National Corp. for Housing Partnership, Meadowood Townhouse Inc. v. Keller

⁵⁶⁹ HOLLANDER, Judge. This case calls upon us to construe the term “surviving dependents” with respect to permanent partial disability benefits awarded posthumously for an injured worker who died from a cause unrelated to her workplace injury. In particular, we focus on whether Maryland Code (1991 RepLVol.), § 9-632(c) of the Labor and Employment Article (“L.E.”), requires a determination of dependency as of the time of the worker’s injury or the worker’s death. Neither party refers us to any Maryland case that clearly establishes when dependency is to be determined in the event that a worker dies before receipt of all permanent partial disability benefits.

Nevertheless, appellants urge us to establish dependency as of the time of the worker’s injury, while appellee argues that it should be established as of the worker’s death. The outcome of the dispute will determine whether the deceased worker’s son is entitled to collect his late mother’s disability benefits. FACTUAL SUMMARY On February 19, 1990, Shirley Jean Keller (“claimant” or “worker”), appellee, 1 who was then 54 years old, was seriously injured while working for the National Corporation for Housing Partnership, Meadowood Townhouse, Inc. (“Employer” or “Meadowood”), appellant. 2 As a result of the accident, Kenneth Keller (“Keller”), the worker’s adult son, left his residence in California and relocated to Maryland to care for his ailing mother. During this time, Keller became financially dependent upon his mother.

Because of her accident, Ms. Keller filed a workers’ compensation claim and received temporary total disability benefits. On February 1, 1994, prior to the resolution of Ms. Keller’s permanency claim by the Workers’ Compensation Commission (the “Commission”), she died of sudden cardiac arrest. It is ⁵⁷⁰ undisputed that the cause of Ms. Keller’s death was not related to her workplace injury. For purposes of this appeal, the parties also agree that Keller was financially dependent upon his mother when she died, but he was not dependent upon her when the injury first occurred.

In February 1995, approximately one year after Ms. Keller’s death, the Commission found that Ms. Keller had “sustained a permanent partial disability ... amounting to 15% industrial loss of use of the body as a result of the injury to the neck and right shoulder.” Thereafter, on May 2,1995, the Commission held a hearing to determine whether Keller was a surviving dependent of the claimant. By order dated July 21, 1995, the Commission found that Keller qualified as a surviving dependent, and awarded his mother’s unpaid disability benefits to him, pursuant to L.E. § 9-632(c). The Commission thus ordered appellants to pay Keller the claimant’s permanent partial disability compensation, which was set at a rate of $180.00 per week, beginning February 1, 1994, for a period of five hundred weeks. The payment was subject to a credit for the temporary total disability payments that the worker had received before she died.

Thereafter, appellants sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. At the hearing on February 19, 1997, the circuit court affirmed the Commission, stating: Section 9-632 [of the Labor and Employment Article] specifically deals with the situation of survival of benefits where the death was not caused by the injuries sustained in the accident and Subsection (e), which is not applicable to this particular factual situation, but does indicate: “If there are no surviving dependents of the covered employee and, on the date of death, the covered employee did not have a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives only to the surviving minor children of the covered employee.” ⁵⁷¹ I cite that because I think it’s significant [that the] Legislature in Subsection (e) did look at the date of death as opposed to the date of injury. The applicable section is 9-632(c), which states: “If there are surviving dependents of the covered employee, the right to compensation survives to the surviving dependents as the Commission may determine.” So, it seems to me that the Legislature is making a distinction as to whether or not there are, in fact, surviving dependents. In coupling that with Subsection (e) where the Legislature refers to date of death, it seems to the Court that the Legislature intended for the Court to look to see if there was [sic], in fact, surviving dependents on the date of death and it’s uncontradicted and, indeed, conceded that Mr. Keller was a surviving dependent on the date of his mother’s death.

So for those reasons, the Court believes that these benefits do survive to Mr. Keller and [this court] will affirm the decision of the Commission. Thereafter, appellants timely lodged the instant appeal. ISSUE Appellants present two questions for our review, which we have combined and rephrased: In a Workers’ Compensation action, when a claimant dies from a cause unrelated to the permanent partial disability claim, is surviving dependency, pursuant to L.E. § 9-632(c), established as of the time of the claimant’s injury or as of the time of the claimant’s death? In our view, L.E. § 9-632(c) vests the Commission with discretion to determine surviving dependency either at the time of the claimant’s injury or at the time of the claimant’s death.

