags. The guard told him that he had to move the car before the parking lot was locked up for the night. The guard ran a check on the tags, found no improprieties, and did nothing further.

When she returned to the area around midnight, Muhammad and the car were gone. The encounter had no special significance for her at the time. 2. James Buchanan The senseless killing of October 2 escalated into a murderous rampage by the morning of October 3. James Buchanan, who owned and operated a landscaping business, was mowing the lawn at the Fitzgerald Auto Store near the White Flint Mall at about 7:45 A.M. Gary Huss, an employee at the auto store, heard a “loud bang” but looked around and saw nothing.

A minute or two later, another employee rushed into his office and said that “someone was dead on the parking lot.” Anoth ²⁰² er employee had also heard a “loud shotgun blast” and saw Buchanan grab his chest, stumble toward the gate, and fall. Buchanan lay dead with a “huge wound” to his chest. The post-mortem examination revealed that a single bullet had entered Buchanan’s body from the back. The wound was consistent with one caused by a .223 rifle shot fired by a high velocity weapon. 3.

Premkumar Walekar No more than 40 minutes after Buchanan was killed, Premkumar Walekar, a taxi driver, was filling his car with gasoline at a nearby Mobil station. Dr. Caroline Namrow was also at the gas station when she heard a “very loud bang” and then saw Walekar walk toward her, pleading, “Call an ambulance.” Walekar collapsed to the ground and Dr. Namrow called 911 on her cell phone. She then attempted to administer CPR, but to no avail. Walekar was pronounced dead en route to the hospital.

The autopsy revealed that the fatal wound was from a long-range shooting. The examiner described a wound showing a “lead snowstorm” effect inside Walekar’s chest, consistent with the firing of a high velocity rifle, such as a .223 rifle. After the October 24 arrest of Muhammad and Malvo, a ballistics examination showed that the lead fragments found in Walekar’s chest had definitely been fired from the Bushmaster rifle recovered from Muhammad’s car. 4. Maria Sarah Ramos Less than 30 minutes later, Maria Sarah Ramos, a 32-year-old wife and mother who worked as a houseeleaner, was shot through the head and died instantly.

She was sitting on a bench at Leisure World Plaza, waiting for her employer to pick her up. A resident of a nearby retirement community was walking to the mailbox when he heard a “huge explosion” and saw Mrs. Ramos “slump over” with blood “pouring from her head.” The autopsy revealed that she had been shot at long range by a high velocity rifle. Officer Cynthia Martin discovered a ²⁰³ bullet hole in the window of the Crisp and Juicy Restaurant just behind the bench where Mrs. Ramos had been sitting. A detective recovered a bullet fragment lying on the restaurant floor.

The ballistics examination confirmed that the bullet fragment had been fired from Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. Kerry Turner worked for a doctor just across from where Maria Ramos had been sitting on the bench. As Ms. Turner parked her car that morning, she saw a dark blue Chevrolet Caprice, which she described as “beat up,” as the only other car on the lot. She noted Mrs. Ramos sitting on the nearby bench.

From inside her office, she subsequently looked out the window and saw Mrs. Ramos slump over with blood pouring from her head. Ms. Turner subsequently identified Muhammad’s car as the one she had seen on the parking lot on the morning Mrs. Ramos was shot. 5. Lori Lewis Rivera Lori Lewis Rivera was a 25-year-old nanny who was vacuuming her mini-van at a Shell station when she was fatally shot in the back a few minutes after 10 A.M. that same day. Maria Welsh had been loading groceries into her car on the parking lot of a Safeway store just behind the Shell station on Connecticut Avenue when she heard a “loud bang.” As she drove away from the Safeway, she saw a woman lying on the ground near the vacuum cleaner at the nearby Shell station.

The woman was calling for help, and Ms. Welsh called 911. When help arrived, Ms. Rivera had no pulse. The autopsy revealed a gunshot wound to the back with no exit wound. The wound was consistent with one inflicted by a high velocity rifle.

The ballistics examination revealed that the bullet taken from Ms. Rivera had been fired from John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. At about the same time that Ms. Rivera was shot, Fred Lofberg, an accountant, was leaving his office to go to a 10 A.M. appointment in Kensington. As he drove past the Shell station where the shooting occurred, he noted, in the center lane of traffic, a blue Chevrolet in “stock condition” with ²⁰⁴ original paint, tires, and hubcaps. He also noticed an odd rust spot on the back, dark tinted windows, and a New Jersey license tag.

His observation took on significance to him when, as he returned home, he heard helicopters overhead and then heard a television report about the shooting at the Shell station. 6. Conrad Johnson By the night of October 3, the vortex of carnage had moved beyond Montgomery County into 1) the District of Columbia; 2) Prince George’s County, Maryland; and 3) four separate counties in northern Virginia. For the last of the 13 shootings and 10 murders, however, the scene of the crime, on October 22, returned to Montgomery County. At just before six A.M., Conrad Johnson, a husband and father of two sons and a bus driver, was shot while stepping out of his bus.

A police officer found Johnson lying on the floor of the bus, bleeding from his chest but still conscious. Doctors were unable to control the extensive hemorrhaging and Johnson died on the operating table. The ballistics examination confirmed that the bullet that killed him had been fired by John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. The officers who responded to the scene of the shooting searched a nearby wooded area.

They found a black duffel bag, a single left-handed brown glove, and a note which had been placed inside two plastic ziplock bags and attached to a tree. What turned out to be Malvo’s DNA was found on one of the ziplock bags and on the glove. Muhammad could not be excluded as the source of DNA extracted from a hair found on the duffel bag. The note declared, as had two earlier notes in Prince George’s County and in Ashland, Virginia, “For you, Mr. Police, call me God.” The note also taunted the police for their “incompetence” and warned that “Your children are not safe.

Can you hear us now? Do not play these childish games with us. You know our demands. Thank you.” The note concluded, “Next person, your choice.” One police witness placed Muhammad’s car, with the tinted windows and the New Jersey tags, in the Aspen Hill area at ²⁰⁵ 6:30 P.M. that evening.

When the tags checked out, however, the officer concluded that he had no reason to stop the car. Another witness placed both Muhammad and Malvo at a YMCA in Silver Spring at 11 A.M. on the morning that Johnson was shot. The Outback Steak House is located one-quarter of a mile away from where Johnson was shot. Monica Schiffman, an employee of the steak house, served and had a conversation with John Muhammad at the Outback on the night before the shooting.

Muhammad was sitting at a table with a lap top computer. He told Ms. Schiffman that the food he had just eaten there had made him sick and that he just wanted to sit for a while. Ms. Schiffman refunded the price of the meal. He left at about 11:30 P.M. Ms. Schiffman watched as he got into his car, which she described as a four-door, dark blue car with tinted windows.

Muhammad’s picture was recorded by a surveillance tape over the door of the steak house. When the Chevrolet Caprice was searched following the arrest of Muhammad and Malvo on October 24, the police recovered a glove matching the one that was found near the scene of Johnson’s murder and a receipt for the duffel bag found at the same location. Also recovered was a lap top computer, which contained, in an “Allah 8” file created on October 10, such language as, “To whom it may concern, call me God. We are offering you a way out.

These are our terms,” followed by a demand for five million dollars to stop the killings. Several maps had been saved on the computer, including two marked with skull and crossbones push pins at the locations where James Martin and James Buchanan had been killed. A handwritten note in the glove compartment included the phrase, “Call me God.” There were also recovered ziplock bags similar to those containing the note that was attached to a tree near the scene of the Johnson murder. The Killing Zone Expands 1.

District of Columbia By the night of October 3, the senseless rampage of killing had spilled over the Montgomery County line into the District ²⁰⁶ of Columbia. At approximately 9:20 P.M., Pascal Chariot, a 72-year-old carpenter from Haiti, was shot and killed as he was crossing the street near the corner of Georgia and Kalmia Avenues. A witness, washing clothes at a nearby laundromat, heard a “loud pop” and then saw a man with a “big hole in his throat” lying on the ground. The autopsy described a single gunshot wound to the chest exhibiting the “lead snowstorm” attributes of a shooting with a high powered, high velocity rifle.

The ballistics examination showed that the bullet that killed Pascal Chariot had been fired from John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. Two hours before Chariot was killed, an officer had stopped the Chevrolet Caprice in the District of Columbia for running a stop sign. Muhammad was identified as the driver. No one else was visible in the car.

When the license check revealed no improprieties, Muhammad was issued a verbal warning and that was it. At about the time that Chariot was shot, Karl Largie was working at the nearby Tropicana Restaurant. He noticed a car parked on the side of the restaurant that appeared to him to be “out of place” and “creepy.” It was a Chevrolet Caprice with all original parts and dark tinted windows. Largie heard what he believed to be a “tire pop,” a sound which he described as “loud but muffled.” Largie then observed the car move off the parking lot very slowly with its lights turned off.

In court, he identified the car in which Muhammad and Malvo were arrested as the same car he had observed on the night of Chariot’s murder. 2. Fredericksburg, Virginia By the next afternoon, that of October 4, the snipers had moved south into Virginia. At about 2:30 P.M., Caroline Seawell, a part-time substitute teacher, was shot outside a Michael’s Craft Store in Fredericksburg as she was placing her purchases inside her car. As she was closing the car door, she felt , a pain in her back and heard something hit her car.

She realized that she had been shot and fell to the ground. A ²⁰⁷ bullet had pierced her lung, diaphragm, and liver, but she survived. She was hospitalized for four days. The ballistics examination showed that the bullet that was removed from her body had been fired from John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle.

Alex Jones was on the parking lot when Caroline Seawell was shot. He heard a “pop” and saw Ms. Seawell fall to the ground. He went to check on her and she told him, “I’ve been shot.” Fearing that he might also be a target, he got back in his car and started driving around the lot in a “zigzag” pattern. He got stuck behind a car that was moving very slowly.

He noticed that it was a Chevrolet Caprice with tinted windows and a New Jersey license tag. 3. Prince George’s County, Maryland Thirteen-year-old Iran Brown was dropped off by his aunt at the Benjamin Tasker Middle School in Prince George’s County, Maryland, at approximately 8 A.M. on October 7. As he waited in front of the school for the doors to be opened, he heard a loud bang and felt a sharp and sudden pain in his chest. He remembered nothing further until he woke up in the Children’s Hospital one week later.

His aunt testified that just after she dropped Iran off, she heard him screaming her name and saw him lying on the ground. She rushed him to the clinic just around the corner and called 911. Iran remained hospitalized for approximately two months. He suffered damage to many of his internal organs; he lost his spleen, parts of his pancreas and liver, and 80% of his stomach.

The ballistics examination revealed that the bullet that pierced his body had been fired from John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. Roger Polk, Jr., testified that a Chevrolet Caprice was parked on his apartment house parking lot, across from the Benjamin Tasker Middle School, throughout the night before Iran Brown was shot. At his mother’s urging, he wrote down the number of the New Jersey license tag — NDA 21Z. ²⁰⁸ After the shooting, the police searched a nearby woods and found a Tarot card with the handwritten message, “For you, Mr. Police. Code: Call me God.

Do not release to the press.” Also recovered was a Bic pen with no ink cartridge and a shell casing. DNA matching that of Malvo was found on the Tarot card. Muhammad was deemed to be a potential contributor of the DNA found on the Bic pen. 4. Manassas, Virginia Two days later, on October 9, the killers were back in Virginia.

