Municipal & County Government Employees Organization v. Montgomery County Executive

WRIGHT, J. This appeal arises from appellee, Montgomery County Executive Isiah Leggett’s (“County Executive”), failure to include sufficient funds to implement a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Montgomery County and the appellant, United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 1994, Municipal and County Government Employees Organization (the “Union”), in the proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2012 (“FY12”). The Union filed a prohibited practice charge against the County Executive accusing him of violating §§ 33-109(a)(8) of the Montgomery County Code (“MCC”). On May 14, 2011, the Montgomery County Labor Relations Administrator (“LRA”) issued a decision finding that the County Executive committed a prohibited practice by failing to submit an impasse arbitrator’s award as part of his proposed budget. ¹⁶⁶ The County filed a writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County seeking judicial review of the LRA’s decision. The circuit court reversed the LRA and this timely appeal followed.

Question Presented The Union ask us to determine: Whether the Labor Relations Administrator for Montgomery County, Maryland correctly applied the Montgomery County Charter and Code when he held that the Montgomery County Executive committed a prohibited practice by refusing to submit an impasse arbitrator’s award as part of his annual budget submission to the Montgomery County Council and ordered the Montgomery County Executive to specifically perform his obligations under the County Code. Finding that the LRA’s decision was based on a correct interpretation of the law, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment. Facts and Procedural History The facts in this case are undisputed. The Union and the County had a series of CBAs with the most current agreement set to expire on July 1, 2011.

Consequently, the Union and the County Executive commenced bargaining for a new CBA in the Fall of 2010 and reached an impasse on certain economic issues in February 2011. Upon reaching an impasse, the parties submitted the dispute to an impasse arbitrator (the “Arbitrator”). The parties were required by the MCC to submit their last, best, final offers (“LBFO”) to the Arbitrator, for the Arbitrator to review and decide which LBFO was the most reasonable. In making a conclusion, the Arbitrator was regulated by MCC § 33 — 108(f), which stated the following: (4) In making a determination under this subsection, the mediator/arbitrator must first evaluate and give the highest priority to the ability of the County to pay for additional short-term and long-term expenditures by considering: (A) the limits on the County’s ability to raise taxes under State law and the County Charter; ¹⁶⁷ (B) the added burden on County taxpayers, if any, resulting from increases in revenues needed to fund a final offer; and (C) the County’s ability to continue to provide the current standard of all public services.

(5) After evaluating the ability of the County to pay under paragraph (4), the mediator/arbitrator may only consider: (A) the interest and welfare of County taxpayers and service recipients; (B) past collective bargaining agreements between the parties, including the past bargaining history that led to each agreement; (C) a comparison of wages, hours, benefits and conditions of employment of similar employees of other public employers in the Washington Metropolitan Area and in Maryland; (D) a comparison of wages, hours, benefits, and conditions of employment of other Montgomery County employees; and (E) wages, benefits, hours, and other working conditions of similar employees of private employers in Montgomery County. On February 18-19, 2011, the Arbitrator held a hearing and both parties submitted evidence and presented witnesses. Following the hearing, the parties submitted briefs to the Arbitrator. On March 28, 2011, the Arbitrator issued an award finding that the Union’s LBFO was the more reasonable offer.

Under MCC § 33 — 108(f)(6), the LBFO selected by the Arbitrator became the final agreement between the parties (“2011 Agreement”). 1 MCC § 33-108(g) then states: ¹⁶⁸ In each proposed annual operating budget, the County Executive must describe any collective bargaining agreement or amendment to an agreement that is scheduled to take effect in the next fiscal year and estimate the cost of implementing that agreement. The employer must submit to the Council by April 1, unless extenuating circumstances require a later date, any term or condition of the collective bargaining agreement that requires an appropriation of funds, or the enactment or adoption of any County law or regulation, or which has or may have a present or future fiscal impact. If a later submission is necessary, the employer must specify the submission date and the reasons for delay to the Council President by April 1. The employer must expressly identify to the Council and the certified representative any term or condition that requires Council review.

