Murrell v. Mayor of Baltimore

ELDRIDGE, J. The issue in this case is whether the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, upholding an administrative decision by the Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community Development to raze certain buildings, was appealable to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, held that the Circuit Court’s judgment was not appealable in light of Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and dismissed the appeal. We shall reverse. I. Prior to setting forth the facts and arguments in the present controversy, it would be useful to review briefly some of the pertinent statutory procedural requirements which must be followed before the Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community Development is entitled to raze a condemned building.

The Building Code, Baltimore City Code (2000 Repl.Vol.), Art. 32, contains a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at ensuring the legal use and occupancy of buddings in the City of Baltimore. The Department of Housing and Community Development is the administrative agency charged with the ¹⁷³ administration, interpretation, and enforcement of the Building Code. 1 Section 105 of the Building Code prescribes the duties and powers of the “Building Code Official,” stating that whenever any part of a building “become[s] dangerous, unsafe, or a menace to public health and safety, the Building Code Official may condemn it and take any other appropriate action to rectify or eliminate the dangerous or unsafe condition.” § 105.2. 2 Nevertheless, before the Building Code Official may take any action on a Building Code violation, the Official must give notice of the code violation to the person legally responsible for the maintenance of the building. See § 116.2. If the violation is not abated or the notice not complied with, the Official may then institute legal proceedings.

See § 116.3. Under § 119, if a structure is deemed “unsafe” or “unfit” for authorized use, the Building Code Official may require the owner to rehabilitate the building, or, if rehabilitation is not feasible, the Official may require the owner to raze the building. An order to raze is not final, however. Subsections 119.3.2.1 and 119.3.2.2 provide: “119.3.2.1 Appeal: The recipient of an order to raze ... may request administrative review of the order under § 123.5. “119.3.2.2 Timetable for rehabilitation: The Building Code Official may rescind or modify the order to raze if the owner demonstrates the financial ability and requisite expertise to rehabilitate the structure within a reasonable time, as determined by the Building Code Official, and agrees to comply with a specified timetable.

Failure to comply with an agreed timetable reinstates the order to raze.” ¹⁷⁴ Various actions are authorized under the Building Code to address the failure to comply with an order to rehabilitate or raze an unsafe building. These are listed in §§ 119.7 and 119.7.1: “119.7 Remedial action by Building Code Official: The Building Code Official may take action under this [section] whenever the owner ... cannot be found or fails to comply with a notice: a. to repair, rehabilitate, stabilize, or raze an unsafe budding or structure, b. to clean, close, board, or otherwise safeguard a vacant building, or c. to remove high grass and weeds or litter, trash, and debris from the premises of a vacant building. “119.7.1 Actions authorized: Under the circumstances described in § 119.7, after giving notice as required by this Code, the Building Code Official may proceed to do any 1 or more of the following: a. condemn the building, b. have a receiver appointed, or c. complete all or any part of the required work through officers, agents, employees, or contractors.” Thus, under § 119.7.1, the Building Code Official must give notice prior to razing a building that is deemed “unsafe” or “unfit” for authorized use. After receiving an order to raze or a condemnation notice, the owner of the building may seek administrative review under § 123. Section 123 sets forth, inter alia, the right to administrative review of notices and orders, the procedural requirements for the administrative hearings, and the right to judicial review of administrative decisions.

The detailed procedures for the administrative hearings can be found in § 123.6, which states in pertinent part as follows: “123.6 Procedure for hearings: The Building Code Official shall conduct all hearings held, under this Code in accordance with this § 123.6. ¹⁷⁵ “123.6.1 Hearings open to the public: All hearings shall be open to the public. “123.6.2 Notification of complainants: Before any hearing, the Building Code Official shall notify all persons who the Building Code Official knows are interested in the hearing of its scheduled date, tíme, place, and purpose. “123.6.4 Presiding Officer: The Building Code Official presides at all hearings. “123.6.6 Decision of Building Code Official: Within 30 days after a hearing is completed, the Building Code Official shall render a written decision that includes the reasons for the decision. “123.6.7 Records: The Department shall keep a complete record of all papers filed in connection with any hearing, together with a copy of the Building Code Official’s written decision.” II. Turning to the facts of this case, on August 17, 1992, the Department of Housing issued two notices of housing code violations to the petitioner Murrell for the buildings located at 562 Gold Street and 566 Gold Street. 3 The notices advised the petitioner to (1) “remove all trash and debris, high grass and weeds within ten (10) days of the date of this notice and keep in clean and sanitary condition at all times”; (2) “board up all accessible openings within ten (10) days of the date of this notice and notify inspector when this is done” as well as to “[k]eep these openings boarded until the building is razed or rehabilitated”; and, finally, to (3) “[rjepair and rehabilitate or raze after securing approval from the building official.” The notices stated that “conditions must be corrected by 9/17/92 ¹⁷⁶ unless otherwise noted.” The record in this case does not disclose what actions, if any, by either the petitioner or the Department, took place between August 17, 1992, and 1999. On February 2, 1999, Alvin Waters, an inspector for the Department of Housing, inspected the three properties located at 562 Gold Street, 566 Gold Street, and 2201-2203 Pennsylvania Avenue. As a result of his inspection, Mr. Waters posted a condemnation notice upon each of the properties.