Dean Harold Meyers, a 53-year-old engineer, left his job in Manassas at about 8 P.M. He stopped at a Sunoco station in Manassas on his way home to Maryland. He was shot through the head and killed instantly. The ballistics examination established that the bullet that killed him, entering behind his left ear and then fragmenting, came from John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. The wound was consistent with a bullet fired from a high velocity rifle.

Officer Steven Bailey responded to a Bob Evans Restaurant across the street from the shooting and began stopping cars as they left the parking lot in order to question the occupants. He stopped a Chevrolet Caprice with tinted windows and asked the occupant, whom he later identified as John Muhammad, if he had heard or seen anything. Muhammad responded that he had not seen anything, and the officer let him proceed on his way. On that parking lot, the police found an ADC map of Baltimore.

The fingerprints of both Muhammad and Malvo were found on that map. One hour before Dean Meyers was shot, Linda Thompson, who works at a bank near the Sunoco station, left work. She saw an old Chevrolet parked in the very far right corner of the bank parking lot. She testified that the car was blue and had New Jersey license tags.

She saw a young Afro-American male get into the car, while another Afro-American male was walking across the parking lot. At trial, she identified the younger man as Malvo and the older man as Muhammad. ²⁰⁹ Concerned about security at the bank, Ms. Thompson actually spoke with Muhammad. It was for this murder of Dean Meyers that Muhammad was tried and convicted by a jury in Virginia Beach on November 17, 2003. He was sentenced to death on March 9, 2004.

The conviction and the sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia on April 22, 2005. Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451 , 619 S.E.2d 16 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 2035 , 164 L.Ed.2d 794 (2006). 5. Fredericksburg, Virginia Two days later, on October 11, Kenneth Bridges stopped at an Exxon station just off Interstate 95 near Fredericksburg at 9:15 A.M. Virginia Police Officer David Gray was nearby, investigating an automobile accident, when he heard a “pop” and knew it was a gunshot. He heard on his scanner that someone had just been shot at the Exxon station.

He responded immediately and found Kenneth Bridges lying dead on the ground. The autopsy showed that Bridges had died from a gunshot wound to his back and that the wound was consistent with a shot having come from a high velocity weapon. The ballistics examination established that the lethal bullet had been fired from John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. Shortly before Bridges was shot, Christine Goodwin noticed a dark car with heavily tinted windows and New Jersey license tags backing into a parking space near the Exxon station “at an odd angle.” Also observing the car was Patricia Bradshaw, who was having breakfast with her husband at the Waffle House near the Exxon station.

She saw a “funky blue” car with dark tinted windows drive past the Exxon station very slowly. The car turned into the parking lot of a nearby Ramada Inn, backing into a parking spot. Moments later, she yelled for her husband to “get down” because there had been a shooting at the Exxon station. She could see Kenneth Bridges lying on the ground.

She gave the police a description of the car she had observed. ²¹⁰ 6. Falls Church, Virginia Three days later, on October 14, Linda Franklin, a 47-year-old F.B.I. intelligence analyst, had finished shopping at a Home Depot just outside Falls Church at approximately 9:15 P.M. She was killed immediately when the top of her skull was blown away by a sniper’s bullet. The police arrived to find her husband crouched over her body, wailing. The autopsy revealed that the wound was consistent with one caused by a shot from a high velocity weapon.

The ballistics test showed that the fatal bullet had been fired from John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. 7. Ashland, Virginia Five days went by before the next shooting. On October 19 at about 8 P.M., Jeffrey and Stephanie Hopper were leaving the Ponderosa Steak House in Ashland, a few miles north of Richmond on Interstate 95. They were traveling south from Pennsylvania and had deliberately avoided stopping for gas in the Washington, D.C. area because of the rash of sniper shootings.

As the two walked to their car, Jeffrey Hopper heard an “enormous explosion” and realized that he had been shot in the stomach. After extended hospitalization, he survived, but he lost most of his stomach and a part of his pancreas. The ballistics examination revealed that the bullet taken from his stomach had been fired from John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. In a wooded area across from the Ponderosa, the police recovered a shell casing and a Cinna Rasin bag.

Both Malvo’s fingerprints and Malvo’s DNA were found on the Cinna Rasin bag. Tacked to a tree was a ziploc bag with a note inside. Malvo’s DNA was on the ziploc bag. The note bore the words, “For you, Mr. Police.

Call me God. Do not release to the press.” On the back was a further note which referred to phone calls that had been placed to the police and to a priest in Ashland. Those calls had demanded ten million dollars in ransom money in order for the killings to stop. That note ²¹¹ concluded, “P.S. your children are not safe anywhere at any time.” With the murder of Conrad Johnson in Montgomery County three days later, the killings in the Washington suburbs came to an end.

Its toll consisted of ten deaths, three grievous woundings, and a metropolitan area of approximately four million people who had been subjected to three weeks of inexpressible terror. The Alabama Connection Between October 15 and October 21, four telephone calls were received by the police and one by a Catholic priest that threw light on this case. On October 15, a call was received by Amy Lefkoff, a dispatcher for the Rockville, Maryland police. A tape of the call was played for the jury.

The message was: “Good morning. Don’t say anything, but (unintelligible) the killers in your area. Look at the tarot card. (Unintelligible).

Do not (unintelligible). We have called you two times before trying to negotiate. We’ve got no response. People are dying.” The caller hung up and never called back.

The call came from a 703 exchange. The day before the call, on October 14 at 9:15 P.M., Linda Franklin had been murdered in Falls Church. The Falls Church area is within the 703 exchange. Jumping ahead to the fifth and final call, the notes found in the woods after the shooting of Jeffrey Hopper on October 19 led the police to believe that the sniper might attempt to contact them at the Ponderosa Steak House.

An F.B.I. agent arranged to reroute and monitor any such call. A call was received at 7:57 A.M. on October 21. The caller said “Hello” twice, and it then sounded as if a tape recorded message were being played. The message referred to earlier demands, the terms of which were non-negotiable.

The message again concluded with the warning, “Your children are not safe.” It was the second, third, and fourth calls that established the Alabama connection. In his testimony as a State’s wit ²¹² ness, to be discussed more fully infra, Lee Malvo stated that he and Muhammad had decided to place the calls because prior attempts to contact the police had been unsuccessful and because Muhammad “wanted to be taken seriously.” A call on October 18 was received by Officer Derek Baliles at the Montgomery County media center. The caller was described as a male in his late teens. The call came from the number 804-752-2931.

The 804 area code covers the Richmond area, including Ashland, where Jeffrey Hopper would be shot the next evening. The caller began by telling its recipient to “just shut up and listen.” The caller claimed to have information about “snipers” but wanted Baliles to' authenticate something first. The caller wanted Baliles to verify information regarding a shooting at a liquor store. Baliles was given the name of Police Sergeant Martino and a telephone number to contact him.

The caller told Baliles that a shooting happened “somewhere on Ann Street,” that two people had been shot, and that one of them died. At that point an operator interrupted to say that more money had to be deposited. The line went dead. Some time went by before the caller called back at 5:40 P.M., asking for “Officer Derek.” Officer Baliles told the caller that he had, in the meantime, confirmed the information previously given by the caller by contacting police authorities in Alabama.

The caller then explained that he needed to get more coins to stay on the line. The line again went dead and there was no further contact. The fourth call was placed at 9:00 P.M. that night to Father William Sullivan in Ashland, Virginia. The male caller made reference to “all these killings” and stated that “this lady didn’t have to die.” The victim killed four days earlier had been Linda Franklin.

The caller told Father Sullivan to “write this down” and he then spoke of the “robbery of a liquor store in Montgomery, Alabama.” The caller then concluded, “Mr. Police, I am God. Do not talk to the press.” Officer Baliles had telephoned the number that had been given to him by the anonymous caller and found that he was ²¹³ connected to Sergeant Martino of the Montgomery, Alabama Police Department. Sergeant Martino confirmed that on September 21, 2002, there had been a robbery of an ABC Liquor Store on Ann Street in Montgomery, in the course of which two women had been shot. A young black male had been seen running from the scene.

There was a police chase but the suspect got away. Lieutenant James Graboys, who participated in that chase, made a positive in-court identification of Malvo as the man he chased. In the chase, moreover, the fugitive dropped a magazine, which was a gun catalog called “Armor Light.” It subsequently developed that Malvo’s fingerprints were on that gun catalog. Malvo himself testified that Muhammad and he had committed the liquor store robbery in Montgomery.

Muhammad did the shooting of the two victims from the trunk of the Caprice, and Malvo ran up to rob the fallen victims. One of the shooting victims, Claudine Parker, died that night from her wound. A bullet had entered her back, transected her spinal cord, and passed through her lung. The report of the medical examiner established that the wound showed a “snowstorm effect,” which is indicative of a shot from a high powered rifle.

A subsequent ballistics examination showed that projectile fragments taken from the body of Claudine Parker had been fired from John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. Kelly Adams survived and described the man who ran past her after she was shot as an Afro-American with a thin build and very hairy legs. The bullet that broke her jaw in half, shattered her face and teeth, and paralyzed her left vocal cord had also been fired from John Muhammad’s Bushmaster rifle. A Fortuitous Breakthrough The three-week siege of the Washington area had attracted nationwide attention.

On October 17, 2002, Sergeant Roger Thomson of the Montgomery County Police Department received a call from Tacoma, Washington. The caller said that a John Williams had been involved in a divorce, that Williams had changed his name to John Muhammad, and that his ex- ²¹⁴ wife lived in the Washington, D.C. area. The caller also stated that Muhammad was regularly in the company of a “teenage boy” whom Muhammad referred to as “the sniper.” When on October 23 the police learned that the fingerprints contained on the gun catalog left at the scene of the robbery and murder in Alabama were those of Lee Malvo, they forwarded a photograph of Malvo to their tipster in Tacoma. The tipster identified Malvo as the person whom John Muhammad had called “the sniper.” A check with the national Crime Information Center computer files showed that Muhammad owned a 1990 Chevrolet Caprice with the New Jersey license tag NDA 21Z.

A lookout for that automobile was broadcast by the press later on that evening of October 23. The end game was afoot. The Capture Once the description of the Chevrolet Caprice with the New Jersey license tags went out over the air waves, it was just a matter of hours. One of those who heard the report was Whitney Donahue, a refrigerator repairman who worked in the Virginia/D.C. area.

He stopped at a rest area on Interstate 70 west of Frederick at 11:30 that night and spotted on the parking lot a car matching the description that had been broadcast. He immediately called 911 and the police arrived within ten minutes. Because the darkly tinted windows made it impossible to determine whether the occupants of the car were asleep, the final assault was carefully planned. Numerous F.B.I. agents assisted in the arrest.

At 1:30 A.M. on October 24, teams of agents and police, wearing protective gear, charged across the open parking lot and smashed out the side windows of the Caprice. Muhammad and Malvo were taken into custody, and the Washington metropolitan area breathed a long-withheld sigh of relief. The “Killing Machine” Muhammad and Malvo were arrested in the blue 1990 Chevrolet Caprice sedan that had New Jersey license tags ²¹⁵ NDA 21Z. Christopher Okiupski, the owner of the Sure Shot Auto Sales Company dealing in used ears in Trenton, New Jersey, testified that Muhammad purchased the Caprice from him on September 9, 2002.

(The first of the shootings that occurred in this case took place in Montgomery, Alabama, on September 21, 2002.) Okiupski identified a photograph of the Caprice and he made an in-court identification of Muhammad as the man who purchased it. Ultimately, sixteen separate witnesses identified the Caprice as the vehicle they had seen at or near one of the shooting scenes at approximately the time of the shooting. Muhammad made three trips to the Sure Shot Auto Sales Company before closing the deal on the third visit. The car had formerly been a police car.

