Myers v. State

GREENE, J. This case stems from a stop, arrest, and search of petitioner, Ernest Myers, on February 12, 2003, in Pennsylvania. The stop and detention of Myers led to the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant and the discovery of stolen goods located in his vehicle. 1 Eight days after the stop, but prior to Myers’s conviction in Pennsylvania, Maryland law enforce ²⁶⁶ ment agents used information gained from the stop and search of Myers’s vehicle in Pennsylvania to obtain a Maryland search warrant. A subsequent search of a Maryland residence yielded evidence that linked Myers to several burglaries in Maryland. 2 The Circuit Court for Washington County denied Myers’s motion to suppress and admitted into evidence several stolen items which were recovered from a residence in Hagerstown (“Hagerstown residence”). Myers was convicted by a jury of theft of property having a value of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or greater, 3 and was sentenced to ten-years imprisonment.

He appealed to the Court of Special Appeals challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, the alleged illegality of his arrest, and the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. Myers v. State, 165 Md.App. 502 , 885 A.2d 920 (2005). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Myers’s conviction, and he filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, which we granted. Myers v. State, 391 Md. 577 , 894 A.2d 545 (2006).

The issue for our review is whether an arrest, pursuant to an outstanding arrest warrant, and subsequent Maryland search warrants were sufficiently attenuated from a traffic stop, which the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined was illegal under Pennsylvania law. We hold that the arrest of Myers pursuant to an outstanding arrest warrant sufficiently attenuated the taint of the traffic stop in Pennsylvania. FACTS We adopt the facts as accepted by the Court of Special Appeals, including those set forth by the Pennsylvania Superi- or Court: ²⁶⁷ The charge and conviction in this case was based on the theft of property taken on October 11, 2002, from the residence of Joseph Marinelli in Washington County. Hs H* ‡ ❖ The facts, in pertinent part, as set forth in the Superior Court’s opinion (quoting from the trial court’s opinion), are as follows [:] On February 12, 2003, at approximately [6:40 p.m.], Officer Clifford Weikert of the Carroll Valley Borough Police Department, while in a marked vehicle on routine patrol, observed a red Dodge Sundance unoccupied and parked in a no-parking zone along Northern Pike Trail.

As he proceeded down the roadway past the vehicle, Officer Weikert observed a black male individual wearing a dark stocking cap and dark clothing walking toward the vehicle. As Officer Weikert passed this individual, Officer Weikert observed this individual bend over and apparently cover his face from Officer Weikert’s view. Alerted by these actions, Officer Weikert proceeded down the road, immediately turned his vehicle around, and returned towards the area where he observed the individual and the vehicle. As he headed toward the parked vehicle, Officer Weikert observed the red Dodge Sundance pass him at a high rate of speed.

Based upon the distance between the location where Officer Weikert initially observed [Myers], the location of the parked vehicle and the amount of time that passed while Officer Weikert turned his vehicle around, Officer Weikert opined that the individual must have sprinted to the vehicle since the time of his initial observation. When the Dodge Sundance passed the police vehicle, Officer Weikert once again turned his vehicle around in order to follow the Dodge Sundance. While following the vehicle, he estimated it was traveling at a rate of speed of 40 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone. Officer Weikert indicated that at the time he observed the individual walking along the roadway, he was aware of a description of a suspect from a February 5, 2003 incident, in ²⁶⁸ which a known eyewitness described a person involved in an attempted burglary.

Specifically, Officer Weikert was aware that the suspect involved in the February 5, 2003, incident was wearing charcoal gray clothing, a dark blue cap, and was a black male between 5'6" and 5'10" in height. Officer Weikert was also aware that several weeks prior to this incident there were a number of burglary or criminal trespass related incidents occurring in the Carroll Valley Borough area.... * * * * Prior to the stop of the individual’s vehicle, Officer Weikert was also aware that the investigation into the criminal incidents ... revealed that each of the incidents occurred between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., which was a time consistent with the time of Officer Weikert’s observation of the subject in dark clothing. According to Officer Weikert, the recent number of burglaries within the Carroll Valley area was excessive and unusual based upon his experience as a Carroll Valley police officer and his familiarity with the area. * * * * Officer Weikert initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. At the time of the traffic stop, Officer Weikert observed in plain view a large screwdriver within the vehicle, which appeared to him to be consistent with a screwdriver capable of making pry marks [similar to those] found at [the other recent burglaries].

