Nelson v. Carroll

RODOWSKY, Judge. The petitioner, Charles A. (“Pee-Wee”) Nelson (Nelson), contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in an unreported opinion when it refused to consider the merits of Nelson’s contention that he was entitled under Maryland Rule 2-519(a) (Motion for judgment) to judgment in his favor as plaintiff in a civil action alleging battery. 1 At issue is whether, as held by the Court of Special Appeals, Nelson failed to preserve his contention for appellate review under Maryland Rule 8-131(a) 2 because Nelson did not “state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted.” Md. Rule 2-519(a). The action now before us was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and resulted in a verdict in favor of the defendant, the respondent, Albert (“Junior”) Carroll (Carroll). ²⁴⁹ Carroll shot Nelson in the stomach in the course of an altercation over a debt owed to Carroll by Nelson.

The shooting occurred on the evening of July 25, 1992, in a private nightclub in Baltimore City that Nelson was patronizing. Carroll, who was described as being a “little tipsy,” entered the club and demanded repayment by Nelson of the $3,800 balance of an $8,000 loan that Carroll had made to Nelson. Nelson immediately offered to make a payment on account but that was unsatisfactory to Carroll. At some point Carroll produced a handgun from his jacket.

Carroll did not testify. There were only two witnesses who described how the shooting came about, Nelson and Prestley Dukes (Dukes), a witness called by Carroll. Dukes testified that when Nelson did not give Carroll his money Carroll hit Nelson on the side of the head with the handgun and that, when Nelson did not “respond,” Carroll “went to hit him again, and when [Carroll! drawed back, the gun went off.” Nelson, in substance, testified that he tendered $2,300 to Carroll, that Carroll pulled out his pistol and said that he wanted all of his money, and that the next thing that Nelson knew, he heard a shot and saw that he was bleeding. After judgment had been entered for the defendant, Nelson appealed to the Court of Special Appeals raising but one argument, namely, that judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability should have been entered as a matter of law after all of the evidence had been presented. 3 At the conclusion of jury instructions, when the court invited counsel to approach the bench for the purpose of taking any exceptions, the following took place: ²⁵⁰ “[NELSON’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, at the outset, we would except to any instruction on the issue of liability.

We would move for a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability. There should not even be any issue of liability submitted to the jury. “THE COURT: All right. I’m sorry I didn’t let you get that on the record before my instructions, but my motion [sic] is the same now as it would have been then. Denied.” A majority of the panel of the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the above-quoted motion lacked the degree of particularity required by Rule 2-519(a) and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment of the circuit court without reaching the merits.

Judge Ellen Hollander dissented, finding not only that the issue had been preserved but also that Nelson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. This Court then granted Nelson’s petition for certiorari which raised only the issue of whether the Court of Special Appeals had correctly interpreted and applied Rule 2-519(a). The Court of Special Appeals erred in considering Nelson’s motion in isolation. Decisions of this Court and of the Court of Special Appeals have made it clear that the sufficiency of the particularity of the reasons for a Rule 2-519(a) motion is determined in light of legal arguments that have been made in the course of the action, with particular emphasis on whether the trial judge could identify, through a process analogous to incorporation by reference, the argument that was being made in support of the motion.

In the case now before us Nelson’s asserted basis for judgment in his favor on the issue of liability was first made well in advance of trial in support of a motion for summary judgment. The argument was renewed at trial when Nelson sought a judgment based upon defense counsel’s opening statement. 4 ²⁵¹ In K & K Management, Inc. v. Lee, 316 Md. 137 , 557 A.2d 965 (1989), defendants-appellants argued in a motion for summary judgment, in a trial brief, and in “extensive” oral argument on their motion for judgment at the close of plaintiffs’appellees’ case that their conduct did not constitute malicious interference with business relationships. Id. at 153 , 557 A.2d at 972 . At the close of all of the evidence the appellants renewed their motion for judgment “ ‘[o]n all the same bases,’ without ‘tak[ing] the [c]ourt’s time to argue further.’ ” Id.

(alterations in original). The trial court responded: “ ‘Sure. They are renewed and denied again.’ ” Id. This Court held that, in light of the arguments already advanced by appellants, the renewed motion was sufficiently particularized under Rule 2-519(a).