On the second visit, Muhammad and a male companion (not Malvo) took the car for a test drive, listened to the motor, opened and closed the doors, and generally checked everything out. The actual salesman who was with Muhammad and his companion came into the office to describe to Okiupski how the two had removed the back seat and then laid down in the trunk. Okiupski himself looked out and saw Muhammad “kind of lying inside” the trunk. On the third visit the deal for the car was closed.

After the purchase, Muhammad transformed the Caprice into what the prosecuting attorney, in closing argument, described as a “killing machine.” A hole that had not been there before was cut into the lid of the trunk, just above the license plate, through which a rifle barrel could be projected. The side and rear windows of the Caprice were heavily tinted, which they had not been before. The inside of the trunk lid, which at the time of the car’s purchase had been white, was repainted dark blue, making it less visible when opened. Most significantly, the backrest of the rear seat had been modified so as to permit easy access into the trunk from inside the car.

The backrest was split into two sections and each could be rotated outward to permit entry into the gunport that had been created in the trunk. ²¹⁶ The Bushmaster When the police team broke into the car on the early morning of October -24, Muhammad was found sitting on the back bench seat, which was partially rotated out from its normal position. Behind the other section of the rear seat, attached by a bungee cord for quick removal, was the Bushmaster rifle, with a live round in the chamber and live rounds in the magazine. A tripod was mounted on the muzzle end of the barrel. A right-handed brown glove was stuffed in the hole that had been cut in the trunk lid.

It matched the left-handed glove that had been found at the site of the Conrad Johnson killing. An ATF firearms examiner testified that the Bushmaster was in good working order. Also recovered from the Caprice was a rifle scope, hidden inside a sock; two boxes of .338 caliber magnum ammunition; and earplugs. There was testimony that the firing of a Bushmaster rifle, particularly in a closed area such as the trunk of an automobile, would be very painful to the ears of the shooter unless they were protected.

Malvo’s fingerprints and DNA were found on the Bushmaster. Muhammad’s DNA was found on the rifle scope. The ballistics examination ultimately revealed that the Bushmaster had fired the shells involved in four of the six killings in Montgomery County, in the Prince George’s County shooting, in the District of Columbia murder, in all five shootings in Virginia, and in the murder in Montgomery, Alabama. In the other two Montgomery County murders, the lead fragments from James Martin’s body and from James Buchanan’s clothing had no identifiable characteristics.

Other incriminating evidence was recovered in the search of the Caprice. There was a wallet containing an AT & T calling card, which had been used near various crime scenes; two identification cards from different states with different names but both bearing the photograph of Muhammad; two walkie talkies; maps with both Bethesda and Silver Spring circled; a GPS device; and a note recording the task force tip line ²¹⁷ number and other phone numbers connected to the sniper murders. In the Caprice at the time of the capture were various incriminating notations. A document examiner found “writing indentations” on the car manual found in the glove compartment.

The indentations revealed the words “Call me God.” A voice recorder found in the Caprice contained the undeleted message, “We have given you a way out. You know our requests. You know our demands. And you know that it can be done.

My advice to you is to take it because we will not deviate from what we told you to do. Thank you.” The voice on the tape was identified as the voice of John Muhammad. A digital evidence expert from the F.B.I. laboratory was able to retrieve data that had been deleted from the seized laptop computer. That retrieved data included such phrases as “the truth of the Muhammad assassinations,” “people to die later,” “Officer Derek is dead,” and “priest called at 8.” In the hard drive were the words “To whom it may concern.

Call me God.” There was also retrieved “Streets and Trips” software, which had been installed on September 29, 2002. On it were “skulls and crossbones” and “push pins” at various locations linked to specific sniper shootings. Lee Boyd Malvo At the time of this reign of terror in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, John Allen Muhammad was 41 years of age and Lee Boyd Malvo was 17. With respect to the six murders that occurred in Montgomery County between October 2 and October 22, 2002, Malvo entered a guilty plea to first-degree murder in each case.

He was sentenced to six consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole. Malvo had earlier entered guilty pleas in Virginia to the crimes that had been committed in Virginia. He agreed to testify voluntarily as to all of the shootings that occurred in Maryland (including Prince George’s County) and in Virginia. With respect to the crimes occurring in other jurisdictions, to wit, in the District of Columbia and in Ala ²¹⁸ bama, he indicated that he would initially assert his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself but that he would then testify when ordered to do so by the trial judge.

Malvo testified for the major part of two full trial days. His testimony is transcribed on 468 pages of the trial transcript. Malvo, who was born in Jamaica, was 15 years of age and was living with his mother on the island of Antigua when he first met John Muhammad. Malvo and Muhammad became close friends, with Muhammad frequently referring to Malvo as his “son.” Malvo felt that Muhammad “understood” him.

Malvo soon began living with Muhammad and studying the teachings of the Nation of Islam. When shortly thereafter, Muhammad moved to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Malvo moved with him and lived with Muhammad and Muhammad’s three children. For a short time Malvo rejoined his mother in Fort Meyers, Florida, but he and Muhammad stayed in close touch by telephone. Muhammad had, in the meantime, moved to Washington State.

Malvo ultimately decided to leave his mother and to take a Greyhound bus to Washington State and to live again with Muhammad. It was there that Muhammad introduced Malvo to Earl Dancy. The three men often went to a rifle range, where Malvo was taught to fire an AK47, a 270 rifle, and a 306 rifle. According to Malvo, “I absorbed everything [Muhammad] taught me.” Malvo’s time on the rifle range soon began to be focused exclusively on high powered rifles.

Muhammad taught Malvo marksmanship and sniper tactics. Muhammad explained to Malvo that a .223-caliber hollow point bullet would create a “chainsaw reaction,” ricocheting and cutting everything in a victim’s body. It was during their stay in Washington State that Muhammad became increasingly angry over the fact that his wife had left and, with a court order, had taken the children. In July of 2002, Muhammad learned that his wife and the children were living in Clinton, Maryland.

He announced to Malvo that the two of them were going to Washington, D.C. “to terrorize these people.” Muhammad asserted that, notwith ²¹⁹ standing a court order awarding custody to the wife, “no white man in a black world is going to tell him when and where and why he cannot see his children.” It was shortly before their departure that Muhammad and Malvo stole the Bushmaster rifle from the Bull’s Eye Gun Shop in Washington State. Muhammad explained that it was a good choice o f a weapon because the “chances are if you get hit, you were going to die.” Malvo described how the two then traveled to the east coast in August 2002, where they first conducted a surveillance of the home of Muhammad’s wife and children. They then traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, where Muhammad purchased the Caprice. Muhammad had gotten the ideas for modifying the rear of the vehicle in order to turn it into an effective gunport for a sniper from an IRA manual.

The two then traveled to Montgomery, Alabama, in order to test out the success of their modifications to the Caprice. It was at the scene of the September 21, 2002 shootings in Montgomery that Malvo, while fleeing the scene, dropped the IRA manual that contained his fingerprints. The two then traveled to Montgomery County, Maryland, chosen as “the perfect area to terrorize” because “it was lower to upper middle class, well-off, mostly whites.” The two of them initially scouted out particularly effective spots for the shootings, measuring distances, and looking for areas that were populated, were without surveillance cameras, and with hiding places where shots could be fired without witnesses. Malvo further elaborated as to the several stage strategy that Muhammad had devised.

The first stage of the plan was to create general chaos by committing “six slayings a day for 30 days.” The second stage of the grand strategy, which they were preparing to put into operation at the time of their apprehension, was to “create more damage by using explosives with ball bearings or nails aimed at schools, school buses, and hospitals, especially children’s hospitals.” The plan also included the use of explosives to kill police officers. The initial target for the second stage was to have been the City of Baltimore. ²²⁰ Malvo elaborated with respect to the plan to kill police officers: Baltimore was going to be the main center of phase two. Essentially what was going to happen is you would kill one police officer with a different weapon and it wouldn’t be linked to the shootings, then dozens probably of officers would go to the funeral and then you would have improvised explosives. Q. You would have what?

A. Improvised explosives. Q. Improvised explosives? A. Yes. Q. And what does that mean?

A. It would be a mixture of Cl and some other stuff with ball bearings and nails. The first would be blow, it would blow and the projectiles would kill everyone at the scene. Then there would be secondary devices which would be for when ambulances came. (Emphasis supplied).

Indeed, Muhammad and Malvo had reconnoitered Baltimore. At approximately 12:30 A.M. on the morning of October 8, Officer James Snyder of the Baltimore City Police Department was on patrol when he noticed a blue Chevrolet Caprice parked at a Mobil station. He saw no one inside. He returned to the area at about 2:30 A.M. and saw the car still parked there.

The car had New Jersey license tags. The officer found Muhammad sleeping on the front seat. He removed Muhammad from the car, asked for identification, and asked what Muhammad was doing there. Muhammad explained that he had just come from Virginia on his way to see his father in New Jersey and was tired.

When the license check came back clean, the officer allowed Muhammad to leave the scene. Malvo, who at the time was a short distance away with the rifle, had it trained on the officer. He testified that he was prepared to shoot the officer if the officer attempted to arrest Muhammad. ²²¹ Looking ahead to the second subcontention of the appellant’s third contention, it behooves us to note, at this point in our summary of Lee Malvo’s testimony, that all of the information thus far recounted came exclusively from Malvo. None of it was known to the police until Malvo informed them of it.

The defense contention, therefore, that Malvo was “fed” this information by his first interrogator, Detective June Boyle, self-evidently could not apply to this portion of Malvo’s testimony. We can, to this extent, at least trim down the subcontention. Malvo then proceeded to testify, in thorough detail, about each of the six murders that were committed in Montgomery County. He testified as well about the murder of Pascal Chariot in the District of Columbia and about the shooting of Iran Brown in Prince George’s County.

He also described fully the three murders and two other shootings that took place in northern Virginia. Malvo also described in detail the September 21 robbery of the liquor store in Montgomery, Alabama, resulting in the murder of Claudine Parker and the serious wounding of Kelly Adams. Malvo also testified in complete detail abut the various efforts by Muhammad and himself to communicate with the police through telephone calls and through written messages left tacked to trees near various shooting sites. The only inconsistency in Malvo’s statements that ever surfaced concerned the detail of whether he or Muhammad had been the actual triggerman on various occasions.

In his trial testimony, Malvo stated that he had been the actual shooter of Iran Brown in Prince George’s County and of Conrad Johnson in Montgomery County. He stated that Muhammad had been the actual triggerman on all other occasions. Malvo acknowledged that he had made a prior inconsistent statement in that regard shortly after he was arrested, when he was questioned by Detective June Boyle in Virginia. On that occasion, Malvo claimed to have been the triggerman for all of the shootings.

At the present trial, he explained why he had made that statement in Virginia. It was to save Muhammad from capital punishment, available only for ²²² triggermen. Malvo himself faced no threat of capital punishment because of his tender age. At trial, Malvo testified about the arrangement that he and Muhammad had agreed upon.

Q And when you spoke with Detective Boyle, did you tell her the entire truth? A No. Q Now, why not? A Muhammad and I had spoke earlier, and him being my, as I thought then, my father, I, it was said that I could die. And I’m a child, and if I say I’m the triggerman and take the responsibility for all these shootings, he said chances are I will not die.