Each notice of condemnation advised that the owner had a right to appeal. There is nothing in the record indicating that a condemnation notice was posted on the petitioner’s property located at 564 Gold Street. A week later, on February 9, 1999, Mr. Waters prepared a report for the Department of Housing describing the alleged code violations in detail, recommending that the three properties be condemned as a safety hazard, and stating that, if the conditions were not corrected or the braidings rehabilitated, the buildings should be razed. Specifically, his report noted as follows with respect to 562 Gold Street: “This building has been abandoned, it is rodent infested, dilapidated.

Lacks proper sanitation, heating, plumbing and utilities. Adjacent to a vacant building on either side and the braiding is a fire hazard; stress cracks in the side and rear masonry walls. “Above deteriorating conditions of damage and decay cause the braiding to be unsafe and unfit for human habitation. [Section 119.0, 119.1, and 119.1.1 of the 1997 Baltimore City Bldg Code] Recommend building be condemned as a SAFETY HAZARD. If the above conditions are not corrected or the structure rehabilitated, building should be razed.” Next, regarding 566 Gold Street, Mr. Waters’s report stated: “This building has been abandoned, it is rodent infested, dilapidated. Lacks proper sanitation, heating, plumbing and utilities.

Adjacent to a vacant building on either side and the building is a fire hazard; missing doors and windows, stress cracks in the side masonry wall. ¹⁷⁷ “Above deteriorating conditions of damage and decay cause the building to be unsafe and unfit for human habitation. [Section 119.0, 119.1, and 119.1.1 of the 1997 Baltimore City Bldg Code] Recommend building be condemned as a SAFETY HAZARD. If the above conditions are not corrected or the structure rehabilitated, building should be razed.” Finally, his report recited the following for 2201-2203 Pennsylvania Avenue: “The rear masonry wall has severe vertical and horizontal stress cracks with loose and bulging bricks, which appears to be in imminent danger of collapsing. “Above deteriorating conditions of damage and decay cause the building to be unsafe and unfit for human habitation. [Section 119.0, 119.1, and 119.1.1 of the 1997 Baltimore City Bldg Code] Recommend building be condemned as a SAFETY HAZARD. If the above conditions are not corrected building should be razed.” The record does not contain an inspection report for 564 Gold Street. On the same day, the Department of Housing mailed to the petitioner a letter for each of the condemned properties (562 Gold Street, 566 Gold Street, and 2201-2203 Pennsylvania Avenue), which enclosed a copy of the condemnation notice.

The Department of Housing also sent to the petitioner letters notifying him of the impending charges and liens for the cost of razing the condemned properties. The Department of Housing sent four letters — they referred to (1) 562 Gold Street; (2) 566 Gold Street; (3) 2201-2203 Pennsylvania Avenue; and (4) 564 Gold Street. The letters, which were identical except for the property address referenced, stated: “In accordance with the Condemnation Notice issued on February 2,1999, this is to advise that the above-mentioned property, owned by you is to be razed. The work will be performed under emergency orders of the Director of Construction and Buildings Inspection.

