Murphy v. Baltimore County

SALMON, Judge. Angela Murphy (“Murphy”), a Baltimore County police officer, was fired from her job on September 1, 1993, for an “[(Inability to perform the duties and functions of a Police Officer for medical reasons which cannot be accommodated.” After filing two earlier petitions, Murphy, on August 6, 1996, filed a second amended petition for writ of mandamus requesting, inter alia, that she be reinstated as a Baltimore County police officer and that she be awarded damages for a denial of due process. Appellee, Baltimore County, filed a motion to dismiss that was granted by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on October 16,1996. Murphy filed a timely appeal presenting two questions: 1.

If a police officer is denied a disability retirement, is the police department precluded from dismissing that offi ¹¹⁷ cer because she is physically unable to perform her full police duties? 2. Is a police officer denied her property right in continued employment without due process of law when that officer is terminated without a pre-termination hearing or post-termination hearing shortly after her termination? Our answers to both questions are, “Not necessarily,” and for reasons explained below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. I. BACKGROUND FACTS Most of the facts set forth in Section I are based on histories provided by Murphy to health care providers who examined her and thereafter wrote reports that were filed in the record in this case.

Because of the number of reports and the detailed histories that appellant provided, we have attempted only a brief summary — yet one that will be inclusive enough to understand the legal arguments presented. In February 1988, at age 22, Murphy, an African-American, joined the Baltimore County Police Department. She served five tumultuous years as a police officer. Murphy claims that she was permanently mentally disabled due to having been the victim of racism and discriminatory treatment by her police department supervisors, particularly by one supervisor, Sergeant McGee.

During a performance evaluation, McGee, according to Murphy, “tackled” her. She sustained injuries to her arm as a result of this attack. 1 In addition to this physical attack, Murphy claims that fellow police officers directed racially derogatory remarks at her and she was otherwise systematically harassed. When she filed complaints about her treatment, she was labeled a “complainer.” Murphy was told that there were no problems before she came to the precinct and that she tried to make everything a “black/white issue.” Because of perceived racial ¹¹⁸ tensions, she became increasingly agitated in 1992 after white Los Angeles police officers, who were accused of wrongfully beating Rodney King, were acquitted of state criminal charges. Murphy was described by her doctors as “a hostile, angry young woman,” who admitted that she had problems dealing with the public and following orders.

For instance, Murphy admitted that she often ignored supervisors if she felt that their demands were “unimportant.” She was hostile to and denigrated fellow African-American police officers by characterizing them as “house niggas.” Similarly, she admitted to “cussing out” citizens who called the police hotline with “stupid ass questions.” In sum, according to reports submitted by Murphy’s treating doctors, she had difficulty getting along with either white or African-American co-workers due to her mental condition. Murphy “ ‘regrets’ that she has not ‘blown away’ [certain] members of the Police Department” and has said that she understands why postal workers have resorted to violence. She reported to one of her doctors that “she was not entertaining such an idea but could understand how sweet a feeling it would be — even for just a moment — to get even.” Her greatest regret was that her nemesis, Sgt. McGee, retired before she could get even with him.

According to appellant, her treatment by the police department caused a “mental condition [that] prevented [her] from performing the tasks required of a police officer, even one filling a light-duty position [like telephone duty].” Murphy’s “mental condition” manifested itself in the form of depression, nervousness, insomnia, and stomach problems that had her “eating Mylanta like candy.” She began seeing psychiatrists and was admitted to the Baltimore County General Hospital with pancreatitis, which, according to Murphy, was “related to the high level of stress she was encountering.” Hence, on February 6, 1993, Murphy applied to the Baltimore County Employees’ Retirement System Board of Trustees for line-of-duty disability retirement benefits, alleging job- ¹¹⁹ related stress injuries. The applicable Baltimore County regulation requires that: Upon the application of a member in service or of the employer, any member who has been totally and permanently incapacitated for duty as the natural and proximate result of an accident occurring while in the actual performance of duty at some definite time and place, without willful negligence on his part, shall be retired by the board of trustees; provided that the medical board shall certify that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty, that such incapacity is likely to be permanent, and that such member should be retired.... Baltimore County Code § 23-55 (emphasis added). The Board of Trustees reviewed Murphy’s petition and, in August of 1993, found that she was mentally or physically disabled for the further performance of duty but nevertheless denied her request for a pension because Murphy had failed to prove that her disability was likely to be permanent.