This is if you go to Virginia. If you’re in the feds, don’t say anything. Once I got to Virginia and I saw June Boyle, she introduced herself, I said “Where am I?” She said “You’re in Fairfax, Virginia.” I said thank you. We went upstairs, and she asked me, she says “Can I speak to you.” I said yes, and from thereon on, I just showboated on everything.

Q Who, when you were speaking with Detective June Boyle, who did you say had actually pulled the trigger in all of these shootings. AI told her I pulled the trigger in all the shootings. Q Was that true? A No. (Emphasis supplied).

In the present case, of course, we are not dealing with a death sentence, and it makes no difference which of the two was the actual triggerman on any particular occasion. In Virginia, it might have mattered. In this case, it is a distinction without a difference. Defense and No Defense The only defense mounted by John Muhammad was to offer six witnesses in an effort to drag several red herrings across the prosecutorial trail.

In view of the fact that 60,000 tips ²²³ were received by the police during the course of the killings, inevitably many of those were false leads. It is those that Muhammad sought to exploit. One of his witnesses testified that after Sarah Ramos was shot, he observed a white truck take off “really fast.” A second stated that after Pascal Chariot was shot, a red car, sitting next to her waiting for a light, took off and ran the red light. A third witness had seen a white box van near the place where one of the sniper shootings was reported, and a fourth had seen a white box truck near the place where Premkumar Walekar had been shot.

A fifth witness noticed two men, one Caucasian and one Asian, near the Benjamin Tasker Middle School two days before Iran Brown was shot. The common denominator purpose was to suggest that someone else committed those crimes. The sixth witness was Officer Ralph Daigneau, who had, pursuant to a tip following the Dean Meyers shooting, executed a search warrant for a residence in Virginia that turned up a cache of guns and ammunition. The officer explained, however, that both residents of the searched premises were absolutely eliminated as suspects in the Dean Meyers murder.

The weapons, moreover, were submitted to the Alcohol, Tax and Firearm Division experts for examination, and none of them was connected in any way to the murders in this case. John Muhammad himself did not take the stand to offer any defense. He was not, of course, required to do so. He was, on the other hand, permitted to do so.

In any event, he chose not to do so. A Juggernaut of Evidence The appellant raises nine contentions of allegedly reversible error. Some of those contentions, moreover, consist of two or more subcontentions. We find no reversible error in any of those contentions or subcontentions.

Were there occasional lapses or glitches? Of course there were, as inevitably would be expected in any trial of this length, complexity, and intensity. There were, however, no lapses or glitches of any major ²²⁴ consequence in what was, in the last analysis, a meticulously prepared and superbly conducted trial. Our judicial system has such a massive investment in a trial of this length and complexity, however, that it behooves us to support our decision in every way that it is possible to do so.

Although our primary holdings will be that there was no error established by any of the respective contentions or subcontentions, there are also available a series of alternative holdings to support our affirmation of the judgments that we would be remiss in neglecting. With respect to each of the contentions and subcontentions, even if we were, purely for the sake of argument, to hypothesize error as to any one of them, we would nonetheless, in each and every instance, be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that such error was harmless. Fields v. State, 395 Md. 758, 763-64 , 912 A.2d 637 (2006); State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 388 , 906 A.2d 374 (2006); Brown v. State, 364 Md. 37, 42 , 770 A.2d 679 (2001); Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 578-79 , 602 A.2d 677 (1992); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976). At this point in the opinion, as we conclude our summary of the evidence, it is appropriate to take note of the absolutely inundating sweep of the State’s evidence.

The guilt of the appellant was so massively and overwhelmingly established, in a dozen different ways, by the tidal wave of inculpatory evidence that it is inconceivable to us that the elimination of any hypothesized error, or series of hypothesized errors, could have made any difference whatsoever to the jury verdicts in this case. As we take up each contention and subcontention, one by one, we will conclude each particular analysis by making brief reference to this alternative holding of “harmless error.” We may, on each such occasion, take note of the relative inconsequence of that particularized hypothesized error. As we look to the other pan of the balance scale, however, we will find no need to make further reference to the juggernaut of the State’s case of guilt. For that purpose, our preceding summary will suffice and need not be repeated. ²²⁵ Contention I: The Constitutional Right To Represent Oneself The first two contentions are inextricably intertwined.

The first concerns Muhammad’s assertion of his constitutional right to represent himself, pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The second concerns the scheduling of a hearing on Muhammad’s competency to stand trial. It was an irresolvable conflict over the issue of competence that caused the final rift between Muhammad and the two attorneys from the Office of the Public Defender who had been representing him during the pretrial stages of the case. Before Judge Ryan scheduled an emergency pretrial hearing on March 31, 2006, he had received a letter from Muhammad in which Muhammad asserted his intention to defend himself: Your Honor, I’m informing the court, from this time on I enter [sic] on representing mine [sic] self in this case.

I’m asking the court, please, may I have stand-by counsel to assistance [sic] me in mine [sic] defense “only.” At the hearing on March 29, Muhammad clearly explained his position. I would not, I would not give up my rights to represent myself. I don’t care what [counsel from the OPD] and them are saying. I am not incompetent.

I have no problem with logical reasoning. I have no problem with understanding what is going on in the courtroom. I’ve asked [counsel] from day one, Your Honor, I mean from day one I’ve asked [counsel], I should say [counsel] specifically. When [counsel] came to visit me on death row [1] with Mr. Shapiro, John Shapiro introduced me to [counsel].

And at that moment, before I allowed [counsel] to speak, I said “[Counsel], I want you to know right now when I come to Maryland it is ²²⁶ my intention to represent myself, and if you have a problem mth that, being stand-by counsel, you need to let me know that right now. ” ... It’s no one that they have ever brought to me that I have not made that clear to. It is my intention to represent myself. (Emphasis supplied).

Muhammad made it very clear that if he did not represent himself, then nobody in the courtroom would be advocating the position that he wished to maintain. MR. MUHAMMAD: And I’m supposed to help [counsel] to convince the jury that I was insane when I committed these crimes that I had nothing to do with, so I can go to jail for the rest of my life. Your Honor, if I do that I would be insane.

But unless I speak in the courtroom, there would be nobody in the courtroom trying to prove to the jury that I am sane and I had nothing to do with these crimes. That’s insanity, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied). Judge Ryan first determined that Muhammad was competent to stand trial, an issue we will consider in fuller detail when we turn to the second contention.

Although counsel had been representing Muhammad with respect to various pretrial matters — a scheduling conference on September 2, 2005; another scheduling conference on September 28, 2005; and a motions hearing on March 6, 2006, regarding 1) access to discovery, 2) severance, and 3) the admissibility of “other crimes” evidence — it was only immediately before the March 31 hearing that they filed a suggestion that Muhammad be declared incompetent to stand trial. That suggestion was filed over the strenuous objection of Muhammad himself. He alleged that the suggestion was nothing but a stratagem to “trump” his asserted intention to defend himself, a decision with which counsel vigorously disagreed. [W]hen these people are [claiming] that Muhammad doesn’t have the capability to use logic or reason to understand what is going on in a trial is, it doesn’t make any sense, because [counsel] have tried tremendously to get me, to compel me to give up my rights to defend myself. ²²⁷ And when they decide that that couldn’t work, then they bring this doctor in here, who in Virginia I had a problem with.... And [counsel] now when they’ve realized that they cannot compel me to give up my rights to represent myself, all of a sudden they’re going to get this person whom they’ve known has a preconceived notion that Muhammad should not be representing himself because she feels that I’m guilty.

And the more I tell her that I’m innocent, the more she look at me like I just came off a spaceship from, another planet. Your Honor, 7 am not incompetent. This is [counsel’s] way of trying to circumvent my rights over the decision for me to represent myself. (Emphasis supplied).

It was clear that the decision to represent himself was no spur-of-the-moment impulse but the fully formed determination of Muhammad from the outset of the proceedings against him. Paul [DeWolfe] and them mind is made up simply because I said that I want to defend myself. They thought apparently that I was just speaking words and that eventually they was going to compel me to say okay, you all go ahead and take the responsibility of defending me. I never hinted in any other direction [than] that it is my intention to represent myself.

Paul and them assumed that I was just speaking words. But now when I’ve expressed it to you, they have been trying to keep it away from you for months. Now that I’ve expressed it to you, all of a sudden Muhammad is incompetent, Muhammad is crazy. Your Honor, that’s an insult to my family.

It’s insult to everything that I know and love. It’s an insult to the military. It’s an insult to everything that I’ve did in my life. Because Your Honor, if I’m incompetent now, I’ve been incompetent from the day I was bom.

(Emphasis supplied). As Judge Ryan examined Muhammad’s decision to represent himself, the extended exchange between them revealed a ²²⁸ solid understanding on Muhammad’s part of what was involved in such an undertaking. THE COURT: ... I want to explain to you, you have an absolute constitutional right to be represented by attorneys to defend you in these charges.

You understand that. MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And you also have a constitutional right to represent yourself.

Do you understand that? MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: But the two are what we call mutually exclusive.

MR. MUHAMMAD: I understand, Your Honor. THE COURT: You can’t have both. MR.

MUHAMMAD: I understand. Your Honor, I was never asking for a hybrid lawyer. I was never asking for a hybrid law situation. [2] THE COURT: And where did you hear about that word hybrid? Because I was going to ask you about that.

MR. MUHAMMAD: Your Honor, I’ve done a lot more than just sit in a hole and watch four walls. I’ve asked for stand-by counsel. (Emphasis supplied).

Muhammad understood the difficulties inherent in calling and in examining witnesses. THE COURT: Lawyers have skill in cross-examining witnesses, you understand that? MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And figuring out even what witnesses to call, if any. MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And they, lawyers particularly in criminal cases, serious ones like yours particularly, have an opportunity that you don’t have to access to the State’s Attorney’s ²²⁹ Office.

Not that you couldn’t speak to the State’s Attorney, but they could just call them on the telephone pretty much any time they wanted, to talk about what evidence would be presented or witnesses. And you don’t really have that ability, do you understand that? MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You have a right of trial through the representation of lawyers, and even, and by yourself if you want. But one of the rights that, or some of the rights that defendants have in criminal cases is the right to call witnesses. I already told you that. The right to confront the witnesses, cross-examine them, right to issue subpoenas on your behalf to require people to come to court to testify.

The right to insist that the prosecution proves its case beyond a reasonable doubt is the burden that the State has. That’s what lawyers do for defendants. And you understand that? MR.

MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And you don’t want these lawyers to represent you, to help you do that? MR. MUHAMMAD: Not in the courtroom, Your Honor, no.

Your Honor, I’ve asked [counsel] to give me the different rules and laws pertaining to stand-by counsel so I can know my rights that I have as far as stand-by counsel is concerned. I’ve asked for that almost from day one. THE COURT: Okay. Well, you understand if you do represent yourself at trial, it could hurt you.

I mean you understand that, do you? MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied).

Muhammad fully appreciated that acting as his own pro se lawyer, he would be required to follow the rulings of the trial judge. THE COURT: Okay. And you understand if you represent yourself you have to comply with all of the rules of court? ²³⁰ MR. MUHAMMAD: That’s why I’ve been asking for all the rules of evidence.

I’ve asked for them repeatedly from day one as well. THE COURT: And I’m not suggesting you would, but if there came a time during the trial where you were difficult to handle and weren’t complying with the rules, I wouldn’t let you continue to represent yourself. MR. MUHAMMAD: Your Honor, this is your house.

I understand. Yes. That makes sense. THE COURT: All right.

So do you still want to represent yourself? MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied).