Each submission to the Council must include: (1) all proposed legislation and regulations necessary to implement the collective bargaining agreement; (2) all changes from the previous collective bargaining agreement, indicated by brackets and underlines or a similar notation system; and (3) all side letters or other extraneous documents that are binding on the parties. The employer must make a good faith effort to have the Council approve all terms of the final agreement that require Council review. On March 15, 2011, the date required for budget submission by § 303 of the Montgomery County Charter (“Charter”), the County Executive submitted a proposed budget (“FY12 Budget”) to the Council that did not include the Union’s LBFO and sufficient funding to implement the 2011 Agreement, but instead included the County Executive’s LBFO, which had been rejected by the Arbitrator. The County Executive’s FY12 Budget admitted that “[t]his budget recommendation is ¹⁶⁹ inconsistent with the arbitrated award.” The Union filed a petition in the circuit court to compel the County Executive to submit the Arbitrator’s award as part of the FY12 Budget.

The circuit court held that the Union’s petition was premature because the Union was required to seek administrative relief first. To comply with the court’s instruction, the Union filed prohibited practice charges with the LRA. The parties submitted briefs to the LRA and agreed to allow the LRA to decide the ease without a hearing. On May 14, 2011, the LRA issued a decision finding that the County Executive’s actions constituted a prohibited practice under MCC § 33 — 109(a)(8), which states that it is a prohibited practice for the employer to “[d]irectly or indirectly oppos[e] the appropriation of funds or the enactment of legislation by the county council to implement an agreement reached between the employer and the certified representative under this article.” The LRA found that the Charter permits the Council to limit the County Executive’s budgetary discretion by requiring the County Executive, by statute, to include an impasse arbitrator’s award in the proposed budget.

In his decision, the LRA stated: Since the County has admitted that County Executive did not include in his recent budget the interest arbitration award and it’s [sic] funding, the LRA finds that the County Executive did commit a prohibited practice as charged by the Union. However, if the County Executive’s newly claimed discretion, to decide what his budget will contain, is determined to be valid, no Prohibited Practice will be found. That being the case, this discussion will turn to the legal questions upon which the briefs focused. This case presents a number of intriguing questions, which were not answered in the briefs, and which cause puzzlement and invite speculation.

Here are just a few such questions: 1. When did a County lawyer first realize that Charter 308 offered the opportunity for the County Executive to free himself of the requirement of the collective bargain ¹⁷⁰ ing law on what must be included in his budget submission? 2. Was the County Executive immediately told he had established a poor practice by following the several collective bargaining laws in regard to what he must place in his budget? 3. Did anyone assess the harm using this previously unknown discretion might have on the long established relationship with the several unions? 4.

How is it possible that when amendments were made over the years to the County Charter, particularly those related to collective bargaining or to State or County laws, that no one discovered this conflict between the Charter and the collective bargaining laws? 5. Doesn’t the County have lawyers for both the Council and the Executive who should check on the language in proposed changes to the Charter and legislation to avoid such conflicts? 6. Has the decades-long practice by both the Union and County of following the collective bargaining law regarding what must be included in the County Executive’s budget created a “past practice” which, as it would in private sector arbitration, make the formal rule inoperative? The LRA understands there is a difference between a law and a collective bargaining agreement.

The parties are free to modify a CBA by practice. On May 16, 2011, the County petitioned the circuit court for administrative mandamus to reverse the LRA’s award. On June 7, 2011, the circuit court, in an oral opinion, granted the County’s petition and reversed the decision of the LRA. The order was entered on June 10, 2011.

On June 23, 2011, the Union noted this appeal. Additional facts will be discussed in the relevant sections below. ¹⁷¹ Standard of Review The parties urge us to apply the usual standard of review of administrative agency decisions. Under this standard, the appellate court’s role is identical to that of the circuit court, and we review the agency, or in this case, the LRA’s decision. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Prigel Family Creamery, 206 Md.App. 264, 273-74 , 47 A.3d 1087 (2012); Frey v. Comptroller of Treasury, 422 Md. 111, 137-38 , 29 A.3d 475 (2011), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1796 , 182 L.Ed.2d 618 (2012).