Accordingly, we shall affirm. DISCUSSION The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”), codified in Code, Title 9 of the Labor and Employment ⁵⁷² Article, 3 “entitles covered employees to compensation for accidental personal injuries that arise ‘out of and in the course of employment[.]’ ” Barnes v. Children’s Hosp., 109 Md.App. 548 , 553, 675 A.2d 558 (1996) (quoting L.E. §§ 9-101(b), 9-501(a)). It is well settled that the provisions of the Act are liberally construed in favor of the employee, in order to accomplish the Act’s benevolent purpose. Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Hempfield, 206 Md. 589, 594 , 112 A.2d 488 (1955); see also Lovellette v. Mayor of Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282 , 465 A.2d 1141 (1983); Barnes, 109 Md.App. at 553 , 675 A.2d 558 ; Ewing v. Koppers Co., Inc., 69 Md.App. 722, 731 , 519 A.2d 790 (1987).

Similarly, any ambiguity in the law must be resolved in favor of the employee. Mayor of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 97 , 656 A.2d 757 (1995); Barnes, 109 Md.App. at 554 , 675 A.2d 558 . Nevertheless, we may not extend coverage beyond that authorized by statute. Tortuga, Inc. v. Wolfensberger, 97 Md.App. 79, 83 , 627 A.2d 56 , cert. denied, 332 Md. 703 , 632 A.2d 1209 (1993); see Montgomery County v. McDonald, 317 Md. 466, 472-73 , 564 A.2d 797 (1989).

L.E. § 9-632(c), which governs the survival of permanent partial disability compensation, is at issue here. It mandates that, under certain circumstances, when the claimant dies from a non-compensable cause, any unpaid permanent partial disability compensation “survives” to the claimant’s “surviving dependents.” The provision is silent concerning the determination of dependency status, however. The section states, in part: Survival of compensation. ⁵⁷³ * * * (b) In general. — If a covered employee dies from a cause that is not compensable under this title, the right to compensation that is payable under this Part IV of this subtitle and unpaid on the date of death survives in accordance with this section. (c) Surviving dependents. — If there are surviving dependents of the covered employee, the right to compensation survives to the surviving dependents as the Commission may determine.

(d) No surviving dependents; obligation to support surviving spouse. — If there are no surviving dependents of the covered employee and, on the date of death, the covered employee had a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives jointly to: (1) the surviving spouse of the covered employee; and (2) the surviving minor children of the covered employee. (e) No surviving dependents or obligation to support surviving spouse.-If there are no surviving dependents and, on the date of death, the covered employee did not have a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives only to the surviving minor children of the covered employee. (Italics in original; boldface added). 4 Because L.E. § 9-632(c) does not contain any statutory language concerning the determination of dependency status, appellants urge us to rely on L.E. § 9-679. That provision governs a dependent’s entitlement to compensation for the death of a covered employee when the worker’s death is the ⁵⁷⁴ result of an accidental personal injury or occupational disease.

L.E. § 9-679 states: Determination of dependency. Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the Commission shall determine all questions of partial or total dependency in accordance with the facts of each case that existed: (1) at the time of the occurrence of the accidental personal injury that caused the death of the covered employee; or (2) on the date of disablement from the occupational disease that caused the death of the covered employee. (Boldface added). It is apparent that, in contrast to L.E. § 9-632(c), which is silent with respect to determining dependency, L.E. § 9-679 addresses the time or event that determines dependency status.

It provides that, in death benefit cases, dependency is determined “at the time of the occurrence of the accidental personal injury” or “on the date of disablement.” Appellants posit that the Legislature’s failure to articulate in L.E. § 9-632(c) when dependency arises means that the Legislature intended the Commission to incorporate L.E. § 9-679. Therefore, they contend that, as with L.E. § 9-679, dependency under L.E. § 9-632(c) is ascertained as of the time of the claimant’s injury, rather than as of the time of the claimant’s death. In advancing this position, appellants point to the similarities between disability benefits and death benefits insofar as dependency is concerned. They argue that “the weight of those similarities makes it clear that the [Legislature intended a single definition for ‘dependents’ rather than two definitions.” Moreover, appellants assert that, if the Legislature had intended dependent status to be determined as of the time of death, it would have included the phrase “on the date of death” in L.E. § 9-632(c), just as it did in L.E. §§ 9-632(d) and (e).

Because the statute specifies “on the date of death” in L.E. §§ 9-632(d) and (e), but not in L.E. § 9-632(c), ⁵⁷⁵ appellants suggest that this Court should infer from the Legislature’s omission in L.E. § 9-632(c) that it intended dependency to be determined as of the time of a claimant’s injury. Appellants argue that, under L.E. § 9-632(c), [tjhose who are entitled to benefits as dependents are the persons who suffered a loss of support as a result of the injury. Only those individuals who were dependent on the injured worker on the date of the accident or disablement from an occupational disease could suffer a loss or reduction of support as a result of that compensable event. Persons who become dependent only after the accident cannot experience an accident-induced reduction in their support.