Muhammad also professed to have an understanding of the voir dire process. THE COURT: Oh, yes, I forgot to ask you. That’s one of the things I wanted to talk about today anyway. This is a jury trial, and we’re going to pick a jury.

You have a right to assist in the selection of jurors, and lawyers are really valuable in that process, give you, help you decide who to strike, who might be helpful. Do you understand that? MR.. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor.

I mean I don’t have a problem in the lawyers assisting me in doing that. I really don’t. And I understand the voir dire process. I shouldn’t say process, but I understand voir dire.

(Emphasis supplied). Judge Ryan cautioned Muhammad against representing himself, but recognized his unassailable right to do so. THE COURT: So Mr. Muhammad, I understand you want to represent yourself, but I’m trying to tell you that’s not a good idea. I said that at the beginning.

There are a lot more disadvantages than advantages. If I permit you to discharge [counsel], do you understand that I’m not going to postpone the trial? ²³¹ MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, I understand that, Your Honor THE COURT: — I want you to understand that I understand you want to represent yourself because you want to represent yourself. MR.

MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And not because you don’t understand that lawyers can be very helpful to you, and that you’re, in my opinion, making a had decision. MR. MUHAMMAD: I understand what you’re saying, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay, then I’m going to grant your motion and permit you to represent yourself. (Emphasis supplied). Muhammad asserted that he was ready and willing to abide by the law of evidence and by the rulings of the court.

MR. MUHAMMAD: Your Honor, I don’t want any special rules to change. I don’t want nothing to change, because I mean from what you’ve told me I’m sure that you would continue to tell me that rules of evidence will apply in your courtroom. I expect to abide by those rules of evidence and I expect for those rules of evidence not to change simply because Muhammad is in your courtroom.

(Emphasis supplied). As we assess the intertwined issues of Muhammad’s competence not only to stand trial but to represent himself at that trial, we cannot help but take note of his quickness and sharpness in spotting a slip of the tongue on the part of others. THE COURT: Okay, let me talk to you some more----[O]riginally today was set for me to deal with the matters you raised in your letter, which basically was that you want to represent yourself. Since I got that, you, Mr. DeWolfe and Mr. Shefferman, filed this suggestion of bankruptcy.

MR. MUHAMMAD: I wish it was bankruptcy. ²³² THE COURT: Sorry about that. Incompetency. (Emphasis supplied).

Muhammad also demonstrated some understanding of both what stand-by counsel might be able to do by way of assisting him and also what limitations there might be on the role of stand-by counsel. MR. MUHAMMAD: Well, I was trying to get the understanding of what it means in Maryland. That’s why I asked [counsel] to give me anything pertaining to it.

But from what I understand thus far, a stand-by counsel can help me pertaining to any procedures outside of the courtroom. They can help me in the courtroom as well, as long as I ask them, you know, for questions. But they can’t solicit any type of tactic or statement or anything pertaining to the questions I need to ask the witness or anything like that. I was just trying to get more detail on it pertaining to Maryland.

And that’s why I asked for the rules of, the procedure on having stand-by counsel. THE COURT: Okay. Well, you mentioned this hybrid representation, but there is some discretion on the part of a judge, in this case, me. I would have some discretion, and it would really go toward just the flow of the case, if you will, just to keep the right order and just keep thing on track.

It may be that some type of hybrid would be permitted by me. We’ll just have to wait and see. Did you understand what I said? MR.

MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied). Muhammad fully understood that the public defenders he had been working with might not be able to serve as stand-by counsel. THE COURT: ...

What’s going to happen if the Public Defenders Office tells these lawyers they can’t act as standby lawyers? You’ll be here all by yourself. MR. MUHAMMAD: Your Honor, I came out of my mother’s womb all by myself. ²³³ THE COURT: Yes, but that, look, and I don’t mean to be disrespectful to what you just said, that’s all.

That’s different than being in here on trial, charged with six murders. MR. MUHAMMAD: I understand that, Your Honor. THE COURT: So that answer is not sufficient.

MR. MUHAMMAD: Your Honor, if they choose to say no, then it’s fine, Your Honor, if they choose to say no. That’s why I asked them initially, tell me now, and if it’s no then it’s okay. (Emphasis supplied).

Muhammad exhibited an understanding of the charges against him and of the possible penalties. A Your Honor, I understand that I’m here because these people have accused me of killing six people, okay, and there’s an assortment of other people they have accused me of killing as well, or attempted to kill, okay. I understand that there’s specifically six counts that I’m brought up on here in Maryland, but there’s other ones that’s added to it to show me leading up to committing these crimes. I understand the penalty if I’m found guilty.

Q What is the penalty? A Well, thus far from what I’ve learned they have dropped it, capital, as far as the death penalty, and now it’s life in prison. (Emphasis supplied). A later exchange supplemented that knowledge of the possible penalties by adding to the list life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

THE COURT: Okay. Now we talked about this earlier, but you understand that you’re charged with six separate counts of first-degree murder. MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And each of those charges carries with it a possible penalty, punishment of up to life in prison. MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor. ²³⁴ THE COURT: ... What Ms. Winfree’s just reminded me of is the State has put you on notice that it’s asking that any, if you’re found guilty, that the sentence of life be that without possibility of parole.

Do you understand that? Did you know that before? MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor.

Yes (Emphasis supplied). When Judge Ryan pointed out that the State would be using scientific evidence, Muhammad responded: A Yes, I understand that, too. Yes. I understand the DNA.

I understand the ballistics. I understand the doctors’ reports. I understand the experts’ analysis pertaining to reconstruction. I understand all of that, Your Honor.

(Emphasis supplied). Muhammad protested again his competence to defend himself. A Your Honor, if I felt that I was not up to the task to handle myself in a courtroom, I would have informed you. If I don’t know how to do something, Your Honor, if I don’t know how to present myself in a manner, I would seek guidance and I would seek assistance.

If I felt that I should not be doing this without the assistance of counsel, I would have informed you of that, Your Honor ... There’s no reason at all why I should be denied my rights by allowing people to circumvent my rights because I won’t give them up freely---- Your Honor, it really, it makes me upset to even think that it’s on the record by my name that I have some type of mental disorder. If I have a mental disorder, Your Honor, then Rosa Parks had a mental disorder because she didn’t get up off that seat. (Emphasis supplied).

When probed by Judge Ryan as to why he wanted to represent himself, Muhammad emphatically insisted that it was because “I can best present my case.” ²³⁵ THE COURT: But I understand your request to be that you want to represent yourself; it didn’t matter who your lawyers were. MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes. Yes.

THE COURT: You just, you want to represent yourself. MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, Your Honor. Because I feel that I can best present my case.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, tell me why. MR. MUHAMMAD: Because, Your Honor, I’ve learned, in Virginia the more and more I would tell my lawyers to do something, they go in a totally opposite direction.

Whenever I tell them or ask them to ask a certain question or to present a certain piece of evidence, they feel it’s not appropriate for it to be presented. Yet the State have already presented it, and I asked to them expound on it more, and they won’t do it. And Paul and Brian and them have expressed the same type of characteristics as Peter and John have. But even if they haven’t, Your Honor, I still have made it very clear before any of this have even arose at all, it is my intention to represent myself.

So none of this has anything to do with me not cooperating with Paul .... I’ve always decided. I told Peter and John that from the beginning that it’s my intention to represent ... Your Honor, I know me and I know my capabilities, and I know my limitation.

And if I felt that I was limited in any kind of way in adequately representing myself in the trial, I would have informed you of that. It is not my intention to lose. It is not my intention to do anything except abide by the Court’s rules and abide by the evidence and rules of evidence. (Emphasis supplied).

Judge Ryan disagreed with Muhammad’s decision but acknowledged that Muhammad had made a knowing, wilful, and intelligent decision to represent himself. THE COURT: Well, Mr. Muhammad, let me say this, that your, in my judgment your dissatisfaction with [corn ²³⁶ sel] doesn’t really have much merit to it. I have ruled that you, I haven’t said the words yet, but that you are competent, I have said that, and that I believe you’re knowingly and willfully and intelligently deciding to represent yourself I’m going to permit you to represent yourself. But I don’t think it’s the right decision, and it isn’t because you’re not getting good representation.

And I believe [counsel] are very competent lawyers, and have represented you competently. (Emphasis supplied). Faretta v. California The hearing of March 29, 2006, consuming an entire day, was devoted exclusively to resolving the intertwined issues of 1) Muhammad’s competence to stand trial and 2) Muhammad’s constitutional entitlement to represent himself. During the course of that hearing, there was no mention of Maryland Rule 4-215.

Although ardently opposing Muhammad’s decision to discharge them and to represent himself, former defense counsel never once alluded to the Maryland rule. Neither did the prosecutors nor the trial judge nor the appellant himself. At this juncture, however, defense counsel choose to pose their primary contention on this appeal not in terms of Muhammad’s constitutional right to pro se representation and to the steps required to effectuate that right; they rely instead exclusively on the alleged failure of the trial court, sua sponte, to satisfy every jot and title of the Maryland rule. We believe, on the other hand, that casting the contention in constitutional terms will provide a clearer focus on the fundamental and overriding principles that are in play.

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States grants to every criminally accused the right to the assistance of counsel. Although no mention has been made of the counterpart provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 21 thereof has always been interpreted in pari ²³⁷ materia with the Sixth Amendment. State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616 , 626 n. 3, 870 A.2d 217 (2005); Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 589 , 536 A.2d 1149 (1988); Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260 , 262-63 n. 1, 523 A.2d 597 (1987); Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111 , 119 n. 1, 486 A.2d 163 (1985); Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702 , 712 n. 3, 481 A.2d 192 (1984). The coexistence of 1) the right to counsel and 2) the “correlative right” to dispense with counsel and represent oneself was first alluded to by Justice Frankfurter for the Supreme Court in Adams v. United States ex rel.

McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236 , 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942). The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations that go to the substance of an accused’s position before the law.... [T]he Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.

(Emphasis supplied). Cautioning against the excessive protection of one aspect of a right at the expense of a correlative aspect of the right, the Supreme Court admonished that we must be careful not “to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution.” 317 U.S. at 280 , 63 S.Ct. 236 . Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), posed the question squarely of whether there is a constitutional right to pro se representation and then answered that question in the affirmative. The question before us now is whether a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.

Stated another way, the question is whether a State may constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense. It is not ²³⁸ an easy question, but we have concluded that a State may not constitutionally do so. (Emphasis supplied). Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court stressed that the paramount consideration is judicial deference to the defendant’s choice.

The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who must be “informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,” who must be “confronted with the witnesses against him,” and who must be accorded “compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation — to make one’s own defense personally — is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment. The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. 422 U.S. at 819 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court further observed that the right of self-representation is not to be “considered inferior to the right of assistance of counsel.” In sum, there is no evidence that the colonists and the Framers ever doubted the right of self-representation, or imagined that this right might be considered inferior to the right of assistance of counsel.

To the contrary, the colonists and the Framers, as well as their English ancestors, always conceived of the right to counsel as an “assistance” for the accused, to be used at his option, in defending himself. The Framers selected in the Sixth Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right of self-representation. That conclusion is supported by centuries of consistent history. Id. at 832 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (emphasis supplied).

A state, no matter how nobly motivated, simply may not “compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want.” ²³⁹ [I]t is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want. The value of state-appointed counsel was not unappreciated by the Founders, yet the notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to them. And whatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice. Id. at 833-34 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (emphasis supplied).