As such, our review is limited to determining if the agency’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and “no error of law exists.” Id. The agency’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Generally, we accord some deference to the agency when it is interpreting the statutes it administers. Md. Aviation Admin, v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 572 , 873 A.2d 1145 (2005).

However, where the issue lies not with the collective bargaining statutes themselves, but with an interpretation of the Charter and the Council’s ability to limit the County Executive’s budgetary discretion, no deference is required. Discussion I. Collective Bargaining Law and Montgomery County Charter The Union argues that the LRA properly concluded that the County Executive violated the MCC sections pertaining to collective bargaining with the Union by failing to include the Arbitrator’s award as “part of the budget.” (Emphasis in original). The Union contends that the collective bargaining laws unequivocally require the County Executive to include an arbitrator’s award as part of the proposed budget because the award requires fiscal action to fund the CBA. According to the Union, it is insufficient for the County Executive “to simply submit the award for the Council’s review or to submit a description of the award for the Council’s consideration.” The Union argues that the County Executive does not have “unlimited ‘legislative’ discretion when ¹⁷² participating in budgetary matters” because the Charter limits that discretion.

The County responds that the County Executive has a “virtually unchecked” discretionary legislative function in proposing a budget delegated to him by Charter § 303 that cannot be divested by any collective bargaining laws enacted by the County Council. The County asserts that the Charter “permits the Council to prescribe by law what information — as opposed to recommendations — the County Executive must include in the recommended budget.” The County avers that the term “recommendation” refers to a “discretionary act calling for the exercise of judgment” in contrast to “a requirement to provide information, which is a ministerial function.” The County also argues that a prohibited practice charge cannot arise out of the County Executive’s “expression of his views,” and that the County Executive “cannot be called to account before an arbitrator for an exercise of his legislative discretion.” Ultimately, the dispute involves the interpretation of the Charter and any effect the collective bargaining laws enacted by the Council has on the County Executive’s responsibilities under Charter § 303. The Court of Appeals, after noting that “[t]he tension between public employee unions and local governments, particularly those bound by an executive budget system, has surfaced in Maryland appellate cases since at least [1945],” provided an extensive review of the cases arising since then in the recent opinion in Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 428 Md. 723, 728 , 53 A.3d 1184 (2012). After an exhaustive discussion, the Court concluded that collective bargaining is appropriate charter material, and a county can impose binding arbitration on the executive branch. 2 Id. at 743-45 , 53 A.3d 1184 .

There is no need to reiterate their ¹⁷³ thorough analysis here, in response to the parties’ arguments, that binding arbitration cannot apply to the County Executive. A. The State Executive Budget System The Montgomery County budget system is modeled in many respects on the State budget system. The State has an “executive” budget system, where the budget originates with the Governor. So too, does Montgomery County — as the County points out, “[u]nder the Charter, only the County Executive can initiate the County’s budgetary process.” However, where the State system limits the ability of the General Assembly to alter the budget submitted to it, 3 the Montgomery County system gives the Council unfettered authority to alter, reduce, or increase the appropriations submitted by the Executive. 4 The similarities of the two systems, in regard to the limitations placed on the executive branch’s discretion as to what must be included in the budget is instructive.

The State budget process is set forth in Art. III, § 52 of the Maryland Constitution. Section 52 was adopted, in large measure, to correct the haphazard system of appropriation ¹⁷⁴ that existed prior to 1915, which could easily lead to a deficit. 5 See McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 96 , 98 A.2d 561 (1953) (“Appropriations for various purposes were made piece-meal by the General Assembly, each project receiving independent consideration without relation to other claims upon the public purse.”). Section 52 apportioned responsibility according to the established branches of government by vesting “sole responsibility, within the limits of the Constitution and the provisions of existing law, of presenting to the Legislature a complete and comprehensive statement of the needs and resources of the State” to the Governor. Md. Action for Foster Children, Inc. v. State, 279 Md. 133, 146 , 367 A.2d 491 (1977) ¹⁷⁵ (quoting Journal of Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland at 133-34).