Appellants also contend that if the Legislature meant dependency to be determined at the time of death, it would not have used the term “surviving dependents” in L.E. § 9-632(c). In this regard, appellants aver that “[t]he modifier ‘surviving’ clearly indicates that ‘dependents’ can predecease the injured worker.” It follows that if a dependent predeceases a claimant, dependency must have existed before the death of the claimant. Further, appellants maintain that, in the death benefit context, the term “surviving dependents” has been construed in case law to refer to the time of the claimant’s injury. Thus, they urge us to apply the same reasoning to determine dependency in a case involving permanent partial disability benefits.

Additionally, appellants rely on the legislative history of the Act. They state: “The amendments offered in the legislative process make it clear that the legislature carefully considered the question of dependency. It seems incredible that the legislature did not intend the expression ‘surviving dependents’ to relate to the date of accident in cases of both related and unrelated death.” (Emphasis added). Appellee counters that, in view of the absence in L.E. § 9-632(c) of any language indicating when dependency is to be determined, and the references to the date of death in L.E. §§ 9-632(d) and (e), dependency must be established at the time of death.

Appellee also posits that a death benefit case is ⁵⁷⁶ unlike a disability case, and thus the language used in L.E. § 9-679 for death benefit cases, and the case law construing death benefits, do not apply here. In view of the Legislature’s failure to articulate in L.E. § 9-632(c) the time or event that governs dependency status in the disability context, we turn to consider the principles of statutory construction. These principles guide our resolution of the parties’ conflicting interpretations of L.E. § 9-632(c). The fundamental precept of statutory construction requires us to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.

Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995); Cassidy, 338 Md. at 93 , 656 A.2d 757 ; Privette v. State, 320 Md. 738, 744 , 580 A.2d 188 (1990). Ordinarily, we refer to the language of the statute to accomplish this task, State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133 , 669 A.2d 1339 (1996); Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 332 Md. 279, 306 , 631 A.2d 77 (1993); State v. Patrick A., 312 Md. 482, 487 , 540 A.2d 810 (1988), and give the statutory language “its natural and ordinary meaning.” Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523 , 636 A.2d 448 (1994). As the Court stated in Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146 , 626 A.2d 946 (1993), “Giving the words their ordinary and common meaning ‘in light of the full context in which they appear, and in the light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence,’ normally will result in the discovery of the Legislature’s intént.” (Citations omitted). On the other hand, “the plain meaning rule does not necessarily ... compel á literal construction of a statutory provision.” Abington Ctr.

Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Baltimore County, 115 Md.App. 580, 603 , 694 A.2d 165 (1997). Rather, we strive to “avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106 (1994); see Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge No. 35 v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174 , 680 A.2d 1052 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693 , 668 A.2d 1 (1995); Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491-92 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993); Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986). ⁵⁷⁷ When interpreting a statute, the court may consider the statute’s purpose, Pagano, 341 Md. at 133 , 669 A.2d 1339 ; Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987), bearing in mind the context in which the statute was adopted.

C.S. v. Prince George’s County Dep’t of Social Servs., 343 Md. 14, 24 , 680 A.2d 470 (1996); Condon, 332 Md. at 491 , 632 A.2d 753 ; Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Mohler, 318 Md. 219, 225 , 567 A.2d 929 (1990); Brzowski v. Maryland Home Improvement Comm’n, 114 Md.App. 615, 627-28 , 691 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 346 Md. 238 , 695 A.2d 1227 (1997). Accordingly, we will not interpret a statutory provision in isolation. Rather, “we consider the purpose, goal, or context of the statute as a whole.” Papillo v. Pockets, Inc., 118 Md.App. 194, 200-01 , 702 A.2d 429 (1997); see Bd. of Trustees v. Hughes, 340 Md. 1, 7 , 664 A.2d 1250 (1995); Prince George’s County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658 , 667 A.2d 898 (1995); Frost, 336 Md. at 138 , 647 A.2d 106 . As we said in Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 115 Md.App. 460, 480 , 694 A.2d 107 , cert. granted, 347 Md. 155 , 699 A.2d 1169 (1997), “To glean the Legislature’s intent, a statute must also be read as a whole, so that all provisions are considered together and, to the extent possible, reconciled, and harmonized.” Thus, “[i]n expounding on part of a statute, resort should be had to every other part [of the statute],” Brzowski, 114 Md.App. at 627 , 691 A.2d 699 , so that no “word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or