Shortly thereafter Murphy was terminated by the police department because of her “[ijnability to perform the duties and functions of a Police Officer for medical reasons which cannot be accommodated.” Murphy, on November 27, 1993, objected to her discharge by requesting a hearing before the Personnel Salary and Advisory Board (PSAB). The PSAB held a hearing on May 6, 1994, and on June 6, 1994, denied Murphy’s request for reinstatement. Appellant appealed the Board of Trustees’ decision to the Baltimore County Board of Appeals. The Appeals Board affirmed the decision of the Board of Trustees on March 24,1994.

II

DISCUSSION A. Issue I — The Applicability of Biscoe Citing Biscoe v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 96 Md. App. 1 , 623 A.2d 666 , (1993), appellant argues that “[t]he law in Maryland states that a police officer denied retirement benefits on the ground that he or she is not permanently ¹²⁰ incapacitated for the further performance of his or her duties, may not be terminated for an inability to perform those duties because of the incapacity.” This was not our holding in Biscoe . We held in Biscoe that “[i]f an officer claiming [an] incapacity applies for retirement and is rejected upon a finding that he or she can perform the duties of an available position, the Police Commissioner cannot dismiss the officer upon a finding that the officer cannot perform those duties.” Biscoe, 96 Md.App. at 22 , 623 A.2d 666 . Thus, the contradictory findings that existed in Biscoe did not concern the “permanence” of Biscoe’s injuries. Instead, the contradiction existed because, on the one hand, Biscoe was told by the Board that he could perform his duties and, on the other hand, he was told by the police department that he could not perform them.

That issue does not present itself in the case sub judice. A review of the facts in Biscoe will make appellant’s misinterpretation of the case apparent. 2 Officer Biscoe completed police academy training in January 1981. By November 1991 he had used over 550 “sick days,” the bulk of which were taken after March 1988 when Biscoe was involved in a line-of-duty accident. In April 1990, Biscoe was assigned to “light duties” as a warrant officer in the Central Records Division where he worked for five days before taking a nine month medical leave.

During his medical leave, in August of 1990, Biscoe filed a petition for a disability pension as provided for in Baltimore City Code, Article 22, ¹²¹ § 29-41A. 3 In January of 1991, a hearing examiner denied his petition, stating: The Claimant does have degenerative arthritis of the right ankle which limits his ability to perform prolonged standing or walking on a persistent and regular basis. However, [I] find[ ] that the Claimant’s former duties as Warrant Officer did not require extensive walking and standing on a regular basis. In other -words, the hearing examiner determined that Officer Biscoe was still able to perform “light duties” and, thus, was not totally disabled. About three months later, in April of 1991, the Director of Personnel wrote a letter to Biscoe explaining that his use of medical leave was far above the precinct average and that he needed to reduce greatly his use of leave.

When Biscoe continued to use an excessive amount of sick leave, the Director recommended that he be brought before the disciplinary board. After numerous administrative and judicial hearings, Biscoe was terminated from the police force because of his inability to perform his duties — even light duty — on a full-time basis, a conclusion by the Department completely at odds with the Board’s determination that Biscoe was able to perform light duties. Thus, the issue in Biscoe was not the “permanency” of Officer Biscoe’s injuries, as appellant argues, but the conflict created by the fact that the disability retirement board found that Biscoe was still able to perform light duty, and therefore not qualified for a pension, and the fact that the police department later terminated Biscoe’s employment because it determined that Biscoe’s injuries did not permit him to per ¹²² form even light duty on a full-time basis. This conflict created an impermissible Catch-22.

It is here undisputed that the Board of Trustees and the Board of Appeals rejected Murphy’s retirement disability claim because they determined that no evidence was put forward to prove that her injury was “likely to be permanent.” Baltimore County Code § 23-55 presents three requirements for obtaining a disability pension. The officer must prove that he or she was (1) “totally and permanently incapacitated,” (2) by an accident that occurred in the line of duty, (3) that was not caused by willful negligence on the officer’s part.