The right to represent oneself is not a second-class right that may be casually shunted aside. Maryland has consistently followed Faretta v. California in recognizing the constitutional right to pro se representation. State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 626-27 , 870 A.2d 217 (2005) (“[T]wo fundamental rights ... are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution: the right to the assistance of counsel and the right of self-representation.”); Gregg v. State, 377 Md. 515, 548 , 833 A.2d 1040 (2003) (“The Supreme Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants the accused not only the right to be represented by counsel, but also the right to make his own defense without the assistance of counsel.”); Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 441-42 , 735 A.2d 1003 (1999) (“Conversely, a defendant also has a constitutional right to self-representation.”); State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 412-13 , 676 A.2d 513 (1996) (“[T]wo rights ... are fundamental to our system of criminal justice: the defendant’s right to counsel, and the defendant’s right to self-representation.”); Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 589 , 536 A.2d 1149 (1988) (“Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant also has an independent right to reject the assistance of counsel and to elect to represent himself.”); Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 263-65 , 523 A.2d 597 (1987) (“fTJhere are only two types of representation constitutionally guaranteed — representation by counsel and representation pro se — and they are mutually exclusive.”); Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 121 , 486 A.2d 163 (1985); Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 123-27 , 406 A.2d 98 (1979) (“It is now clear that ²⁴⁰ an accused in a criminal prosecution has two independent constitutional rights with regard to the management of his defense. He has both the right to have the assistance of counsel and the right to defend pro se.”); State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 267 , 347 A.2d 219 (1975).

See also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 , 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (“The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the accused’s best possible defense.”). The problem, of course, is that the right to counsel and the correlative right to pro se representation are not, and in the nature of things cannot be, literally equal. There is, to begin with, an inherent psychic tension between them. They push in opposite directions.

When, therefore, those opposing pushes are in a state of equilibrium, there must be a tiebreaker. The law does not say, for instance, that a defendant must intelligently and knowingly waive the right of self-representation before he may invoke the right to counsel. How then does the law handle the delicate balance between a preferred constitutional right and a non-preferred constitutional right when they are in opposition? Of necessity, there is a presumption that when all else is equal, the right to counsel will prevail over the right to pro se representation. 3 To rebut that presumption, there ²⁴¹ must be a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of the right to counsel in order to establish the correlative right to self-representation.

Faretta v. California, quoting both Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. at 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236 , set out the appropriate waiver standard. When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo those relinquished benefits.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463-465 [, 58 S.Ct. 1019 ]. Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that “lie knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. at 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236 . 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (emphasis supplied). In State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 414 , 676 A.2d 513 (1996), Judge Raker thoroughly analyzed the steps that must be taken to invoke the right to pro se representation and pointed out that if Faretta, Johnson v. Zerbst, and Adams are satisfied that it would be “reversible error” to deny a request for self-representation.

If the defendant requests dismissal of counsel in order to proceed pro se, and if the proposal to discharge counsel is timely and unequivocal, the court must ordinarily grant the request. Faretta . By choosing self-representation, the defendant forgoes the right to counsel. Therefore, the court must conduct a waiver inquiry to ensure that any decision ²⁴² to waive the right to counsel is “made with eyes open.” (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.

McCann). The Sixth Amendment requires that the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel must be “knowing and intelligent.” Johnson v. Zerbst. Although courts have recognized several exceptions to the Faretta rule, these exceptions have been narrowly construed to effectuate the defendant’s right to self-representation. Absent a recognized exception, refusal to grant a timely, unequivocal request for self-representation is reversible error.

(Emphasis supplied). The extended exchanges between Judge Ryan and the appellant at the hearing on March 29, 2006, demonstrated unequivocally that Muhammad freely and intelligently asserted his constitutional right to self-representation pursuant to Faretta v. California. His waiver of the right to counsel was unquestionably “knowing and intelligent” according to the waiver standard of Johnson v. Zerbst. He was fully apprised by Judge Ryan of the disadvantages likely accruing to him from the choice he made, but he nonetheless made that choice “knowing what he was doing” and “with his eyes open” according to Adams v. United States ex rel.

McCann. The Constitution requires nothing more for the vindication of the fundamental right to self-representation. Indeed, the Constitution may not tolerate anything more than that. As Judge Eldridge noted in Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 589 , 536 A.2d 1149 (1988): The interplay among the right to counsel, waiver of the right to counsel, and the Faretta right of self-representation, has posed problems.

In Faretta v. California, Johnson v. Zerbst, and Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, the Supreme Court struck a finely calibrated balance between the conflicting and mutually exclusive right to counsel and right to self-representation. An additional thumb, no matter how nobly motivated, placed on either pan of that scale could throw the Supreme Court’s delicately calibrated balance out of constitutional kilter. Gra ²⁴³ tuitous additional layers of protection bestowed on the right to counsel, for instance, would certainly seem to pose undue and unconstitutional burdens on the correlative right to self-representation.

If, arguendo, they should be in collision with each other, a rule of court would unquestionably have to yield to a fundamental constitutional right. Maryland Rule 4-215, for instance, arguably smothering the right to counsel under layer upon layer of implemental protection, could readily be deemed to pose an unconstitutional burden on the assertion of one’s right to self-representation. Language in some of the caselaw to the effect that the rule implements and protects, at one and the same time, each of the two conflicting rights is gobbledygook, worthy of a political spinmeister or a snake oil salesman. It adds additional protection to the right to counsel by making it more difficult to invoke the right of pro se representation.

It protects one at the expense of the other. Of two mutually exclusive rights, the one that you will retain if you waive nothing is self-evidently the preferred alternative. Every additional requirement imposed by the rules increases the likelihood that the preferred right, that of counsel, will not be lost. By inverse proportion, however, it decreases the likelihood that the non-preferred right of pro se representation will be successfully invoked.

Such implementing rules, to be sure, may better protect the defendant, but only in the sense that the unspoken premise of the rulemakers is that the best way to protect the defendant is to burden, and thereby to discourage, the option of pro se representation. To say, however, that the rule provides implemental protection of the constitutional right to represent oneself is so much pompous nonsense. The rule does the very opposite of what it is, in that regard, purported to do. The fact that Rule 4-215 goes further than is constitutionally required was first noted by Judge Raker in State v. Wischhusen, 342 Md. 530 , 543 n. 10, 677 A.2d 595 (1996): Rule Jp-215 imposes requirements that exceed constitutional standards.

For example, the Rule requires the court to inform the defendant of the nature of the charges and the potential penalty. These duties need not be performed for ²⁴⁴ the judge to satisfy the knowing and intelligent waiver standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464-65 , 58 S.Ct. at 1023 . (Emphasis supplied). Chief Judge Bell similarly made note of the fact that Rule 4-215 goes beyond what is constitutionally mandated in Richardson v. State, 381 Md. 348 , 367 n. 11, 849 A.2d 487 (2004): It is important to note that Rule í-215 imposes requirements that exceed constitutional standards.

State v. Wischhusen, 342 Md. 530, 543, n. 10 , 677 A.2d 595, 601, n. 10 (1996); see also Brown v. State, 103 Md.App. 740 , 654 A.2d 944 (1995), aff'd, 342 Md. 404 , 676 A.2d 513 (1996). (Emphasis supplied). And see Broadwater v. State, 171 Md. App. 297, 299 , 909 A.2d 1112 (2006), aff'd, 401 Md. 175 , 931 A.2d 1098 (2007), in which this Court pointed out that Rule 4-215 contains “stern directions far more unforgiving than the Sixth Amendment’s right to the assistance of counsel itself.” With respect to such excess coverage, it is clear that a defendant who wishes to represent himself and who has satisfied Faretta, Johnson v. Zerbst, and Adams but who has failed to satisfy one of the non-constitutional provisions of Rule 4-215 could be denied his constitutional right to pro se representation if the rule of court were permitted to “trump” the constitutional principle. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would countenance such a thumb on the scales of its finely calibrated balancing. 4 ²⁴⁵ The fact that Rule 4-215(e), for instance, may provide more protection for the right to counsel than is constitutionally required may or may not pose a problem.

A defendant might seek to discharge counsel, thus engaging the gears of Rule 4-215(e), for either of two very different reasons: 1) to obtain substitute counsel or 2) to represent himself pro se. A defendant’s request to discharge is not a constant. The request may be handled differently and the response may have very different legal consequences depending upon the particular purpose giving rise to the request. Judge Raker recognized this difference in treatment contingent upon purpose in State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 413-14 , 676 A.2d 513 (1996) (“The trial court’s subsequent procedures depend on whether the defendant requests substitute counsel or self-representation.”).

See also State v. Campbell, 385 Md. at 627-28 , 870 A.2d 217 . In Moten v. State, 100 Md.App. 115 , 640 A.2d 222 (1994), reversed on other grounds, 339 Md. 407 , 663 A.2d 593 (1995), the Court was discussing Rule 4-215(e) and the effort by the defendant to discharge counsel. After noting the failure of the trial court to determine whether there was a meritorious reason for the requested discharge, this Court noted that different consequences might accrue, depending upon the defendant’s purpose in seeking the discharge. We recognize that if appellant had requested new counsel, the court’s failure to make such a determination would make the waiver ineffective.

In this case, however, appellant did not ask for another lawyer. He made a strategic decision to represent himself. Id. at 123, 640 A.2d 222 (emphasis supplied). This disparity alone should help to convey the desperately needed message that with a package of almost infinitely diverse provisions such as Maryland Rule 4-215, one cannot approach it with the delusive mantra that one rule fits all. ²⁴⁶ Additional and constitutionally unrequired protection for the right to counsel is perfectly legitimate if it comes only at the expense of a defendant’s desire to obtain substitute counsel.

If, on the other hand, the constitutionally unrequired extra protection has a chilling effect on the fundamental constitutional right to represent oneself, that is, at the very least, another matter calling for another analysis. Our alternative holding with respect to this contention would be that if a provision of Rule 4-215 were violated and that provision were in excess of the constitutional requirements for an effective waiver, that provision of the rule would not be permitted to stand against what would otherwise be an entitlement to the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation according to established constitutional criteria. Maryland Rule 4-215 In this case, however, it is not necessary to resolve a conflict between a fundamental constitutional right and an implementing rule of court because we find no violation of the implementing rule. Muhammad now claims that Judge Ryan erroneously failed to comply with Rule 4-215 when he granted his request to discharge the two assistant public defenders who had been representing him so that he could represent himself.

We note the irony that Muhammad is now complaining about receiving from Judge Ryan the very ruling that he so earnestly desired and fought so long and hard to obtain. Because Muhammad, on March 29, 2006, already had counsel whom he sought to discharge, the pertinent provision of Rule 4-215 is subsection (e). (e) Discharge of Counsel — Waiver. If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request.

If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial ²⁴⁷ with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel. If the court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with subsections (a)(l)-U) of this Rule if the docket or file does not reflect prior compliance. (Emphasis supplied).

Muhammad does not claim that there was any failure of compliance with subsection (e) except with respect to its last sentence, which incorporates the requirements of subsections (a)(l)-(4). That pertinent portion of subsection (a) provides as follows: (a) First appearance in court without counsel. At the defendant’s first appearance in court without counsel, ... the court shall: (1) Make certain that the defendant has received a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel. (2) Inform the defendant of the right to counsel and of the importance of assistance of counsel.

(3) Advise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any. (4) Conduct a waiver inquiry pursuant to section (b) of this Rule if the defendant indicates a desire to waive counsel. (Emphasis supplied). Subsection (a)(4) has no applicability to this case.