The General Assembly was given authority to initiate appropriations, but was subject to the balanced budget requirement of Art. III, § 52. The underlying purpose of establishing an orderly budget system with clearly delineated responsibility was the rationale behind the Court’s holding in Foster Children, where it stated: The provisions of the Budget Amendment to the Maryland Constitution, Art. III, § 52, and the purposes underlying those provisions set forth in the Goodnow Commission’s report, compel the conclusion that he funding of Art. 88A, § 60B(b) of the Code in future annual budgets is a matter constitutionally committed to the Governor’s discretion. For a court to require that the Governor fund the foster care program administered by the Juvenile Services Administration at a particular level in future Budgets prepared and submitted by the Governor would be inconsistent with several provisions of the Budget Amendment to the Constitution. Id. at 148, 367 A.2d 491 .

The Court further explained: “The Legislature, by enacting statutes specifying minimum spending limits, cannot deprive the Governor of the discretion which the Constitution explicitly vests in him.” Id. at 151 , 367 A.2d 491 . The Court stated that if the General Assembly could specify what was to be included in the budget and the amounts, then the executive budget system would be destroyed. Id. at 152 , 367 A.2d 491 . Dissenting, Chief Judge Murphy stated: To impose such a mandatory duty on the Governor is not to cause the destruction of the executive budget system, as the majority suggests.

Indeed, not to impose such a duty upon the Governor has far more deadly consequences; most certainly it would herald the demise of the delicate and time-honored balance existing between the power and responsibility of the legislature to make the laws and the Governor’s duty to see that they are faithfully executed.... Under the majority’s interpretation, the Governor enjoys ¹⁷⁶ unbridled authority to ignore the legislative will, or even worse, to decide, in his sole discretion, which enactments will be funded and which will not. Id. at 153 , 367 A.2d 491 . The dissent pointed to the language of Art. III, § 52(4) requiring the Governor to include appropriations “for such other purposes as are set forth in the ... laws of the State” and argues that this provision removes the Governor’s discretion to simply exclude items from the budget.

Id. at 157, 367 A.2d 491 . The dissent explains that it is not “new or novel” for the General Assembly “by enacting a general law [to] compel the Governor to include an appropriation in his Budget Bill[.]” Id. at 158 , 367 A.2d 491 (citations omitted); see also id. at 160-61 , 367 A.2d 491 (citing the Goodnow Commission which drafted the Budget Amendment and Md.Code (1957, 1967 Repl.Vol.) Art. 15A, § 21A). Citing to amicus curiae briefs, the dissent clarified the position of the General Assembly: Maryland’s adoption of an executive budget system has resulted in no transfer from the General Assembly of its fundamental power to declare what the law shall be, in fiscal as in other matters. At most, the adoption of such a system shifted to the Governor a role of initiation or proposal; it did not give to the executive branch any power to overrule legislative policy determinations.

The Governor still has the power, within the guidelines established by the General Assembly by law, to allocate the general revenues of the state among the various programs provided by law and to determine the extent to which these programs shall be funded. If in his opinion the general revenues of the state will not be sufficient, then it is incumbent upon him to make this fact known to the Legislature so that it may levy such taxes as it deems best to provide the necessary revenue. Id. at 158-160, 367 A.2d 491 . The majority’s holding was superceded in part by a 1978 constitutional amendment, which required the Governor to ¹⁷⁷ include in the annual budget bill any minimum level of funding for a program specified by statute.

It is our view that, as a result, the dissent’s argument has been vindicated and, as the County Executive analogizes his role to that of the Governor, this discussion is pertinent to the case sub judice. Further, because the question of whether the Council can permissibly constrain the County Executive’s discretion in his budget submission is one of first impression, we will be guided by the State’s example. B. History of the Montgomery County Charter Montgomery County evolved differently than the State, with the position of the County Executive established via an amendment to the County’s original Charter. Montgomery County is a “home rule” county, authorized by Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution to adopt a county charter.