Id. K & K Management relied on Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474 , 554 A.2d 1238 (1989), involving the particularity requirement of Maryland Rule 4-324(a), dealing with a motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal cause. Id. at 483 , 554 A.2d at 1243 . In Warfield , the defense and the prosecutor had respectively argued their differing analyses of the sufficiency of the evidence after the State had closed its case in chief.

Id. at 484 , 554 A.2d at 1243 . At the close of all of the evidence the defense renewed its earlier motion, without stating any grounds. Id. The Court of Special Appeals, holding that satisfaction of the particularity requirement was to be measured exclusively by what transpired on the motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the case, affirmed the conviction without reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.

See Warfield v. State, 76 Md.App. 141, 146 , 543 A.2d 885, 888 (1988), rev’d, 315 Md. 474 , 554 A.2d 1238 (1989). This Court reversed, saying: “We are not of a mind with the Court of Special Appeals in its belief that the second motion for judgment of acquittal must stand alone. As we have seen there were no reasons expressly advanced at the time the second motion was made. But when we consider the purpose of the statute and the rule in the light of their context, we are satisfied that the command to particularize reasons has been met in ²⁵² the circumstances here.

The general purpose of the statute and the rule is patent. It is to implement, by means of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the constitutional authority given an appellate court to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence. The specific purpose of the mandate of the rule to particularize the reasons for the motion is to enable the trial judge to be aware of the precise basis for the defendant’s belief that the evidence is insufficient. Then the judge in determining the motion may fully appreciate the position of the defendant.

All in all the command to particularize the reasons operates to the benefit of the defendant and also acts as an aid to the trial judge.” Warfield, 315 Md. at 487 , 554 A.2d at 1244-45 (citation omitted). In Kent Village Assocs. Joint Venture v. Smith, 104 Md. App. 507 , 657 A.2d 330 (1995), the Court of Special Appeals said the following with regard to the particularity requirement of Rule 2-519(a): “This requirement has important and salutary purposes. It implements, on the one hand, a principle of basic fairness.

A trial judge must be given a reasonable opportunity to consider all legal and evidentiary arguments in deciding what issues to submit to the jury and in framing proper instructions to the jury. The other parties must have a fair opportunity at the trial level to respond to legal and evidentiary challenges in order (1) to make their own record on those issues and (2) to devise alternative trial strategies and arguments should the court grant the motion, in whole or in part. Allowing these issues to be presented for the first time on appeal is also jurisprudentially unsound, for it may well result in requiring a full new trial that otherwise might have been avoided.” Id. at 517 , 657 A.2d at 334-35 . That case involved a four-year-old girl who was seriously injured when a refuse bin located near the apartment building where she lived tipped over on her.

Id. at 511 , 657 A.2d at 332 . At the conclusion of the plaintiffs case in the trial court, ²⁵³ the defendants had moved for a “ ‘directed verdict,’ ” stating that “there was insufficient evidence to allow ‘this matter ... to go forward against this defendant based on the Consumer Product Safety Commission regulations.’ ” Id. at 516-17 , 657 A.2d at 334-35 . Agreeing with the plaintiff, the court held that “the brief, non-specific argument made by appellants in support of their motions [does not] suffice[ ] to present ‘with particularity’ the arguments presented on appeal.” Id. at 517 , 657 A.2d at 335 . In so holding, the court suggested that the degree of specificity required by Rule 2-519(a) may vary with the complexity and length of the trial.

Id. The court stated: “At least in a case of this magnitude, with all of the varied issues presented in a trial that extended over a 25-day period, far more specificity is required.” Id. In the instant matter the panel majority in the Court of Special Appeals did not cite any decisions in support of its holding, but its view of the operation of Rule 2-519(a) is reminiscent of Ford v. Tittsworth, 77 Md.App. 770 , 551 A.2d 945 (1989). In Ford , the defendant had made an oral motion for judgment at the close of the plaintiffs case.

Id. at 772 , 551 A.2d at 945 . At the close of the jury instructions the defendant “renewed” the motion, without success. Id. The Court of Special Appeals held that, assuming, arguendo, that the defendant’s first motion was sufficiently particularized, that motion was “withdrawn by the presentation of [the defendant’s] testimony,” and the subsequent “renewal” of that motion did not satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 2-519(a).

Id. at 774 , 551 A.2d at 946 . Following this Court’s decision in Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474 , 554 A.2d 1238 (1989), however, the Court of Special Appeals recognized the overruling of Ford in the following footnote: “As we had previously done in