Mullinix v. Mullinix

Gilbert, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County awarding a divorce a vinculo matrimonii to the Appellant on the ground of the Appellee’s adultery, and the awarding of custody of the three minor children of the parties to the Appellee. ⁴⁰⁴ The Appellant asserts as error: (1) that the trial court was wrong in granting custody of the three minor sons to the Appellee in view of her adulterous conduct, (2) the granting of a counsel fee to the Appellee’s attorney of $2500.00 in view of the Appellee’s financial position and (3) in the Chancellor’s advising certain witnesses of their right to claim their privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the crime of adultery and in failing to permit the Appellant’s counsel to interject another alleged adulterous relationship not involving the parties hereto, but which he sought to show might possibly occur in the presence of the litigants’ three minor children, and the trial court’s making certain objections to the evidence sua sponte. The parties hereto were married in a religious ceremony in Baltimore City on June 26, 1951. There were three sons born of the marriage who at the time of trial were respectively 15,14 and 12 years of age.

A review of the transcript discloses that this marriage, almost from its inception, was like a volcano looking for a place to erupt. The arguments growing out of the marital discord often reached the point where they became physical conflicts. He had been cut by her and she struck and bruised by him. Twice he attempted suicide.

Each of the parties described himself as a “social drinker” and each described the other as an “alcoholic.” Mr. Mullinix was employed as the president of the Becker Pretzel Company, a concern owned by the wife’s family, until it was destroyed by fire, and is now president of a similar concern in the midwestern part of the country. In June of 1968 the Appellant filed a bill of complaint for a divorce a mensa, alleging that the wife had beaten him and had denied him conjugal rights. He further alleged that the Appellee was not a fit and proper person to have custody of the minor children. Appellee answered the complaint and filed a cross-bill alleging cruelty of treatment by the Appellant, inter alia, and praying for custody of the children.

Thereafter, the parties continued to cohabit until March 24, 1969, when, after an increas ⁴⁰⁵ ing number of violent episodes between them, the Appellee left the marital domicile and took with her the three children. A supplemental bill of complaint was filed by the Appellant on May 23, 1969, alleging desertion and again praying for custody of the minor children. To this bill an answer was filed, denying the allegations of the bill and asking that the same be dismissed. The Appellee set her a mensa bill [filed in 1968, supra~\ before a Master on the question of child support and the Appellant was ordered to pay the sum of $100.00 a week for the support and maintenance of the three minor children; the first payment to be made on May 20, 1969.

On October 3, 1969 the Appellant filed his final bill of complaint repeating and realleging the substances of his previous complaints and further alleging adultery on the part of the Appellee. These allegations were denied. At the trial, adultery by Appellee with one James B. Mc-Closkey was proven to the Chancellor’s satisfaction and he granted the decree of divorce to the husband. No appeal has been taken from that portion of the decree.

Prior to trial the court ordered the parties to be seen by the court psychiatrist, Dr. Homer B. Martin. Significantly, the report concludes, “We can see no clear-cut advantage of either of these parents having custody of these three children.” A parade of witnesses testified as to the sobriety of the Appellant and the Appellee. Witnesses for the Appellant testified that he was the proper person to have custody of the children. Witnesses for the Appellee testified that she was the proper person to have custody of the children, notwithstanding any adulterous relationship on her part, because they said that if she was having an adulterous affair with McCloskey it was discreet and hidden from the children; it was not flaunted and her witnesses were unaware of it.

The children testified, out of the presence of their parents, that they did not believe any adulterous relationship between their mother and McCloskey; that they thought they were no more than “good friends” and that basically they thought it ⁴⁰⁶ would be better they live with their mother and that the three boys should stay together. “And I think — well, my brothers think — we really want to live with my mother, they really don’t want to say it, except Steve, I know he wants to live with my mother.” The oldest son stated, when pressed by Appellant’s counsel, as to whether he would want to live with his mother if adultery was proven, “It would have some effect, but I can’t make a decision, because —.” When pressed further he replied that he didn’t know. Insofar as the emotional well-being of all concerned, it was his thought that the boys should remain with the mother. He was unalterably opposed to a separation of the boys, that is, a splitting of custody by awarding one or two to one parent and the remainder to the other parent. The second child testified he would like to live with his mother; that the most he could say existed between his mother and McCloskey was that they were friends and that he had never seen any indication of any misbehavior.