The county charter functions as a “constitution” for the county. Mont. Cnty. v. Anchor Inn Seafood Rest., 374 Md. 327, 331 , 822 A.2d 429 (2003) (citing Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 248 , 743 A.2d 748 (2000)). Article XI-A, § 3, requires “that a county adopting a home rule charter must select one of two types of government: (1) an elective legislative body known as the County Council without an elected County Executive or (2) an elective County Council plus an elective County Executive.” Id. at 331, 822 A.2d 429 (footnote omitted); see Md. Const.

Art. XI-A, § 3. In 1948, Montgomery County adopted a charter. In the original charter, Montgomery County had no county executive, making the elected County Council the entire governing body with both legislative and executive powers. Id. at 332, 822 A.2d 429 .

Twenty years later, in 1968, Montgomery County adopted a new charter, effective in 1970, which, pursuant to Article XI-A, imposed separation of powers with the Council as the legislative branch and a county executive as the executive branch of the government. Id.; see also Eggert v. Mont. Cnty. Council, 263 Md. 243, 256-60 , 282 A.2d 474 (1971) (discussing the new charter and how the Council’s efforts to ¹⁷⁸ exercise powers now reserved to the executive branch were invalid).

The original Charter expressly prohibited the Council, when sitting in executive session from exercising legislative powers. Scull v. Mont. Citizens League, 249 Md. 271, 280 , 239 A.2d 92 (1968). In construing the Council’s powers respective roles, the Court in Scull stated that “unambiguously ... the Council in executive session has and may exercise the administrative and executive powers ... and may implement and facilitate and insure the proper execution of laws and ordinances passed by the Council in legislative session[.]” Id. at 281-82 , 239 A.2d 92 .

This same delineation of power is reflected in the new (and current) Charter. Article 1 of the Charter describes the legislative branch of the county, with § 101 stating, in pertinent part: All legislative powers which may be exercised by Montgomery County under the Constitution and laws of Maryland, including all law making powers heretofore exercised by the General Assembly of Maryland but transferred to the people of the County by virtue of the adoption of this Charter, and the legislative powers vested in the County Commissioners as a District Council for the Montgomery County Suburban District, shall be vested in the County Council. The legislative power shall also include, but not be limited to, the power to enact public local laws for the County and repeal or amend local laws for the County heretofore enacted by the General Assembly upon the matters covered by Article 25A, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957, as now in force or hereafter amended, and the power to legislate for the peace, good government, health, safety or welfare of the County. Article 2 of the Charter sets forth the executive branch powers, stating in § 201: The executive power vested in Montgomery County by the Constitution and laws of Maryland and by this Charter shall be vested in a County Executive who shall be the chief executive officer of Montgomery County and who shall ¹⁷⁹ faithfully execute the laws.

In such capacity, the County Executive shall be the elected executive officer mentioned in Article XI-A, Section 3 of the Constitution of Maryland. The County Executive shall have no legislative power except the power to make rules and regulations expressly delegated by a law enacted by the Council or by this Charter. The Charter’s delegation of power is critical to an analysis of the meaning of Charter § 303. Section 303 states: The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than January 15 and March 15, respectively of each year, proposed capital and operating budgets including recommended expenditures and revenue sources for the ensuing fiscal year and any other information in such form and detail as the County Executive shall determine and as may be prescribed by law.

These budgets shall be consistent with six-year programs. A summary shall be submitted with the budgets containing an analysis of the fiscal implications for the County of all available budgets of any agencies for which the Council sets tax rates, makes levies, approves programs or budgets. As discussed, Charter § 305 gives the Council the authority to “add to, delete from, increase or decrease any appropriation item in the operating or capital budget.” The Council clearly did not divest itself of authority to overhaul the budget submitted by the Executive in the way that the General Assembly is precluded from altering that submitted by the Governor. Section 511 states: The Montgomery County Council may provide by law for collective bargaining, with arbitration or other impasse resolution procedures, with authorized representatives of officers and employees of the County Government not covered by either Section 510 or Section 510A of this Charter.

