New England Car Spring Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Rail Road

Bartou, J., delivered the opinion of this court. The question presented for decision by this appeal is, whether certain “coal cars” described in the statement of facts found in the record, are the subject of mechanics’ lien, under the provisions of the act of 1845, ch. 176, and involves the construction of that act, and of the act of 1838, ch. 205, to which it is a supplement. Although those acts have been the subject of several adjudications in this court, the question presented by the record has not before been directly decided. In the case of Wells & Miller vs. The Canton Company, 3 Md. Rep., 241 , and the case of Denmead vs. The Bank of Baltimore, 9 Md. Rep., 179 , which were cases of liens on machinery, under the act of 1845, the machinery, which was the subject of the lien, was of a fixed or stationary kind.

Admitting the coal cars in this case to be, in point of fact, machines, we are of opinion that they are not such machines as are contemplated by the act of 1845. The language of the 4th section of that act is: “That every machine hereafter to be erected, constructed, or repaired, within the city of Baltimore, shall be subject to a lien, in like manner as buildings are made subject, under the provisions of this and the original act to which this is a supplement.” It has been argued that the word machine, in this section, being used without qualification, is extensive enough to embrace. all kinds of machines, as well those which are movable as those which are fixed or stationary. Such a construction would be fraught with the most mischievous consequences. The word machine, if to be taken iu its most extended signification, means every thing which acts by a combination of the mechanical powers, however simple or complex it may be.

The ingenious argument of the appellant’s counsel, and the authorities he cites are sufficient to demonstrate that this word, if to be understood in its broad general sense, will not only comprehend locomotives, ⁹⁰ threshing machines, and such like, but that all the various machines used in agriculture and commerce, carriages and vehicles in ordinary use, even watches and clocks, and all the machines in domestic use, would be-alike embraced in the terms of the law. Can it be for a moment supposed that the legislature designed to subject all these to the operation of the lien laws? Such things, like the coal cars in question, are mere chattels which pass by delivery; a construction which would embrace them within the provisions of the lien laws, would interrupt the daily transactions of trade in such articles, and render the rights of property in them insecure. In looking at the provisions of the lien laws, and applying to them the safe and well-established rules of construction which are to govern us, in arriving at the intention of the legislature, we are the more convinced of the propriety of limiting and restraining the meaning of the word machine, used in the law to fixed or stationary machinery.

We adopt the language employed by Judge Buchanan, in delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals, in the case of the Canal Co. vs. The Rail Road Co., 4 G. & J., 152: “Statutes should be construed with a view to the original intent and meaning of the makers, and such construction should be put upon them as best to answer that intention, which may be collected from the cause or necessity of making the act, or from foreign circumstances; and when discovered, ought to be followed, although such construction may seem to be contrary to the lptter of the statute. That, therefore,