Nealon v. Travers

Parke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Lydia B. Nealon, a widow of many years, had a son, David Nealon, and a daughter, Katie M. Nealon, who married Harold V. Travers in. February, 1914. The mother went to live with the newly wed pair, and the family relations were happy until the accidental death of the daughter on May 10th, 1927.

After her death, the mother-in-law continued to live at the home, although differences arose. One controversy is presented by this appeal, and it grew out of an improved lot in Aberdeen which had been conveyed to the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties on August 26th, 1918. About four years later the fee simple property was conveyed to the wife in severalty, and it so remained until her death intestate and without issue, when it vested by law in her mother and her husband as tenants in common. On May 18th, 1927, which was eight days after the daughter’s death, the mother-in-law conveyed her estate in tiie realty to the son-in-law, who, on August 24th, 1928, conveyed by mortgage deed the land and improvements to the First National Bank of Aberdeen as security for his debt to it of $1,200.

There was no change affecting the title until March 19th, 1930, when Lydia B. Nealon began a suit in equity against Harold V. Travers to have her deed to him set aside on the ground that it had been procured from her by fraud. The chancellor heard the testimony and dismissed ³³¹ the bill, and an examination of the record affords no basis for a disagreement-. The grant is without valuable consideration, but it is valid as a gift, unless there be some equity shown to set it aside. Cunningham v. Dwyer, 23 Md. 231 ; Simpson v. League, 110 Md. 286 , 72 A. 1109 ; Combs v. Scharf, 143 Md. 74 , 121 A. 857 .

Even if the gift were improvident, the donee unworthy, and the donor now desirous of recalling her bounty, equity will not, on these grounds, rescind a deed of gift. Simpson v. League, 110 Md. 286 , 72 A. 1109 ; Combs v. Scharf, 143 Md. 74 , 121 A. 857 ; Goodwin v. White, 59 Md. 509 . After her daughter’s funeral, the plaintiff pictures the defendant as coming to her in tears, crying that the plaintiff could compel a sale of the property, and that she told him, in the presence of her son, who had come to attend his sister’s burial, that she would not adopt such a course, and that it was then agreed that the defendant should have a paper writing prepared for their joint execution that would prevent the property from being sold during the plaintiff’s life, and providing for its sale at her death and that her share should pass to her son. The son’s version of the understanding is similar to his mother’s, except that the property was not to be sold during their joint lives, but was to be sold on the death of either.

A few days afterwards the deed in controversy was brought to the house. The plaintiff and defendant, and Ernest Yolkart, Esq., the latter’s attorney and the deed’s draughtsman, and Dorsey E. Eowe, a notary public, were the only persons present. The plaintiff’s testimony is that she and the defendant were at home at night when the attorney and the notary came with the deed, which she asserted was neither read nor its contents or