Myers v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services

MEREDITH, J. This case concerns the authority of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) to grant relief to a State employee who files a grievance claiming that the employee’s position has been incorrectly reclassified. The State contends that, even if the ALJ agrees with the employee that the position has been incorrectly reclassified, the ALJ is limited to ordering that there be a new classification study. The employees who are appellants in this case assert that the ALJ, as the final decision maker in the grievance proceeding, has the authority to order that the employee’s classification be changed. The ALJ agreed with the employees.

So shall we. Background Title 4 of Md.Code (1996, 2004 RepLVol.), State Personnel and Pensions Article (“S.P.P.”), § 4-201, et seq., provides for the Secretary of the Department o'f Budget and Management (“Secretary-DBM”) to establish position classifications for State employees. Each employee is entitled to receive a written position description, S.P.P. § 7-102(a), and the duties ²⁷⁵ assigned to the employee must be “consistent with the duties and responsibilities for the position’s assigned class.” S.P.P. § T — 102(e)(1). Prior to May 18, 2000, State employees who handled purchasing and procurement duties generally held positions that were classified as being part of the Agency Buyer series of classifications.

In 1999, the Department of Budget and Management (“DBM”) created a new classification series that distinguished employees who purchased items using the competitive bidding or negotiation process from those who generally purchased items for their agency without utilizing competitive bidding or negotiation. The new classifications were known as the Agency Procurement Specialist series, published by DBM on May 18, 2000. The appellants in this case are seven employees who have jobs involving procurement for the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”), the appel-lee. Prior to a classification study that was conducted by the DPSCS in 2001, all of the appellants were employed in positions that were classified in the Agency Buyer series.

In an effort to determine whether the newly created Agency Procurement Specialist series applied to any of its procurement personnel, in 2001, the DPSCS conducted a study of the classifications of 28 employees holding positions in the Agency Buyer series, including the appellants. The classification analyst who conducted the DPSCS study requested clarification from the DBM’s Division of Salary Administration and Position Classifications as to the distinction between the older Agency Buyer series and the new Agency Procurement Specialist series. In a letter dated March 9, 2001, a classification analyst from the DBM’s Division of Salary Administration and Position Classification responded: “Both the Agency Procurement Specialist series and the Agency Buyer series are used for positions performing procurement work. [However,] [t]he Agency Procurement Specialist series was designed to recognize work related to the competitive or negotiated procurement process.” In contrast, ²⁷⁶ “Agency [B]uyers are not responsible for procurements made through the competitive or negotiated process,” and “[t]hey do not determine the most appropriate procurement methods to use in accordance with COMAE Title 21.” Based upon the recommendations made at the conclusion of the classification study, the classification of appellant Beverly Smith’s position was upgraded from Agency Buyer I to Agency Buyer V. The positions of appellants Diane Myers, Kevin Hunt, and Tracey Lunkin were reclassified from Agency Buyer V to Agency Procurement Specialist II; and the positions of appellants Debra Carty, Jayne Dryden, and Behira Said were reclassified from Agency Buyer IV to Agency Procurement Specialist II. On September 11, 2001, Smith filed a grievance with the DPSCS, contending that her position “should be reclassified to at least Agency Procurement Specialist II retroactive to the fullest legal extent.” On the same date, the other six appellants (all of whom had had their positions reclassified to Agency Procurement Specialist II) jointly filed a grievance with the DPSCS, contending that their positions “should be reclassified to Agency Procurement Specialist Supervisor retroactive to the fullest legal extent.” In accordance with S.P.P. § 12-201(b), the DPSCS agreed to bypass “Step One” of the grievance process (S.P.P. § 12-203).

Pursuant to S.P.P. § 12-204, the DPSCS conducted a “Step Two” conference to review the appellants’ grievances, but was unable to resolve the grievances. Following the Step Two conference, the DPSCS denied the employees’ requests to have their positions further reclassified. As “Step Three” of the grievance process, pursuant to S.P.P. § 12-205, the employees appealed the DPSCS’s decision to the Secretary-DBM. A designee of the Secretary-DBM convened a conciliation conference with the parties, but failed to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement.

Therefore, as required by S.P.P. § 12 — 205(b)(2)(ii), the Secretary-DBM referred the matters to the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) to “dispose of the grievancefs] or conduct a hearing” pursuant to S.P.P. ²⁷⁷ § 12-205(c). The decision of the OAH “is the final administrative decision,” pursuant to S.P.P. § 12 — 205(c)(2)(ii). An evidentiary hearing to consider appellants’ consolidated grievances was held by the OAH. In a written opinion dated May 22, 2003, the ALJ determined that appellant Smith’s “job duties primarily relate to the competitive and/or negotiated procurement process.” He also found that appellant Smith and her supervisor, appellant Myers (whose position had been reclassified to Agency Procurement Specialist II as a consequence of the DPSCS study), shared similar job responsibilities.

