Namleb Corp. v. Garrett

JAMES R. EYLER, Judge. The question in this case is whether the Circuit Court for Howard County correctly interpreted a restrictive covenant in a Declaration of Covenants applicable to the lots in a particular subdivision and, if so, properly enforced the covenant by granting injunctive relief. More particularly, the question is (1) whether a covenant that limited use of a lot to a single family dwelling and to “residential purposes” prohibited the construction of a road on the restricted lot for the purpose of providing access to lots in an adjoining subdivision and (2) if so, whether injunctive relief was proper. The circuit court held that the covenant did prohibit the proposed use and granted injunctive relief.

We shall affirm. Factual Background Beaufort Park is a subdivision that was in existence for many years prior to the events relevant to this case. All lots in Beaufort Park are subject to a Declaration of Covenants, dated August 7, 1973, and recorded among the Land Records in Howard County. Patrick and Diane Garrett, appellees, owm a home in Beaufort Park purchased on November 28, 1997. ¹⁶⁶ William and Mary Ann Guthier, the remaining appellees, own a home in Beaufort Park purchased on February 26, 1999.

The pertinent portion of the Beaufort Park covenants is as follows. Covenant (1) provides, in pertinent part, “No lot shall be used except for residential purposes, however, a medical doctor may maintain an office in his home provided he is a bona fide resident. No residence other than one detached single-family dwelling shall be erected on any one lot in said subdivision.” On February 1, 1989, the Namleb Corporation (Namleb), one of the appellants, purchased Lot 20 in Beaufort Park, located on a cul-de-sac accessed by Penelope Court, and improved by a single family dwelling. On the same day, Namleb also purchased a large tract of land known as Lot 14, located adjacent to the Beaufort Park subdivision.

On October 30, 1990, Namleb recorded a plat in the Land ■ Records of Howard County, reflecting the subdivision of parcel 14 and former Lot 20 in Beaufort Park into 9 lots known as Beaufort Estates. As ultimately proposed by Namleb, a large portion of former Lot 20 in Beaufort Park, including the house, was designated as part of Lot 1 in Beaufort Estates. The remaining portion of former Lot 20 was subdivided into “pipe-stems” to provide access from 6 undeveloped lots in Beaufort Estates to Penelope Court. Under the proposal, Lot 1 in Beaufort Estates would have direct access to Penelope Court, and lots 2 through 6 in Beaufort Estates would have access to Penelope Court utilizing the “pipe-stems.” On May 22, 1991, Namleb recorded a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Beaufort Estates in the Land Records of Howard County.

Much later, and prior to this litigation, Namleb conveyed lots 2 and 4 in Beaufort Estates to Gordon VanderBrug, James Achterhof, and James Ellis, trustees of the Richard D. Van Lunen Charitable Foundation, the remaining appellants. Appellants, collectively, own all of the lots in Beaufort Estates to be serviced by the access roads in question. ¹⁶⁷ On August 14, 2000, appellees filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, pursuant to Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Sections 3-406 and 3-409, naming appellants as defendants. Appellees alleged that Namleb’s construction of access driveways over Beaufort Park Lot 20 would violate Beauford Park’s restrictive covenant limiting the use of lots to single family dwellings for residential use only. Appellees alleged that the road was for the commercial development of Beaufort Estates, not for the residential use of Beauford Park Lot 20.

On October 26, 2000, appellants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court denied the motion. On January 31, 2001, a consent order granting an interlocutory injunction was entered, preventing appellants from using Beaufort Park Lot 20 as a roadway or driveway. On August 14, 2001, and November 21, 2001, the court held hearings to determine whether appellants had violated the restrictive covenants at issue and, if so, the nature of the relief to be granted.

On March 14, 2002, the court, in a memorandum opinion and order, concluded that the covenants in question were unambiguous and that appellants’ proposed use would violate the covenants. The court also concluded that injunctive relief was appropriate, and it enjoined appellants from using Lot 20 in Beaufort Park as a roadway or driveway to serve property outside of Beaufort Park. Appellants filed a notice of appeal. Standard of Review Although Md. Rule 8—131 (c)(2002) provides a clearly erroneous standard for our review of a trial court’s ruling on the evidence in an action tried without a jury, no deference is given to the trial court for “questions of law or legal conclusions drawn from factual findings.” See ST Sys.

Corp. v. Maryland Nat’l Bank, 112 Md.App. 20, 27 , 684 A.2d 32 (1996); Van Wyk v. Fruitrade, 98 Md.App. 662, 669 , 635 A.2d 14 (1994). ¹⁶⁸ The decision to grant or deny an injunction has traditionally been given considerable deference. See J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm., 368 Md. 71, 93 , 792 A.2d 288 (2002). The grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See El Bey v. Moorish Sci.

Temple of Am., 362 Md. 339, 354-55 , 765 A.2d 132 (2001). We give no deference to the trial court, however, if there is a clear error of law. See Id. (quoting Western Md. Dairy, Inc. v. Chenowith, 180 Md. 236, 244 , 23 A.2d 660 (1941)); see also State Comm’n on Human Rels. v. Talbot County Det.