Any law so enacted shall prohibit strikes or work stoppages for such officers and employees. The Council enacted the collective bargaining laws at issue pursuant to Charter § 511 and imposed binding arbitration on the Executive, but not on itself. See footnote 6 and accompa ¹⁸⁰ nying text, infra. It is evident that the Council retained nearly all the discretion in enacting a budget, subject only to the Executive’s line-item veto power.

C. Statutory Interpretation Recently, in Mont. Cnty. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Mont. Cnty. Lodge 35, Inc., 427 Md. 561 , 50 A.3d 579 (2012), the Court of Appeals reiterated the following regarding statutory interpretation: It is a well-settled principle that the primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.

The first step in this inquiry is to examine the plain language of the statute, and if the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written. Thus, where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts do not normally look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent. Furthermore, words may not be added to, or removed from, an unambiguous statute in order to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature chose to use[.] Id. at 572-73 , 50 A.3d 579 (quoting Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hayward, 426 Md. 638, 649-50 , 45 A.3d 224 (2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). “Charters are subject to the same canons of statutory construction that apply to the interpretation of statutes.” Just as the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, so it is “the cardinal rule of charter interpretation.” Mayor & City Council v. Bunting, 168 Md.App. 134, 141 , 895 A.2d 1068 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals has said: where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment.

In such circumstances, the ¹⁸¹ court, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense. Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986) (internal citations omitted). Even under the plain meaning rule, however, we do not ignore the Legislature’s purpose if it is readily known ... [and] may ... consider the particular problem or problems the Legislature was addressing, and the objectives it sought to attain.

Maryland — Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Anderson, 164 Md.App. 540, 569-70 , 884 A.2d 157 (2005) (internal citations omitted). “[W]e are obligated to construe the statute as a whole, so that all provisions are considered together and, to the extent possible, reconciled and harmonized.” Id. at 570 , 884 A.2d 157 (citations omitted). A statutory provision should be interpreted in the context of the entire statutory scheme, and reading the various provisions together and giving effect to each can aid in determining the intent of the legislature. Office of the Pub. Defender, 413 Md. 411, 464 , 993 A.2d 55 ; see Gordon Family P’ship v. Gar On Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138 , 702 A.2d 753 (1997).

Thus, we must view § 303 in context of the entire Charter. Section 302 of the Charter, entitled “Six Year Programs for Public Services, Capital Improvements, and Fiscal Policy,” states: The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than January 15 of each even-numbered year, a comprehensive six-year program for capital improvements. The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than March 15 of each year, comprehensive six-year programs for public services and fiscal policy. The six-year programs shall require a vote of at least five Councilmembers for approval or modification.

Final Council approval of the six- ¹⁸² year programs shall occur at or about the date of budget approval. The public services program shall include a statement of program objectives and recommend levels of public service by the County government, and shall provide an estimate of costs, a statement of revenue sources, and an estimate of the impact of the program on County revenues and the capital budget. The capital improvements program shall include a statement of the objectives of capital programs and the relationship of capital programs to the County’s long-range development plans; shall recommend capital projects and a construction schedule; and shall provide an estimate of costs, a statement of anticipated revenue sources, and an estimate of the impact of the program on County revenues and the operating budget. The capital improvements program shall, to the extent authorized by law, include all capital projects and programs of all agencies for which the County sets tax rates or approves budgets or programs.