The ALJ further found that in Myers’s absence, Smith performed Myers’s supervisory duties. Based upon the evidence presented at the administrative hearing, including the DPSCS’s review of Smith’s position, the DBM’s guidance letter of March 9, 2001, and the testimony of the employees and classification analysts who appeared at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that “Ms. Smith should be reclassed to Agency Procurement Specialist II.” With respect to Myers’s request that her position be classified as Agency Procurement Specialist Supervisor, the ALJ noted that in order for a position to be classified as Agency Procurement Specialist Supervisor, the employee’s duties must include the supervision of someone classified as an Agency Procurement Specialist in the Agency Procurement Specialist series. At the time the DPSCS conducted its classification review of appellant Myers’s position, her duties did not include the supervision of anyone classified in the Agency Procurement Specialist series. Accordingly, the DPSCS had determined that Myers’s position could not be reclassified to Agency Procurement Specialist Supervisor.

Nonetheless, as a consequence of the ALJ’s conclusion that Smith’s position should be reclassified to Agency Procurement Specialist II, appellant Myers’s duties do include supervision of an employee classified in the Agency Procurement Specialist series. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that appellant Myers’s duties now qualified her position to be reclassified to Agency Procurement Specialist Supervisor. The ALJ further ordered “that Beverly Smith and Diane Myers should receive ²⁷⁸ back pay from September 11, 2000.” (September 11, 2000, was one year prior to the date appellants filed their grievances.) With respect to the remaining five employees seeking reclassification from Agency Procurement Specialist II to Agency Procurement Specialist Supervisor, the ALJ denied their grievances. Although there was some evidence to suggest that appellants Hunt, Lunkin, Carty, Dryden, and Said performed functions similar to appellant Myers, none of these other five employees supervised employees whose positions were classified in the Agency Procurement Specialist series.

Consequently, the ALJ denied the requests of Hunt, Lunkin, Carty, Dryden, and Said to have their positions reclassified to Agency Procurement Specialist Supervisor. The DPSCS filed a petition with the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, requesting judicial review of the ALJ’s decision to reclassify appellants Smith and Myers. In a cross-petition, the five appellants whose grievances were denied sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision not to reclassify their positions. In a written opinion filed April 1, 2004, the circuit court concluded that the ALJ exceeded the scope of his authority when he ordered that Smith’s and Myers’s positions be reclassified.

Based upon the DPSCS’s contention that reclassification was not a remedy available to the ALJ under S.P.P § 12-402, the circuit court stated: This Court finds that although ALJ Dewberry had sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ms. Smith and Ms. Myers should be reclassified, he exceeded his scope of authority in actually ordering the reclassification. Consequently, this Court modifies the decision of the ALJ on the issue of Ms. Smith and Ms. [Myers’s] reclassification and orders ALJ Dewberry to remand the case to the Department [ie., DPSCS] to restudy Ms. Smith’s and Ms. [Myers’s] positions in accordance with his findings below. ²⁷⁹ This Court finds no error in the ALJ’s determination that Ms. Smith was entitled to reclassification as an APS II and as a result of Ms. Smith’s reclassification, Ms. Myers was also entitled to reclassification as an APS-Supervisor. (Emphasis in original.) The circuit court affirmed the ALJ’s decision not to reclassify the remaining five appellants. All seven employees noted an appeal to this Court.

I. AIM’s Order to Reclassify Positions of Smith and Myers In an appeal from the circuit court’s ruling upon a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision, we look through the circuit court’s decision and review the decision of the agency. Dept. of Health v. Campbell, 364 Md. 108, 123 , 771 A.2d 1051 (2001) (“it is the final decision of the final decision maker at the administrative level, not that of the reviewing court, that is subject to judicial review”). The standard of review was recently summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows: Many Maryland cases have set out the standard for judicial review of administrative agency decisions. We have often stated that a court ordinarily will review the actions of an administrative agency only to determine if its conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

In reviewing factual determinations, or mixed questions of law and fact, we apply the “substantial evidence” standard set forth in § 10-222(h)(3)(v) of the State Government Article, reversing the agency’s findings only if we hold that “a reasoning mind” could not have reached them on the record before the agency. Charles County v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 295 , 855 A.2d 313, 318 (2004); Board of Physician v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-68 , 729 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1999). See Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512-13 , 390 A.2d 1119, 1123-24 (1978). In reviewing an agency’s legal conclusions, on the other hand, we determine under § 10-222(h)(3)(iv) of the State Government Article whether the conclusions are “affected by any other error of law.” Accordingly, we review de ²⁸⁰ novo.

Spencer v. State Board of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 528 , 846 A.2d 341, 348-49 (2004). While we frequently give weight to an agency’s experience in interpretation of a statute that it administers, it is always -within our prerogative to determine whether an agency’s conclusions of law are correct. Christopher v. Montgomery County Dept. of Health & Human Services, 381 Md. 188, 198 , 849 A.2d 46, 52 (2004); Baltimore Lutheran High Sch. v. Empl. Sec. Adm., 302 Md. 649, 662 , 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985).

In reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, we evaluate the decision of the agency under the same statutory standards as would the circuit court. Spencer, 380 Md. at 523-24 , 846 A.2d at 346 (2004). Kushell v. Department of Natural Resources, 385 Md. 563 , 870 A.2d 186 , Slip Opinion at 12-13 (2005). Consequently, the question of law for us to decide with respect to appellants Smith and