The colloquies between Judge Ryan and Muhammad, moreover, show clear compliance with subsections (a)(2) and (3). Muhammad, indeed, makes no argument with respect to either of those subsections. His contention focuses exclusively on subsection (a)(1). Again ironically, Muhammad does not assert that he did not receive a copy of the charging document.

He ²⁴⁸ asserts only that Judge Ryan did not “make certain, that the defendant ... received a copy of the charging document,” in literal compliance with subsection (a)(1). The complaint is only procedural, not substantive. The thrust of Muhammad’s argument, as stated in his brief, is as follows: What the court utterly failed to do in this case is “[mjake certain that the defendant has received a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel” are required by 4-215(a)(l)____ The “precise rubrics” of 4-215 were not followed in the case at bar in that nowhere does the record demonstrate that Mr. Muhammad received a copy of the charging document including the advice of right to counsel. Thus, the court could not, without asking Mr. Muhammad directly, which it did not do, make certain that he had received a copy of the charging document as required by 4-215(a)(l).

(Emphasis supplied). As we focus in on subsection (a)(1), it is important not to treat all of the provisions of Rule 4-215 the same but to recognize the fundamental difference, in terms of essential character, between subsection (a)(1), which concerns the happening of an event, and most of the other provisions of Rule 4-215, which involve the actual and direct imparting of specific information by the judge to the defendant. Subsection (a)(2) and (3), for instance, deal with such specific advisements. [TJhe court shall: (2) Inform the defendant of the right to counsel and of the importance of assistance of counsel. (3) Advise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any.

(Emphasis supplied). Subsection (a)(1), by contrast, is of an entirely different nature. In Broadwater v. State, 171 Md.App. at 304 , 909 A.2d ²⁴⁹ 1112, this Court pointed out the difference in character between subsection (a)(1), on the one hand, and other subsections dealing with informational advisements, on the other hand. With respect to the three absolute requirements, the first is, essentially, the court’s confirmation that someone delivered to the defendant “a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel.” The second and third requirements, concerning, respectively, 1) “the right to counsel” and “the importance of assistance of counsel” and 2) “the nature of the charges” and the “allowable penalties,” are actual advisements that must be made by the judge personally to the defendant on the face of the record.

Some appreciation of the different natures of these three (or four or five) requirements will make an application of a sometimes overly generalized caselaw more sensitively possible. (Emphasis supplied). As we pointed out, 171 Md.App. at 323 , 909 A.2d 1112 , subsection (a)(1) is in a class by itself and there is no need to treat it as one treats other subsections which are true advisements. It would not, however, apply to requirement # 1, by which the court only seeks information about an event (the delivery of a copy of the charging document).

The recipient of information pursuant to requirement # 1 is the judge, not the defendant. The requirement is that “the court shall make certain” that the event (the delivery of the charging document) had at some earlier time actually taken place. This is not part of a message being aimed at the defendant. (Emphasis supplied).

Focusing in on subsection (a)(1), the only subsection being invoked by the appellant, we have already noted the fundamental difference between it and the other requirements of subsection (a). The others involve the process through which a judge imparts certain critical information to a defendant. Subsection (a)(1), unlike the other provisions, involves only the ²⁵⁰ objectively measured question of whether “the defendant received a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel.” As Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 609 , 536 A.2d 1149 (1988), makes clear, the satisfaction of subsection (a)(1) does not require a judge to make inquiry of, or say anything to, a defendant in a courtroom. If evidence objectively establishes that the defendant actually received a copy of the charging document, moreover, the fact that the judge failed to “make certain” of that fact is immaterial.

The very occurrence of receiving the document speaks for itself and ipso facto satisfies the subsection. The holding in this regard of Fowlkes v. State was unequivocal. As to subsections (l)(l)-(3), the record contains a copy of the charging document in the defendant’s case. This document, which bears the defendant’s signature, contains a notice of the right to counsel; therefore, this document demonstrates compliance with subsection (a)(1). 311 Md. at 609 , 536 A.2d 1149 (emphasis supplied).

We cite Fowlkes v. State not to suggest that the facts showing compliance in that case parallel the facts showing compliance in the case before us. That is another mater, and we will address it. We cite Fowlkes for the threshold proposition that if extrinsic evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that the defendant indeed received a copy of the charging document, adequate compliance with subsection (a)(1) has been shown. Whether the judge himself did or did not do something or other in the courtroom is a redundant technicality.

The evidence in this case was clearly legally sufficient to support a finding that Muhammad had, indeed, “received a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right of counsel.” Muhammad was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury on June 16, 2005. That charging document was drawn in six counts, each charging a deliberate and premeditated murder in the first degree. Each respective count charged the murder of one of Muhammad’s six murder ²⁵¹ victims in Montgomery County and gave the name of the victim and the date of each particular murder. On June 16, 2005, the Deputy State’s Attorney for Montgomery County filed in the circuit court a Motion to Issue a Bench Warrant pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-212(d)(2).

The motion recited that the indictment against Muhammad had been handed down on that day, June 16, 2005. Rule 4-212(a) provides in pertinent part: When a charging document is filed ... a ... warrant shall be issued in accordance with this Rule. Subsection (d)(2) further provides, in pertinent part: (2) In the circuit court. Upon the request of the State’s Attorney, the court may order issuance of a warrant for the arrest of a, defendant ... if an indictment has been filed against the defendant; and (A) the defendant has not been processed and released pursuant to Rule 4-216, or (B) the court finds there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant will not respond to a summons.

A copy of the charging document shall be attached to the warrant. (Emphasis supplied). The Motion for the Issuance of the Bench Warrant further recited: 1. This is the original charging document and the Defendant has never been processed. 2.

The issuance of a bench warrant will assure that the Defendant will be brought to court to answer for the charges filed in the instant matter. 3. The warrant will act as a detainer for the Defendant, who is in custody in another jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied). Rule 4-202(a), in turn, prescribes the necessary contents of a charging document.

After listing those required factual allegations that an indictment itself must contain, the subsection goes on to spell out the notice that the person charged must also receive, explaining in detail that person’s right to an attorney. The notice that was included as part of the charg ²⁵² ing document against Muhammad followed verbatim the language of Rule 4-202(a): TO THE PERSON CHARGED: 1. This paper charges you with committing a crime. 2. If you have been arrested, you have the right to have a judicial officer decide whether you should be released from jail until your trial. 3.

You have the right to have a lawyer. 4. A lawyer can be helpful to you by: • explaining the charges in this paper; • explaining the possible penalties to you; • helping you at trial; • helping you protect your constitutional rights; and, • helping you to get a fair penalty if convicted. 5. Even if you plan to plead guilty, a lawyer can be helpful. 6. If you want a lawyer but do not have the money to hire one, the Public Defender may provide a lawyer for you.

The Court Clerk will tell you how to contact the Public Defender. 7. If you want a lawyer but you cannot get one and the Public Defender will not provide one for you, contact the Court Clerk as soon as possible. 8. DO NOT WAIT UNTIL THE DATE OF YOUR TRIAL TO GET A LAWYER! If you do not have a lawyer before the trial date, you may have to go to trial without one.

On that same day, June 16, the Bench Warrant was issued by Judge Durke G. Thompson. There is also in the file a directive to the Clerk of the Circuit Court to furnish “a triple certified copy of the charging document in this case” and the further notation that it was “issued on 6-16-05.” Muhammad, who had been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Virginia, was at the time of his indictment in Montgomery County imprisoned in the Sussex I ²⁵³ State Prison in Waverly, Virginia. Katherine Winfree, the Deputy State’s Attorney for Montgomery County, filed on June 16 a Certificate of Service, attesting that she had on that date mailed a copy of the charging document package to John Allen Muhammad at the Sussex I State Prison in Waverly, Virginia. Because Muhammad was, as of June 16, 2005, imprisoned in Virginia, the Bench Warrant, as its application recited, would also serve as a detainer.

Rule 4 — 212(f)(2) controls that situation and it provides, inter alia, that the defendant shall be “served with a copy of the charging document and warrant.” There is also in the file evidence that Muhammad received a copy of the charging document on yet a second occasion. On the bottom of a copy of the Bench Warrant is a Return of Service from Sheriff Raymond M. Knight attesting that he had “served a copy” on Muhammad on August 22, 2005. With respect to such a Return of Service, Rule 4-212(g) provides: (g) Return of service. The officer who served the defendant with the summons or warrant and the charging document shall make a prompt return of service to the court that shows the date, time, and place of service.

(Emphasis supplied). As further evidence of receipt of the charging document by Muhammad, on that same day, August 22, the Public Defender’s Office, representing Muhammad, filed a motion to waive the Bench Warrant hearing on the charges, noting that Muhammad had been indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury. From that total predicate, we hold that the evidence abundantly supports the conclusion that Muhammad received “a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel” and that subsection (a)(1) was thereby satisfied. Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. at 609 , 536 A.2d 1149 ; Moten v. State, 100 Md.App. 115, 121 , 640 A.2d 222 (1994), reversed on other grounds by Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407 , 663 A.2d 593 (1995). ²⁵⁴ Although the extended exchanges between Judge Ryan and Muhammad on March 29, 2006 may not, in and of themselves, prove that Muhammad had received a copy of the charging document, they do offer persuasive corroboration of that fact.

Muhammad stated that he was charged with six counts of first-degree murder in Montgomery County. He knew that the death penalty had been dropped but that he faced the possibility of life imprisonment without parole on each count. At one point, before Judge Ryan cut him off, he began to list the specific names of the persons he was charged with killing. Q Now, tell me what you understand in this jurisdiction, here in Maryland, are the nature of the charges against you.

What do you understand you’re being charged with? A I understand that I’m being charged with six counts of murder pertaining to, I think his first, last name is Walekar, Mr. Walekar? The second person— Q You don’t have to tell me their specific dates and places and all the specific allegations. I just want to make sure you understand what you’re charged with and how serious these charges are.

(Emphasis supplied). If Muhammad behaved as if he received a copy of the charging document (he did so behave), it is more likely that he received a copy than if he had not so behaved. Through the long and hard fought hearing of March 29, 2006, neither Muhammad nor anyone on his behalf ever complained of not having received a copy of the charging document. Even as of this appeal he makes no such complaint.

Once again, we consider such behavior not as proof per se of compliance but as behavior corroborative of other proof. It is not without some evidentiary significant. Throughout the entire day-long hearing, moreover, Muhammad exhibited a sophisticated understanding of both his right to counsel and his right to self-representation. If nothing else, Muhammad’s detailed understanding of the charging document tends to corroborate the conclusion that he had, ²⁵⁵ indeed, received a copy of the charging document.

Maryland Rule 4-215(a)(l) was satisfied. A Rule 4-215(a)(l) Violation As Harmless Error As an alternative holding, we also conclude that even if, purely arguendo, we were to assume that Rule 4-215(a)(1) had been violated, we would still be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that such error was harmless in this case. Muhammad argues that a violation of Rule 4-215(a) may never be harmless error and he cites for that proposition Parren v. State, 309 Md. at 280-82 , 523 A.2d 597 , and Moten v. State, 339 Md. at 411-13 , 663 A.2d 593 . Both of those cases, however, dealt with violations of subsection (a)(3) and not with violations of subsection (a)(1).

We have already belabored the fundamental difference in character between subsection (a)(1) and subsection (a)(3). Subsection (a)(3) deals with the advising of the defendant by the judge of certain critical information. Subsection (a)(1) deals with an entirely different matter. What is true with respect to a subsection (a)(3) violation is not necessarily true at all about a subsection (a)(1) violation and the appellant cannot prove his point by simplistic analogy.

