Maryland case law › Mulchansingh v. Columbia Management Inc.

Mulchansingh v. Columbia Management Inc.

33 Md. App. 304 (1976) · Maryland Court of Special Appeals
Maryland Court of Special AppealsDisposition: ReversedLowe✓ Good law
HoldingColumbia Management Inc.

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question before us is whether a party in landlord-tenant proceedings is entitled to a jury trial, and if so, under what circumstances. The answer seems clearly set forth by the Court of Appeals in Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338 . The issue arose when Columbia Management Inc. (landlord) filed a Complaint in Summary Ejectment in the District Court of Maryland for Howard County against Winston A. Mulchansingh (tenant), for five months unpaid 305 rental of $496.35 per month, a percentage of the rent as provided by the lease and late charges of $585.00, for a total of $3802.11.

The complaint was on the form provided by the District Court which “. .. prays by warrant to have again and repossess the premises, together with judgment for the amount of rent due and costs.” Tenant replied with a Notice of Intention to Defend and a Jury Demand, pursuant to Md. District Rules 302 and 343. The case was then transferred to the Circuit Court for Howard County. When the case came on for hearing, 1 the judge decided sua sponte that, based on the case of Greenbelt Consumer v. Acme Mkts., 272 Md. 222 , the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the ejectment proceedings: “ . .. And looking over the files, gentlemen, I find that in Law No. A-7586 that this is a complaint in Summary Ejectment whereby the landlord seeks to repossess his premises and then obtain a judgment of amount of rent due.

And it is my opinion that under the holding of Greenbelt Consumer v. Acme Markets decided in 1974, and reported in 272 Md. 222 that this is a proceeding to repossess the premises, it’s a landlord-tenant proceeding, and that the District Court of Maryland has exclusive jurisdiction and this Court does not, and therefore this Court must return it to the District Court for a determination of that issue.” In that case the landlord was not attempting to recover any property. The suit was brought in the district court by the landlord for $12,000 in accrued past due rent only. Following a verdict favorable to the landlord, the tenant appealed to the circuit court. The tenant argued that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear landlord’s claim because the claim exceeded the monetary jurisdiction 306 of that court, as set forth in Cts.

Art., § 4-401 (1). The landlord agreed that its claim exceeded the monetary limit imposed by § 4-401 (1) but contended that the district court had “exclusive original” jurisdiction in any action involving a landlord and a tenant pursuant to § 4-401 (4). These sections read as follows: “§ 4-401. EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION.

Except as provided in 4-402, and subject to the venue provisions of Title 6,1 2 1 the District Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in: (1) An action in contract or tort if the debt or damages claimed do not exceed $5,000; (4) An action involving landlord and tenant, distraint, or forcible entry and detainer, regardless of the amount involved; ”. The court reasoned that § 4-401 (4) was not intended to provide unlimited monetary jurisdiction in the district court, but rather that: “ . .. the General Assembly intended to encompass within § 4-401 (4) only those possessory in rem or quasi in rem actions that provided a means by which a landlord might rapidly and inexpensively obtain repossession of his premises situated in this State or seek security for rent due from personalty located on the leasehold. It follows from what we have said that the District Court of Maryland is without jurisdiction to render a judgment in excess of the $5,000 limit when it is instituted in a contract claim independent of one of the possessory actions to 307 which we have already referred.” 272 Md. at 229-230 . The trial judge below, in the case at bar, extended the Greenbelt holding to mean that anytime a possessory action is filed with a contract and monetary claim, the district court has “exclusive” jurisdiction which, presumably, could not be ousted for any reason: “(Court) And the way your action is framed, I would find it to be a landlord-tenant case and not just a simple suit for damages and that would, therefore, keep it within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court.

If you want to sue just for the rent then I, I think it’s a different situation.” The tenant argued that because the landlord’s monetary claim exceeded $500, he was entitled to a jury trial under § 4-402 (e) (1), which states that: “In a civil action in which the amount in controversy exceeds $500, a party may demand a jury trial pursuant to the Maryland

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