He corroborated the oldest son’s testimony. When he was asked by Appellant’s attorney whether or not he told his father that if the mother were committing adultery he wanted to go with the father, his answer was “yes.” He was then asked, “Is that still true?” to which he replied, “Yes; but I know they’re not.” The youngest son simply indicated an unqualified preference to live with his mother. The record indicates that it was the Appellee who attended the P.T.A. meetings and the school functions; who looked after the everyday care and welfare of her children; who saw that they were properly dressed, fed, housed and cared for and who took the children on vacations. Other than an occasional attendance at an athletic feat, the father’s participation in the boys’ social and scholastic activities was minimal.

The Appellant apparently works hard and long hours in his present position. He testified that he lives in an apartment located in the plant where he is employed, but that if he were awarded custody of the children he would hire a house ⁴⁰⁷ keeper and probably move his 75 year old mother to his new residence to care for the children. He would acquire a suitable house. His hours of employment range from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

In addition to the main plant, he is responsible for two others; one 300 miles away; the other 20 miles. He must visit these plants. The one 300 miles away he should visit once a week. He admitted that when he last visited Towson prior to the trial and requested visitation rights with the boys he took them to the attorney’s office for an interview and then returned them to their home.

He further admitted that for the last four or five years he did not take a vacation with them when their mother took them to Ocean City. During the course of the trial, McCloskey, the paramour, admitted to a sexual relationship with the Appellee on two occasions, but denied any such activity after September of 1969, although he continued to see Mrs. Mullinix frequently at her home. In fact, he had a telephone in her house which was used in connection with his antique business and she had answered the phone for him. He further testified that some of his antiques, mostly furniture, were stored in her basement.

When the oldest son who was attending McDonogh School changed from a day student to a boarding student, the Appellant reduced the support payments from $100.00 a week to $66.00 a week. He did this, he says, on advice of counsel because his son was no longer living at home, and presumably because he was going to pay the board bill at McDonogh. As of the time of trial in May, 1970, however, the bill had not been paid. While the court endeavored to prevent the exposure of the children to the sordid details, which we see no need to incorporate herein, it is of importance to note that their father (Appellant) read them excerpts from private investigator reports relative to their mother’s adultery.

He explained to them what “adultery” meant and stated in response to the court’s question as to why he had done this: “I felt that by letting them know that I ⁴⁰⁸ was aware of what was going on, is that they would loosen up and we could have a better time together, and that there wasn’t any secrets, or something of that nature.” With this background, after a full and lengthy trial, Judge Turnbull stated in his opinion from the bench: “Were it not for the problem involving Mr. McCloskey, even though the wife was guilty of adultery, I would have no problem in awarding her custody; I think she has been by and large a very good mother, that is my impression of her, that is certainly what I get from the numerous witnesses who have testified in that regard, the acquaintance of some of them with the Mullinixes going back for many years, and it is obvious that she looks out for the physical well-being of these boys; they are alert, well behaved, intelligent boys. I think these two people are very fortunate to have such well adjusted children in the light of the turmoils which surrounded these children over a long period of time; and I am very, very much impressed with all three of these boys. The mother obviously takes good care of the boys; she looks out for their physical well-being * * *. But, in any event, she does take good care of the kids, of that I am convinced, and I find that as a matter of fact, that she does so, with the exception of the atmosphere created by McCloskey.