Parren v. State, 309 Md. at 280 , 523 A.2d 597 , clearly concerned a subsection (a)(3) violation: [T]he trial court did not comply with that part of § (a)(3) which requires that “the court shall ... advise the defendant of ... the allowable penalties ...” (Emphasis supplied). The Parren Court went on, 309 Md. at 282 , 523 A.2d 597 : We hold that the noncompliance with that part of subsection (3) of § (a) of Rule Jp-215 which requires that the trial court advise the defendants of the penalties allowed for the crimes charged against them, rendered their waivers of counsel ineffective. (Emphasis supplied). The holding of the Court of Appeals in Moten v. State was equally tightly confined to a subsection (a)(3) violation.

At the ²⁵⁶ very outset of her opinion, Judge Raker clearly stated the precise issue before the Court. This case presents the question of whether a trial court’s failure to advise a defendant who wishes to waive counsel of allowable penalties, as required by Maryland Rule 4-215, can be harmless error. We shall answer in the negative. 339 Md. at 408 , 663 A.2d 593 (emphasis supplied). The Court followed its earlier holding in Parren .

We hold that under Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260 , 523 A.2d 597 (1987), harmless error analysis is inapplicable to a violation of Maryland Rule Jp-215 (a) (3). 339 Md. at 409 , 663 A.2d 593 (emphasis supplied). The violations in Parren and Moten were precisely the same. The defendants’ convictions [in Parren ] were accordingly reversed, because “the noncompliance with that part of subsection (3) of§ (a) of Rule Jp-215 which requires that the trial court advise the defendants of the penalties allowed for the crimes charged against them, rendered their waivers of counsel ineffective. Moten, like the defendants in Par[r]en, was not informed by the court of the allowable penalties for the charges pending against him.

As in Parren , the advice given in this case is insufficient. 339 Md. at 411-12 , 663 A.2d 593 (emphasis supplied). As we have already discussed fully, subsection (a)(1) deals with a requirement of an entirely different nature. Even if we were to hypothesize, arguendo, a subsection (a)(1) violation, we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that that fact would not have made any difference whatsoever to Muhammad’s knowing and intelligent decision to waive the assistance of counsel in this case and to assert his constitutional right to represent himself. Muhammad’s decision was not flawed by any lack of knowledge.

A compelled reversal of the convictions in this case on the basis of something that clearly did not make any difference would be senseless. We find legal support for our conclusion, moreover, in the decision of Chief Judge Murphy for this Court in Moten v. ²⁵⁷ State, 100 Md.App. 115 , 640 A.2d 222 (1994). In our Moten, this Court found violations of both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3). We held that both were susceptible to harmless error analysis.

The Court of Appeals reversed our holding with respect to a subsection (a)(3) violation. That part of Judge Murphy’s opinion dealing with a subsection (a)(1) violation, on the other hand, was left untouched. It has never been reversed nor overruled. It is as of this moment the law of Maryland, and we shall follow it.

As in this case, Moten did not assert any ultimate prejudice but was content to rely exclusively on a procedural glitch. Appellant does not contend that the record fails to show whether he received a copy of the charging document. He argues instead that he is entitled to a new trial merely because when he asserted his right to self representation, Judge Wright failed to question him as required by the rule. 100 Md.App. at 120 n. 2, 640 A.2d 222 (emphasis supplied). Our ultimate conclusion was clear.

It is true that Judge Wright should have asked appellant whether he had received a copy of the charging document, which in this case was an indictment filed on December 8, 1992. The failure to ask that question, however, does not require a reversal of appellant’s conviction. Id. at 121 , 640 A.2d 222 (emphasis supplied). Contention II: The Scheduling of the Competence Hearing The appellant’s second contention concerns Judge Ryan’s ruling that he was competent to stand trial.

That issue is so inextricably interwoven with the issue of his competence to represent himself pro se that it is impossible to separate them into watertight analyses. Everything that we have said in our resolution of the first contention bears with equal relevance on this second contention. Competence to decide to represent oneself is the same thing as competence to stand trial. In Godinez v. ²⁵⁸ Moran, 509 U.S. 389 , 113 S.Ct. 2680 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), the Supreme Court pointed out that the necessary competence to choose self-representation over the right to counsel requires ipso facto the same degree of competence that is required to stand trial, no more and no less.

This case presents the question whether the competency standard for ... waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial. We hold that it is not. 509 U.S. at 391 , 113 S.Ct. 2680 (emphasis supplied). The Court elaborated: Nor do we think that a defendant who waives his right to the assistance of counsel must be more competent than a defendant who does not, since there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights. Id. at 399 , 113 S.Ct. 2680 .

The defendant’s skill, or lack thereof, in conducting a pro se defense, when that is the issue, is an irrelevant consideration. It is the understanding of what is going on that is the critical criterion. In Faretta v. California, we held that a defendant choosing self-representation must do so “competently and intelligently,” but we made it clear that the defendant’s “technical legal knowledge” is “not relevant” to the determination whether he is competent to waive his right to counsel, and we emphasized that although the defendant “may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored.” Thus, while “[i]t is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts,” a criminal defendant’s ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation. Id. at 399-400 , 113 S.Ct. 2680 (emphasis supplied).

Judge Ryan properly found that Muhammad was competent to defend himself. One cannot be competent to ²⁵⁹ defend oneself, however, if one does not understand what is going on in the courtroom. That understanding is the core requirement of competence to stand trial. The ability (not necessarily the willingness but simply the raw ability) to be of assistance to one’s attorney is implicit in the ability to be of assistance to oneself, if one is representing oneself.

The two competencies are one and the same. In Thanos v. State, 332 Md. 511, 519-20 , 632 A.2d 768 (1993), Judge McAuliffe wrote for the Court of Appeals as it held that the defendant in that case was competent to discharge his attorneys and to represent himself. The Court cited Godinez v. Moran for the proposition that the “competency standards [are] the same for standing trial and for waiver, even though a valid waiver may require [the] additional finding that it was knowing and voluntary.” In assessing competence, moreover, it is important to keep in the front of the mind that competence to stand trial (or to waive counsel) is a very different thing than criminal responsibility. It is far more a matter of raw intelligence than it is of balanced psychiatric judgment or legal sanity or of mental health generally.

Because of the very nature of the subject, it is one in which a defendant’s conversation with a judge may be far more revealing than a defendant’s conversation with a psychiatrist or psychologist. The judge both speaks the language and understands the language of courtroom behavior and courtroom problems, which may sometimes be largely a foreign tongue to the most educated o f psychiatrists. The two disciplines are very different, and the professor who is, in effect, marking the defendant’s paper needs to be a master of the appropriate discipline. In Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 3 — 101(f), the Legislature has set out precisely the limited scope of the pertinent inquiry, as it defines “incompetent to stand trial” to mean “not able (1) to understand the nature or object of the proceeding; or (2) to assist in one’s defense.” It is much more a function of rationality than of mental health generally, as Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 299-300 , 372 A.2d 1069 (1977) ²⁶⁰ (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 , 80 S.Ct. 788 , 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)), prescribes the two prerequisites to a finding of competency: “the accused must have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him, [and] must at the trial have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” Gregg v. State, 377 Md. 515, 527 , 833 A.2d 1040 (2003) (emphasis supplied).

And see Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 87 , 622 A.2d 727 (1993). In Gregg v. State, the Director of Forensic Psychiatry at the Crownsville Hospital had examined Gregg and concluded that “Gregg was not competent to stand trial because [he] the doctor believed the defendant did not have a ‘rational understanding’ of the charges against him.” Id. at 520, 833 A.2d 1040 . On cross-examination, however, it was developed that the doctor’s conclusion was based far more on the doctor’s belief that Gregg would likely remain dangerous and repeat his criminal behavior once released than it did on Gregg’s ability to perform in the courtroom. Id. at 520-22 , 833 A.2d 1040 .

Notwithstanding the doctor’s conclusion, the trial judge ruled that Gregg was competent to stand trial. In affirming the trial judge’s determination, Judge Harrell pointed to the criteria that are far more pertinent than the ones relied upon by the psychiatrist. Gregg’s behavior at trial may be described as stubborn and argumentative at most. He responded appropriately to the judge’s questions and his defense was in no way aberrant for a pro se defendant.

He demonstrated both a rational understanding of the proceedings in which he was involved and of the relevant facts. Id. at 547 , 833 A.2d 1040 (emphasis supplied). Precisely the same type of exchange between the trial judge and the defendant was held to have been of pivotal significance, in affirming a decision of the trial judge not sua sponte to hold a competency hearing, in Johnson v. State, 67 Md.App. 347, 359-60 , 507 A.2d 1134 (1986). ²⁶¹ The judge’s questions concerned not only appellant’s understanding of the charges and of his rights, but also inquired into appellant’s age, family history, educational background, work history, medical history and psychological history. Appellant answered all of the judge’s questions in a rational, coherent manner.

He also displayed a marked degree of sophistication about the law. While his legal skills were not those of a lawyer, he did appear to have gained some practical understanding of the law, perhaps through his prior confrontations with it. In sum, there is every indication in the record that appellant met the standard of competency to stand trial. (Emphasis supplied).

The defense (on this contention it is questionable whether that collective designation includes Muhammad himself or not) mounts a two-pronged attack on Judge Ryan’s ruling that Muhammad was competent to stand trial. Procedurally, the defense alleges that Judge Ryan abused his discretion by going forward with a hearing on competence on March 29, 2006 rather than rescheduling the hearing for some later date. Substantively, the defense contends that the ultimate ruling itself was erroneous. A. The Timing of the Hearing The issue is not that of whether there would be a hearing on competence or whether Judge Ryan would make a ruling on competence.

In this case, there was a hearing and there was a ruling. Both took place on March 29, 2006. The issue rather is simply one of when that hearing and ruling would take place. This is one of those calls concerning the scheduling and the management of a trial that invokes the abuse of discretion standard on the part of the trial judge.

The thrust of the argument made by the defense, largely on the basis of a recently prepared evaluation of Muhammad by Dr. Dorothy Otnow Lewis, was that the competency hearing should have been held on a later date so that Dr. Lewis could be present to testify. All of the parties were then before the ²⁶² court on March 29, 2006, to resolve the question of Muhammad’s expressed desire to discharge counsel and to represent himself. Dr. Lewis’s report was dated March 27, 2006, two days earlier. A number of factors persuade us that Judge Ryan did not abuse his discretion in going forward and deciding the question of Muhammad’s competence to stand trial on that very day.

It was on March 24, 2006, that Judge Ryan had received a letter from Muhammad requesting that he be allowed to discharge counsel and to represent himself. Because the massive month-long trial of this case was scheduled to begin within another month, Judge Ryan moved immediately to get the new issue resolved, so that old counsel, new counsel, or Muhammad himself could plan accordingly. He ordered a hearing on it for March 29. Whether defense counsel’s subsequent timing was simply a matter of happenstance or whether there was a cause-and-effect relationship at work, counsel filed on March 28 a suggestion of Muhammad’s incompetence to stand trial.

If incompetent to stand trial, Muhammad would have been thereby incompetent to dismiss counsel. The former would have had a decided influence on the latter. At that point, counsel had been working with the appellant on the case for seven months. A scheduling order had directed that all pretrial motions be filed by November 7, 2005, and that all experts be designated by November 28, 2005.

As part of the responsive flurry, Dr. Lewis filed her evaluative report on March 27. The most ardent and