Under provisions of the Baltimore City Code, funds expended by the City to per ¹⁷⁸ form this work are chargeable against the owner and constitute a lien against the property. “A bill covering the services performed by the City will be forwarded to you shortly. “The purpose of this letter is to notify you of the impending bill and lien. Upon receipt of the bill for such emergency work, these charges must be paid within thirty (30) days to avoid further legal action. It is suggested that arrangements be made to satisfy this lien prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) days.” This was the first document referring to a problem with the 564 Gold Street property. Although the letters advised the petitioner that “[t]he work will be performed under emergency orders,” the Department of Housing later stated: “While petitioner ... claims that these properties did not involve an emergency, [the Department of Housing] never claimed that their demolition did in fact constitute an emergency.” A month later, on March 8, 1999, the petitioner met with Mr. Harris, who was also an inspector from the Department of Housing.

The petitioner related to Mr. Harris that he planned to renovate the buildings in question. Mr. Harris advised him to contact the Department of Housing, which, in turn, advised him to take an appeal. By letter dated March 15, 1999, the petitioner requested an appeal from the Department’s determination and condemnation order. The petitioner then applied for permits to paint the exterior walls and to install windows for each of the properties on Gold Street, as well as to remove and replace the rear brick wall for the 2201-2203 Pennsylvania Avenue warehouse.

These applications were received by the Department of Housing on April 1,1999, and were each denied on April 6, 1999. Notably, an internal memorandum from the Department of Housing, dated the same day, stated in reference to the 2201-2203 Pennsylvania Avenue warehouse: “This is the building the Mayor ask[ed] the Commissioner to take down at the ribbon cutting on 3/31/99.” ¹⁷⁹ The petitioner then hired Derrick Burnett, an architect, to perform a building survey on the four subject properties. Mr. Burnett inspected the buildings and submitted a report to the petitioner on April 13, 1999. With respect to the three Gold Street properties, the report essentially stated that the structural integrity of the buildings was sound, but that some aesthetic improvements should be made.

The report noted that the rear wall of the Pennsylvania Avenue warehouse should be repaired, but that the overall structural integrity of the building “appears to be sound and in good standing condition.” A copy of this report was forwarded to the Department of Housing on April 14,1999. On April 13, 1999, the Department of Housing sent a letter to the petitioner granting his request for a hearing. The letter stated, in pertinent part: “Please be advised that ... your request for an Administrative Hearing has been granted relative to the City Condemnation and order to raze the subject property. The Hearing has been scheduled for: Date: April 26,1999 Time: 10:30 a.m.

Location: 417 E. Fayette Street, Room — 1301” The hearing took place as scheduled and was attended by the petitioner, his counsel, Mr. Burnett, and several officials from the Department of Housing. Mr. Dennis Taylor, who apparently had been designated by the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development as the “Building Code Official,” see n. 2, supra, presided over the proceeding. According to an affidavit of Mr. Murrell later filed in the Circuit Court, Mr. Burnett at the hearing discussed the findings in his architectural report. In addition, Mr. Murrell stated in his affidavit that, at the hearing, he “advised Mr. Taylor that the rear wall to the warehouse at 2201-2203 Pennsylvania Avenue could be repaired within two weeks and that the remaining work on all the properties, including 562-566 Gold Street, could be repaired within sixty days.

Mr. Taylor advised me that this plan was ¹⁸⁰ acceptable and that I should follow through and get the necessary construction permits.” The only “record” of the hearing is a single page of paper containing some handwritten notes. The notes recite that the petitioner intended to “restore the properties] within 90 days,” that he intended to “encapsulate [the] lead paint,” and, referring to the 2201-2203 Pennsylvania Avenue property, that the “warehouse repairs will be made in two weeks.” Nevertheless, Mr. Murrell stated in his affidavit, “[a]fter the meeting that day, April 26, 1999, I attempted to obtain construction permits for the properties but was advised by Shawn Karimian, at the Department of Housing ... that he would not authorize their issuance and that no matter what I did, the properties would be demolished.” On the same day as the hearing, the Commissioner of the Department of Housing, Mr. Daniel Henson, sent a letter to the petitioner stating as follows: “This letter will serve as formal notification to you of the results of the hearing and my concurrence with the decision reached by the Hearing Officer. The results and decision are as follows: 1) The Hearing Panel determined by City records that you failed to repair and rehabilitate or raze your properties at the subject addresses which have severely deteriorated and constituted a threat to the public health and safety and; 2) Proper procedures were followed to notify you of the City Condemnation and order to raze the subject properties and; 3) Pursuant to 119.2 of Article 32 of the Baltimore City Building Code (as amended) the notice ordering you to raze the properties will remain in effect as issued and; 4) City demolition of the properties after your failure to do so will result in a lien being placed against them for the demolition work performed. ¹⁸¹ The record shows that this letter was returned “unclaimed” and was not received by the petitioner. In addition, although Commissioner Henson’s letter refers to “the decision reached by the Hearing Officer,” the record contains no such decision.