Officer Weikert identified the driver as [Myers] and took him into custody on outstanding warrants from a neighboring jurisdiction[ 4 ] As a result of a search incident to his arrest, ²⁶⁹ several items of rare United States Currency and a savings bond titled in another person’s name were recovered from [his] person. The screwdriver was seized, the vehicle was impounded, and a search warrant was obtained for a search of the vehicle. During the subsequent search, a number of pieces of jewelry were found in the front console and seized as evidence. j-* * * Suppression Hearing — Maryland [A]fter [Myers] was charged in this case, he filed a motion to suppress all evidence. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Eric Guyer, with the Pennsylvania State Police, and Investigator Greg Alton, with the Washington County Sheriffs Department, testified.

Trooper Guyer testified to the following: In September, 2002, he was assigned to the criminal investigation division and continued an investigation, begun by his predecessor, of several burglaries with similar modes of operation. In connection with that investigation, Trooper Guyer had frequent contact with Investigator Alton. ²⁷⁰ On February 12, 2003, the day of the traffic stop, Trooper Guyer went to the Carroll Valley[, PA] Police Department station. At that time, Trooper Guyer became aware of evidence that had been seized from [Myers] and his vehicle. Trooper Guyer also interviewed [Myers].

Trooper Guyer contacted Investigator Alton and shared information. As a result of information obtained from the evidence seized, officers applied for and obtained search warrants, which were executed[ 5 ] The evidence obtained included stolen property and physical evidence connecting [Myers] to various crime scenes. ²⁷¹ Investigator Alton testified that he began investigating burglaries in December 2001 and that he had identified [thirty-four] burglaries with a similar mode of operation. Prior to the traffic stop of [Myers] in Pennsylvania, Investigator Alton had a description of a suspect, described as a black male 5'7" or 5'8" in height. This information was made available to various police departments.

Investigator Alton did not know [Myers] and had not identified him as a suspect. Investigator Alton was aware that the arrest of [Myers] on February 12, 2003, was on an outstanding arrest warrant. Based on information obtained from the evidence seized from [Myers], Investigator Alton obtained and executed search warrants in Maryland. One of the places searched was a residence located at 26 Belview Avenue in Hagerstown.

During the search, the police seized stolen property, some of which had been stolen from the residence of Joseph Marinelli on October 11, 2002. The police found other items.... The search warrants were obtained and executed prior to the Superior Court’s decision. At the suppression hearing [in the Circuit Court for Washington County], five search warrants were introduced into evidence as State exhibits, and the Superior Court’s opinion was introduced as a court exhibit.

The [Circuit [C]ourt denied [Myers’s] motion to suppress. The court explained: At the time of the vehicle stop [... Myers] had an outstanding arrest warrant issued by the State of Maryland, which is not disputed.[ 6 ] This court holds that once he was identified by the Pennsylvania authorities and confirmed that he had an outstanding warrant by a neighboring jurisdiction, he was lawfully detained. Maryland law is clear that the issue of identity discovered during an illegal detention is not subject to exclusion by the “fruit of the poisonous ²⁷² tree” doctrine.

Modecki v. State, 138 Md.App. 372 , 771 A.2d 521 (2001). The subsequent search and seizure of [Myers] and his vehicle pursuant to the arrest warrant, and not because of the traffic stop itself was therefore lawful. Trial Joseph Marinelli testified that someone entered his home on October 11, 2002, by breaking the kitchen door. He testified that various items were taken, including three strongboxes.

One contained the deed to his house and related papers. Another contained jewelry, including five watches which he valued at $1900. The third contained U.S. Savings Bonds, which he had to cash in, and by doing so, lost four thousand dollars. Mr. Marinelli described other items taken, including a credit card, a backpack, a class ring, a gold charm, and pens and pencils.

Detective Chris Kayser, with the Hagerstown Police Department, testified that he investigated the break-in at Mr. Marinellfs home. He stated that the value of items stolen, as reported by Mr. Marinelli, included a gold charm valued at $500, a high school class ring valued at $100, and a pearl tie clip valued at $500. He stated that the total loss was reported as $18,840.00. Some of the items were recovered during the search of 26 Belview Avenue.

