Neal v. CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD

MATRICCIANI, J. This case stems from an assault perpetrated while the appellant was an inmate at the Jessup Pre-Release Unit in ⁶⁶⁶ Anne Arundel County. Appellant Maceo Neal (Mr. Neal) appeals the decision of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirming the decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (the Board), appellee, to deny permanent partial disability benefits for Mr. Neal. Mr. Neal presents one issue for our consideration: I. Whether a victim of crime who loses an eye is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits as a matter of law. We conclude that Mr. Neal is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits and reverse the decision of the Board to deny Mr. Neal these benefits.

FACTS On July 12, 2002, Mr. Neal was assaulted while he slept in the Division of Corrections. As a result of the assault, his right eye was injured and subsequently had to be removed. The medical work to repair Mr. Neal’s eye was performed by Johns Hopkins University Clinical Practice Association and the bills were sent to Prison Health Services (PHS). PHS paid only a portion of the amount billed to Mr. Neal by Johns Hopkins, leaving an unpaid balance of $1,858.48.

In July 2005, Mr. Neal’s counsel attempted to get information from Johns Hopkins’ billing department to find out whether the hospital was pursuing a settlement agreement with PHS to cover the unpaid bills, but he could not reach anyone. 1 At the time of his injury, Mr. Neal was scheduled for work release. This process was delayed by three weeks due to the injury sustained as a result of the assault. On November 4, 2004, Mr. Neal filed a Crime Victims’ Compensation Application with the Board and sought to recover for medical expenses and the disability he incurred as a result of the assault. On November 30, 2004, the Board denied his claim for compensation because, it concluded, he ⁶⁶⁷ had no unreimbursed medical expenses nor had he lost two continuous weeks’ earnings.

On December 22, 2004, Mr. Neal filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The Board consented to a reconsideration of his case and held a hearing on September 27, 2006. After the hearing, Mr. Neal was awarded $213.87 2 in temporary total disability, but he was denied permanent partial disability for the same reason as the original decision, namely, that he had returned to work with no diminution in earnings. On January 25, 2007, Mr. Neal sent a letter to the Board requesting that it reconsider its decision.

On February 28, 2007, the Board issued its final decision, again denying Mr. Neal permanent disability but granting $213.87 in temporary total disability because the injury had delayed his assignment to work-release employment for three weeks. The Board stated in its final decision that the remainder of the medical bills were being reviewed for payment by other sources. Mr. Neal filed a second petition for judicial review in the Prince George’s County Circuit Court on May 7, 2008. On February 27, 2009, a hearing was held in the circuit court and Mr. Neal requested that the court reverse the Board’s denial of his claim for permanent disability benefits.

Mr. Neal asked that the Board be directed to pay his permanent partial disability benefits plus his outstanding medical bills. The court affirmed the Board’s denial in an oral decision, and Mr. Neal timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. Mr. Neal contends that the full panoply of disability benefits under Md.Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Title Nine, Subtitle Six ⁶⁶⁸ of the Labor and Employment Article are available to crime victims under Md.Code (2001, 2008 Repl.

Vol.), Title Eleven, Subtitle Eight of the Criminal Procedure (CP) Article (criminal injuries compensation statute). He argues that the Board ignored the plain meaning of the criminal injuries compensation statute and the intent of the General Assembly to assist victims in obtaining disability benefits when the legislature removed the “serious financial hardship” requirement from the statute in 2001. Thus, he argues that a claimant no longer needs to show loss of earnings as a prerequisite to an award of permanent partial disability benefits. The Board, on the other hand, contends that its decision to deny the permanent partial disability award was based on a correct conclusion of law.

The Board argues that it was correct not to apply the workers’ compensation statutory standards to Mr. Neal’s claim for permanent partial disability because he failed to present any evidence of a loss in earnings or earnings capacity. Because this is an appeal from a circuit court’s review of an agency’s final decision, our role in this appeal is precisely the same as that of the circuit court. Maryland Secs. Comm’r v. U.S. Secs. Corp., 122 Md.App. 574, 585 , 716 A.2d 290 (1998). Appellate review of an administrative agency’s decision is ordinarily narrow.

Finucan v. Md. State Bd. of Physician Quality Assur., 151 Md.App. 399, 411 , 827 A.2d 176 (2003). We are limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determining if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. Id. We are also constrained by the Administrative Procedure Act, set forth in Md.Code Ann., State Government § 10-222 and § 10-223, from reversing or modifying the administrative decision unless it is: (1) unconstitutional; (2) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (3) results from an unlawful procedure; (4) is affected by any other error of law; (5) is unsupported by competent, material, ⁶⁶⁹ and substantial evidence in light of the entire record submitted; or (6) is arbitrary or capricious.