Furthermore, the record contains nothing confirming that such a decision by the designated “Building Code Official,” who conducted the hearing, was ever made. On the following day, Commissioner Henson sent to the petitioner’s counsel a letter stating: “I am in receipt of your letter ... which included a report by an architectural firm. “After reviewing this report, I have determined that the condemnation notice will remain in effect based on the following: 1. The submitted report is not stamped by a licensed structural engineer; and 2. according to the Baltimore City Building Code, a structure can be condemned for reasons other than its structural integrity.” On May 4, 1999, Mr. Karimian from the Department of Housing approved the Department’s application to raze the three properties located at 562, 564, and 566 Gold Street. Several days later, the Department’s application to raze the warehouse located at 2201-2203 Pennsylvania Avenue was also approved.

On May 21, 1999, the petitioner filed, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, an action to review the Department’s decision. Named as defendant was “The Department of Housing and Community Development of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.” In an accompanying memorandum, the petitioner argued that the Department of Housing had failed to comply with the mandated procedures set forth in the Building Code. Additionally, the petitioner argued that the Department’s actions violated Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Article III, § 40, of the Maryland Constitution. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court issued an order affirming the decision of the Department of Housing. ¹⁸² Within seven days after the Circuit Court’s decision, the petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment of the Circuit Court pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-584.

While this motion was pending, the Department of Housing razed the properties and assessed the costs to the petitioner. The petitioner’s motion was denied by the Circuit Court on June 1, 2000. The petitioner then filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, asserting that Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, precluded an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. 4 The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing that § 12-302(a) precluded the appeal.

With regard to the petitioner’s contention that the action in the Circuit Court was “in the nature of a mandamus proceeding” and that, therefore, an appeal was authorized by § 12-301 of the Courts and ¹⁸³ Judicial Proceedings Article, the Court of Special Appeals stated: “The facts do not support appellants’ claim that the review in circuit court was not a judicial review action, but actually a mandamus action.... “In this case, appellants sought judicial review of the decision of an administrative agency, [the Department of Housing], in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. In their petition for judicial review, appellants requested that the circuit court ‘reverse the decision of the Department of Housing and Community Development.’ At no time did appellants style their review in circuit court as a mandamus action or request relief appropriate to a mandamus action, such as ordering [the Department of Housing] to mail conforming notices to appellants or to conduct an administrative hearing following the appropriate procedures. Instead, appellants sought review of the administrative procedures employed and factual and legal issues decided. In all respects, the circuit court action was an ordinary statutory judicial review action.” The petitioner filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the action in the Circuit Court was “in substance a common law mandamus action” and was appeal-able under the principles set forth in Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, 345 Md. 477, 485-500 , 693 A.2d 757 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1053 , 118 S.Ct. 702 , 139 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998).

The petitioner further argued that the respondent failed to comply with both statutory and constitutional requirements. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the appeal was properly dismissed. 5 This Court granted ¹⁸⁴ the certiorari petition, Murrell v. Baltimore, 365 Md. 472 , 781 A.2d 778 (2001).

III

A. This is the most recent in a line of cases involving the application of Maryland Code (1974, 2002 RepLVol.), § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which, inter alia, creates an exception to the general appeals statute for statutory actions in the circuit courts seeking judicial review of adjudicatory administrative decisions. 6 The general appeals statute, which is § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, broadly authorizes appeals from final judgments in civil cases decided by the circuit courts. Section 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, however, provides that “§ 12-301 does not permit an appeal from a final judgment of a court entered ... in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of ... an administrative agency----” This Court in Kant v. Montgomery County, 365 Md. 269, 274 , 778 A.2d 384, 387 (2001), explained § 12-302(a) as follows: ¹⁸⁵ “Although § 12-302(a) refers to a circuit court exercising ‘appellate jurisdiction’ in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency or local legislative body, the word ‘appellate’ is a misnomer in this context. As we have often pointed out, a circuit court action reviewing the adjudicatory decision of an administrative agency or local legislative body is not an ‘appeal.’ Instead, it is an original action for judicial review. The above-quoted language in § 12-302(a), creating an exception to the general appeals statute, ‘refers to an original circuit court action, authorized by statute, judicially reviewing an adjudicatory decision of an administrative agency or an adjudicatory decision of a local legislative body when it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.’ ” Quoting Prince George’s County v. Beretta, 358 Md. 166, 175 , 747 A.2d 647, 652 (2000).