Investigator Alton testified that he obtained a search warrant for 26 Belview Avenue and executed it on February 20, 2003. When he executed the warrant, a “teenaged female” answered the door, who contacted her mother, Michelle King Hewitt. The officer explained why he and other officers were there, and they then searched the residence. The officers recovered various items of stolen property, including property owned by Mr. Marinelli.

The recovered property owned by Mr. Marinelli included a strongbox containing a deed and other papers, two watches, a backpack, and a pocketknife. Investigator Alton testified that, in addition to stolen property, he found mail and bills addressed to [Myers] at 26 Belview Avenue. He also found male clothing in an upstairs bedroom. ²⁷³ [Myers] stipulated that property that Mr. Marinelli identified as his was recovered from 26 Belview Avenue, (alteration added). The jury found [Myers] guilty of theft and that the value of the property stolen had a value of $500 or greater, (alteration in original).

Myers, 165 Md.App. at 507-13 , 885 A.2d at 922-26 (footnote omitted). In his appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Myers argued that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the ruling of the Superior Court was at least persuasive, if not binding authority, and the stop of Myers’s vehicle was unlawful. Myers contended that “the [C]ircuit [C]ourt was required to cull out all tainted information and make a probable cause determination,” which that court failed to do. Myers, 165 Md.App. at 513 , 885 A.2d at 926 .

The Court of Special Appeals disagreed and held that the Pennsylvania court’s ruling was only binding with respect to its conclusion that probable cause was lacking to make a stop, based on Pennsylvania motor vehicle laws. The intermediate appellate court “expressed no [independent] opinion on the validity of the stop based on whether there was probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred.” Myers, 165 Md.App. at 517 n. 4, 885 A.2d at 929 n. 4. The court also held that the Superior Court’s holding, pertaining to the issue of reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity and the application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation, was not binding on Maryland courts. On the basis of Maryland case law, interpreting federal constitutional law, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Superior Court’s holding that the stop was made without reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

As to the availability of a remedy for violation of the Fourth Amendment, the intermediate appellate court held that because the officer did not make the stop for the purpose of enforcing the outstanding arrest warrant, “[t]he exclusionary rule [... did] not require suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of the search ²⁷⁴ incident to a valid arrest on an outstanding warrant.” Myers, 165 Md.App. at 528 , 885 A.2d at 935 . STANDARD OF REVIEW When reviewing a Circuit Court’s denial of a motion to suppress, our scope is ordinarily limited to the record of the suppression hearing and does not include the record of the trial. See Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 477 , 893 A.2d 1119, 1128 (2006). We consider the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

See Whiting v. State, 389 Md. 334, 345 , 885 A.2d 785, 791 (2005). Ordinarily, we will defer to the factual findings of the suppression hearing judge. See State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 607 , 826 A.2d 486, 493 (2003). The legal conclusions, the application of the law to the facts, and the determination of whether the evidence should be suppressed are reviewed by this Court de novo.

See Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 155 , 899 A.2d 867, 876 (2006); Whiting, 389 Md. at 345 , 885 A.2d at 791 . DISCUSSION Myers contends that this Court is bound by the previous decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Myers, 858 A.2d 1278 (Pa.Super.Ct.2004) (unpublished) with regard to that court’s rulings on: (1) probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred; (2) probable cause to suspect Myers was involved in criminal activity; and (3) the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence seized by Pennsylvania law enforcement officers. Myers also asserts that even if this Court is not bound by the Superior Court’s decision, the evidence obtained subsequent to his arrest on an outstanding arrest warrant was derived from the fruit of the poisonous tree and, therefore, should have been excluded from the subsequent Maryland search warrant application. Myers maintains that absent the illegally obtained evidence, Maryland police would have been unable to make the requisite showing of suspicion of criminal activity for the magistrate to ²⁷⁵ grant a search warrant for the Hagerstown residence.

According to Myers, the evidence obtained by the Hagerstown police from the Hagerstown residence should have been suppressed by the trial court on Myers’s motion. The State’s response is that the outstanding warrant for Myers’s arrest sufficiently broke the causal connection between the illegal stop and the evidence seized thereafter. The State claims that Investigator Alton acted in good faith when he applied for and obtained the search warrants. Furthermore, the inevitability that the evidence would have been seized due to the outstanding warrant breaks the causal connection between the invalid stop and the evidence found in the Hagerstown residence.