We may not uphold the agency order unless it is sustainable on the agency’s findings and for the reasons stated by the agency. Johnson v. Crim. Injuries Comp. Bd., 145 Md.App. 96, 106 , 801 A.2d 1092 (2002).

Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency. Finucan, 151 Md.App. at 411 , 827 A.2d 176 . Therefore, an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts. Id.; People’s Counsel for Balt.

County v. Elm St. Dev., Inc., 172 Md.App. 690, 701 , 917 A.2d 166 (2007). When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, our inquiry ordinarily ends. Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 212 , 783 A.2d 194 (2001).

Canons of construction are “no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation” and we must “presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 , 112 S.Ct. 1146 , 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). Therefore, only when a term is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning do we consider extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain its meaning. Fister, 366 Md. at 216 , 783 A.2d 194 . However, the plain-meaning rule is not absolute.

Johnson v. Crim. Injuries Comp. Bd., 145 Md.App. 96, 111 , 801 A.2d 1092 (2002). Rather, the statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.

Id. A Maryland court looks at the larger context, including the legislative purpose, within which statutory language appears. Id. Construction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided.

Id. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (the Act) is the statute through which the General Assembly undertook to ⁶⁷⁰ provide a measure of financial assistance in specified circumstances to innocent victims of crime and their dependents. Gossard v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 279 Md. 309, 310 , 368 A.2d 443 (1977). The specific provisions at issue in this case are codified in the Md.Code (2001, 2008 Repl.

Vol.), § 11-810 of the CP Article, and read, in pertinent part: §§ 11-810. Conditions for awards on claims (a) In general.— (1) The Board may make an award only if the Board finds that: (i) a crime or delinquent act was committed; (ii) the crime or delinquent act directly resulted in: 1. physical injury to or death of the victim; or 2. psychological injury to the victim that necessitated mental health counseling; (iii) police, other law enforcement, or judicial records show that the crime or delinquent act or the discovery of child abuse was reported to the proper authorities within 48 hours after the occurrence of the crime or delinquent act or the discovery of the child abuse; and (iv) the victim has cooperated fully with all law enforcement units. * * * (c) Minimum allowable claim. — The Board may make an award only if the claimant, as a result of the injury on which the claim is based, has: (1) incurred at least $100 in unreimbursed and unreimbursable expenses or indebtedness reasonably incurred or claimed for: (i) medical care; (ii) expenses for eyeglasses and other corrective lenses; (iii) mental health counseling; (iv) funeral expenses; (v) repairing, replacing, or cleaning property; (vi) disability or dependent claim; or ⁶⁷¹ (vii) other necessary services; or (2) lost at least 2 continuous weeks’ earnings or support.!).] Once an applicant for benefits has fulfilled the requirements outlined in § 11-810, the applicant will be awarded benefits pursuant to CP § 11-811, which reads, in pertinent part: §§ 11-811. Amount of award (a) In general.— (1) (i) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an award under this subtitle shall be made in accordance with the schedule of benefits, as it existed on January 1, 2001, and degree of disability as specified in Title 9, Subtitle 6 of the Labor and Employment Article and any other applicable provisions of the Labor and Employment Article, except for Title 9, Subtitle 8 of the Labor and Employment Article. (ii) For determining the amount of an award under this subtitle, the term “average weekly wages” does not include tips, gratuities, and wages that are undeclared on the claimant’s State or federal income tax returns for the applicable years.

(iii) If a claimant does not have “average weekly wages” to qualify under the formula in Title 9, Subtitle 6 of the Labor and Employment Article, the award shall be in an amount equal to the average of the maximum and minimum awards listed in the applicable portion of that subtitle. (2) An award for loss of earnings or support made under this subtitle may be up to two-thirds of the victim’s gross average wage, but may not be less than the amount provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection. (b) Limits. — Compensation awarded under this subtitle may not exceed: (1) for a disability-related or dependency-related claim: (i) except as provided in item (ii) of this paragraph, $25,000; or ⁶⁷² (ii) if the injury to the victim results in permanent total disability, up to an additional $25,000 after a disability-related claim has been awarded to the victim[ ... ] In its findings of fact, the Board stated that “[t]he claimant suffered temporary total disability for three weeks, after which he was able to begin work-release employment.” The Board’s conclusions of law were the following: (1) the claimant is the innocent victim of crime; (2) the claimant satisfied the statutory criteria to qualify for an award for temporary total disability; (3) The claimant,