Since § 12-301 does not authorize an appeal from a circuit court judgment in a statutory action for judicial review of an adjudicatory administrative decision, any right of appeal in such a case must be found in some other statute. Where no other statute authorizes an appeal in the type of case covered by § 12-302(a), the Court of Special Appeals is not authorized to entertain the appeal and must dismiss it. See Prince George’s County v. Beretta, supra, 358 Md. at 180-183 , 747 A.2d at 654-656 . As the Court of Special Appeals correctly determined, § 123.7 of the Building Code limits judicial review of a decision of the Department of Housing to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

It does not provide for an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Furthermore, no other statute which has been called to our attention expressly provides for such an appeal. Consequently, the critical question in this case is whether the suit is a statutory judicial review action encompassed by § 12-302(a) or whether the suit can legitimately be treated as a common law mandamus action. If it is the former, as held by the Court of Special Appeals, then the intermediate appellate court correctly dismissed the appeal.

If it is the latter, as ¹⁸⁶ argued for by the petitioner, then the Circuit Court’s judgment was appealable under § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. B. Although we have in some recent cases set forth the history of § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, see n. 6, supra, it would be useful to review again some of that history. The historical background of a statute often casts light on the meaning or scope of that statute. The principle embodied in § 12-302(a) began as a judicially created exception to the broad general appeals statute.

The first Maryland case adopting the principle appears to be Wilmington & Susquehanna Railroad Company v. Condon, 8 G. & J. 443 (1837). That case involved an Act of the General Assembly authorizing the condemnation of property for a railroad, authorizing the sheriff to summon a jury to fix the value of the property condemned, and providing for judicial review in the County Court 7 of the decision by the sheriffs jury. An appeal to this Court was taken from the County Court’s judgment affirming the jury’s decision, but, in a brief one paragraph opinion, this Court held that the judgment was not appealable, reasoning as follows ( 8 G. & J. at 448 , emphasis added): “From the nature and course of their proceedings, this power of review [of the decision by the sheriffs jury] is a fit subject for litigation in a County Court, but it is wholly inappropriate to the jurisdiction of this Court. It is a special limited jurisdiction given to the County Court, from the decision of which no appeal lies to any other tribunal.” While the Court in Condon pointed out that the statute authorizing judicial review of the sheriffs jury’s decision did not expressly provide for an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Condon opinion did not discuss or even cite the general ¹⁸⁷ appeals statute in effect at the time, the broad language of which would appear to authorize an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The next case to dismiss an appeal under the principle announced in Condon appears to have been Savage Manufacturing Co. v. Owings, 3 Gill 497 (1846). In that case, an enactment of the General Assembly provided for a proceeding before a Commission if individuals petitioned for the opening of a public road, and the statute further provided for “confirmation” proceedings before a County Court. In the Savage case, the Commission ordered a public road to be opened, and the court confirmed the Commission’s decision. An appeal to this Court was dismissed, with the Court stating ( 3 Gill at 498 ): “Jurisdiction of this proceeding is not exercised by the County Court, in virtue of its general powers, as a Court of common law; it is vested by a special delegation of power and by the terms of the Act which confers it, to be exercised, not according to the forms and course of the common law, but in a special and peculiar mode.” The Court went on to hold that neither a writ of error nor an appeal will lie “to a Court vested with special jurisdiction, and which does not proceed according to the forms of the common law.” Id. at 499 .

In Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, supra, 345 Md. at 487-488 , 693 A.2d at 762 , we summarized the applications of the Condon and Savage rule as follows: This rule of construction was subsequently applied by this Court in a variety of contexts, including judgments of county courts or circuit courts reviewing decisions by justices of the peace, Herzberg v. Adams, 39 Md. 309, 312 (1874); Hough v. Kelsey & Gray, 19 Md. 451, 455-456 (1863); State v. Mister, 5 Md. 11, 15 (1853); Crockett v. Parke, 7 Gill. 237, 240 (1848); judgments of the Baltimore City Court reviewing judgments of People’s Court of Baltimore City, Montgomery Ward v. Herrmann, 190 Md. 405, 408-411 , 58 A.2d 677, 678-680 (1948); judgments of county ¹⁸⁸ and circuit courts reviewing decisions of local government officials, Co. Commrs. Harford Co. v. Jay, 122 Md. 324, 327 , 89 A. 715, 717 (1914); Stephens v. Mayor & Council of Crisfield, 122 Md. 190, 192-193 , 89 A. 429, 429-430 (1914); Webster v. Cockey, 9 Gill 92, 93-95 (1850); circuit court judgments reviewing certain decisions of orphans’ courts, Lammott v. Maulsby, 8 Md. 5, 8-9 (1855); and circuit court judgments in actions for judicial review of administrative agency decisions, Simpler v. State, Use of Boyd, 223 Md. 456, 460-461 , 165 A.2d 464, 466 (1960); Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 196 Md. 400, 406-407 , 76 A.2d 736, 738 (1950). We went on in the Gisriel opinion to point out that, in more recent times, the rule has been most frequently applied to preclude appeals in statutory actions for judicial review of administrative adjudicatory decisions ( 345 Md. at 488 , 693 A.2d at 762-763 ): “The rule precluding, under the general appeals statute, appeals from circuit court judgments in cases of special limited statutory jurisdiction, persisted despite several recodifications of the general appeals statutes by the Legislature containing no mention of the rule. Furthermore, in later years, the rule was frequently applied to limit appeals from circuit court judgments reviewing decisions of administrative agencies.

See, e.g., Prince George’s Co. v. AFSCME Council 67, 289 Md. 388, 397-400, 406 , 424 A.2d 770, 774-776, 779 (1981); Urbana Civic v. Urbana Mobile, 260 Md. 458, 461 , 272 A.2d 628, 630 (1971) (‘ “The rule is that where an inferior court exercises a special limited jurisdiction which is conferred by statute, no appeal from its decision in such cases lies to this [C]ourt unless expressly given by the statute” ’); Md. Pharmacy Board v. Peco, Inc., 234 Md. 200, 202 , 198 A.2d 273, 274 (1964) (‘the provisions of [the general appeal statute] do not apply to cases where the trial court exercises a special or limited jurisdiction conferred by statute’); Hart v. Commr. of Motor Vehicles, 226 Md. 584, 587 , 174 A.2d 725, 726 (1961); Simpler v. State, Use of Boyd, supra, 223 Md. at 460-461 , 165 A.2d at 466 ; Bd. of Med. ¹⁸⁹ Examiners v. Steward, 208 Md. 574 , 580-581, 102 A.2d 248, 251 (1954); Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 196 Md. at 406-407 , 76 A.2d at 738 ; Abbott v. Administrative Hearing Board, 33 Md.App. 681, 685-686 , 366 A.2d 756, 759 (1976), cert. denied, 280 Md. 727 (1977); Prince George’s County v. Fahey, 28 Md.App. 312, 315-316 , 345 A.2d 102, 104-105 (1975).” Finally, we pointed out in Gisriel that the General Assembly in 1973 abolished most applications of the rule, but for the first time, embodied the rule in a statute with regard to judicial review actions of adjudicatory administrative decisions and adjudicatory local government decisions. We further pointed out that the practical impact of the rule is almost entirely with regard to adjudicatory decisions by local government administrative agencies and governmental bodies ( 345 Md. at 488-490 , 693 A.2d at 763 , footnotes omitted): “In 1973, the General Assembly recodified the appeals statutes in its enactment of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Code, which became effective on January 1, 1974. With its enactment of § 12-301, the Legislature retained the broad, general grant of the right to appeal. In addition, § 12-301 partially abrogated the above-discussed rule by expressly stating that the right of appeal existed ‘from a final judgment by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction’ unless expressly denied by law.

Thus the Legislature abolished a large part of the doctrine disallowing appeals from circuit court judgments entered pursuant to the exercise of special limited statutory jurisdiction. “The Legislature, however, expressly retained a portion of the doctrine by its enactment of § 12-302(a), which makes § 12-301 inapplicable to appeals from final judgments of circuit courts reviewing decisions of the District Court, administrative agencies, or local legislative bodies. Nevertheless, judgments of the circuit courts reviewing decisions of the District Court are generally subject to further discretionary appellate review by petitions for writs of certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals. See §§ 12-305 ¹⁹⁰ and 12-307(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Moreover,