In addition, the State asserts that the subsequent search warrant was justified and any evidence seized during the search was not required to be suppressed at trial. Validity of the Stop We have long recognized that “[t]he legality of [an] arrest and, therefore, the reasonableness of the search and seizure incident to the arrest, turns on the law of the State in which the arrest was made, absent a controlling federal statute.” Stanley v. State, 230 Md. 188, 191 , 186 A.2d 478, 480 (1962) (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 , 68 S.Ct. 222, 226 , 92 L.Ed. 210 , 217 (1948)) (cases cited therein). See Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 , 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631 , 61 L.Ed.2d 343, 348-49 (1979); State v. Evans, 352 Md. 496, 518 , 723 A.2d 423, 433-34 (1999); Little and Odom v. State, 300 Md. 485, 493 , 479 A.2d 903, 907 (1984) (acknowledging that “stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief’) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979)). It is equally well settled in Maryland that, without a warrant, a police officer may arrest a suspect for a misde ²⁷⁶ meanor committed in the officer’s presence or for a felony of which the officer has reasonable cause to believe the defendant guilty.

Stanley, 230 Md. at 193 , 186 A.2d at 480-81 . These standards are consistent with the federal constitutional principle that the stop of a motorist on the basis of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion that the motorist was engaged in conduct in violation of the criminal law, are constitutionally reasonable when measured against an “objective standard.” See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 , 99 S.Ct. at 1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d at 668 . In Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 97-98 (1996), the Supreme Court held that a traffic stop is reasonable so long as the officer had probable cause to believe that the driver violated a traffic law even if the officer decided to stop the vehicle because the officer subjectively intended to use the stop as a means to investigate unrelated criminal activity. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968), the Supreme Court held that “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude^] in light of his experience^] that criminal activity may be afoot ... [,]” he is entitled to stop the person.

In the instant case, the Court of Special Appeals relied on a prior decision of that court to support its determination “that the [Pennsylvania] Superior Court’s decision is binding with respect to its conclusion that there was no probable cause for the stop based on a violation of the motor vehicle laws.” Myers, 165 Md.App. at 515 , 885 A.2d at 927 . In addition, the intermediate appellate court held that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision “is [neither] ... binding as to the remedy [, nor] its conclusion that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. The intermediate appellate court, however, “expressed no [independent] opinion on the validity of the stop based on whether there was probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred.” Myers, 165 Md.App. at 517 n. 4, 885 A.2d at 929 n. 4. The Court of Special Appeals relied on Moore v. State, 71 Md.App. 317, 323 , 525 A.2d 653, 656 (1987), which held that because the District of Columbia applied federal constitutional ²⁷⁷ law to its analysis of probable cause, the Maryland court was not bound to follow the District of Columbia’s law of arrest.

Thus, in testing the validity of the arrest in Moore, the court referred to its prior decision in Berigan v. State, 2 Md.App. 666, 668 , 236 A.2d 743, 744 (1968). The Moore court stated: Since the arrest occurred in the District of Columbia, under the ruling in [Berigan], we apply that jurisdictions’s “law” in testing the validity of the arrest. While the Berigan Court did not delineate what it meant when referring to the “law” of the arrest jurisdiction, the word “law” must refer to the particular statutes and constitutional provisions of that jurisdiction. Where ... [the arresting jurisdiction’s] statutory and constitutional provisions are not in contravention of the United States Constitution, and to the extent that they expand an arrestee’s rights, clearly those provisions control any decision concerning the validity of an arrest.

If the word “law” in Berigan meant case law interpreting federal constitutional law, under the principles of federalism, a sister state’s constitutional interpretation would not necessarily be binding in this State. Where, however, that sister state’s interpretation is persuasive, as was the case in Berigan, a Maryland court may adopt that jurisdiction’s analysis. Moore, 71 Md.App. at 322-23 , 525 A.2d at 656 . First, we will assume arguendo, for purposes of Fourth Amendment probable cause analysis, that under Pennsylvania law the traffic stop was invalid because, pursuant to a Pennsylvania statute, the police officer did not have probable cause to justify the stop.