Ctr., 370 Md. 115, 127 , 803 A.2d 527 (2002); Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 394 , 761 A.2d 899 (2000). Discussion Intended Use of Beaufort Park Lot 20 The restrictive covenant at issue provides, in part: “(1) LAND USE AND BUILDING TYPE. No lot shall be used except for residential purposes ... No residence other than one detached single family dwelling shall be erected on any one lot in said subdivision.” Appellants contend that, although there are no cases directly on point in Maryland, treatises and case law from other states indicate that the proposed access way on Beaufort Park Lot 20 is for “residential purposes” within the meaning of the covenant.

Appellees contend that the plain meaning of the covenant and the decision in Eisenstadt v. Barron, 252 Md. 358 , 250 A.2d 85 (1969), prohibit the access road because the road would violate the covenant by serving multiple homes outside of the Beaufort Park subdivision. Appellants attempt to distinguish Eisenstadt by pointing out that, in that case, the access road to an adjoining lot was to service apartments to be built. Appellants conclude that the dispositive fact in Eisenstadt was the nature of the building (i.e., a multiple family dwelling, an apartment building) and not its location. Additionally, appellants point out that Beaufort Estates is limited to single family homes, and the covenants applicable to those lots impose greater restrictions than those imposed by the covenants in Beaufort Park. ¹⁶⁹ Courts in several states have addressed whether an access way over restricted property is a violation of a restrictive covenant limiting the use of such property.

In several cases, the language of the covenant was the same as or similar to the covenant in this case. See, e.g., cases collected in V. Woerner, Annotation, Maintenance, Use or Grant of Right of Way Over Restricted Property as Violation of Restrictive Covenant, 25 A.L.R.2d 904 (1952). Each case must be decided on its own facts, of course, because there are many variables, including the language in the covenant. With respect to covenants restricting property to “residential” use with no more than one single family dwelling, courts have split in their view as to whether the use is limited to serving the property in question.

If we were writing on a clean slate, we might agree with appellants. We are not, however, and we regard Eisenstadt as controlling. In that case, Eisenstadt purchased land from Barron. Eisenstadt, 252 Md. at 359 , 250 A.2d 85 .

A restrictive covenant upon the land required that it be used only for residential purposes and contain only a single family dwelling. Id. at 360 , 250 A.2d 85 . Eisenstadt also owned an apartment building adjacent to his lot, which was not a part of the property governed by the restrictive covenant. Id. at 361 , 250 A.2d 85 .

Eisenstadt constructed a driveway over his lot to access his apartment building. Id. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that “it might be argued that since the Eisenstadt use is a residential use and the roadway is incidental to such residential use such use is not precluded by the restriction.” Id. at 369 , 250 A.2d 85 . The Court reasoned, however, that “it was the intent of the restriction to permit erection on the premises only of a dwelling calculated to accommodate a single family unit ...

We see no other interpretation that could be put on the word ‘single’ inserted prior to the word ‘dwelling.’ ” Id. The Court acknowledged that this included the right to construct roads or other structures “incidental to the use of such single dwelling.” Id. Because the road in question was going to serve more than one residence, the Court of Appeals concluded “the use of the property as a means of access to an apartment house or apartment houses ¹⁷⁰ on adjoining land not within the subdivision is not a use permitted under the restriction.” Id. Similarly, in the case sub judice, appellants wish to construct an access road over a lot subject to a covenant restricting use to a single family residence.

The proposed access road would serve more than one residence, all of which would be located outside of the subdivision. We disagree with appellant’s assertion that, because the proposed building in Eisenstadt was an apartment building, Eisenstadt is distinguishable. The decision was premised on the fact that the proposed road would service multiple residences. Whether for apartments or multiple homes, the proposed road in Eisenstadt and the proposed road in this case were intended to serve multiple residences and, in both instances, outside of the subdivision.

Applying the reasoning in Eisenstadt , we hold that the proposed access road(s) is prohibited by the restrictive covenant. Appellants urge us to rely on Bove v. Giebel, 169 Ohio St. 325 , 159 N.E.2d 425 , 1959 Ohio Lexis 607 (1959), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio held that an access road to property outside of a subdivision fell within the subdivision’s residential use only covenant. Id. at 428 , In that case, Bove, who resided on Lot 28, purchased from Giebel, the owner of Lot 29, a 25 foot strip of land originally part of Lot 29, and an unimproved six-acre parcel outside the subdivision. Id..

Bove intended to construct two dwellings on the unimproved parcel. Id. Bove wanted to access the unimproved parcel by a road to be constructed on the 25 foot strip of Lot 29, that he had annexed. Id.

Giebel countered that the road was not for a residential use within the meaning of the restrictive covenant that applied to land in the subdivision. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that for the restrictive covenant to prohibit the access road, it would have to read, “not merely a use ‘for residence purposes only1 but ‘for residence purposes in the subdivision only.’ ” Id., 159 N.E.2d at 428 . The problem with relying on Bove is that