The Council may amend an approved capital improvements program at any time by an affirmative vote of six Council-members. The fiscal program shall show projections of revenues and expenditures for all functions, recommend revenue and expenditure policies for the program period and analyze the impact of tax and expenditure patterns on public programs and the economy of the County. The County Executive shall provide such other information relating to these programs as may be prescribed by law. All capital improvement projects which are estimated to cost in excess of an amount to be established by law or which the County Council determines to possess unusual characteristics or to be of sufficient public importance shall be individually authorized by law; provided however, that any project declared by the County Council to be of an emergency nature necessary for the protection of the public health or safety shall not be subject to this requirement if ¹⁸³ the project is approved by the affirmative vote of six Councilmembers.

Any project mandated by law, statutory or otherwise, interstate compact, or any project required by law to serve two or more jurisdictions shall, likewise, not be subject to this requirement. The County Council shall prescribe by law the methods and procedures for implementation of this provision. (Emphasis added). Just as in Charter § 303, in the above-cited section of the Charter, the County Executive is required to include in the six-year plan any “other information ... as may be prescribed by law.” The Council may amend an approved capital improvement program at any time by an affirmative vote of six Councilmembers.

Here, the Charter again reserves to the Council the authority to amend the County Executive’s submissions. Section 303 requires the County Executive to make the budget consistent with these six-year programs, a clear limit on the County Executive’s discretion. The Council retains the authority to limit the County Executive’s power through legislation in other Charter provisions as well. Section 217, entitled “Reorganization of the Executive Branch,” states that “[t]he Council may prescribe by law the organization of the Executive Branch of County Government.” (Emphasis added).

Section 309, entitled “Transfer of Funds,” permits the County Executive to “transfer an unencumbered appropriation balance within a division or between divisions of the same department” but allows the Council to limit that authority in stating that “[tjransfers between departments, boards or commissions, or to any new account, shall be made only by the County Council upon the recommendation of the County Executive.” Section 501, entitled “Disaster-Continuity of Government During Emergencies,” states: In order to ensure continuity of government during an emergency caused by a disaster or enemy attack, the Council shall prescribe by law for the temporary suspension of specific provisions of this Charter and for temporary succes ¹⁸⁴ sion to the powers and duties of public offices whether filled by election or appointment. (Emphasis added). The Charter affords the Council the authority to control the County Executive’s action or limit the County Executive’s discretion by enacting laws specific to more general Charter provisions. Moving on, the Charter provision in question, § 303, is not ambiguous.

It requires the County Executive to include information “required by law” in the budget proposal. The County argues that the provision in dispute in § 303 should be read such that “other information ... as may be prescribed by law” is separate from what must be included in the budget. We disagree. Parsing the sentence into its component parts results in the following: The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than January 15 and March 15, respectively of each year, proposed capital and operating budgets including [1] recommended expenditures and revenue sources for the ensuing fiscal year and [2] any other information in such form and detail [a] as the County Executive shall determine and [b] as may be prescribed by law.

The disputed provision requires that the County Executive “includ[e]” in the budget “information in such form and detail” that is “prescribed by law” in addition to information that he chooses to include in his discretion. “Other information” cannot be separated from “including” in the way that the County suggests. Charter § 511 is also not ambiguous; it gives the Council the authority to enact collective bargaining laws with arbitration and impasse procedures if it so chooses, and which it has done. Those laws are binding on the County Executive as well as the employees to which they relate. If the County Executive, as the employer who is required to be bound by an arbitrator’s decision, can effectively undo an arbitrator’s decision by refusing to include any agreement in the budget proposal that requires appropriation, then an intractable conflict results.

See Atkinson, 428 Md. at 748 n. 9, 53 A.3d 1184 ¹⁸⁵ (discussing that if the legislative body is required to have the “discretion to refuse to fund a binding arbitration award, then there can never be binding arbitration”). We are required by another canon of statutory construction to “ ‘avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.’ ” Bunting, 168 Md.App. at 142 , 895 A.2d 1068 (quoting Nesbit v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 75 , 854 A.2d 879 (2004)).

The Bunting Court stated by way of example that Montgomery County had used its code to “define the boundaries of what had been granted in [its] charter[ ].” Id. at 146 , 895 A.2d 1068 . Thus, the Council defined the boundaries of the County Executive’s budgetary discretion granted