We need not, and do not, decide whether Maryland courts are bound to follow Pennsylvania’s conclusion that probable cause was lacking to justify the stop, 7 because any taint from that stop was sufficiently attenuated by the ²⁷⁸ arrest warrant and the subsequent arrest of Myers pursuant to that warrant. Secondly, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the Federal Exclusionary Rule, ordinarily, is the appropriate remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment. We reach this conclusion because the Pennsylvania courts did not expressly rely on state constitutional provisions or an exclusionary rule based upon Pennsylvania state law in deciding that Myers’s motion to suppress evidence should have been granted. During proceedings in the Pennsylvania trial court, Myers moved to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the stop of his vehicle.

The trial judge denied that motion. In addition, Myers filed a motion in limine to preclude the introduction of evidence relating to his conduct on the date of his arrest. The trial judge granted the motion in limine to “preclude the introduction of the screwdrivers found in the vehicle, the evidence of burglaries in the Carroll Valley area, and the evidence of clothing worn by [Myers].” The trial judge denied the motion as to Myers’s request to preclude the testimony of Officer Weikert as it related to his observations of [Myers] on the date of his arrest. Myers was convicted, and he appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

In his brief submitted to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Myers “raised the following question[] for ... review: [w]hether the trial court erred in finding that the stop of [his] vehicle was based on probable cause?” Commonwealth v. Myers, 858 A.2d at 1278 . The Superior Court addressed the explanations proffered by the Commonwealth to justify Officer Weikert’s stop of Myers’s vehicle. The Commonwealth argued that the stop was justified because the officer believed that Myers was traveling in excess of the posted speed in violation of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code and was engaging or had engaged in other criminal activity. The Pennsylvania court rejected both arguments.

The Superior Court first examined whether Officer Weikert had probable cause to stop Myers for a suspected violation of Pennsylvania’s Vehicle Code. The court summarized the history, as determined at the ²⁷⁹ Pennsylvania suppression hearing, in relevant part, as follows: Myers drove past Officer Weikert at what the officer described as “a high rate of speed.” According to the factual findings, “[w]hen the Dodge Sundance [, Myers’s vehicle,] passed the police vehicle, Officer Weikert once again turned his vehicle around in order to follow the ... [car]. While following the vehicle for two-tenths of a mile, he estimated it was traveling at a rate of speed of 40 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone.” 8 Myers, 858 A.2d at 1278 . Because Officer Weikert failed to use a speed measuring device, as required by 75 Pa.

Cons.Stat. § 8868 9 , to support his belief that Myers was in violation of 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 3362, the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that the officer’s “subjective, unreliable estimate of a vehicle’s speed [was] not sufficient to establish a violation of the Vehicle Code.” Myers, 858 A.2d at 1278 . Thereafter, the Superior Court held that “the Commonwealth [did] not establish [] that the officer had reasonable and articulable grounds to suspect that [Myers] had violated a provision of the Vehicle Code, sufficient to support the stop of his vehicle.” 10 Myers, 858 A.2d at 1278 . ²⁸⁰ As to the other allegations of criminal activity, the Superior Court determined that Officer Weikert lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Myers’s vehicle because the allegations that Myers matched a general description of an individual suspected of an attempted burglary one week prior to the date of his arrest, and that he was observed within the broad time frame and within the broad geographic area of burglaries that had occurred in the preceding month, was insufficient to establish that he was engaged in criminal activity at the time when he was stopped by the officer. Id.

In addition, the Superior Court concluded that the allegation that Myers fled the scene after “being observed approximately 100 yards from an illegally parked vehicle, was not sufficient to form the basis for reasonable suspicion.” Id. The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Superior Court that Officer Weikert did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Myers was involved in any criminal activity involving burglaries. See Myers, 165 Md.App. at 518-23 , 885 A.2d at 929-32 (noting the vague description of the suspected perpetrator, the time elapsed between the previous crime, and the large area within which the crime had occurred). We agree with the Superior Court and the Court of Special Appeals that Officer Weikert lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that Myers had been involved in any burglaries in the area.

In the instant case, Officer Weikert had only a vague description of the burglary suspect such that ²⁸¹ any observed similarity between Myers and the description of the suspected burglar was insufficient to give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion of past criminal activity. In addition, Myers’s attire, his proximity to the area of previously reported crimes, and his driving off in a car failed to provide reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. We emphasize, however, that this determination is made independent of Pennsylvania’s interpretation of reasonable suspicion, and is based instead on this Court’s interpretation of federal constitutional requirements as applied to the instant case. This Court has stated that to determine whether an officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a Terry stop, courts “must look at the totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer ha[d] a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Collins v. State, 376 Md. 359, 368 , 829 A.2d 992, 998 (2003) (quoting U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 749 (2002)) (citations omitted).

