Musgrove v. State

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Appellant, Wayne Musgrove, was convicted of daytime housebreaking and grand larceny by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Judge James H. Pugh, the presiding judge, thereupon imposed a general sentence of ten years in the Maryland Penitentiary. It appears that the apartment of Julius Kristal was entered illegally during the daytime.

When called by the State, Mr. Kristal testified that he left his apartment on the morning of November 19, 1965, and upon his return at approximately 5 :30 P.M. that day, he found the apartment “in a shambles.” Mr. Kristal testified that cash in excess of $100 was missing from the apartment and that his jewelry case had been opened and certain items of jewelry were missing therefrom. When asked about the condition of the entrance door, Mr. Kristal stated, “I wouldn’t know, I didn’t look at it, not anticipating anything.” He also testified that keys to the apartment were possessed by himself, his wife, his nineteen year old son, and the resident manager. He indicated that on the day in question an engineer had been in his apartment for the purpose of making repairs. Neither Mrs. Kristal nor the Kristal’s son were called as witnesses. ⁵⁶ The Appellant contends, arid the State concedes, that there was no evidence presented which would establish a breaking into the apartment as required by Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 30 (1967 Repl.

Vol.), the statute under which Musgrove was indicted. We agree, and accordingly, the judgment of conviction for daytime housebreaking will be reversed. The only evidence connecting the Appellant with the crime of larceny was his fingerprint which was found upon Mr. Kristal’s jewelry case and he contends that this evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. It is a sound principle of law that proof of fingerprints corresponding to those of the accused, found in the place where a crime was committed, under such circumstances that they could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed, may be sufficient proof of identity to sustain a conviction.

Wharton, Crim. Ev., Vol. 3, Sec. 982, p. 480; Underhill, Crim. Ev., Vol. 1, Sec. 142, p. 269. In McNeil v. State, 227 Md. 298 , the Court of Appeals dealt with a set of facts not dissimilar from those presented in the instant case.

The record there indicated that a tavern had been closed for business and locked up on February 7, 1961. The proprietor had visited the tavern on February 28, 1961, and found everything in order. When he again visited the tavern on March 4, 1961, he found that a cellar window had been broken out, that his safe had been severely damaged and that various machines had been broken into and various items had been taken from the premises. A police officer testified that he found a partially empty beer bottle beside the safe, from which bottle he had obtained a fingerprint.

An expert testified that the fingerprint was that of the accused, and that it had been left on the bottle not more than eighteen hours prior to March 4, 1961. The proprietor testified that the bottle was not there upon his previous visit. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to support the inference of guilt drawn by the trial court, sitting without a jury. The