I think, absent McCloskey, she is much better equipped to take care of the children than is her husband. His devotion to his boys is highly credible and commendable, * * *, I am persuaded that the boys prefer to be with the mother, and I think they are old enough, intelligent enough, mature enough so that their wishes should have great weight upon the Court, provided their wishes can be complied with under proper circumstances. ⁴⁰⁹ “There is no suggestion in this case that Mrs. Mullinix is a wanton woman, that she is promiscuous, that she is flagrant in adultery; the only thing with which she is flagrant is her continued association with McCloskey * * *. “This is one of the most difficult cases I have had in over ten years in this position, and twenty-eight years before that as an active practitioner, and no matter what I do with the case I am still going to have a gnawing feeling that perhaps I am not right. But I find, gentlemen, under all the circumstances, that the custody should be awarded to the mother, with the specific, rigid provision that she must not at any time, in any way have anything to do with Mr. McCloskey, or he with her, of course; and the children shall in no way, at any time, at any place or under any circumstances, except by accident, passing him on the street, or something of that kind, be exposed to his company. Mrs. Mullinix, therefore, with that condition, and with that influence, and that aura removed from the household, is, in my opinion, the better equipped, and it is to the better interests of the children that she be granted custody.

It will be her choice to make; if she is determined that she would rather have Mc-Closkey than the children I will accommodate her, because I will quickly move to take custody away from her, upon any properly presented evidence that she has failed to comply with this order.” We agree with Judge Turnbull. The question of custody of children is a matter of particular concern to courts of equity. The rule to be applied in awarding custody is what is in the best interest of the children. Kauten v. Kauten, 257 Md. 10 , 261 A. 2d 759 (1970) ; Orndoff v. Orndoff, 252 Md. 519 , 250 ⁴¹⁰ A. 2d 627 (1969) ; Shanbarker v. Dalton, 251 Md. 252 , 247 A. 2d 278 (1968) ; Breault v. Breault, 250 Md. 173 , 242 A. 2d 116 (1968) ; Sullivan v. Auslaender, 12 Md. App. 1 (1971) ; Widdoes v. Widdoes, 12 Md. App. 225 (1971).

The Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Finan, in Kauten v. Kauten, supra, said: “While simple to state, application of the rule is often quite difficult for an appellate tribunal which has before it only the transcribed record. For this reason the court has established certain principles for better application of the legal standard to the facts at hand. For example it will be a rare occurrence when a young child will be taken from its mother if she is a fit person and all other things are equal. Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 357 , 157 A. 2d 442 (1960).

This is true even though the mother has been guilty of adultery. Shanbarker v. Dalton, supra. Another common principle is that a person who has committed adultery will have the burden of proving his fitness. Insogna v. Insogna, 229 Md. 33 , 181 A. 2d 677 (1962), Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327 , 207 A. 2d 481 (1965), and Cornwell v. Cornwell, 244 Md. 674 , 224 A. 2d 870 (1966).

Perhaps the most often applied rule of interpretation is that the chancellor’s findings of fact should be given great weight since he had the parties, witnesses and child before him. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 255 Md. 86 , 256 A. 2d 886 (1969), Daubert v. Daubert, 239 Md. 303 , 211 A. 2d 323 (1965), and Sibley v. Sibley, 187 Md. 358 , 50 A. 2d 128 (1946).” Appellant cites to us Pontorno v. Pontorno, 257 Md. 576 , 263 A. 2d 820 (1970), wherein custody was denied to an adulterous mother and there was no clear showing otherwise that she was a fit and proper person. The facts, however, in Pontorno , are quite dissimilar to those in this case. In Pontorno , the paramour lived in the same house as the wife and children and the children were led ⁴¹¹ to believe that the paramour was their father.

Here, there is no such testimony. The Mullinix children have no identity problem. Certainly, they are not under the impression that the Appellee and McCloskey are more than good friends and they have been carefully sheltered from any other conclusion, except by the Appellant’s misguided efforts to draw the children to him by reading excerpts from the investigation report. There was ample testimony, absent McCloskey, from which the Chancellor could conclude, as he did, that the Appellee is a fit and proper person to have custody.

The answer to any question of future association with