In Collins , we pointed out that in our decision in Cartnail, 359 Md. at 289, 753 A.2d at 528, we examined ... six factors ... as appropriate considerations in determining what constitutes reasonable suspicion: (1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the vehicle in which he fled; (2) the size of the area in which the offender might be found, as indicated by such facts as the elapsed time since the crime occurred; (3) the number of persons about in that area; (4) the known or probable direction of the offender’s flight; (5) observed activity by the particular person stopped; and (6) knowledge or suspicion that the person or vehicle stopped has been involved in other criminality of the type presently under investigation.’ Collins, 376 Md. at 369 , 829 A.2d at 998 (citation omitted). In our analysis of the vehicle stop, we have accepted the premise that Officer Weikert did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Myers’s vehicle for reasons stated previously in this opinion. Accordingly, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at Myers’s trial in Maryland came from the “exploitation of that illegality or instead by [a] means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” ²⁸² Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 417 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455 (1963). Evidence Obtained as a Result of a Fourth Amendment Violation and the Exclusionary Rule The issue of whether an outstanding arrest warrant discovered subsequent to an illegal traffic stop and detention is sufficient to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional seizure, is a question of first impression for this Court.

To answer that question, we will review both federal and state cases, as well as our decision in Ferguson v. State, 301 Md. 542, 549 , 483 A.2d 1255, 1258 (1984), to resolve whether the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of Myers’s traffic stop in Pennsylvania would have been proper. When government officials violate the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, the usual remedy is to suppress any of the resulting physical, tangible materials and verbal evidence. See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. at 485-86 , 83 S.Ct. at 416 , 9 L.Ed.2d at 453-54 . Illegally obtained evidence is excluded under the exclusionary rule — a judicially imposed sanction for violations of the Fourth Amendment.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1692-93 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090-91 (1961). The purpose of the rule is to deter lawless and unwarranted searches and seizures by law enforcement officers. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-85 , 83 S.Ct. at 416 , 9 L.Ed.2d at 454 ; Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-16 , 88 S.Ct. at 1875 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 900 ; Ferguson, 301 Md. at 549 , 483 A.2d at 1258 . The exclusionary rule, as a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment, was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).

The Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 , 48 S.Ct. 564, 567 , 72 L.Ed. 944, 949-50 (1928), summarized that Court’s holding in Weeks as follows: The striking outcome of the Weeks case and those which followed it was the sweeping declaration that the Fourth ²⁸³ Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its introduction by government officers through a violation of the Amendment. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920), Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court, noted that the Fourth Amendment is reduced to a form of words if “the protection of the Constitution covers the physical possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act.” 11 Accordingly, “the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule [also] applied to incriminating evidence derived from the primary evidence.” Ferguson, 301 Md. at 548 , 483 A.2d at 1257 (emphasis added) (holding that testimony concerning a victim’s extrajudicial identification of the defendant was required to be suppressed as fruit of the illegal arrest of the defendant, but the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant was admissible as it had an independent source from the illegal arrest). In Ferguson, this Court noted that Silverthorne marked the genesis of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Ferguson, 301 Md. at 548 , 483 A.2d at 1257 .

Summarizing the development of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, Judge Cole, writing for this Court, said that “the [Supreme] Court [later] extended the exclusionary rule to evidence that was the indirect product or fruit’ of the police conduct resulting from a violation of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.” Id. (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 ). To that end, in Ferguson, we acknowledged that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is but “an aspect of the exclusionary rule.” 12 Ferguson, 301 Md. at 548 ²⁸⁴ n. 2, 483 A.2d at 1257 n. 2. Not all evidence obtained during or after an illegal search and seizure, however, need be excluded from trial.

The Supreme Court, in Wong Sun, stated that [w]e need not hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ 371 U.S. at 487-88 , 83 S.Ct. at 417 , 9 L.Ed.2d at 455 . There exist three judicially acknowledged methods by which evidence can be shown to have been purged of the primary taint. In Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 , 60 S.Ct. 266, 268 , 84 L.Ed. 307, 312 (1939), the Supreme Court acknowledged that it is possible that the challenged evidence can “become so attenuated as to